Galgoczy v. Ithaca City School District et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________________________________________
Jane Doe,
Plaintiff,
v. 	3:25-cv-806 (ECC/MJK)
Ithaca City School District, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________________________________________
Leah Costanzo, Esq., for Plaintiff
April J. Laws, Esq., for Defendants
Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
Plaintiff moves for permission to proceed under a pseudonym
in this action. (Dkt. 13). Defendants oppose the motion. (Dkt. 20).
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed under a
pseudonym is denied.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff alleges that this case arises from the unlawful conduct of
the Ithaca City School District and the four individual defendants, sued
in their personal capacities, “who engaged in sexual harassment, gender
discrimination, and age discrimination against Plaintiff, Jane Doe, a
former ICSD student, while she was getting state-mandated
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observational hours at ICSD as an adult.” (Compl., Dkt. 2 at ¶1).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants accused her of engaging in a sexual
relationship with the teacher she was observing. (Compl., at ¶4).
Plaintiff alleges that school district officials widely disseminated false
accusations against Plaintiff. (Compl., at ¶5). The Complaint makes
specific allegations in 131 paragraphs before asserting claims for
defamation, invasion of privacy, violation of due process rights, sex
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title IX, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, gender and age
discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of New York’s
Human Rights Law. (See Compl. generally).
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Legal Standard
“When evaluating a request by a party to proceed anonymously or
by pseudonym courts consider numerous factors, including whether
identification would put the affected party at risk of suffering physical
or mental injury.” John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. John Does Nos. 1-27, No.
11-CV-7627, 2012 WL 364048, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2012) (quoting
Guerrilla Girls, Inc. v. Kaz, 224 F.R.D. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
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The Second Circuit has provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to
consider in balancing a plaintiff’s interest in anonymity against the
public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to defendants. See Sealed
Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189-190 (2d Cir. 2008).
Those factors are as follow:
(1) whether the litigation involves matters that are highly
sensitive and [of a] personal nature; (2) whether identification
poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the . . .
party [seeking to proceed anonymously] or even more critically,
to innocent non-parties; (3) whether identification presents
other harms and the likely severity of those harms, including
whether the injury litigated against would be incurred as a
result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity; (4) whether
the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of
disclosure, particularly in light of his age; (5) whether the suit
is challenging the actions of the government or that of private
parties; (6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the
plaintiff to press his claims anonymously, whether the nature
of that prejudice (if any) differs at any particular stage of the
litigation, and whether any prejudice can be mitigated by the
district court; (7) whether the plaintiff’s identity has thus far
been kept confidential; (8) whether the public’s interest in the
litigation is furthered by requiring the plaintiff to disclose his
identity; (9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the
issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak
public interest in knowing the litigants’ identities; and (10)
whether there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting
the confidentiality of the plaintiff.
Id. at 190 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Application of these factors to the particular facts of a case “is left
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to the sound discretion of the district court.” N. Jersey Media Group,
Inc. v. Doe, 2012 WL 5899331, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012) (citing
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d at 190). “However, the
bar to proceed in Court anonymously is high.” Doe v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., No. 23-CV-931, 2023 WL 7000939, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2023).
“[P]seudonyms are the exception and not the rule,” and a party
seeking to “receive the protections of anonymity ... must make a case
rebutting that presumption.” United States v. Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39,
45 (2d Cir. 2020)).
Here, the parties agree concerning the non-exhaustive list of
factors to be considered by the Court, with the exception of Factor
10.
a. Factor 1: Highly Sensitive and Personal Nature
Plaintiff does not allege any form of sexual assault or abuse.
(See generally Compl., Dkt. 2). Instead, Plaintiff alleges sexual
misconduct, defamation, and an invasion of sexual privacy. Id.
While Plaintiff argues that the allegations of sexual abuse and
harassment are examples of highly personal claims favoring
anonymity (Dkt. 13, at 1-2), Defendant argues that the claims here
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do not meet the threshold level of sensitivity required to overcome
the presumption of open judicial proceedings (Dkt. 20, at 2) (citing
See, Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)) (“[T]he
actions [sexual misconduct] alleged here are no more intimate than
those alleged in hundreds of sexual harassment cases that are
prosecuted openly in the victims’ names every day in our courts.”)
According to Plaintiff, Defendants contend that Plaintiff was
the victim of child sexual abuse. (Dkt. 13, at 2). Plaintiff does not
allege the same. (Id.) Plaintiff was an adult at the time that she
investigated the third-party complaint against the teacher.
Moreover, “courts have also indicated that allegations of sexual
assault, by themselves, are not sufficient to entitle a plaintiff to proceed
under a pseudonym.” Doe v. Skyline Automobiles Inc., 375 F. Supp.
3d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); see also Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359,
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying motion to proceed pseudonymously
despite concluding that “[i]f the allegations of the complaint are
true, plaintiff was the victim of a brutal sexual assault” and “has
very legitimate privacy concerns.”)
This factor does not weigh in favor of allowing Plaintiff to
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proceed anonymously.
b. Factor 2: Risk of Retaliatory Physical or Mental
Harm
Plaintiff alleges that she has already suffered several
psychological distresses requiring emergency medical intervention
(Compl., at ¶49) and that she continues to experience anxiety,
depression, and trauma (Compl., at ¶128). Plaintiff asserts that
public identification would greatly exacerbate this harm, subjecting
her to victim-blaming, stigmatization, and reputational injury.
Courts have recognized that victims of sexual misconduct face
unique risks of severe psychological harm from forced disclosure.
(Dkt. 13, at 2) (citing Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 197
(E.D.N.Y. 2006)). Nevertheless, “[w]ith regard to allegations of
mental harm, plaintiffs must base their allegations ... on more than
just mere speculation.” Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d 521, 528
(S.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, the
potential for victim-blaming, stigmatization, harassment and gossip
into her private life in the future are also insufficient. See Lawson v.
Rubin, No. 17-CV-6404, 2019 WL 5291205, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), at *8
(finding an argument that Plaintiff will become subject of future
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criticism, social stigma, and ridicule to be “unpersuasive.”); see also
Doe v. Cornell Univ., No. 19-CV-1189 (MAD/ML), 2021 WL 6128738
at *5 (N.D.N.Y. 2021), aff’d 2021 WL 6128807 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)
(“[C]ourts have found that evidence of embarrassment, social
stigmatization, and economic harm provides an insufficient basis
for proceeding anonymously.”).
Plaintiff has invited public scrutiny by filing an action in this
Court. The public allegations against the individual Defendants
likewise invite a measure of public scrutiny, and the allegations
against them may well subject them to future criticism, stigma and
embarrassment. This factor does not weigh in favor of allowing
Plaintiff to proceed anonymously.
c. Factor 3: Other Harms and Their Severity
Plaintiff asserts that public disclosure would cause her
permanent reputational and professional damage. (Dkt. 13, at 2). In
addition, she claims that details about her personal life - whether
consensual or the result of grooming - would be permanently linked
to her name online, following her throughout her career in the
small, male-dominated field of music education. (Id.). Plaintiff
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alleges that she has already faced questioning from students and
parents about these events, and disclosure would invite further
harassment and gossip. (Compl., at ¶89). Plaintiff concludes that
forcing her to litigate these violations publicly would compound the
very privacy harms this action seeks to redress. (Dkt. 13, at 2).
Protecting potential reputational and professional harm is an
insufficient basis on which to proceed under a pseudonym. See
Perelman v. Visa USA, Inc., No. 24-CV-9793, 2025 WL 2962006 at *1
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“Indeed, courts have recognized that the mere
potential for reputational harm does not justify granting a plaintiff
anonymity.”); see also Doe v. Gerken, No. 21-CV-01525, 2022 WL
167914, at *3 (D. Conn. 2022) (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Guerilla Girls, Inc. v. Kaz, 224 F.R.D. 571,573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)) (“In
sum, ‘courts should not permit parties to proceed pseudonymously just
to protect the parties’ professional or economic life.’”).
As discussed above, the harm that Plaintiff is seeking to protect
against is not dissimilar to the potential harm that may be suffered by
the individual Defendants if her allegations of misconduct are not
proven. In addition, as Plaintiff alleges, there have already been
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questions and discussions in her community concerning the events
which form the basis for this lawsuit. (Dkt. 13, at 2). People already
know. (Id.). To be clear, a public records search of the individual
Defendants will reveal Plaintiff’s very serious allegations them. While
at present the Complaint is simply Plaintiff’s allegations, those
allegations are now associated with the names of the Defendants. This
factor does not weigh in favor of allowing Plaintiff to proceed
anonymously.
d. Factor 4: Plaintiff's Particular Vulnerability
Plaintiff alleges that she is a young woman early in her
professional life, suffering ongoing trauma because of Defendants’
conduct and accusations to her college professors that she engaged in
sexual misconduct. (Dkt. 13, at 2). Plaintiff alleges that she required
emergency medical care and suffered panic attacks and academic
withdrawal due to the stress. (Compl., at ¶¶49, 124-125). She also
alleges that if Defendants are correct that she was groomed as a minor
(which is not an allegation in the Complaint), Plaintiff takes the
position that she is a victim of abuse who deserves protection and
privacy, not public exposure. (Dkt. 13, at 2).
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“The plaintiff’s age is a critical factor” in the determination of
the fourth factor, ‘as courts have been readier to protect the privacy
interest of minors in legal proceedings than of adults.’” Rapp v. Fowler,
537 F. Supp. 3d 521,528 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citation omitted). “If a
plaintiff is not a child, this factor weighs against a finding for
anonymity.” Id. at 530; see also, Lape v. Waters, No. 25-CV-180
(MAD/DJS), 2025 WL 671806, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Doe v.
Skyline Auto. Inc., 375 F. Supp.3d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2019))
(“Because Plaintiffs are adults and ‘provide no evidence that [their]
age makes [them] particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of
disclosure,’ the fourth factor weighs against allowing Plaintiffs to
proceed anonymously in this matter.”) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff is a college student and legally considered an
adult. See Doe v. City Univ. of New York, No. 21-CV-9544, 2021 WL
5644642, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (“. . . where plaintiff brings claims as an
adult, courts find this factor cuts against them, regardless of whether
the plaintiff is relatively young”) (emphasis added). As such,
Plaintiff’s adult status precludes satisfaction of the vulnerability
requirement to justify pseudonymous litigation. This factor does not
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weigh in support of the relief sought by Plaintiff.
e. Factor 5: Public v. Private Defendants
Plaintiff’s claims challenge actions of a public school district
and its officials. It is accurate to state that when a plaintiff attacks
governmental activity, the plaintiff’s interest in proceeding
anonymously is considered strong. See EW v. New York Blood Ctr., 213
F.R.D., 108,111 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
In this case however, there are individual defendants who are
sued in their individual capacities. On balance, this factor weighs
against Plaintiff’s motion.
f. 	Factor 6: Prejudice to Defendants
Plaintiff argues that Defendants will suffer no prejudice if
pseudonymity is granted because they know her identity, can
conduct full discovery, and can defend the case without limitation.
(Dkt. 13, at 2). “Generally, a defendant is ‘not greatly prejudiced in his
ability to conduct discovery’ if the defendant ‘knows Plaintiff’s name.’” Doe
v. DNA Diagnostics, No. 25-CV-2878, 2025 WL 1725449, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
2025) (quoting Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
Plaintiff contends that the public disclosure of Plaintiff’s name serves
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no legitimate defense interest and argues that Defendants’ refusal
to consent, which is alleged to be conditioned on dropping
individual-capacity claims (an assertion that Defendants do not
contradict), is tactical and unrelated to pseudonymity, thus
establishing that no genuine prejudice exists. (Dkt. 13, at 2).
Defendants argue that by suing the individual Defendants in
their individual capacities, Plaintiff has essentially conceded that
this factor weighs against pseudonymity. Defendants contend that
it is unfair to allow plaintiff to proceed anonymously, while
requiring defendants to defend themselves publicly. (Dkt. 20, at 5).
“[C]ourts recognize that ‘there is an imbalance [that] arise[s] where
[a] [d]efendant must defend himself publicly while plaintiff could
make [his] accusations from behind a cloak of anonymity.’” Perelman,
2025 WL 2962006, at *2 (quoting Doe v. Combs, No. 25-CV-1652),
2025 WL 1993598 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)). “ Anonymity creates
inherent asymmetry between the parties and would make it
difficult to obtain witnesses and witness testimony if Defendant is
not able to discuss Plaintiff’s identity with witnesses.” Id.
Where credibility is a factor – as will be the case in this action
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especially where Plaintiff is also seeking damages for defamation –
allowing a plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously presents an inherent
risk of prejudice. See DNA Diagnostics, 2025 WL 1725449 at *6; see
also Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (by bringing
the action Plaintiff “has put [his] credibility in issue”). This factor
weighs against allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously.
g. Factor 7: Confidentiality Maintained Thus Far
Plaintiff contends that her identity has been protected from
the outset, and filings have consistently used “Jane Doe” and that
this fact favors pseudonymity. (Dkt. 13, at 2). Defendant argues
that this focus is too narrow and belies other important
considerations, noting that while Plaintiff asserts that her identity
has remained confidential, she has also conceded that the District
Defendants have already been made aware of Plaintiff’s identity. (Dkt.
20, at 6) (citing Sebastian v. Doe, No. 25-CV-0911, 2025 WL 856242 at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (holding that Plaintiff’s concession that District
Defendants were already aware of Plaintiffs identity “undercuts any
suggestion that proceeding under a pseudonym is required to protect
plaintiff from retaliatory harm for bringing this suit.”)); see also Doe v.
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Mclellan, No. 20-CV-5997, 2020 WL 7321377 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)
(“Thus, because the disclosure of plaintiff’s identity to Defendant, as
well as the lack of evidence corroborating the alleged risk of harm and
retaliation from the general public, the seventh factor weights against
allowing plaintiff to proceed anonymously.”) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the school community in Ithaca is apparently aware of
what transpired as Plaintiff alleges that she received questions from
non-school district individuals.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s allegations of defamation, if
credited, means that the alleged defamatory statements have already
been published to third parties. (Dkt. 20, at 6). Accordingly, the
substance of her claims, along with the information underlying them,
has, necessarily and to some extent, already been made public. See Doe v.
Solera Cap, LLC., No. 18-CV-1769, 2019 WL 1437520, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (“Prior disclosure to the public of a plaintiff’s identity effectively
nullifies the shield of privacy provided by proceeding anonymously.”)
(citations omitted); see also Sebastian, 2025 WL 856242, at *2 (“But
Plaintiffs ‘real identity’ is already public, as Plaintiff himself admits.”).
This factor weighs against Plaintiff’s request to proceed under a
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pseudonym in this litigation.
h. Factors 8 & 9: Public Interest in Disclosure
Plaintiff argues that the public has little legitimate interest in
knowing Plaintiff’s identity. (Dkt. 13, at 3). According to Plaintiff, the
central issues - governmental privacy violations, due process, and Title
IX protections - can all be adjudicated without revealing who Plaintiff
is, concluding that the public’s ability to understand the case, monitor
the court proceedings, and evaluate rulings will be fully preserved
through pseudonymous proceedings. (Id.).
Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s view is too narrow. (Dkt 20,
at 6) (citing Doe v. Combs, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136838, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (holding that Plaintiff’s contention that the public has
less interest in her identity as a purported victim of sexual abuse in
comparison to District Defendants is too narrow of a view of public
interest as “the public also has a legitimate interest in knowing the
underlying facts of a litigation, including the identities of litigants.”).
This factor weighs against allowing Plaintiff to proceed under a
pseudonym in this litigation.
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i. 	Factor 10: Other available protective mechanisms
The tenth factor inquires “whether there are any alternative
mechanisms for protecting the confidentiality of the plaintiff.” Sealed
Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d Cir.
2008). As Defendant argues, Plaintiff can secure alternative
mechanisms for protecting confidential and sensitive information.
(Dkt. 20, at 7). The Court agrees. While Plaintiff’s name would be
disclosed, sensitive, embarrassing or other confidential information
can be protected against disclosure. Courts have consistently held
that a plaintiff “can seek less drastic remedies than blanket
anonymity, such as redactions to protect particularly sensitive
information, or a protective order.” Combs, 2025 WL 1993598, a t *6;
see also Mclellan, 2020 WL 7321377, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Due to
the existence of alternate means of protecting Plaintiff from the
alleged future harms, the final factor weighs against allowing
plaintiff to proceed anonymously.”). This factor weighs against the
relief sought by Plaintiff.
For the reasons set forth above, balancing the Plaintiff’s
interest in anonymity against both the public interest in disclosure
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and any prejudice, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to
prove that exceptional circumstances exist which would support
allowing her to proceed anonymously.
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. 13) is DENIED, and
it is hereby further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff is directed to file an amended
complaint in her actual name no later than November 28, 2025 and
the Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to substitute the actual
name of the Plaintiff on the docket of this action. The case shall
proceed with the caption so amended.
Dated: November 12, 2025.
______________________
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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