Chaney v. Raybens Enterprises et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NAKIA CHANEY,
Plaintiff,
1:25-cv-1300
v. 	(GTS/DJS)
RAYBENS ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
NAKIA CHANEY
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Troy, New York 12180
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review an Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff.
Dkt. No. 5, Am. Compl. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 7. That Motion has been granted.
The matter has been referred to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R.
72.3. The Court recommends that the Amended Complaint be dismissed.
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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Amended Complaint alleges that, on September 5, 2018, Plaintiff Nakia
Chaney (“Plaintiff”) injured “his back and sarcastic [sic] joint” during the course of his
employment, Am. Compl. ¶ 20, presumably at Defendant Raybens Enterprises, also
known as Green Facilities Solutions (“Defendant Employer”). 	Id. at p. 53 (stating that
Plaintiff was hired to work at Defendant Employer and that Plaintiff’s project manager
was Defendant Jose Marrucci). The Amended Complaint further alleges that, following
Plaintiff’s injury, Defendant Jose Marrucci (“Defendant Marrucci”), a manager at
Defendant 	Employer, 	“promised 	to 	complete 	worker 	compensation 	to 	restore
[P]laintiff[’s] lost wages,” but that, as of the date that Plaintiff filed the Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff had not received reimbursement. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22.
According to Plaintiff, on April 10, 2019, after seven months of “complaining
about the faulty work equipment, sexual harassment against [D]efendant Alberto
[Puertas], vacuum setting [P]laintiff on fire, and trying to get copies of the worker
compensation claim,” Plaintiff “attempted to submit a request for time off form” to
Defendant Marrucci to “try[] to recover vacation days owed to [P]laintiff.” Id. at ¶¶ 18-
19 & 23. The Amended Complaint alleges that, during this exchange, Plaintiff informed
Defendant Marrucci that he planned to contact the Department of Labor and Division of
Human Rights regarding his complaints. Id. at ¶ 26.
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The Amended Complaint further alleges that, at the end of the workday, a
supervisor handed Plaintiff a two-day suspension form, which stated that Defendant
Raytice Spencer (“Defendant Spencer”) witnessed Plaintiff using his cellphone while
working. 	Id. at ¶ 28. 	The Amended Complaint also alleges that, after leaving work,
Plaintiff called Defendant Marrucci and stated that he would add unlawful suspension to
his other complaints when he contacted the Department of Labor, Division of Human
Rights, Attorney General’s Office, and other agencies. 	Id. at ¶ 33. 	The Amended
Complaint alleges that Defendant Marrucci thereafter retaliated against Plaintiff’s
“exercise [of] his protected rights” by unlawfully terminating Plaintiff’s employment. Id.
at ¶¶ 34-35 & 92.
The Amended Complaint brings claims alleging that Plaintiff “was denied federal
due process as his employment was terminated without [P]laintiff having an opportunity
to challenge the alleged allegations of phone use,” that Defendant Marrucci and
Defendant Spencer “conspired . . . to manufacture and fabricate a misbehavior report for
alleged phone use in [an] attempt to silence [P]laintiff for making reports,” and that
Defendant Marrucci breached Plaintiff’s contract of employment and the “covenant of
good faith and fair dealings.” Id. at ¶¶ 45-46 & 74-75.
Separately, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Marrucci violated his religious rights
and discriminated against him in violation of the First Amendment by “confiscat[ing]”
Plaintiff’s kufi and denying Plaintiff “accommodation to attend Ramadan, jummah
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Friday, or wear kufi, while other employees celebrated Halloween, Christmas and other
holidays at the work site.” Id. at ¶¶ 90-91.
Attached 	to 	the 	Amended 	Complaint 	are 	various 	exhibits, 	including 	an
Administrative Decision filed by the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board on
May 17, 2019, which found that Plaintiff “d[id] not have sufficient medical evidence of
a permanent disability.” 	Id. at p. 26. 	Also attached to the Amended Complaint is a
Decision filed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board on October 17, 2019,
which overruled a prior determination that had disqualified Plaintiff from receiving
benefits on the basis that he “lost employment through misconduct,” and reopened
Plaintiff’s case. Id. at pp. 42 & 47. Various filings related to an action commenced by
Plaintiff against Defendant Employer before the New York State Division of Human
Rights were also attached to the Amended Complaint. See, e.g., id. at p. 38.
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1
1 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (internal citations omitted). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if
the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
To the extent that the Amended Complaint asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, see Am. Compl. at pp. 1-2, it should be dismissed as untimely. 	The statute of
limitations for a section 1983 action in New York is three years. Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d
547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995). 	“[A] cause of action under section 1983 accrues ‘when the
plaintiff knows of or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’”
Walker v. Cuomo, 2012 WL 4490760, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (quoting Pearl v.
City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002)).2 Here, Plaintiff had reason to know
of any claimed violation of his rights at the time of his termination on April 10, 2019.3
The Amended Complaint, filed more than six years later, is clearly untimely.
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a valid
claim 	under 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983, 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	allege 	that 	the 	challenged
conduct . . . was attributable to a person acting under color of state law.” 	Whalen v.
County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997). Here, the Amended Complaint failed
to put forth any evidence that Defendant Employer, which appears to be a private entity,
2 Copies of unreported cases from Westlaw are attached to this opinion for Plaintiff’s reference.
3 In any event, Plaintiff has not shown a proper basis for alleging a federal constitutional due process right to
challenge a private company’s employment decisions.
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is either a state actor or otherwise acted under color of state law when it decided to fire
Plaintiff. See generally Am. Compl.; see, e.g., Yang v. Eastman Sch. of Music, 2022 WL
1040418, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 7, 2022); Faddis-DeCerbo v. Astor Servs. for Child. &
Fams., 500 F. App’x 46, 47 (2d Cir. 2012). Likewise, the Amended Complaint also failed
to put forth any evidence that Defendant Spencer, Defendant Marrucci, Defendant Donna
Mackey, and Defendant Alberto Puertas, all of whom are presumably employees of
Defendant Employer, are state actors or acted under color of state law. See generally Am.
Compl. 	There are simply no allegations made of any “nexus between the named
Defendant[s] and the State.” Smiley v. Golub Corp., 2015 WL 566323, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 10, 2015). Consequently, “Plaintiff cannot proceed on a theory of liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.” Id.
To the extent that the Amended Complaint’s allegations of religious discrimination
can be construed as a claim pursuant to Title VII, that claim would also be barred. The
Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Marrucci violated Plaintiff’s religious rights
and discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment. Am. Compl. ¶¶
90-91. 	However, individuals—like Defendant Marrucci—are not subject to liability
under Title VII. Yerdon v. Poitras, 120 F.4th 1150, 1156 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing Tomka v.
Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We now hold that individual defendants
with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title
VII.”)).
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Even if the Court construed Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting a violation of Title
VII by Defendant Employer, that claim would be barred as well. “Before an aggrieved
party can assert a Title VII claim in federal court, [they are] generally required to exhaust
the administrative remedies provided by the statute.” 	Nelson v. CMC Packaging Sols.,
2025 WL 2933274, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 2682264 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2025) (quoting Duplan v. City of New
York, 888 F.3d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 2018)). “That is, a Title VII plaintiff generally must file
a charge of discrimination” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred,” and “must then file an action in federal court within 90 days of receiving a
right-to-sue letter from the agency.” Id. (quoting Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d
at 621).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he ever filed a complaint with the EEOC, let
alone that any such complaint was timely filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful
employment practice, and Plaintiff has not alleged that the present action was filed within
90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter. See generally Am. Compl. Plaintiff also “has
not pleaded any facts to support the application of equitable tolling,” Nelson v. CMC
Packaging Sols., 2025 WL 2933274, at *2, which is “not to be applied liberally,” and “the
Court cannot fathom any applicable tolling provision that would enable Plaintiff to bring
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an action for discrimination” more than six years “after the discrimination allegedly took
place.” Smiley v. Golub Corp., 2015 WL 566323, at *4.
Though the Amended Complaint is far from a model of clarity, it appears that the
remaining claims Plaintiff seeks to pursue are state law claims related to the termination
of his employment. However, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Home
Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435, 437 (2019) (quotations omitted).
Jurisdiction in federal court generally exists only when diversity of citizenship is present.
28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	“To have complete diversity, ‘each plaintiff’s citizenship must be
different from the citizenship of each defendant.’” Johnson v. Glob. Promotion & Pub.
Corp., 2013 WL 828744, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (quoting Hallingby v. Hallingby,
574 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2009)). Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff and
the Defendants are all residents of New York. Am. Compl. at p. 1. As a result, there is
clearly a lack of complete diversity, and no diversity jurisdiction exists in this case. See
Butler v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 2019 WL 330591, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2019), report
and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 652197 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2019).
Finally, while a district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims if certain conditions are met, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the court may decline to do so
where it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in
its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the
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exercise of jurisdiction.” 	Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Here, having recommended dismissal of the federal claims over which the Court has
original jurisdiction, the Court also recommends that the District Court decline to exercise
its supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be DISMISSED with
prejudice as to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be DISMISSED with
prejudice as to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Title VII against Defendant Jose Marrucci;
and it is further
RECOMMENDED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	be 	DISMISSED
without prejudice to refiling in accordance with the governing limitations period as to
Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Title VII against Defendants Raybens Enterprises and Green
Facilities Solutions; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	be 	DISMISSED
without prejudice to refiling in state court in accordance with the governing limitations
period as to Plaintiff’s state law claims; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)4 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. C IV. P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: January 9, 2026
Albany, New York
4 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV . P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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