Stevanovic v. Meratas Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BOJAN STEVANOVIC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MERATAS INC., DARIUS GOLDMAN,
Defendants.
1:25-cv-00760 (AMN/CBF)
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
EL-HAG & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 	JORDAN EL-HAG, ESQ.
777 Westchester Ave – Ste 101
White Plains, NY 10604
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 2025, plaintiff Bojan Stevanovic (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against
Meratas Inc. and Darius Goldman (together, “Defendants”), bringing various claims pursuant to
New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) and New York common law. 	See Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”).
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment under Rule 55(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 18 (the “Motion”).
For the following reasons, the Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part.
II. 	BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Plaintiff is an individual residing in British Columbia, Canada. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 5. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Meratas Inc. is a corporation organized under New York law with its
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principal place of business in Albany, New York. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Darius
Goldman is the CEO of Meratas and resides in Connecticut. Id. at ¶ 8.
B. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
Defendants hired Plaintiff on or around May 16, 2022 as a Sales Development
Representative. Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff submits an agreement (“Agreement”) signed by Plaintiff and
a representative of Defendant Meratas, consisting of an offer letter (“Offer Letter”), independent
contractor agreement, a nondisclosure agreement (“NDA”), and a non-compete agreement. Dkt.
No. 1-2. Although Plaintiff agreed to and signed the independent contractor agreement, see id. at
6-12, 1 Plaintiff alleges that he was in fact hired as “a non-exempt, W-2 employee,” classified as
full-time, and compensated through regular payroll. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 22. Plaintiff further alleges
that Defendants did not allow him to set his own hours, expected him to keep to a 40-hour
workweek, and otherwise “exerted full control over [his] job duties, schedule, work conditions,
and pay.” Id. at ¶¶ 27, 37. As to his pay, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants compensated Plaintiff
with an annual base salary of $71,010.00.” 	Id. at ¶ 31. 	Plaintiff’s pay structure also included
performance-based commissions. 	Id. at ¶ 32. 	However, Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants
failed to provide him with a written wage notice and written wage statements in compliance with
the requirements of NYLL Section 195. See id. at ¶¶ 30, 77-78. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
later promoted him to Account Executive. Dkt No. 18-3 at ¶ 3.
On January 12, 2024, Defendant Goldman terminated Plaintiff’s employment with
Defendant Meratas. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 64. About one month prior to his dismissal, Plaintiff alleges
that his access to the company-maintained Google document tracking commissions was revoked,
1 Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic
filing system.
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and that in response to his request for reinstatement, Defendant Goldman told Plaintiff that the
company was restructuring his compensation plan. See id. at ¶¶ 43-47. Plaintiff alleges that on
December 4, 2023, despite an expected commission payment exceeding $8,000.00, Plaintiff
instead received a commission payment of $1,837.50. 	Id. at ¶ 48. 	Plaintiff subsequently
complained about the reduced commission and asked for an explanation, which Plaintiff alleges
was never provided. Id. at ¶¶ 49-51. Over the next month, Plaintiff alleges that he continued to
have conversations about his compensation structure with his superiors, including Defendant
Goldman, see id. at ¶¶ 52-61. 	Plaintiff further alleges that on December 29, 2023, Plaintiff
“received his salary payment, but did not receive any commission” despite having earned
approximately $9,000.00 in commissions that month according to his own records. Id. at ¶ 62.
On April 4, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a demand for arbitration with the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) pursuant to the Agreement, bringing claims under NYLL
Sections 191-c, 193, 195, 215, and under common law. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12; see Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2-4;
Dkt. No. 1-2 at 11 (arbitration clause). Plaintiff alleges that after serving the demand for arbitration
on Defendants, Defendants “failed to take any substantive step to advance the arbitration, including
but not limited to, failing to pay the required filing or arbitrator fees, failing to respond to AAA
notices, and failing to otherwise engage in the selection of an arbitrator or participate in a
preliminary hearing.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 12-13. Following Defendants’ failure to arbitrate, Plaintiff
filed this action. Id. at ¶¶15-16.
C. Plaintiff’s Submissions
In support of the Motion, Plaintiff submits a factual affidavit detailing, among other things,
his job responsibilities, see Dkt. No. 18-3 at ¶¶ 3, 6-11, his promised salary and commissions, see
id. at ¶¶ 4-5, 14, 27, 31, and Defendants’ alleged actions in violation of the NYLL, see id. at ¶¶
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32-38. Plaintiff also submits copies of the Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Meratas,
Dkt. No. 1-2, a self-calculated accounting of Plaintiff’s damages, Dkt. No. 18-5, and papers in
support of attorneys’ fees and costs, Dkt. Nos. 18-1, 18-6.
D. Plaintiff’s Legal Claims
Plaintiff asserts five causes of action: (i) failure to pay commissions in violation of NYLL
Section 191-c; (ii) failure to provide wage notices in violation of NYLL Section 195 et seq.; (iii)
retaliation for engaging in protected activity under NYLL Section 215; (iv) unlawful deduction of
wages in violation of NYLL Section 193; and (v) breach of the Agreement pursuant to state
common law. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 71-101.
Plaintiff also seeks the following damages: $15,162.50 in unpaid commissions; $71,010.00
in lost wages; liquidated damages under NYLL Sections 191 and 198; statutory penalties under
NYLL Section 198; compensatory, emotional distress, and liquidated damages under NYLL
Section 215; pre- and post-judgment interest; and $14,787.05 in attorney’s fees and costs. Dkt.
No. 18-2 at 8. Plaintiff contends that the total estimated damages are $227,593.62. Id.; see also
Dkt. No. 18-5 (Plaintiff’s damages calculation).
E. Procedural History
Defendant Meratas was served on June 24, 2025, Dkt. No. 4, and Defendant Goldman was
served on July 10, 2025, Dkt. No. 5. To date, Defendants have neither appeared nor responded to
the Complaint. See generally Docket.2
2 The Court finds that Defendants’ failure to appear in this action effectively constitutes a waiver
of Defendants’ right to compel arbitration under the Agreement. See, e.g., NextGear Cap., Inc. v.
Tristate Auto Serv. Ctr., Inc., No. 23-CV-9458, 2025 WL 897565, at *7 n. 5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27,
2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 23-CV-09458, 2025 WL 895849 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
24, 2025) (finding waiver of contract’s arbitration provision on motion for default judgment
because defendant failed to appear). The Court also notes that a provision compelling arbitration
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On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff requested an entry of default against Defendants pursuant to
Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 6. The Clerk granted the request as
to both Defendants on July 25, 2025, Dkt. Nos. 7, 8, but United States Magistrate Judge Thérèse
Wiley Dancks vacated both entries on July 29, 2025 and ordered a corrected entry of default only
against Defendant Meratas because Defendant Goldman was due to answer on July 31, 2025, Dkt.
No. 10. The Clerk filed an entry of default as to Defendant Meratas later the same day. Dkt. No.
11. On August 15, 2025, Plaintiff renewed his request for an entry of default as against Defendant
Goldman, Dkt. No. 12, and the Clerk granted Plaintiff’s request later the same day, Dkt. No. 13.
On September 30, 2025, Magistrate Judge Dancks granted Plaintiff’s request, filed on
September 29, for an extension of time to file a motion for default. Dkt No. 17. Plaintiff then filed
the Motion on October 6, 2025, requesting the entry of a default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 18.
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “provides a ‘two-step process’ for the entry
of judgment against a party who fails to defend: first, the entry of a default, and second, the entry
of a default judgment.” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir.
2011) (citing New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005)). The first step is governed by
Rule 55(a), which provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise,
the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)); see also N.D.N.Y.
L.R. 55.1 (setting forth affidavit requirements). 	Entry of a default “formalizes a judicial
does not implicate the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing Am. E Grp. LLC v. Livewire
Ergogenics Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 390, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting cases)).
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recognition that a defendant has, through its failure to defend the action, admitted liability to the
plaintiff.” Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 128. The second step “requires the plaintiff to seek a judgment
by default under Rule 55(b).” Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 2011).
Entry of a default judgment “converts the defendant’s admission of liability into a final judgment
that terminates the litigation and awards the plaintiff any relief to which the court decides it is
entitled[.]” 	Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 128. 	A default judgment “ordinarily must be entered by the
district judge, rather than by the clerk of court, except in certain circumstances[.]” Id.; see also
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 55.2 (setting forth requirements for requesting a default judgment).
“Before entering a default judgment, the court ‘must ensure that (1) jurisdictional
requirements are satisfied, (2) the plaintiff took all the required procedural steps in moving for [a]
default judgment, and (3) the plaintiff’s allegations, when accepted as true, establish liability as a
matter of law.’” 	Windward Bora, LLC v. Brown, No. 21-cv-03147, 2022 WL 875100, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Jian Hua Li v. Chang Lung Grp. Inc.,
No. 16-cv-6722, 2020 WL 1694356, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2020)). Additionally, “[t]here must
be an evidentiary basis for the damages sought by plaintiff, and a district court may determine
there is sufficient evidence either based upon evidence presented at a hearing or upon a review of
detailed affidavits and documentary evidence.” 	Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council
Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund, Educ. & Training Fund & Other Funds v. Metro
Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). When evaluating
a request for a default judgment, a “district court is empowered under Rule 55(b)(2), in the exercise
of its discretion, to ‘conduct hearings or make referrals’ as may be necessary, inter alia, to
determine the amount of damages or establish the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Mickalis,
645 F.3d at 129 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B)-(C)).
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While a court may enter a default judgment if the requisite standard is satisfied, the Second
Circuit has cautioned that default judgments “are generally disfavored and are reserved for rare
occasions[.]” Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). “Because we have ‘a
strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits,’ and because ‘a default judgment is the most
severe sanction which the court may apply,’ . . . we have characterized a district court’s discretion
in proceeding under Rule 55 as ‘circumscribed.’” Mickalis, 645 F.3d at 129 (first quoting Green,
420 F.3d at 104; then quoting Enron, 10 F.3d at 95; and then citing State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2004)).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdictional Requirements
The Court first considers its jurisdiction over this matter. While a “plaintiff has the burden
to establish jurisdiction, a federal court has an independent obligation to determine whether
subject-matter jurisdiction exists ‘even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Wilmington
Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB as tr. of Aspen Holdings Tr. v. Fernandez, 712 F. Supp. 3d 324, 330
(E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Chapman v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 558 F. Supp. 3d 45, 48 (E.D.N.Y.
2021)). 	Diversity jurisdiction exists with respect to each of Plaintiff’s claims. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(2). 	As to personal jurisdiction, the Court has general jurisdiction over Defendant
Meratas, which is alleged to be incorporated in the state of New York. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 6. Defendant
Goldman, however, is alleged to be a resident of the state of Connecticut. Id. at ¶ 8. While Plaintiff
does not provide the authority under which the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
Defendant Goldman, the Court finds that it has the requisite authority pursuant to Section 302(a)(1)
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.
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Personal jurisdiction over an employer does not automatically create personal jurisdiction
over that employer’s individual corporate officer. Gabal v. Scoutsee Inc., No. 18-cv-2236, 2019
WL 6220546, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-
2236, 2019 WL 6211386 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2019). 	However, under Section 302(a)(1), an
individual corporate officer is subject to a court’s personal jurisdiction when the individual officer
participated in the in-state corporate activities that gave rise to the action. 	Holguin v. Quality
Furniture NY LLC, No. 23 CIV. 0004, 2024 WL 4954048, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2024), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 23 CIV. 04, 2025 WL 50016 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2025) (citing
Ramiro Aviles v. S & P Glob., Inc., 380 F. Supp. 3d 221, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)). 	A court may
exercise specific jurisdiction over an individual corporate officer “where the corporation’s
activities were performed for the benefit of the individual defendant, the activities were performed
with the individual defendant’s knowledge and consent, and the individual defendant ‘exercised
some control over the corporation.’” Gabal, 2019 WL 6220546, at *2 (citing Beatie and Osborn
LLP v. Patriot Scientific Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 367, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Meratas and Goldman “(1) hired the Plaintiff, (2)
terminated the employment of the Plaintiff, (3) set the wage rate of Plaintiff, (4) maintained payroll
records concerning the Plaintiff, or (5) instituted work rules for the Plaintiff.” Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 7,
9.3 	Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Goldman restructured Plaintiff’s commission
structure, and in doing so stated that he “had chosen a random number he considered sufficient.”
Id. at ¶ 53. 	Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Meratas agreed that its NDA with
Plaintiff was to be interpreted according to the laws of New York. See id. at ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 1-2 at
3 The Complaint twice alleges these facts against Defendant Meratas. Based on the Complaint’s
organization, the Court interprets the second of these allegations as a typo meant to allege the same
against Defendant Goldman.
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15. 	Accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Meratas, a corporation operating in
New York and availing itself of New York law, acted at the direction of Defendant Goldman to
set Plaintiff’s wages and terminate Plaintiff, the Court finds that it has specific personal jurisdiction
over Defendant Goldman pursuant to Section 302(a)(1).
B. Procedural Requirements
Here, Plaintiff requested and received entries of default against both Defendants in
compliance with Rule 55(a) and Local Rule 55.1. Dkt. Nos. 6, 11, 12, 13. Plaintiff then filed the
present Motion in accordance with Rule 55(b) and Local Rule 55.2 Dkt. No. 18. The Motion does
not include a certificate of service demonstrating that Defendants received the Motion. 	See
generally id. But because Defendants were served at the commencement of this action and have
not “appeared personally or by a representative,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), Plaintiff was not
required to effectuate further service with respect to the Motion. See, e.g., Alston v. City of New
York, No. 22-cv-5395, 2024 WL 4100175, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2024) (“This limitation in the
rule is based on the common-sense assumption that if a party has ignored service of a summons
and complaint, a plaintiff does not have to chase him down with subsequent notices to see if he
has changed his mind.”), appeal filed, No. 24-2521 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2024); Rove LLC v.
Antonio168, No. 20-cv-02124, 2023 WL 6796034, at *3 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2023) (similar).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements for seeking a
default judgment. Windward, 2022 WL 875100, at *2.
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C. Liability as a Matter of Law
1. 	Employment Relationship
Despite Defendants classifying Plaintiff as an independent contractor, Plaintiff argues that
he was in fact an employee for the purpose of the NYLL. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 34; Dkt. No. 18-2 at
4-5. Accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court agrees.
The NYLL defines an employer as “any person, corporation, limited liability company, or
association employing any individual in any occupation, industry, trade, business or service.” N.Y.
Lab. Law § 190(3). It defines an employee as “any person employed for hire by an employer in
any employment.” 	Id. at § 190(2). 	Generally, corporate officers may not be subjected to civil
liability as employers for corporate violations of the NYLL unless a plaintiff alleges “that such
persons exercised control of the corporation’s day-to-day operations by, for example, hiring and
firing employees, supervising employee work schedules, and determining the method and rate of
pay.” Gregg v. Cmty. Care Companions, Inc., 252 N.Y.S.3d 379, 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 2026).
Under the NYLL, whether an employment relationship exists depends on “the degree of
control exercised by the purported employer over the results produced or the means used to achieve
the results.” Bynog v. Cipriani Grp., 1 N.Y.3d 193, 198 (N.Y. 2003). When assessing the degree
of control, relevant factors include “whether the worker (1) worked at his own convenience, (2)
was free to engage in other employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer’s
payroll and (5) was on a fixed schedule[.]” Id. While a court may consider the fact that a plaintiff
agreed to a contract styled as an “independent contractor agreement,” such an agreement by itself
is not determinative of employment status and may be outweighed by facts collectively alleging
that the plaintiff was an employee. Ward v. Cohen Media Publications LLC, No. 1:22-CV-06431,
2023 WL 5353342, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2023) (finding that plaintiff plausibly pled that she
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was an employee entitled to protection under, inter alia, the NYLL despite independent contractor
agreement).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that despite the fact that the Agreement includes an independent
contractor agreement, Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 34; see Dkt. No. 1-2, he was in fact an employee because
Defendants controlled his schedule and duties and because he received fringe benefits in the form
of paid vacation and sick days. 	Dkt. No. 18-2 at 4. 	Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants
compensated him through regular payroll, and that he received a base salary of $71,010.00 per
year in addition to commissions. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 22, 31-32. While Plaintiff does not make further
allegations suggesting that he was not in fact free to engage in other employment, the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true and considered together with the submitted Agreement,
show that Plaintiff did not work at his own convenience, received fringe benefits, was on
Defendant Meratas’ payroll, and worked on a fixed schedule. 	Thus, on a motion for default
judgment, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to establish that he was Defendant’s employee and
subject to the protections of the NYLL.4 Furthermore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations
are also sufficient to establish that Defendant Goldman, who Plaintiff alleges set his compensation
and terminated him, was liable as an employer under the NYLL. 	See id. at ¶¶ 9, 53; see, e.g.,
Bonito v. Avalon Partners, Inc., 967 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (finding that plaintiff
properly sued individual corporate officer as employer under the NYLL where he alleged that
officer “hired and fired employees, supervised and controlled employees’ work schedules,
determined the method and rate of pay, kept employment records, and approved any vacations”).
4 The Court notes an inconsistency between Plaintiff’s allegations and his submission to the Court
concerning his salary. The Offer Letter stipulates a base salary of $48,000.00, Dkt. No. 1-2 at 4,
but Plaintiff alleges a base salary of $71,010.00, Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 31. 	However, ultimately, this
inconsistency does not bear on whether Plaintiff was Defendants’ employee.
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2. 	Breach of Contract
The Court first turns to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. 	Under New York law, a
plaintiff bringing a claim for breach of contract must allege: (i) the formation of a contract between
the parties; (ii) performance by the plaintiff; (iii) failure of defendant to perform; and (iv) damages.
Ward, 2023 WL 5353342, at *16.
Plaintiff asserts that the Complaint plausibly alleges that he and Defendants entered into
an employment agreement and that he performed his job obligations without issue. Dkt. No. 18-2
at 7; see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 22, 25-26; see also Dkt. No. 1-2. 	Plaintiff further asserts that the
Complaint plausibly alleges that the Defendants failed to pay his earned commissions under the
agreement and that they have accordingly breached the contract. Dkt. No. 18-2 at 7. Accepting
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that they are sufficient to establish that Defendants
are liable under the Agreement. See, e.g., Newman v. ASA College, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 3d 521, 542
(S.D.N.Y. 2024) (finding that defendant for-profit college and its officers were liable to plaintiff
employee for breach of contract).
3. 	NYLL Claims
The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the NYLL.
a. 	Section 191-c Failure to Pay Commissions
Plaintiff argues that the Complaint adequately alleges that Defendants failed to pay
Plaintiff his earned commissions and that Plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover his commissions
pursuant to NYLL Section 191-c. Dkt. No. 18-2 at 5. However, Section 191-c is inapplicable to
Plaintiff.
New York courts have consistently held that “salaried employees who receive commissions
are protected under Section 191(1)(c), while independent contractors are covered by Sections
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191-a through 191-c.” Gould v. Marconi Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 119-cv-1454, 2020 WL 2042332,
at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020). Here, the Court incorporates its above finding that Plaintiff has
established that he is an employee and accordingly finds that he is not covered by Section 191-c.
Therefore, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for default judgment as to Plaintiff’s claim under
Section 191-c of the NYLL. 	See, e.g., id. (denying default judgment under Section 191-c to
plaintiff employee who received fixed salary in addition to commissions); Derven v. PH
Consulting, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 360, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that Sections 191-b and
191-c did not apply to plaintiff receiving a fixed salary and benefits in addition to commissions).
b. 	Section 195 Failure to Provide Wage Notices
Plaintiff’s second cause of action seeks liquidated damages under NYLL Section 198 for
the Defendants’ violation of Section 195. 	Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 76-79. 	Plaintiff asserts that the
Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendant failed to provide the required wage notices at the time
of hiring and the required wage statements for each instance of payment pursuant to Section 195.
Dkt. No. 18-2 at 5-6.
Section 195 of the NYLL “requires an employer to provide an employee, at the time of
hiring, with a notice (1) describing the employee’s rate of pay for regular and for overtime hours;
(2) stating whether the employer intends to credit allowances for items such as tips, meals, and
lodging toward the employee’s minimum wage; (3) describing certain health care benefits; and (4)
providing other basic information.” Guthrie v Rainbow Fencing Inc., 113 F.4th 300, 303 (2d Cir.
2024) (citing N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(1)(a)). Such notice is to be provided to employees “whether
paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other.” 	N.Y. Lab. Law
§ 195(1)(a); see also id. § 190 (including commission-based earnings within the definition of
“wages” in NYLL Article 6). An employer must also provide a statement each time wages are
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paid that details the calculation of regular and overtime pay for that pay period, along with other
information on deductions and allowances. 	Guthrie, 113 F.4th at 303 (citing N.Y. Lab. L.
§ 195(3)). 	A plaintiff alleging a violation of Section 195 must show “some causal connection
between the lack of accurate notices and the downstream harm.” Id. at 308.
Here, the Court finds that the Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant violated
Section 195. Additionally, the Court finds that the Complaint adequately alleges downstream harm
because Plaintiff states that he was provided no reason or basis for the reduction in his commission
pay. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 50-56; see, e.g., Lambert v. New Start Capital LLC, 799 F. Supp. 3d
258, 290-91 (finding that plaintiff adequately pled claim under Section 195 where plaintiff did not
receive the requisite notices and showed that the compensation agreement terms did not reflect the
actual pay and commissions she received). Accepting his allegations as true, the Court infers that
Plaintiff therefore lacked the ability to challenge Defendants’ “vague” restructuring of his
compensation. See id.; see also Dkt. No 18-3 at ¶¶ 18-27; see, e.g., Rueda v. A & G Iron Works
Corp, No. 1:25-CV-1791, 2026 WL 183692, at *12-13 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2026) (holding that
plaintiff showed causal connection between lack of wage notices and downstream harm where it
prevented him from challenging defendants’ concealment of wage violations and pursuing
remedial action sooner); Tene v. Neuehaus Studios Inc., No. 23-CV-2040, 2025 WL 2731755, at
*8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025) (finding downstream harm resulting from NYLL Section 195
violation where Plaintiff alleged “lack of knowledge about the rates of pay he was receiving and/or
should have been receiving” such that he could ascertain whether he was being properly paid).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that Defendants harmed him by failing
to provide the necessary wage notices and wage statements in violation of the NYLL.
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c. 	Section 215 Retaliation
Plaintiff next asserts that the Complaint adequately alleges that Defendant terminated
Plaintiff from his position in retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaints about his reduced commissions.
Dkt. No. 18-2 at 6. Here too, the Court agrees.
“To state a Section 215 retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) that [he] complained to
[his] employer; (2) about conduct [he] reasonably believed violated New York Labor Law or any
order issued thereunder; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action as a result.” 	Tozzi v.
Daleview Care Denter, No. 24-cv-3741, 2026 WL 215418, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2026) (citing
N.Y. Lab. Law Section 215). As to the complaint, a plaintiff need not cite to a specific statute or
file a formal complaint, but an informal complaint raising a colorable violation of a statute is
sufficient. See Gatto v. Fujitec Am., Inc., No. 21 CIV. 9754, 2024 WL 4306787, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 2024). 	“To adequately plead causation, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the
retaliation was a ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse action.” Ward, at *14 (quoting Duplan
v City of New York, 888 F.3d 612, 625 (2d Cir. 2018)) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). Proof of causation can be either “(1) indirect[ ], by showing that the protected activity
was followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence such
as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct; or (2) direct[ ],
through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant.” Zuckerman
v. GW Acquisition LLC, No. 20-CV-8742, 2021 WL 4267815, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2021).
As to indirect proof, “temporal proximity is enough to plead a prima facie case of retaliation if the
proximity is ‘very close.’” 	Zuckerman, 2021 WL 4267815 at *19 (citing Dhar v. City of New
York, 655 F. App’x 864, 865-66 (2d Cir. 2016)). Generally, courts in this circuit have found that
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a period of two or three months between the protected activity and the adverse action is the outer
limit for causation based on temporal proximity. Id. (collecting cases).
Here, the Complaint alleges that on or around December 4, 2023, after Plaintiff received
less than his expected commission for the month of November, he complained to his supervisors
and Defendant Goldman about the reduction of his commission. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 50; see Dkt. No.
18-2 at 6; Dkt. No. 18-3 at ¶¶ 17-20. The Complaint also alleges that after further conversations
addressing Plaintiff’s concerns about his commission pay, work responsibilities, and a new
compensation structure, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment on January 12, 2024. Dkt.
No. 1 at ¶¶ 51-64. The Court accepts these allegations as true for the purposes of this Motion, and,
considering that Defendants terminated Plaintiff a little more than a month after he began to
complain, finds that Plaintiff has established by temporal proximity that his complaints were a but-
for cause of his termination. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that Defendants
retaliated against him under the NYLL. 	See, e.g., Ramah v. 138 Hillside Ave Inc., No. 20 CV
03317, 2021 WL 7906551, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2021) (finding on motion for default that
plaintiff who complained orally concerning wage deductions established “sufficiently close
temporal proximity to establish causation” on his NYLL retaliation claim where plaintiff was
terminated less than two months after his complaint); Stevens & Co., LLC v. Tang, No. 23-CV-
1835, 2024 WL 1157344, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2024) (finding that defendant who demanded
payment of unpaid commissions sufficiently alleged counterclaim for retaliation under Section
215 by showing “a short period of time” between defendant’s complaint and the alleged adverse
action); see also Feliciano v. City of New York, No. 14 CIV. 6751, 2015 WL 4393163, *10
(S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2015) (stating that “where no additional facts are pled, temporal proximity
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ordinarily requires that the allegedly retaliatory act occur within two months of the plaintiff’s
protected activity” and collecting cases).
d. 	Section 193 Unlawful Wage Deductions
Plaintiff’s Motion also argues that Defendant is liable pursuant to NYLL Section 193
because Defendant made deductions from Plaintiff’s earned commissions without Plaintiff’s
written authorization and without legal justification. Dkt. No. 18-2 at 7; see Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 91.
To successfully allege an unlawful wage deduction under Section 193, a plaintiff must
show that “(1) there is an employer-employee relationship; (2) the employer makes a deduction
from the employee’s wages; and (3) the deduction is not otherwise permitted by law or authorized
for the employee’s benefit.” 	Fersel v. Paramount Med. Servs., P.C., 588 F. Supp. 3d 304, 320
(E.D.N.Y. 2022) (citations omitted). In 2021, the New York legislature amended Section 193 to
clarify that “wage theft remains completely and without exception in violation of statute and all
employees are entitled to full wages, benefits, and wage supplements earned.” 	Birner v.
Kensington Vanguard Holdings, LLC, No. 24-CV-2743, 2025 WL 963311, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2025) (quoting No Wage Theft Loophole Act, 2021 N.Y. Laws ch. 397 (codified as amended
N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 193, 195)). 	Specifically, Section 193(5) provides: “There is no exception to
liability under this section for the unauthorized failure to pay wages, benefits or wage
supplements.” 	N.Y. Lab. Law § 193(5). 	In application, therefore, a court assessing whether a
plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a deduction in violation of Section 193 looks to whether plaintiff
has alleged that the defendant neglected to pay a sum constituting a wage as defined by NYLL
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Section 190. See Birner, 2025 WL 963311, at *5 (citing Ryan v. Kellogg Partners Inst. Servs., 19
N.Y.3d 1, 3 (N.Y. 2012)).5
Here, Plaintiff alleges that for November, 2023, Defendants owed him a commission
exceeding $8,000.00 but instead paid him a commission of $1,837.50. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 48. For
December, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that he was owed approximately $9,000.00 in commission
payments, but received no commission payments for that month. Id. at ¶ 62. Accepted as true,
the Court is satisfied that these allegations sufficiently establish Defendant’s liability as to
Plaintiff’s unpaid commissions pursuant to Section 193. See, e.g., Birner, 2025 WL 963311, at *6
(denying motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under Section 193 for “commissions due and owing
under the [a]greement”).
D. Damages
Having found that Plaintiff has established Defendants’ liability as to the above-cited
provisions of the NYLL and for breach of contract, the Court now addresses whether the Motion
is sufficient to award damages without a hearing or additional briefing. Plaintiff seeks a substantial
sum in damages, comprising lost wages, unpaid commissions, liquidated damages, statutory
penalties, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. See Dkt. No. 18-2 at 8;
Dkt. No. 18-5. 	However, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Motion fails to provide a sufficient
evidentiary and legal basis on which to fully calculate damages.
5 This approach is broader than the previous majority view that limited recovery under Section 193
to allegations that a defendant employer deducted a specific amount from a plaintiff employee’s
wages. See, e.g., Ward, 2023 WL 5353342, at *16 (finding that plaintiff pleading failure to pay
entire wages under her contract did not plead Section 193 violation); Zuckerman v. GW Acquisition
LLC, No. 20-CV-8742 (VEC), 2021 WL 4267815, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2021) (dismissing
Section 193 claim where plaintiff failed to allege “any facts about any specific deductions”). But
even under the previous view, Plaintiff’s allegations here are sufficient to establish liability
because Plaintiff alleges in at least one instance that Defendant paid him a specific amount below
his expected commission rate. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 48.
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For example, the Motion plausibly alleges that Plaintiff received a base salary but submits
seemingly inconsistent supporting evidence regarding that salary—Plaintiff’s Offer Letter
stipulates a salary of $48,000.00, see Dkt. No. 18-4 at 25, but Plaintiff states in his Motion and
affidavit, without further evidence, that his salary was $71,010 and seeks that amount in lost wages,
see Dkt. No. 18-2 at 3; Dkt. No. 18-3 at ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 18-5. Similarly, as to Plaintiff’s commissions,
Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion assert that Plaintiff was entitled to “over $8000.00” for
November 2024, Dkt. No. 18-2 at 7, and “approximately $9,000[.00]” for December, 2024, Dkt.
No. 1 at ¶ 62, but also rounds those indeterminate amounts to an exact $8,000.00 and $9,000.00 to
arrive at a total owed commission of $15,162.50 after subtracting the $1,837.50 that Defendants
already paid, Dkt. No. 18-3 at ¶¶ 31-32. Plaintiff further states that he is entitled to an additional
$15,162.50 in “liquidated damages equal to 100% of the unpaid commissions” under “applicable
wage laws, including the New York Labor Law and the Fair Labor Standards Act,” but fails to cite
a specific statute and also fails to explain why and how the Fair Labor Standards Act applies given
that Plaintiff has not raised any claims pursuant to that law. See Dkt. No. 18-3 at ¶ 35.6
Plaintiff also claims to seek the statutory cap of $20,000.00 in liquidated damages as
provided by Section 215, Dkt. No. 18-2 at 6, but in a different submission calculates the Section
215 liquidated damage award as another $71,010.00 and instead characterizes the $20,000.00 sum
as compensatory damages for emotional distress without providing evidence in support of that
6 To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking damages for unpaid commissions pursuant to Section 191-c,
the Court denies that claim. See supra Section IV.C.3.a. Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim seeks damages that are duplicative of his statutory claims, the Court notes
that the final amount of such statutory damages should be deducted from any such breach of
contract damages. 	See Newman, 754 F. Supp. 3d. at 543 (finding that while breach of contract
claims are compatible with NYLL claims “if the damages sought are for different wrongs,” any
duplicative damages should be offset to avoid a double recovery).
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amount or any legal basis for the recovery of emotional distress damages, see Dkt. No. 18-3 at ¶
3; Dkt. No. 18-5.
Because the Court cannot discern a consistent evidentiary or legal basis for the various
amounts that Plaintiff proposes as damages, the Court finds it “necessary and proper to hold and
inquest on damages” with respect to Plaintiff’s claims. Mendes v. Prime Mgmt. Consultants LLC,
No. 1:24-CV-01301, 2026 WL 865758, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026) (citation and internal
quotations omitted). The Court further exercises its discretion pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) and refers
this matter to United States Magistrate Judge Carla B. Freedman for a damages inquest. Mickalis,
645 F.3d at 129.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Plaintiff’s NYLL Section 191-c claim be DISMISSED with prejudice;
and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment as to his claims for breach of
contract and under NYLL Sections 193, 195, and 215 be GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that this matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Carla B. Freedman for a damages
inquest; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 13, 2026
Albany, New York
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