Shinnecock Indian Nation v. Hochul et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SHINNECOCK INDIAN TRIBE, a federally
recognized Indian Tribe,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
25-cv-07034 (NJC) (JMW)
-against-
KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, in her official capacity as
Governor of New York, LETITIA A. JAMES, in her
official capacity as New York State Attorney General,
MARIE THERESE DOMINGUEZ, in her official capacity
as Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Transportation, and HONORABLE MAUREEN T.
LICCIONE, in her official capacity as Justice of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Suffolk County,
Defendants.
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WICKS, Magistrate Judge:
Before the Court is Plaintiff Shinnecock Indian Nation (“Plaintiff”) and Kathleen C.
Hochul, Letitia A. James, and Marie Therese Dominguez’s (collectively, “Defendants”) joint
application for a stay of discovery (ECF No. 25) pending a decision on Defendants’ anticipated
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure
to state a claim. Though both parties seek a stay, the Court must independently determine
whether a stay is warranted consistent with Rule 1’s mandate that the Rules “be construed,
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” For the reasons set forth below, the
Court concludes a stay is warranted under the circumstances and therefore the motion (ECF No.
25) is GRANTED.
2/3/2026
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a federally recognized tribe since 2010, commenced this action seeking to
enjoin New York State officials from continuing their alleged violations of federal law protecting
Plaintiff’s parcel of restricted fee lands known as “Westwoods”—the parcel of Plaintiff’s land
subject to this dispute and located in Hampton Bays within the Town of Southampton. (ECF No.
22 at ¶¶ 1, 31, 92.) Plaintiff further seeks to bring into compliance with federal law Defendants
ongoing public use of an illegal easement from 1959 on which a portion of Sunrise Highway in
New York runs over and across Plaintiff’s Westwoods property. (See id. at ¶ 1.) According to
Plaintiff, on July 22, 1959, New York State Department of Transportation’s predecessor acquired
a permanent easement from Plaintiff for purposes of constructing, reconstructing, and
maintaining a highway over Westwoods. (Id. at ¶¶ 49, 52.) The easement, according to Plaintiff,
was not signed by a representative of the United States and contains no reference to the United
States. (Id. at ¶ 53.)
Notably, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants continued operation of Sunrise Highway
through Plaintiff’s federally-protected restricted fee lands at Westwoods “without a valid right-
of-way/easement approved by appropriate federal officials” violates the Non-Intercourse Act—
the federal law protecting Plaintiff’s restricted fee lands against alienation. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff
requests that the Court order Defendants to “obtain a valid right-of-way for the portion of
[Plaintiff’s] Westwoods property on which Sunrise Highway is situated” and “enjoin state-court
proceedings” in the Suffolk County State Court.1 (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7, 147, 154.) In the state court
proceeding, the New York State Department of Transportation and Defendant Dominguez seek to
enjoin the construction, operation, maintenance, and removal of a monument sign on Plaintiff’s
1 See Commissioner of the New York State Department of Transportation et al. v. Goree et al., No.
610010/2019 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cnty. 2019)
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lands at Westwoods within the purported 1959 easement. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 105.) In effect, Plaintiff
seeks to enjoin these state proceedings on the ground that the state litigation amounts to an
ongoing violation of federal law because Defendants obtained their easement for Sunrise
Highway across the Westwoods in violation of the Non-Intercourse Act. (See id. at ¶¶ 7, 115-
116.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“‘[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.’” L.N.K. International, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, No. 22-
cv-05184 (GRB) (JMW), 2023 WL 2614211, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023) (quoting Thomas v.
N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 09-CV-5167, 2010 WL 3709923, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010))
(citation omitted). The mere filing of a dispositive motion, in and of itself, does not halt
discovery obligations in federal court. That is, a stay of discovery is not warranted, without
more, by the mere pendency of a dispositive motion. Gagliano v. United States, No. 24-cv-
07930 (SJB) (JMW), 2025 WL 1104042, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2025) (citing Weitzner v.
Sciton, Inc., No. CV 2005-2533, 2006 WL 3827422, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2006)). Rather,
“[u]nder Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), a district court may stay discovery during the pendency of a
dispositive motion for ‘good cause’ shown.” Alloway v. Bowlero Corp., No. 2:24-CV-04738
(SJB) (JMW), 2025 WL 1220185, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2025). In evaluating whether a stay
of discovery pending resolution of a motion to dismiss is appropriate, courts typically consider:
“(1) whether the defendant has made a strong showing that the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious;
(2) the breadth of discovery and the burden of responding to it; and (3) the risk of unfair
prejudice to the party opposing the stay.” Brinkmann v. Town of Southold, New York, No. 21-cv-
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02468 (LDH) (JMW), 2022 WL 3912974, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022) (citation omitted).
“Courts also may take into consideration the nature and complexity of the action, whether some
or all of the defendants have joined in the request for a stay, and the posture or stage of the
litigation.” Vida Press v. Dotcom Liquidators, Ltd., 22-cv-2044 (HG) (JMW), 2022 WL
17128638, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2022). It is against this backdrop that the Court considers the
present application.
DISCUSSION
A. Whether Defendants Have Made a Strong Showing
That Plaintiff’s Claims are Unmeritorious2
i. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Defendants intend to move for dismissal “on jurisdictional grounds,” the first being
pursuant to the doctrine of abstention recognized in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). (See
ECF No. 25 at p. 2.) Pursuant to the Younger doctrine, “district courts should abstain from
exercising jurisdiction only in three exceptional circumstances” involving: “(1) ongoing state
criminal prosecutions, (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings
involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions.” Falco v. Justs. of the Matrimonial Parts of Supreme Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805
F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Sprint Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 70 (2013). “Relevant here, under Younger, ‘federal courts should
refrain from interfering with core state court civil administrative processes, powers, and
functions that allow the state courts to adjudicate the matters before them and enforce their
judgments . . . .’” Leonardo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 21-CV-04949 (OEM) (JMW), 2024
2 In considering the present motion, the Court is basing the analysis solely upon the arguments in the pre-
motion letters which is not intended to prejudge the motion to dismiss in any way which will be briefed
before, considered and ruled upon by the Hon. Nusrat J. Choudhury.
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WL 4485608, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
4344849 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024) (quoting Cavanaugh v. Geballe, 28 F.4th 428, 434 (2d Cir.
2022)).
Here, Plaintiff’s action at bar specifically seeks “to enjoin state-court proceedings in the
Supreme Court [of Suffolk County]” involving the operation of advertising display signs on each
side of Sunrise Highway at Plaintiff’s Westwoods property. (ECF No. 22 at ¶ 7.) “When a
plaintiff ‘seek[s] injunctive relief relating to the same property that is the subject matter of the
underlying state court action[,]’ Younger abstention applies.” Brown v. RXR Soyo Exalta, LLC
(Sawyer Place), No. 24-CV-4250 (LTS), 2024 WL 3316011, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2024)
(quoting Abbatiello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-CV-4210, 2015 WL 5884797, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2015)). Because Plaintiff seeks to order a sitting state-court judge to refrain
from taking action in her own litigation relating to the Westwoods property that is also subject to
this federal litigation, it appears that the Younger abstention doctrine would apply. See Clark v.
Bloomberg, No. 10-CV-1263 (JG), 2010 WL 1438803, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2010) (holding
that Younger abstention doctrine precludes federal district court from staying the pending state-
court proceedings because “both concern the disposition of real property and hence implicate
important state interests, and there is no reason to doubt that the state proceedings provide [the
plaintiff] with an adequate forum to make the arguments he seeks to raise in this court”).
Defendants further intend to move for dismissal on grounds that “the Non-Intercourse Act
and federal preemption claims should not be before the federal court as they are defenses to the
State court litigation that happen to be grounded in federal law.” (ECF No. 25 at p. 2.) Indeed,
Plaintiff, in its Amended Complaint, alleges that this Court has “federal question jurisdiction
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because the Complaint alleges ongoing violations of the Nation’s rights and the legal status of
Westwoods pursuant to federal law . . . .” (ECF No. 22 at ¶ 15.)
The Second Circuit, in New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, addressed this very issue
and concluded that federal subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because the complaint only
alleged violations of State law and that the Shinnecock Nation’s tribal immunity defense did not
create a federal question. See 686 F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 2012). In reaching this conclusion, the
court compared examples where “federal issues related to Indian land [arose] defensively” and
thus did “not support finding federal question jurisdiction,” to instances where the complaint
“assert[s] a current right to possession conferred by federal law, wholly independent from state
law.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661
(1974)).
The Second Circuit’s decision, however, pre-dates the recognition of Westwoods as part
of the Nation’s aboriginal territory. Indeed, in January of 2025, the Department of Interior
(“DOI”) “notified the Nation that the Nation’s Westwoods property ‘is and always has been
restricted fee land held by the Nation’” and is thus “‘within the purview of the Nonintercourse
Act . . . .’” (ECF No. 22 at ¶¶ 46, 117.) Indeed, on January 2, 2025, Assistant Secretary of the
DOI for Indian Affairs signed a letter to the Shinnecock Nation stating, in relevant part, that:
The Department examined the land title status of the Westwoods parcel and
determined that it is within the Nation’s aboriginal territory, that the Nation has
resided within its aboriginal territory since time immemorial and has never
removed 	therefrom, 	and 	that 	Westwoods 	is 	within 	the 	purview 	of 	the
Nonintercourse Act and is therefore restricted against alienation absent consent of
the United States. This land is and has always been restricted fee land held by the
Nation and is now recorded to reflect such status.
(Id. at ¶ 93) (emphasis added).
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Importantly, Circuit Judge Hall’s dissent in Shinnecock Indian Nation echoes, that
“[w]hether the tribe holds aboriginal title to Westwoods is ‘an important issue of federal law that
sensibly belongs in federal court.’” 686 F.3d at 146 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc.
v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 315 (2005)). In addition, “[t]he issue of
aboriginal title and therefore the propriety of state and local regulation over that land ‘appears to
be the only legal or factual issue contested in the case,’” and thus belongs in a federal forum. Id.
While the caselaw following this recent recognition by the DOI of Westwoods as being within
the Nation’s “aboriginal territory” is scarce, Judge Choudhury has provided the parties an
opportunity to submit briefing on the Court’s jurisdiction and the availability of a private right of
action for the Non-Intercourse Act which is to be completed by February 18, 2026. (See
Electronic Orders dated December 31, 2025 and January 6, 2026.)
ii. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Defendants also intend to move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
for a violation of the Non-Intercourse Act. (See ECF No. 25 at pp. 2-3.) The Non-Intercourse Act
provides in relevant part that:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law
or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to
the Constitution . . . under the authority of the United States.
Canadian St. Regis Band of Mohawk Indians v. New York, 146 F. Supp. 2d 170, 185 (N.D.N.Y.
2001) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177).
“This Act prohibited the sale by Indians of any land unless the sale was by public treaty
made under the authority of the United States.” Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v.
Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1994). To establish a violation of the Non-Intercourse Act, a
plaintiff must “establish that (1) they are an Indian tribe; (2) the land at issue was tribal land at
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the time of the conveyance; (3) the United States never approved the conveyance; and (4) the
trust relationship between the United States at the tribe has not been terminated.” Seneca Nation
of Indians v. New York, 382 F.3d 245, 258 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
Here, it appears that Plaintiff has stated a claim under 12(b)(6). Plaintiff maintains that
the Nation is a recognized Indian Tribe under New York State law (ECF No. 22 at ¶ 9), the
United States never approved the conveyance (ECF No. 22 at ¶ 127), and the trust relationship
between Plaintiff and the United States has not been terminated (ECF No. 22 at ¶ 28.) In
addition, as noted above, the DOI in January of 2025 “notified the Nation that the Nation’s
Westwoods property ‘is and always has been restricted fee land held by the Nation’” and is thus
“‘within the purview of the Nonintercourse Act . . . .’” (Id. at ¶ 46.) Specifically, “[the] land is
and has always been restricted fee land held by the Nation and is now recorded to reflect such
status.” (Id. at ¶ 93) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, at this juncture, it appears that
Plaintiff’s claim under the Non-Intercourse Act has merit.
B. Breadth of Discovery and the Corresponding Burdens
The potential scope of discovery weighs in favor of granting a stay of discovery. The
breadth of discovery in this action would be comprised of “voluminous colonial era documents”
and information relevant to an easement from 1959. (See ECF No. 25 at p. 3); see also
Greenidge v. Suffolk County Police Department, No. 25-cv-03604 (SJB) (JMW), 2025 WL
2645549, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2025) (finding “paper-intensive document production” dating
back over several years to amount to a sufficient burden to warrant a stay of discovery).
Furthermore, where, like here, Defendants seek to dismiss the entirety of the Amended
Complaint, a stay is appropriate. See Mineo v. Town of Hempstead, No. 22-CV-04092 (JMA)
(JMW), 2023 WL 7283784, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023) (noting, where defendants’ motion to
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dismiss sought to “dismiss of the entire complaint,” that it would be “most prudent” to avoid the
costly expenses of discovery conducted in the interim before the motion is decided).
Therefore, the reach of discovery coupled with the corresponding burden that would be
placed upon Defendants counsels in favor of granting the stay “because the parties could not
only avoid substantial hardship but also prevent a waste of precious resources ... pending the
outcome of the motion to dismiss.” Alloway v. Bowlero, No. 24-CV-04738 (SJB) (JMW), 2024
WL 4827752, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2024); see Romain v. Webster Bank N.A., No. 23-cv-
05956 (NRM) (JMW), 2024 WL 3303057, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2024) (“[D]iscovery should
be stayed given that all discovery would be for naught if the Complaint is dismissed in its
entirety by Judge Morrison as requested.”); see also Fiordirosa v. Publishers Clearing House,
Inc., No. 21-CV-6682 (PKC)(JMW), 2022 WL 3912991, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2022)
(granting a stay where “any prejudice to Plaintiffs would be short-lived in that once the Court
rules on [the] motion to dismiss, discovery will either move forward, or will no longer be
necessary as the ruling on the motion may reduce, if not eliminate, Plaintiffs’ claims.”).
Accordingly, the breadth and corresponding burdens of discovery justify granting the stay.
C. Risk of Unfair Prejudice
There exists little to no prejudice if a stay is granted. The case is still in its nascent stages
as an Initial Conference has not been held3 and a discovery schedule has not been implemented.
See Gagliano, 2025 WL 1104042, at *4; Amron v. 3M Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. 23-cv-
08959 (PKC) (JMW), 2024 WL 263010, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2024) (granting a stay where
the case was “still in its early stages” considering a discovery schedule had not been entered and
3 The Initial Conference set for January 27, 2026 and the parties’ requirement to submit their proposed
26(f) Scheduling Order were both adjourned sine die pending a decision on the joint motion to stay
discovery. (Electronic Order dated January 21, 2026).
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discovery had not begun). Additionally, a stay would be only for a short period of time as a
briefing schedule on Defendants’ motion to dismiss was already set by Judge Choudhury. (See
Electronic Orders dated December 31, 2025 and January 6, 2026.) Based on this briefing
schedule, the motion to dismiss will be fully briefed by February 18, 2026. (Electronic Order
dated January 6, 2026.) A stay, therefore, would be for only a limited period of time. See
Integrated Systems and Power, Inc. v. Honeywell Intern., Inc., No. 09 CV 5874 (RPP), 2009 WL
2777076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009) (imposing a stay during the pendency of a motion to
dismiss where briefing on the motion would be completed within one month and a stay would
therefore delay commencement of discovery “for only a few months”). Moreover, this is a joint
application thereby demonstrating both parties have expressed a desire to enter into a stay. See
Concern for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Town of Southampton, New York, No. 24-cv-07101 (RPK)
(JMW), 2025 WL 327983, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2025) (finding little to no prejudice if
discovery were stayed where “Plaintiff has consented to a stay”).
CONCLUSION
Considering all of the circumstances presented, good cause exists for a stay of discovery
pending the outcome of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Therefore, the motion to stay (ECF No.
25) is GRANTED and discovery in this action is stayed pending resolution of Defendants’
motion to dismiss. In the event that the motion to dismiss is denied, the parties are directed to
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meet and confer and file a proposed discovery schedule within ten days of the posting of the
Court's order on the dismissal motion.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 3, 2026
S O 	O R D E R E D:
/S/James M. Wicks
JAMES M. WICKS
United States Magistrate Judge
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