Garcia Jimenez et al v. County of Suffolk et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JENNIFER GARCIA JIMENEZ, JENNIFER
GARCIA JIMENEZ on behalf of her minor
daughter “J.M.,” FRANKLIN CAMPOVERDE,
and JOAN MANUEL JIMENEZ,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, SOLON PARKER,
RODNEY K. HARRISON, RAYMOND
TIERNEY, WILLIAM C. NASH, DANIEL
LILLIS, TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON,
MICHAEL D. SARLO, RYAN HOGAN, PETER
VAN SCOYAC, STATE DOES 1-20, and
FEDERAL ROES 1-20,
Defendants.
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
23-CV-9476(AMD)(SIL)
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STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:
Presently before the Court in this case arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”) and New York common law, on referral from the Honorable Ann M. Donnelly,
is Plaintiffs’ Jennifer Garcia Jimenez (“Garcia Jimenez”), on behalf of herself and her
minor daughter “J.M.,” Franklin Campoverde (“Campoverde”), and Joan Manuel
Jimenez (“Manuel Jimenez” and collectively, “Plaintiffs”) motion for leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”). See Docket Entry (“DE”) [93]. For the reasons set forth
herein, the Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint be denied.1
1 Although the referral does not specifically state that Plaintiffs’ motion is referred to this Court for
Report and Recommendation, the Court’s conclusion is styled as a Report and Recommendation
because, as described herein, the Court concludes that the motion to amend should be denied. See
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Plaintiffs’ Complaint and First Amended Complaint
This action arises out of an October 5, 2022 execution of a “no-knock” search
warrant (the “Warrant”) at Plaintiffs’ home located at 361 Flamingo Avenue,
Montauk NY related to suspected possession and distribution of cocaine. 2 	See
generally Complaint (“Compl.”), DE [1]. By way of a Complaint dated December 26,
2023, Plaintiffs commenced this action, asserting causes of action pursuant to Section
1983 and New York state law against the County of Suffolk (“Suffolk County”),
Suffolk County Police Detective Solon Parker (“Parker”), Suffolk County Police
Commissioner Rodney K. Harrison (“Harrison”), Suffolk County District Attorney
Raymond A. Tierney (“Tierney”), Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney William
C. Nash (“Nash”), Police Officer Daniel Lillis (“Lillis”), the Town of East Hampton
(“East Hampton”), East Hampton Police Chief Michael D. Sarlo (“Sarlo”), East
Hampton Police Detective Ryan Hogan (“Hogan”), East Hampton Town Supervisor
Peter Van Scoyac (“Van Scoyac”), as well as state “Doe” Defendants and federal “Roe”
Defendants. Id. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert violations of their rights arising
under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under New
York state law, related to the execution of the Warrant. Id.
Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 461 F. App’x 18, 25 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that denying leave to amend
claims that survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss “amounted to a ruling on a dispositive matter,
something that exceeds a magistrate judge’s authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)”); see Williams
v. Beemiller Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a magistrate judge may not make an
order that is “functionally equivalent to an order of dismissal”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 The facts underlying Plaintiffs’ claims, as well as the alleged involvement of each named Defendant,
are described at length in the Court’s Memorandum and Opinion granting in part and denying in part
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. See DE [79]. They are incorporated
herein by reference and described further where necessary to provide context.
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On June 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”)
against the same Defendants. 	DE [34]. 	The factual allegations in the FAC are, for
all relevant purposes, substantially similar to those alleged in the Complaint. 	See
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (the “MTD
Opinion”), DE [79], at 48 (“[T]he amended complaint is almost identical to the original
complaint.”). On March 28, 2025, Judge Donnelly granted in part and denied in part
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC. 	Id. 	Judge Donnelly held that Plaintiffs’
“claims for excessive force under § 1983 and assault and battery against the Doe
defendants may proceed, as may the negligence claim against the Doe defendants
related to the use of a battering ram,” but that “[a]ll other claims are dismissed.” Id.
Relevant for purposes of the instant motion, in granting Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, Judge Donnelly further held that Plaintiffs “allege that Doe officers saw and
did not intercede in the excessively forceful handcuffing and the use of the battering
ram.” 	Id. at 36. 	Judge Donnelly held that Plaintiffs “do not allege any facts that
support, even circumstantially, that any . . . policy exist[s]” that would support
liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 98
S. Ct. 2018 (1978). Id. at 38. Finally, Judge Donnelly further held that “the plaintiff’s
request for leave to amend a second time is denied,” but instructed Plaintiffs to file a
motion pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1997) to obtain
identifying information of the remaining Doe Defendants. Id. at 1, 48.
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B. 	Motion to Compel Identities of Doe Defendants and the Instant
Motion to File Second Amended Complaint
On April 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion: (1) to compel Defendants to identify
the Suffolk County and Town of East Hampton employees involved in the execution
of the Warrant that forms the basis of this action, and (2) for leave to amend the FAC
to include these individuals as defendants. 	DE [80]. 	On May 13, 2025, this Court
granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion, instructing Defendants to
“provide the names and badge numbers of the officers involved in the execution of
the search warrant at issue in this action or state that they do not possess responsive
information.” See Electronic Order dated May 13, 2025. The Court denied Plaintiffs’
motion to amend the FAC without prejudice as it did not include a proposed Second
Amended Complaint. 	Id. 	On May 23, 2025, Defendants complied with the Court’s
May 13, 2025 Order and provided the requisite identifying information. DE [84], [85],
[90].
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs again seek leave to file a Second Amended
Complaint. DE [93]; see Declaration of Patricia Weiss in Support of Motion to Amend
(“Weiss Decl.”), DE [93-1], at ¶¶ 2-6. 	In the Proposed Second Amended Complaint
(“PSAC”), DE [93-2], Plaintiffs withdraw their claims arising under the First and
Fifth Amendments, as well as any claims asserted against Harrison, Tierney, Nash,
Sarlo, and the federal “Roe” Defendants. 	See generally DE [93-2]; Weiss Decl. ¶ 3.
Instead, in the PSAC, Plaintiffs assert violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, as well as their rights arising under New York state law, against
proposed Defendants Police Officer Andrew Blodorn (“Blodorn”), Police Officer Bryan
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Cobb (“Cobb”), Police Officer Tyler Gilbride (“Gilbride”), Police Detective Michael
Coleman 	(“Coleman”), 	Police 	Detective 	Luke 	McNamara 	(“McNamara”), 	Police
Officer Juan Buitrago (“Buitrago”), Police Detective Arthur Scalzo (“Scalzo”), and
Police Officer Katherine Izzo (“Izzo,” and collectively the “Proposed Defendants”). See
PSAC ¶ 29.
In the PSAC, Plaintiffs allege violations of their Fourth Amendment rights as
a result of an allegedly excessively tight application of handcuffs and a “failure to
intercede to prevent a continuing constitutional law violation.” Id. at ¶¶ 69-78. They
further claim that Defendants violated their rights arising under New York common
law for assault, battery, and negligence. 	Id. at ¶¶ 80-94. 	The extent of Plaintiffs’
allegations regarding the Proposed Defendants’ involvement is that they were
“physically present at the physical location of Plaintiffs’ house.” 	Id. at ¶ 29. 	To
summarize, in the PSAC, Plaintiffs seek to assert claims arising under the Fourth
Amendment and New York state law against Suffolk County, Parker, East Hampton,
Hogan, Lillis, Blodorn, Cobb, Orlando, Gilbride, Coleman, McNamara, Buitrago,
Scalzo, and Izzo. See generally PSAC.
There are four oppositions to Plaintiffs’ motion. The first is by Suffolk County
and Parker (the “Suffolk Defs.’ Opp’n”). DE [94]. The second is by Defendants East
Hampton, Sarlo, Hogan, and Van Scoyoc (the “East Hampton Defs.’ Opp’n”). 	DE
[101]. The third is by Lillis (the “Lillis Opp’n”). DE [103]. The final is by Proposed
Defendants Cobb and Blodorn (the “Proposed Defs.’ Opp’n”). 	DE [104]. 	Plaintiffs
filed a reply to the East Hampton Defendants’ Opposition, see DE [102], but not to
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the other oppositions. 3 	Summonses have neither been requested nor issued for
Proposed Defendants Orlando, Gilbride, Coleman, McNamara, Buitrago, Scalzo, or
Izzo, and none has appeared or opposed the instant motion.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Motions to amend pleadings are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, which provides
that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” 	Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see Amaya v. Roadhouse Brick Oven Pizza, Inc., 285 F.R.D. 251,
253 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“A court should freely give leave when justice so requires, and
such leave is in the court’s discretion.”) (internal quotation omitted). Courts interpret
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 liberally. 	See Assam v. Deer Park Spring Water, Inc., 163 F.R.D.
400, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) dictates that motions
to amend complaints be liberally granted absent a good reason to the contrary . . . .”).
Motions to add parties are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 21, and are afforded “same
standard of liberality afforded to motions to amend pleadings under Rule 15.”
Addison v. Reitman Blacktop, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 74, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 21; Amaya, 285 F.R.D. at 253 (“There is . . . little practical difference
between Rule 15 and Rule 21 since they both leave the decision whether to permit or
deny an amendment to the district court’s discretion.”).
Leave to amend a complaint should be denied “if there is delay, bad faith,
futility, or prejudice to the non-moving party.” 	Hosking v. New World Mortg., Inc.,
3 The oppositions filed by Sarlo and Van Scoyoc are moot, as the claims against those Defendants have
been dismissed and the PSAC does not name them as defendants. The same is true for Defendant
Lillis, who filed a separate opposition despite the fact that the Court already dismissed Plaintiffs’
claims against him and that Plaintiffs fail to allege additional facts that would support a finding of
liability against Lillis.
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602 F. Supp. 2d 441, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182,
83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962)). The party opposing a motion to amend bears the burden
of establishing that the amendment should be denied. See Joinnides v. Floral Park–
Bellerose Union Sch. Dist., No. 12-CV-5682(JS)(AKT), 2015 WL 1476422, at *9
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (“With respect to the Rule 15(a) factors, the party opposing
the motion for leave to amend has the burden of establishing that an amendment
would be prejudicial or futile.”) (internal quotation omitted). 	Here, Defendants and
Proposed Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motion on the grounds that it is both
procedurally improper and futile pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. 	See Suffolk Defs.’
Opp’n at 4-7; East Hampton Defs.’ Opp’n at 12-16; Lillis’s Opp’n at 7-9; Proposed
Defs.’ Opp’n at 17-20.
A. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion is Procedurally Deficient
Initially, Cobb and Blodorn argue that Plaintiffs’ motion fails to adhere to both
Local Civil Rules 15.1 and 7.1. 	See Proposed Defs.’ Opp’n at 2. 	Local Rule 15.1
requires that a motion to amend “include as an exhibit (1) a clean copy of the proposed
amended or supplemental pleading; and (2) a version of the proposed pleading that
shows—through redlining, underlining, strikeouts, or other similar typographic
method—all 	differences 	from 	the 	pleading 	that 	it 	is 	intended 	to 	amend 	or
supplement.” 	Local Civ. R. 15.1(a). 	Likewise, Local Civil Rule 7.1 requires that a
motion be accompanied by a “memorandum of law, setting forth the cases and other
authorities relied on in support of the motion.” Id. at 7.1(a)(2).
In support of their motion, Plaintiffs submit their proposed Second Amended
Complaint. DE [93-2]. They do not, however, submit a copy showing the “differences
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from the pleading that it is intended to amend or supplement.” Local Rule 15.1(a)(2).
Nor do they submit a memorandum of law in support of their motion. 	Plaintiffs’
submission therefore fails to comply with Local Rules 15.1 and 7.1. Plaintiffs’ failure
to adhere to Local Rule 15.1 alone warrants denial of the motion to amend.4 Alexsam,
Inc. v. Mastercard Int’l Inc., No. 15-CV-2799(DG)(VMS), 2025 WL 3451891, at *14
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2025) (“Plaintiff’s failure to [comply] with Local Civil Rule 15.1(a)
is a sufficient basis upon which to deny its motion, albeit without prejudice.”); Brown
v. Whitley, No. 21-CV-2933(AMD)(CLP), 2022 WL 1504757, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 22,
2022) (recommending that the “plaintiff’s request to file a second Amended Complaint
[be] denied without prejudice to plaintiff filing a formal motion to amend, including
a proposed amended complaint and memorandum of law in accordance with [Local
Rule] 7.1(a)”) (Report and Recommendation), adopted by 2022 WL 1501649 (E.D.N.Y.
May 12, 2022). 	Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs’
motion to amend be denied.
B. 	The Merits of Plaintiffs’ Proposed Second Amended Complaint
Moreover, the substance of the allegations in the PSAC do not support granting
Plaintiffs’ motion to amend as they do not remedy the deficiencies identified in the
MTD Opinion and are therefore futile. 	A proposed amendment is futile if “the
proposed claim could not withstand a Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”
4 Although not styled as a “Memorandum of Law,” the Weiss Declaration contains arguments with
citation to authority in support of Plaintiffs’ motion, see DE [93-1], as required by Local Rule 7.1. See
Local Rule 7.1(a)(2). Accordingly, while the submission does not strictly adhere to the requirements
of Local Rule 7.1, the Court takes no position as to whether this provides an independent basis for
denial of the motion.
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Salazar v. Browne Realty Assocs., L.L.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d 378, 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(citing Lucente v. IBM Corp., 310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002)); see Cleveland v.
Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Court . . . reviews proposed
amendments for futility pursuant to Rule 12(b) . . . .”). Therefore, a proposed amended
complaint must “contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is
‘plausible on its face.’” 	Mendez v. U.S. Nonwovens Corp., 2 F. Supp. 3d 442, 451
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1974 (2007)). 	When a party objects to a motion to amend on futility grounds,
“the moving party must merely show that it has at least colorable grounds for relief.”
Copantitla v. Fiskardo Estiatorio, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1608(RJH)(JCF), 2010 WL
1327921, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010) (internal quotation omitted). On a motion to
amend, “the Court is required to accept the material facts alleged in the amended
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Mendez,
2 F. Supp. 3d at 451 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1950 (2009)).
The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to proceed with their claims against the Doe
Defendants related to the application of handcuffs and negligence regarding bringing
the battering ram used in the no-knock search. 	MTD Opinion at 48. 	The legal
standards related to those claims are explained in the MTD Opinion and are
incorporated herein by reference. 	Id. at 9-10, 30-32 (citing Back v. Hastings on
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122) (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the
“personal involvements of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a
prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983”)). Proposed Defendants Cobb and
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Blodorn oppose Plaintiffs’ motion to file a Second Amended Complaint on the grounds
that “there are no other facts in the proposed SAC that either officer handcuffed the
plaintiffs, used a battering ram, or so much as made physical contact with the
plaintiffs which would state a claim for excessive force, assault and battery, or
negligence . . . .” 	Proposed Defs.’ Mem. at 2. 	While the additional Proposed
Defendants have not filed opposition to the instant motion, the same is true for them.
Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the Proposed Defendants applied handcuffs to
Plaintiffs or brought and/or used a battering ram. Rather, as with Cobb and Blodorn,
Plaintiffs merely allege that Orlando, Gilbride, Coleman, McNamara, Buitrago,
Scalzo, and Izzo were “physically present at the physical location of Plaintiffs’
house.”5 PSAC ¶ 29. As Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the Proposed Defendants
played any part in the remaining claims, the allegations in the PSAC remain deficient
and the Court respectfully recommends that the motion to amend be denied. 	Back,
365 F.3d at 122.
With respect to Suffolk County and the Town of East Hampton, they are no
longer viable Defendants as Judge Donnelly has already held that only the claims
against the previously unnamed Doe Defendants may proceed. MTD Opinion at 48.
In any event, Plaintiffs fail to allege any practice or policy as required to state a claim
against a municipality. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036 (“A municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”); Greene v. City
5 The only distinct allegation is that Gilbride was “was stationed outside the house for traffic control”
and that he could “observe Franklin through the window inside house [sic].” PSAC ¶ 70. Plaintiffs do
not, however, allege that Gilbride participated in the actions that form the basis of their remining
claims.
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of New York, No. 08-CV-243, 2017 WL 1030707, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2017)
(“Municipalities 	may 	be 	sued 	directly 	under 	section 	1983 	for 	constitutional
deprivations imposed upon the plaintiff pursuant to a ‘governmental custom, policy,
or usage of the municipality.’”) (quoting Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80
(2d Cir. 2012)). 	Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to allege a claim against Suffolk County
or the Town of East Hampton and the Court recommends that the motion to amend
be denied with respect to those Defendants. 	Based upon the foregoing, the Court
further recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion to amend be denied as futile.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends that
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint be denied.
IV. 	OBJECTIONS
A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being sent to counsel for all
parties by electronic filing on the date below. 	Any objections to this Report and
Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days. 	See 28
U.S.C. §636 (b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(d). 	Failure to file
objections within this period waives the right to appeal the District Court’s Order.
See Ferrer v. Woliver, No. 05-3696, 2008 WL 4951035, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2008);
Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1997); Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84
F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1996).
Dated: 	Central Islip, New York
January 12, 2026 	s/ Steven I. Locke
STEVEN I. LOCKE
United States Magistrate Judge
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