USA v. Latney et al.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
APPEARANCES
For Defendant: 	Glenn Obedin, Esq.
Obedin & Weissman, LLP
The Courthouse Corporate Center, Suite 4200
320 Carleton Avenue
Central Islip, New York 	11722
For United States: 	Michael R. Maffei, Esq.
United States Attorney’s Office
Eastern District of New York
610 Federal Plaza
Central Islip, New York 	11722
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Presently 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	the 	counseled 	letter
motion 	of 	Defendant 	John 	Gamble 	(“Defendant”) 	seeking 	early
termination 	of 	his 	five 	years 	of 	supervised 	release 	(hereafter,
the 	“Motion”). 	(See 	ECF 	No. 	602.) 	The 	Government 	opposes 	the
Motion. 	(See Opp’n, ECF No. 604.) 	For the reasons stated herein,
the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The 	Court 	presumes 	the 	reader’s 	familiarity 	with 	the
background 	of 	this 	case. 	However, 	for 	the 	reader’s 	convenience,
--------------------------------
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
-against-
JOHN GAMBLE,
Defendant.
--------------------------------
ORDER
No. 18-CR-0606 (JS)
FILED
CLERK
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LONG ISLAND OFFICE
12/4/2025 11:13 am
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the Court provides the following summary. 	After the January 2018
launch 	of 	a 	joint 	investigation 	by 	the 	Federal 	Bureau 	of
Investigation and the Suffolk County East End Drug Task Force into
narcotics 	trafficking 	and 	gang 	activity 	on 	the 	East 	End 	of 	Long
Island, 	it 	was 	revealed 	Defendant 	conspired 	with 	others 	to
distribute heroin in and around the Riverhead, New York area. 	(See
Presentence Report (“PSR”), ECF No. 252 (sealed), ¶¶3-5.) 	During
the 	investigation, 	law 	enforcement 	conducted 	several 	controlled
purchases 	of 	heroin, 	cocaine, 	and 	crack 	cocaine 	from 	Defendant,
which occurred at Defendant’s residence. 	(See id. at ¶¶17-18.)
On January 31, 2020, Defendant pled guilty to the lesser-
included 	charge 	of 	Count 	18 	of 	the 	subject 	Indictment, 	i.e.,
conspiring to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation
of 	21 	U.S.C. 	§§ 	846, 	841(a), 	and 	841(b)(1)(B)(i). 	(See 	Jan. 	31,
2020 Minute Entry, ECF No. 178; PSR at ¶1.) 	Thereafter, on August
12, 	2021, 	Defendant 	was 	sentenced 	to 	66 	months’ 	imprisonment 	and
five years’ supervised release. 	(See Judgment, ECF No. 361.)
Defendant 	was 	released 	from 	Bureau 	of 	Prisons 	(“BOP”)
custody 	on 	July 	21, 	2023, 	at 	which 	time 	he 	began 	his 	supervised
release. 	See Fed. Bureau of Prisons: Find an Inmate, John Gamble
(BOP 	Reg. 	No. 	91247-053), 	https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ 	(last
visited 	Dec. 	4, 	2025) 	(stating 	Defendant 	“Not 	in 	BOP 	Custody 	as
of: 07/21/2023”). 	In seeking early termination of his supervised
release, 	Defendant 	states 	he 	“has 	now 	served 	approximately 	50
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percent 	of 	his 	five-year 	term 	of 	post-release 	supervision” 	and
“[t]hroughout 	this 	period, 	. 	. 	. 	has 	been 	fully 	compliant 	in 	all
respects.” 	(Motion 	at 	2.) 	Further, 	Defendant 	asserts 	his
supervising 	Probation 	Officer 	“has 	no 	opposition” 	to 	the 	Motion.
(Id.) 	He does not elaborate further. 	(See id.)
In 	opposition,1 	the 	Government 	argues 	“being 	fully
compliant with conditions of supervision does not rise to the level
of 	‘exceptionally 	good 	behavior’ 	and 	nor 	does 	it 	warrant 	early
termination of [Defendant’s] supervision.” 	(Opp’n at 2.) 	For the
reasons stated infra, the Court agrees.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Applicable Law
It 	is 	well-established 	a 	court 	has 	discretion 	to
“terminate a term of supervised release and discharge a defendant
‘at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release
. 	. 	. 	if 	it 	is 	satisfied 	that 	such 	action 	is 	warranted 	by 	the
conduct 	of 	the 	defendant 	released 	and 	the 	interest 	of 	justice.’”
United 	States 	v. 	Melvey, 	No. 	07-CR-0055, 	2018 	WL 	6624193, 	at 	*1
(E.D.N.Y. 	Dec. 	18, 	2018) 	(quoting 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	3583(e)(1); 	citing
United 	States 	v. 	Lussier, 	104 	F.3d 	32, 	36 	(2d 	Cir. 	1997)); 	see
also United States v. McKay, 352 F. Supp.2d 359, 360-61 (E.D.N.Y.
1 	The Court notes that, while he was given the opportunity to do
so, Defendant did not file a Reply to the Government’s Opposition.
(Compare 	Oct. 	21, 	2025 	Elec. 	Briefing 	Schedule 	Order, 	with 	Case
Docket, in toto.)
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2005); 	United 	States 	v. 	Andrew, 	No. 	22-CR-0032, 	2025 	WL 	1004752,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2025). 	In exercising this discretion, the
court 	must 	consider 	Section 	3553(a) 	Factors. 	See 	18 	U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(1); 	see 	also 	United 	States 	v. 	Scarpa, 	No. 	18-CR-0123,
2024 	WL 	1886681, 	at 	*1 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Apr. 	30, 	2024); 	Melvey, 	2018 	WL
6624193, 	at 	*2 	(“When 	determining 	whether 	to 	grant 	such 	an
application, the Court also must consider the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4),
(a)(5), 	and 	(a)(6). 	These 	factors 	are 	also 	weighed 	by 	the 	Court
in 	determining 	the 	initial 	sentence.” 	(citing 	§ 	3583(e)(1);
Lussier, 	104 	F.3d 	at 	36 	(stating 	court 	must 	consider 	certain
factors in Section 3553(a) before permitting early termination of
a term of supervised release))). 	“[A] statement that the district
court has considered the statutory factors is sufficient.” 	United
States v. Parker, No. 21-CR-0341, 2025 WL 1635971, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
June 9, 2025) (citation modified).
“Early 	termination 	is 	not, 	however, 	‘warranted 	as 	a
matter 	of 	course’.” 	United 	States 	v. 	Rosario, 	No. 	17-CR-0027,
2023 	WL 	7305260, 	at 	*2 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Nov. 	6, 	2023) 	(quoting 	United
States 	v. 	Bastien, 	111 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	315, 	321 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2015);
further citation omitted)); Parker, 2025 WL 1635971, at *2 (same).
Rather, 	“‘[f]ull 	compliance 	with 	the 	terms 	of 	supervised 	release
is 	what 	is 	expected 	of 	a 	person 	under 	the 	magnifying 	glass 	of
supervised 	release 	and 	does 	not 	warrant 	early 	termination.’”
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Bastien, 	111 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	321 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Fenza,
No. 	03-CR-0921, 	2013 	WL 	3990914, 	at 	*2 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	2, 	2013));
see 	also 	Andrew, 	2025 	WL 	1004752, 	at 	*3 	(denying 	early 	release
from supervised release; while commending defendant for “complying
with the conditions of his current supervision and for his overall
progress 	since 	being 	released 	from 	custody”, 	stating 	“such
compliance 	is 	expected 	of 	one 	under 	supervision” 	(collecting
cases)). 	Indeed, 	as 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	explained 	in 	Lussier,
“early termination is not warranted as a matter of course; on the
contrary, 	it 	is 	only 	‘occasionally’ 	justified 	due 	to 	‘changed
circumstances’ 	of 	a 	defendant, 	such 	as 	‘exceptionally 	good
behavior.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Osorio, 	No. 	11-CR-0524, 	2016 	WL
4098589, 	at 	*1 	E.D.N.Y. 	July 	27, 	2016); 	Melvey, 	2018 	WL 	6624193,
at 	* 	2 	(same); 	see 	also 	McKay 	(stating 	“[c]hanged 	circumstances
that justify early termination include a defendant’s exceptionally
good behavior that makes the previously imposed term of supervised
release 	‘either 	too 	harsh 	or 	inappropriately 	tailored 	to 	serve’
general 	punishment 	goals”). 	“It 	is 	[the 	defendant’s] 	burden 	to
show that such early termination is appropriate.” 	Scarpa, 2024 WL
1886681, at *1.
II. 	Application
Defendant 	has 	not 	met 	his 	burden 	of 	showing 	early
termination 	of 	his 	supervised 	release 	is 	warranted. 	His 	bald
statement 	of 	compliance 	falls 	well 	short 	of 	demonstrating, 	e.g.,
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exceptionally 	good 	conduct, 	or 	that 	granting 	the 	requested 	early
termination would be in the interest of justice. 	See 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(1); 	cf. 	Parker, 	2025 	WL 	1635971, 	at 	*2 	(collecting 	cases
where 	courts 	have 	granted 	motions 	for 	early 	termination 	in 	light
of 	defendants’ 	rehabilitative 	efforts 	and 	exceptionally 	good
conduct), 	and 	at 	*4 	(“Even 	in 	cases 	where 	individuals 	have 	fully
complied 	with 	the 	terms 	of 	their 	supervised 	release, 	courts 	have
found 	that 	such 	conduct 	does 	not 	amount 	to 	‘exceptionally 	good
behavior’ as to render the conditions of their supervised release
‘too 	harsh 	or 	inappropriately 	tailored 	to 	. 	. 	. 	the 	general
punishment 	goals 	of 	[S]ection 	3553(a).’” 	(quoting 	Lussier, 	104
F.3d 	at 	36; 	collecting 	cases)). 	Yet, 	it 	is 	his 	burden 	to 	do 	so.
See Scarpa, 2024 WL 1886681, at *1. 	Hence, given the inadequacies
of 	Defendant’s 	Motion, 	i.e., 	his 	failure 	to 	present 	facts 	and
circumstances 	demonstrating 	“exceptionally 	good 	behavior”, 	the
Court finds consideration of the relevant Section 3553(a) Factors
(see 	Opp’n 	at 	3) 	continue 	to 	require 	supervised 	release. 	Simply
put: 	Without 	more, 	post-incarceration 	conduct 	which 	is
unblemished 	is 	an 	“insufficient 	reason 	to 	terminate 	. 	. 	.
supervised release since, if it were, the exception would swallow
the rule.” 	McKay, 352 F. Supp.2d at 361 (quoting United States v.
Medina, 17 F. Supp.2d 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)); see also Melvey, 2018
WL 6624193, at *2 (same); Osorio, 2016 WL 4098589, at *2 (same).
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY 	ORDERED 	that 	Defendant’s
Motion (ECF No. 602) is DENIED in its entirety without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: 	December 4, 2025
Central Islip, New York
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