Tafolla v. S.C.D.A.O et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: 	Joshua Friedman, Esq.
Phillips & Associates, Attorneys at Law, PLLC
45 Broadway, 28th Floor
New York, New York 10006
For Defendants: 	Helen M. Benzie, Esq.
Law Office of Vincent D. McNamara
Tower Square, 1045 Oyster Bay Road, Suite 1
East Norwich, New York 11732
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Presently 	before 	the 	Court 	are 	motions 	in 	limine 	filed
by 	Plaintiff 	Kim 	Tafolla 	(“Plaintiff”) 	and 	Defendants 	Edward
Heilig 	(“Heilig”), 	Joseph 	Carroll 	(“Carroll”), 	and 	County 	of
Suffolk (individually, “Suffolk” or the “County” collectively with
Heilig 	and 	Carroll, 	“Defendants”). 	(See 	Pl.’s 	Motion, 	ECF 	No.
109; 	Defs.’ 	Motion, 	ECF 	No. 	111; 	collectively 	with 	Pl.’s 	Motion,
the “Motions”; see also Pl.’s Support Memo, ECF No. 109-1; Defs.’
Support 	Memo, 	ECF 	No. 	111-22.) 	The 	parties 	have 	also 	filed
--------------------------------X
KIM L. TAFOLLA,
Plaintiff,
-against-
EDWARD HEILIG, DIVISION C HIEF,
JOSEPH 	CARROLL, 	and 	COUNTY 	OF
SUFFOLK,
Defendants.
--------------------------------X
ORDER
17-CV-4897(JS)(AYS)
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respective 	oppositions 	to 	the 	Motions, 	and 	Defendants 	filed 	an
additional reply brief.1 	(Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 115; Pl.’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 116; Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 117.) For the following reasons,
the Motions are respectively GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTS
The 	Court 	assumes 	the 	parties’ 	familiarity 	with 	the
factual 	background 	giving 	rise 	to 	this 	employment 	action
(hereinafter, the “Action”). 	See Generally Tafolla v. Heilig, 80
F.4th 	111 	(2d 	Cir. 	2023). 	However, 	for 	context 	and 	convenience,
the Court briefly reiterates the relevant facts.
Plaintiff 	was 	a 	Clerk 	Typist 	in 	the 	Suffolk 	County
District Attorney’s Office (the “District Attorney’s Office”) from
2008 	until 	her 	termination 	in 	2015. 	Tafolla, 	80 	F.4th 	at 	114.
Her 	position 	involved 	“‘general 	office 	duties,’ 	including
answering calls, typing various legal documents, [] photocopying,”
and, 	to 	a 	disputed 	extent, 	archiving. 	Id. 	at 	115. 	On 	November
25, 2013, Plaintiff “suffered a spine injury when her vehicle was
rear-ended 	at 	a 	stoplight” 	(hereinafter, 	the 	“Accident”). 	Id.;
(Pl.’s 	Support 	Memo 	at 	1.) 	On 	December 	6, 	2013, 	Plaintiff 	asked
Carroll, 	her 	supervisor, 	whether 	another 	employee 	could
temporarily 	perform 	her 	archiving 	responsibilities 	due 	to 	her
1 Plaintiff did not file a reply brief.
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Accident-related soreness (hereinafter, the “First Request”). 	Id.
On December 10, 2013, after Carroll asked Plaintiff for a doctor’s
note 	detailing 	her 	relevant 	restrictions, 	Plaintiff 	provided 	a
note instructing “on separate lines, ‘[n]o lifting over 5 pounds,
- 	[n]o 	bending, 	pushing 	exercises’ 	and 	that 	Tafolla 	would 	be
revaluated in two months.’” 	Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff 	alleges 	Carroll 	did 	not 	react 	to 	the 	First
Request 	until 	January 	7, 	2014, 	when 	he 	had 	an 	assistant 	district
attorney ask Plaintiff about unarchived files. 	Id. at 115. 	After
Plaintiff told Carroll she could not physically archive due to her
injury, 	Carroll 	asserted 	the 	First 	Request 	restricted 	her 	only
from lifting more than five pounds. 	Id. at 115-16. 	According to
Plaintiff, Carroll warned her that failure to archive could result
in 	transfer 	or 	disability 	leave. 	Id. 	at 	116. 	Plaintiff
subsequently performed some archiving, despite the pain. 	Id. 	On
January 	8, 	Plaintiff 	“called 	in 	sick 	and 	had 	an 	appointment 	with
her spine surgeon, Dr. Robert M. Galler” (“Dr. Galler”), who issued
a doctor’s note stating Plaintiff was “was ‘unable to lift, bend,
twist, or push any object over five pounds’ and that she was ‘able
to perform secretarial work but no physical duties at this time.’”
Id. 	When 	Plaintiff 	“returned 	to 	work 	on 	January 	9, 	there 	were
files piled in front of her desk.” 	Id.
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On 	January 	14, 	Plaintiff 	made 	a 	second 	accommodation
request 	to 	Human 	Resources, 	which 	affixed 	Dr. 	Galler’s 	letter
(hereinafter, 	the 	“Second 	Request”). 	Id. 	A 	Human 	Resources
representative 	responded 	by 	telling 	Plaintiff 	the 	County 	did 	not
offer 	light-duty 	assignments 	and 	added 	any 	accommodation 	was 	at
Carroll’s 	discretion. 	Id. 	Later 	that 	day, 	an 	employee 	from 	the
District Attorney’s Office’s Risk Management department also told
Plaintiff 	the 	County 	did 	not 	offer 	light-duty 	assignments. 	Id.
On January 15, Plaintiff reported to work and was asked to archive
once 	more, 	leading 	her 	to 	believe 	the 	Second 	Request 	had 	been
denied. 	Id. at 117. 	On January 16, Heilig responded to the Second
Request 	via 	a 	memorandum 	(hereinafter, 	the 	“Heilig 	Memo”), 	which
asserted 	the 	First 	Request 	had 	been 	accommodated 	by 	limiting
Plaintiff from lifting files over five pounds and that the County
did 	not 	have 	light 	duty 	assignments. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	interpreted
the 	Heilig 	Memo 	as 	the 	denial 	of 	the 	Second 	Request. 	Id. 	The
Heilig 	Memo 	further 	explained, 	if 	Plaintiff 	could 	not 	archive
without 	restriction, 	she 	would 	need 	to 	take 	medical 	leave. 	Id.
Plaintiff 	subsequently 	left 	work, 	took 	disability 	leave, 	and 	was
terminated in 2015. 	Id.
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 21, 2017, Plaintiff brought this Action. 	Id.
On 	August 	19, 	2021, 	this 	Court 	granted 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	for
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Summary Judgment on all claims. 	Tafolla v. County of Suffolk, No.
17-CV-4897, 	2021 	WL 	3675042 	(E.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	19, 	2021).2 	On 	August
18, 	2023, 	the 	Second 	Circuit 	reversed 	this 	Court’s 	decision 	in
part, holding a reasonable jury could find: (1) “archiving was not
an essential function of” the Clerk Typist position; (2) Defendants
did 	not 	grant 	Plaintiff’s 	requested 	accommodation 	and
“unilaterally ended the interactive process” by issuing the Heilig
Memo; 	and 	(3) 	“[D]efendants 	retaliated 	against 	[Plaintiff] 	for
making the accommodation requests.” 	Id. at 125-26.
Upon 	remand 	to 	this 	Court, 	the 	parties 	attempted 	to
settle 	their 	dispute, 	to 	no 	avail. 	(See 	Generally 	Case 	Docket.)
Thereafter, 	after 	several 	requested 	adjournments, 	a 	Pretrial
Conference 	was 	held 	on 	November 	17, 	2025, 	at 	which 	a 	trial 	date
was scheduled, with jury selection scheduled to commence on April
6, 	2026. 	(See 	Nov. 	17, 	2025 	Minute 	Entry, 	ECF 	No. 	107.) 	Three
Motions followed.
The Motions
I. 	In Limine Motions, Generally
As 	thoroughly 	explained 	by 	Honorable 	Katherine 	B.
Forrest of the Southern District of New York:
In 	limine 	motions 	can 	play 	an 	especially
important 	and 	useful 	role 	in 	a 	jury 	trial,
allowing 	the 	parties 	to 	seek 	rulings 	in
advance 	as 	to 	issues 	that 	otherwise 	may
2 Also found in the Case Docket at ECF No. 78.
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require 	extensive 	side 	bars 	or 	argument 	that
can 	interrupt 	the 	proceedings. 	See 	Palmieri
v. 	Defaria, 	88 	F.3d 	136, 	141 	(2d 	Cir. 	1996);
accord 	Highland 	Capital 	Mgmt., 	L.P. 	v.
Schneider, 551 F. Supp. 2d 173, 176 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). 	Well-grounded 	in 	limine 	motions 	may
also 	require 	the 	parties 	to 	sharpen 	their
focus 	on 	the 	real 	issues 	in 	a 	case 	and
streamline 	their 	presentations. 	See 	In 	re
Methyl 	Tertiary 	Butyl 	Ether 	Prods. 	Liab.
Litig., 517 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666–67 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). . . . 	The Court’s role with regard to
such 	pretrial 	rulings 	is 	grounded 	in 	[R]ule
104 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Evidence. 	That
rule “requires that a court make a preliminary
determination 	of 	the 	admissibility 	of 	all
evidence.” 	SEC 	v. 	Tourre, 	950 	F. 	Supp. 	2d
666, 	675 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2013). 	In 	the 	context 	of
a 	pre-trial 	in 	limine 	ruling, 	challenged
evidence “should only be precluded when it is
‘clearly 	inadmissible 	on 	all 	possible
grounds.’” 	(quoting Commerce Funding Corp. v.
Comprehensive 	Habilitation 	Servs., 	Inc., 	No.
01 Civ. 3796, 2005 WL 1026515, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 	2, 	2005)). 	In 	limine 	rulings 	are
“necessarily 	preliminary—and 	[ 	] 	subject 	to
change 	when 	the 	case 	unfolds.” 	Id. 	at 	676
(citing 	Highland 	Capital 	Mgmt., 	551 	F. 	Supp.
2d at 176; Commerce Funding, 2005 WL 1026515,
at *4). 	“A foundation may be laid contrary to
expectations; 	relevance 	may 	appear 	where
previously considered unlikely; the balancing
of factors under Rule 403 may change as events
in 	the 	courtroom 	drama 	unfold. 	The 	Court
recognizes 	that 	trials 	often 	contain
unexpected 	moments 	and 	developments, 	and[,
thus,] 	the 	parties 	should 	bear 	those
developments in mind when determining whether
to 	drop 	or 	re-raise 	an 	issue 	decided 	by 	this
order.” 	Id.
Luitpold 	Pharm., 	Inc. 	v. 	Ed. 	Geistlich 	Sohne 	A.G. 	Fur 	Chemische
Industrie, 	No. 	11-CV-0681, 	2015 	WL 	5459662, 	at 	*1 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Sept.
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16, 	2015); 	see 	also 	Williams 	v. 	Geraci, 	No. 	14-CV-5742, 	2020 	WL
5848738, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) (discussing MIL standard).
II. 	Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine
Plaintiff 	argues 	this 	Court 	should 	exclude 	six 	of
Defendants’ 	exhibits; 	Defendants’ 	Support 	Memo 	seeks 	an 	order
affirmatively 	permitting 	the 	same 	six 	exhibits. 	(Pl.’s 	Support
Memo 	at 	1-6; 	Defs.’ 	Support 	Memo 	at 	3.) 	The 	Court 	addresses 	both
parties’ arguments below.
A. 	Pre-Accident Archive List
Plaintiff 	seeks 	to 	bar 	a 	list 	of 	files 	she 	purportedly
archived 	between 	June 	14, 	2013 	and 	November 	8, 	2013 	(the
Pre-Accident 	Archive 	List, 	ECF 	No. 	110-1) 	on 	grounds 	it 	is 	not
relevant 	under 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Evidence 	(“Rule”) 	401 	and 	is
unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. 	(Pl.’s Support Memo at 1-2.)
The 	Pre-Accident 	Archive 	List 	is 	not 	relevant 	under 	Rule 	401,
Plaintiff 	contends, 	because 	it 	pre-dates 	the 	Accident; 	does 	not
show whether archiving was an essential job function; and does not
bear on Plaintiff’s accommodation claims. 	(Pl.’s Support Memo at
1-2; Pl.’s Opp’n 	at 53 (citing Altman v. New 	Pub. 	Sch. Dist., No.
13-CV-3253, 2017 WL 66326, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2017)).) Under
3 	Because 	Plaintiff’s 	Opposition 	does 	not 	include 	page 	numbers,
the Court will construe the page with the “Preliminary Statement”
heading as Page No. 1.
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Rule 	403, 	Plaintiff 	speculates 	the 	Pre-Accident 	Archive 	List 	may
cause the jury to incorrectly believe that “because Plaintiff could
archive 	files 	before 	[the 	Accident], 	she 	should 	have 	continued
archiving the files after.” 	(Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.) Defendants argue
the Pre-Accident 	Archive List is 	relevant and admissible because,
by filing suit, 	Plaintiff placed her employment records at issue.
(Defs.’ Support Memo at 8-9.)
The 	Court 	finds 	Plaintiff’s 	arguments 	unavailing.
First, 	“‘the 	definition 	of 	relevance 	under 	[Rule 	401] 	is 	very
broad,’ 	[ 	. 	. 	. 	] 	and 	as 	a 	result, 	the 	standard 	for 	relevance 	is
‘very 	low.’” 	United 	States 	v. 	Jones, 	No. 	16-CR-0553, 	2018 	WL
1115778, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2018) (quoting United States v.
Certified 	Envtl. 	Servs., 	Inc., 	753 	F.3d 	72, 	90 	(2d 	Cir. 	2014);
United 	States 	v. 	Al- 	Moayad, 	545 	F.3d 	139, 	176 	(2d 	Cir. 	2008)).
The 	Pre-Accident 	Archive 	List 	clears 	this 	“very 	low” 	hurdle. 	It
could 	plausibly 	help 	the 	jury 	to, 	for 	example, 	ascertain 	whether
archiving was essential to the Clerk Typist Position. 	Plaintiff’s
Rule 403 argument is entirely speculative: it identifies no clear
basis 	for 	unfair 	prejudice, 	cites 	to 	no 	authorities, 	and 	merely
guesses 	how 	a 	jury 	might 	perceive 	the 	Pre-Accident 	Archive 	List.
Such guesswork does not provide a basis for exclusion; accordingly,
the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion as to the Pre-Accident Archive
List and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion as to the same.
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B. 	Greenzang Documents
Plaintiff 	also 	seeks 	to 	exclude 	two 	lists 	of 	documents
archived 	by 	Jennifer 	Greenzang, 	another 	Clerk 	Typist 	in 	the
District Attorney’s Office, between January 7 and January 10, 2014
(ECF 	Nos. 	110-2 	and 	110-3, 	(collectively, 	the 	“Greenzang
Documents”)). 	(Pl.’s Support Memo at 2-3.) Defendants contend the
Greenzang 	Documents 	are 	relevant 	as 	“comparator 	evidence” 	of 	the
work completed by other Clerk Typists. 	(Defs.’ Opp’n at 7 (citing
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. AZ Metro., No. 15-CV-05370, 2020
WL 7404432 at *11 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (admitting “comparator evidence”
where 	it 	“relate[s] 	to 	those 	holding 	positions 	substantially
similar 	to 	those 	of 	the 	claimants 	at 	or 	around 	the 	time 	their
employment 	with 	defendant 	ended”)).) 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	the
Greenzang 	Documents 	are 	not 	suitable 	comparator 	evidence 	because
Clerk Typists “were permitted to divide up the various tasks among
themselves” 	and 	because 	Plaintiff’s 	disability 	makes 	her 	not
“similarly situated” to Greenzang. 	(Pl.’s Opp’n at 5-6 (responding
to 	Defendants’ 	comparator 	evidence 	argument).) 	Plaintiff
additionally 	argues 	work 	performed 	by 	other 	employees 	is: 	not
relevant under Rule 401 because they do not involve Plaintiff; and
unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, because the jury may believe
Plaintiff 	should 	be 	able 	to 	archive 	if 	Greenzang 	could 	also
archive. (Pl.’ Support Mem. at 2-3; Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.)
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As 	Plaintiff 	observes 	in 	her 	Opposition, 	comparator
evidence 	“must 	relate 	to 	those 	holding 	positions 	substantially
similar 	to 	those 	of 	the 	claimants 	at 	or 	around 	the 	time 	their
employment 	with 	defendant 	ended,” 	and 	Greenzang 	is 	similarly 	a
Clerk Typist. 	(Pl.’s Opposition at 7 (quoting AZ Metro., 2020 WL
7404432 	at 	*11).) 	Defendants 	may 	accordingly 	use 	such 	materials
for 	comparator 	purposes. 	As 	such, 	the 	Greenzang 	Documents 	clear
the 	“very 	low” 	relevance 	threshold, 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	Rule 	403
argument 	is 	speculative 	and 	unavailing. 	See 	Jones, 	2018 	WL
1115778, at *9. 	Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion
on 	the 	Greenzang 	Documents 	and 	GRANTS 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	on 	the
same.
C. 	January 2014 Archive List
Plaintiff also seeks to bar a list of files she allegedly
archived in January 2014, which include her purported handwritten
notations 	listing 	each 	file’s 	weight 	(the 	January 	2014 	Archive
List, 	ECF 	No. 	110-4). 	(Pl.’s 	Support 	Memo 	at 	3-4.) 	The 	January
2014 	Archive 	List, 	Plaintiff 	asserts, 	should 	be 	excluded 	under:
(1) Rule 401, because weight notations “are not relevant to whether
the 	accommodation 	addressed 	the 	bending 	and 	twisting
restrictions;” 	(2) 	Rule 	403, 	speculating 	the 	document 	suggests
“weight 	alone 	determined 	whether 	Plaintiff 	could 	perform
archiving;” 	and 	(3) 	Rule 	901(a), 	as 	Plaintiff 	contends 	the 	list
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lacks 	foundation 	and 	is 	unclear 	as 	to 	who 	“recorded 	the 	weights,
when they were recorded, how the weights were measured, what scale
or method was used, and under what circumstances the measurements
were 	taken.” 	(Id.) 	Defendants 	counter 	that 	the 	January 	2014
Archive List is relevant to demonstrating Plaintiff’s performance
of 	assigned 	duties 	and 	is 	admissible 	as 	a 	business 	record 	under
Rule 	803(6), 	but 	they 	do 	not 	address 	the 	foundation 	argument.
(Defs.’ Opp’n at 7-8.)
While 	Defendants 	are 	correct 	in 	concluding 	the 	January
2014 Archive List is relevant—and while Plaintiff has provided an
unavailing 	and 	speculative 	Rule 	403 	argument—Defendants 	have 	not
meaningfully 	addressed 	Plaintiff’s 	foundation 	argument. 	Accord.
Jackson v. Dempsey, No. 18-CV-3007, 2026 WL 205979, at *17 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 27, 2026) (precluding defendants from calling witness because
they 	“did 	not 	meaningfully 	respond” 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	preclusion
arguments). 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	is 	accordingly 	GRANTED 	as 	to 	the
January 2014 Archive List and Defendants’ Motion as to the same is
DENIED without prejudice to renew. 	If Defendants wish to proffer
proper foundation necessary to introduce the January 2014 Archive
List, they may seek to do so at trial.
D. 	Dierdre Horney Texts
Plaintiff 	additionally 	seeks 	to 	block 	admission 	of 	an
undated 	text 	message 	exchange 	between 	Plaintiff 	and 	Assistant
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District 	Attorney 	Deirdre 	Horney 	(“Horney”), 	wherein 	Plaintiff
explains: she filed a charge against the Suffolk D.A.’s office for
disability 	discrimination; 	the 	injuries 	stemming 	from 	the
Accident; 	and 	her 	purported 	experiences 	at 	the 	D.A.’s 	office 	in
January 	2014. 	(Horney 	Texts, 	ECF 	No. 	110-5, 	at 	1-5.) 	Plaintiff
primarily asserts the Horney Texts are inadmissible because they:
(1) lack authentication under Rule 901(a), including because they
are 	undated; 	(2) 	will 	be 	duplicative 	of 	Plaintiff 	and 	Horney’s
live testimony under Rule 611(a)4; and (3) are unfairly prejudicial
under Rule 403, as the texts “may give undue weight to out-of-court
statements 	that 	are 	not 	subject 	to 	contemporaneous
cross-examination.” 	(Pl.’s Support Memo at 3-5; Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8
(citing 	United 	States 	v. 	McPartland, 	81 	F. 	4th 	101, 	120 	(2d 	Cir.
2023); 	F.H. 	Krear 	& 	Co. 	v. 	Nineteen 	Named 	Trs., 	810 	F.2d 	1250,
1258 (2d Cir. 1987)).) Defendants do not meaningfully address these
arguments 	and 	generally 	assert 	Plaintiff 	put 	her 	employment
records at issue by bringing the Action. 	(Defs.’ Opp’n. at 6-8.)
Because 	Defendants 	did 	not 	address 	Plaintiff’s 	arguments 	on 	the
Horney Texts, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED as to their exclusion,
and Defendants’ Motion is DENIED without prejudice to renew as to
the same. 	See, e.g., Jackson, 2026 WL 205979, at *17.
4 Horney is listed as a potential witness. 	(See “Proposed Pretrial
Order,” ECF No. 95 at 5.)
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E. 	Disability Benefits Application
Defendants 	seek 	to 	proffer 	Plaintiff’s 	April 	9, 	2014
Suffolk 	County 	Disability 	Benefits 	Application 	(the 	Disability
Benefits 	Application, 	ECF 	No. 	110-6) 	to 	explore 	potential
inconsistencies 	between 	Plaintiff’s 	answers 	on 	the 	Disability
Benefits Application and her litigation positions. 	(Defs.’ Opp’n
at 	8.) 	Plaintiff 	contends 	the 	Disability 	Benefits 	Application
should 	be 	excluded 	under 	Rule 	401, 	because: 	(1) 	it 	falls 	outside
of 	the 	“relevant” 	time 	period 	of 	December 	2013 	through 	January
2014; 	(2) 	there 	is 	no 	true 	dispute 	Plaintiff 	began 	suffering
injuries 	following 	the 	Accident 	and 	furnished 	medical 	notes 	in
December 2013 and January 2014; and (3) “plaintiff’s character is
not 	in 	issue, 	either 	as 	an 	essential 	element 	of 	a 	claim 	or
defense.” 	(Pl.’s 	Motion 	at 	5-6; 	Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	at 	8-9 	(quoting
Zubulake 	v. 	UBS 	Warburg, 	LLC, 	382 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	536, 	541 	(S.D.N.Y.
2005)).) 	Plaintiff also asserts, without argumentation, that the
Disability Benefits Application is unfairly prejudicial under Rule
403. 	(Pl.’s Opp’n at 9.)
The Disability Benefits Application includes Plaintiff’s
own 	statements 	about 	her 	purported 	disability 	shortly 	after 	she
stopped 	working 	at 	the 	District 	Attorney’s 	Office. 	Such 	content
more than clears the “very low” relevance hurdle. 	Jones, 2018 WL
1115778, 	at 	*9. 	Plaintiff’s 	“relevant 	time 	period” 	argument 	is
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similarly 	unavailing, 	as 	Plaintiff 	herself 	is 	seeking 	to 	offer
several exhibits post-dating January 2014. 	(See Proposed Pretrial
Order 	at 	9.) 	Additionally, 	Plaintiff’s 	argument 	regarding
character 	evidence 	is 	irrelevant, 	as 	she 	cites 	no 	authority
suggesting 	inquiry 	into 	a 	witness’s 	potential 	prior 	inconsistent
statements 	is 	inappropriate 	in 	this 	context. 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion
on the Disability Benefits Application is accordingly, DENIED, and
Defendants’ Motion on the same is accordingly GRANTED.
F. 	GEICO Form
Plaintiff also seeks to bar admission of a September 18,
2017 form detailing personal injury protection claim payments from
GEICO to Plaintiff (the GEICO Form, ECF No. 110-7). 	(Pl.’s Support
Memo 	at 	5-6.) 	The 	GEICO 	Form 	is, 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	estimation:
irrelevant 	under 	Rule 	401, 	on 	grounds 	the 	insurance 	payments 	are
unrelated 	to 	the 	discrimination 	claims; 	barred 	under 	the
“collateral 	source 	rule”5; 	and 	is 	unfairly 	prejudicial 	per 	Rule
403, 	based 	on 	speculation 	“[t]he 	jury 	may 	improperly 	reduce
Plaintiff’s damages by the amount of insurance payments.” 	(Pl.’s
Support Memo at 6-7.) 	Defendants maintain the GEICO Form includes
statements 	of 	existing 	physical 	condition 	under 	Rule 	803(3),
5 Plaintiff asserts the collateral source rule prohibits “payments
from 	third-party 	sources 	such 	as 	insurance 	should 	not 	reduce 	a
plaintiff’s recovery” but does not cite to any cases on this point.
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statements 	made 	for 	medical 	diagnosis 	or 	treatment 	under 	Rule
803(4), and is relevant to whether Plaintiff mitigated her damages.
(Defs.’ 	Opp’n 	at 	8-9 	(citing 	Bergerson 	v. 	N.Y.S. 	Off. 	of 	Mental
Health, 526 Fed. Appx. 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2013)).) On the mitigation
point, 	Plaintiff 	maintains 	insurance 	payments 	are 	irrelevant
because 	mitigation 	only 	“concerns 	a 	plaintiff’s 	duty 	to 	seek
alternate 	employment 	after 	termination.” 	(Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	at 	10
(citing Bergerson, 526 F. Appx. at 111).)6
Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	meet 	her 	burden 	to 	demonstrate
the GEICO Form “is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.”
United States v. Paredes, 176 F. Supp. 2d 179, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Although 	Plaintiff 	appears 	correct 	that 	Bergerson—which 	both
parties rely upon—suggests Plaintiff’s mitigation obligations are
limited 	to 	seeking 	employment 	opportunities, 	she 	has 	not 	shown
that 	the 	GEICO 	Form 	is 	irrelevant, 	unfairly 	prejudicial, 	or
otherwise inadmissible. 	Bergerson, 526 F. App’x at 111. 	The GEICO
Form 	bears 	close 	enough 	temporal 	relation 	to 	the 	Accident 	such
that 	it 	is 	relevant 	for 	Rule 	401 	purposes, 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	Rule
403 argument is entirely speculative. 	Because “development of the
factual 	record 	at 	trial 	may 	make 	some 	exhibits 	relevant 	in 	ways
6 In support of her argument, Plaintiff’s Support Memo includes a
quote purportedly from Redd v. New York State Division of Parole,
923 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	393, 	399 	(E.D.N.Y. 	2013), 	although 	the 	quoted
language does not actually appear in the opinion.
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the 	Court 	cannot 	currently 	predict,” 	the 	Court 	declines 	to 	take
the 	extreme 	step 	of 	preclusion. 	See 	Jackson, 	2026 	WL 	205979, 	at
*10. 	The Court accordingly DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion on this point
and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion on the same.
III. Defendants’ Motion in Limine
Defendants’ 	Motion 	seeks 	to 	exclude: 	(1) 	certain 	of
Plaintiff’s 	medical 	records; 	(2) 	documents 	from 	Plaintiff’s
pre-lawsuit 	proceeding 	with 	the 	Equal 	Employment 	Opportunity
Commission 	(the 	“EEOC”); 	and 	(3) 	an 	excerpt 	from 	the 	Collective
Bargaining 	Agreement 	between 	Suffolk 	County 	and 	Suffolk 	County
Municipal 	Employees, 	Inc. 	(Defs.’ 	Support 	Memo 	at 	10-15.)
Defendants have also requested, without any accompanying argument,
that 	this 	Court 	preclude 	several 	additional 	documents. 	(Defs.’
Support Memo at 4.) Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ Motion on these
documents; the Court addresses the parties’ arguments below.
A. 	Disputed Medical Records
Defendants 	seek 	to 	bar 	Plaintiff 	from 	introducing 	(1)
Plaintiff’s November 27, 2013 Patient Discharge Summary from Stony
Brook University Hospital (ECF No. 112-8); (2) a December 9, 2013
note that appears to be written by Physician Assistant Eugene King
(“King”), 	with 	the 	accident-related 	work 	limitations 	used 	in 	the
First 	Request 	(ECF 	No. 	112-9); 	(3) 	Plaintiff’s 	January 	14, 	2014
Second 	Request 	packet, 	which 	includes 	Dr. 	Galler’s 	note 	(ECF 	No.
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112-11); 	and 	(4) 	a 	November 	19, 	2014 	note 	from 	Dr. 	Michael 	Guo,
explaining 	Plaintiff 	“remains 	totally 	disabled 	from 	all 	work
related activities” (ECF No. 112-14, together with ECF Nos. 112-8,
112-9, and 112-11, the “Disputed Medical Records”). 	(Defs.’ Support
Memo at 4.) Defendants seek to exclude the Disputed Medical Records
on 	grounds 	Plaintiff 	did 	not 	produce 	certifications 	under 	Rules
803(4), 803(6), and 902, and because none of Plaintiff’s witnesses
can provide foundation. 	(Id. at 10.) Plaintiff maintains exclusion
is 	premature 	and 	additionally 	claims 	foundation 	can 	be 	provided
through 	several 	witnesses, 	including 	King, 	Dr. 	Galler, 	and
Plaintiff herself. 	(Pl.’s Opp’n at 11-12.)
The Court agrees that exclusion of the Disputed Medical
Records 	is 	premature 	at 	this 	stage. 	These 	documents 	are
contemporaneous 	to 	and 	highly 	probative 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	medical
condition. 	Absent 	a 	clear 	showing 	of 	inadmissibility, 	Plaintiff
should 	have 	an 	opportunity 	to 	demonstrate 	foundation 	exists.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion on the Disputed Medical Records is
DENIED 	without 	prejudice. 	Defendants 	may 	renew 	their 	objections
if Plaintiff is unable to lay the requisite foundations.
B. 	EEOC Materials
Defendants 	additionally 	seek 	to 	exclude 	materials
related 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	EEOC 	proceeding 	(the 	EEOC 	Materials, 	ECF
Nos. 112-16, 112-17, 112-18, and 112-19). The EEOC Materials include:
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Defendants’ position paper responding to Plaintiff’s EEOC charge;
the 	EEOC’s 	determination 	letter 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	claim; 	a 	letter
from Suffolk County to the EEOC denying Plaintiff’s charge; and a
letter 	from 	the 	EEOC 	to 	the 	parties. 	(See 	Generally 	EEOC
Materials.) 	Defendants 	contend 	such 	materials 	are 	cumulative 	and
“seek 	to 	usurp 	the 	jury’s 	role 	and 	function.” 	(Defs.’ 	Support
Memo 	at 	13-14.) 	Plaintiff 	contends 	the 	EEOC 	Materials 	relevantly
record Defendants’ own admissions and characterizations of events
and 	may 	be 	useful 	in 	the 	event 	Defendants 	provide 	“shifting
explanations for adverse actions [which would] constitute evidence
of 	pretext.” 	(Pl.’s 	Opp’n 	at 	18 	(citing 	Kwan 	v. 	Andalex 	Grp.,
LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846-47 (2d Cir. 2013)).) Any risk of prejudice,
Plaintiff 	contends, 	can 	be 	addressed 	with 	limiting 	jury
instructions. 	(Id. at 18-19.)
The Court agrees the EEOC Materials are cumulative. 	They
provide no original probative insights into whether: archiving was
an 	essential 	function 	of 	the 	Clerk 	Typist 	position; 	whether
Plaintiff 	received 	an 	accommodation; 	or 	Plaintiff 	was 	retaliated
against. 	To the extent the EEOC Materials summarize facts related
to the issues, several fact witnesses may testify to those facts.
See Jackson, 2026 WL 205979, at *9 (“To the extent Plaintiff wishes
to 	obtain 	testimony 	based 	on 	what 	certain 	witnesses 	[said 	in 	an
excluded 	report], 	those 	witnesses 	can 	speak 	for 	themselves.”).
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Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	GRANTS 	Defendants’ 	Motion; 	to 	the 	extent
the EEOC Materials become relevant (such as, as Plaintiff argues,
to 	establish 	prior 	inconsistent 	statements), 	Plaintiff 	may 	renew
her Motion seeking their introduction at trial.
C. 	CBA Excerpt
In 	a 	three-sentence 	argument, 	Defendants 	assert 	“[t]he
Collective Bargaining Agreement has nothing to do with the alleged
reasonable 	accommodation 	or 	retaliation 	issues” 	and 	should
accordingly be excluded. 	(Defs.’ Support Memo at 15 (citing Int’l
Mins. 	and 	Res., 	S.A. 	v. 	Pappas, 	96 	F.3d 	at 	586).) 	Plaintiff, 	on
the 	other 	hand, 	contends 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement’s
“job description” section is relevant to “whether archiving was an
essential 	function 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	position” 	and 	because 	it 	may
contradict Defendants’ “no light duty” policy statements. 	(Pl.’s
Opp’n at 20-21 (citing ECF No. 112-20, the “CBA Excerpt”).) Given
the 	brevity 	of 	Defendants’ 	argument 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	legitimate
reason 	for 	introducing 	the 	CBA 	Excerpt, 	Defendants 	have 	not 	met
their 	burden 	on 	this 	claim; 	it 	is 	accordingly 	DENIED 	without
prejudice to renew.
D. 	Additional Documents
Defendants’ 	Support 	Memo 	additionally 	seeks 	an 	order
precluding 	Plaintiff’s 	Proposed 	Exhibits 	8, 	10, 	13, 	and 	17 	(ECF
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Nos. 	112-10, 	112-12, 	112-13, 	112-14, 	collectively 	the 	“Additional
Documents”) 	on 	various 	general 	hearsay, 	relevance, 	and
authentication 	grounds, 	although 	Defendants 	make 	no 	substantive
arguments as to any of these documents. 	(See Defs.’ Support Memo
at 16; Pl.’s Opp’n at 15-17.)7 	Such bald assertions do not satisfy
Defendants’ 	burden 	of 	demonstrating 	inadmissibility 	and 	are,
accordingly, DENIED without prejudice to renew.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that each of the Motions (ECF Nos.
109 and 111) is granted in part and denied in part, as summarized
below and in the more fully expressed body of this ORDER:
I. 	Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED in 	part and DENIED 	in part,
such that it is:
A. 	DENIED as to the Pre-Accident Archive List;
B. 	DENIED as to the Greenzang Documents;
C. 	GRANTED as to the January 2014 Archive List;
D. 	GRANTED as to the Horney Texts;
E. 	DENIED as to the Disability Benefits Application; and
F. 	DENIED as to the Geico Form;
7 	In 	support 	of 	her 	argument 	as 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Exhibit 	No. 	10,
Plaintiff’s 	Support 	Memo 	includes 	a 	quote 	purportedly 	from 	Stern
v. 	Trustees 	of 	Columbia 	Univ., 	131 	F.3d 	305, 	313 	(2d 	Cir. 	1997),
although 	the 	quoted 	language 	does 	not 	actually 	appear 	in 	the
opinion.
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II. 	Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in 	part and DENIED 	in part,
such that it is
A. 	GRANTED as to the Pre-Accident Archive List;
B. 	GRANTED as to the Greenzang Documents;
C. 	DENIED as to the January 2014 Archive List;
D. 	DENIED as to the Horney Texts;
E. 	GRANTED as to the Disability Benefits Application;
F. 	GRANTED as to the Geico Form;
G. 	DENIED as to the Disputed Medical Records;
H. 	GRANTED as to the EEOC Materials;
I. 	DENIED as to the CBA Excerpt; and
J. 	DENIED as to the Additional Documents.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: March 12, 2026
Central Islip, New York
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