Johnson v. Suffolk County et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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CHAD S. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
-against-
SUFFOLK COUNTY, SCPD
HEADQUATERS, SEAN COMISKEY,
MICHAEL SOTO, and SEAN P.
MCQUAID,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
11-CV-2481(SIL)
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STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:
Presently before the Court in this excessive force action brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) is Plaintiff Chad Johnson’s (“Plaintiff” or “Johnson”)
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) after a jury verdict in favor of Defendants Sean Comiskey
(“Comiskey”), 	Michael Soto (“Soto”) and Sean P. McQuaid (“McQuaid”).1 	See DE
[167], [168], [169]. Specifically, Johnson argues that certain evidence was admitted
at trial in contravention of earlier rulings on the parties’ motions in limine that was
unduly prejudicial, thereby tainting the verdict. For the reasons set forth below, the
motion is denied.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Trial Testimony
1 Defendants Suffolk County and SCPD Headquarters were dismissed from this case prior to trial. See
DE [5], [18].
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The following facts are drawn from the testimony at trial.2 On the date of the
alleged use of excessive force, May 24, 2010, Plaintiff was 22 years old, 5’ 11” and
weighing approximately 145 to 150 pounds. Tr. 59. He worked as a stock boy on the
overnight shift at a local Stop & Shop and was a student at Briarcliff College. Tr. 60-
61. At the time he lived with his then girlfriend-now wife Paulette Plant, her sister,
her sister’s partner and their child. Tr. 61, 120.
On April 6, 2010, Plaintiff was visited by two detectives from the Suffolk
County Police Department, Thomas McDougal and Mark Pulaski, in connection with
a murder. Tr. 120, 380-81, 518.3 The conversation was friendly and Johnson was not
arrested. Tr. 121. Johnson concedes that he was dishonest with the detectives during
this conversation. Tr. 229-30.
Plaintiff’s first interaction with Defendants Detectives Soto and Comiskey was
on April 9, 2010. 	Tr. 119, 122, 489, 517-18. 	Soto and Comiskey came to Johnson’s
house, sometime between 11:00 a.m. and noon, Tr. 124-25, 129, 381-82, and the three
of them wound up talking in the unmarked police car the detectives arrived in, with
Soto and Comiskey in front and Plaintiff in the back seat. Tr. 125-26, 384, 489, 519-
20. The initial conversation ended so that Plaintiff could have lunch with Ms. Plant
and then the three of them met again afterwards at approximately 1:30 p.m. at a deli
across from where his wife worked. 	Tr. 130-32; see Tr. 385-86, 520-21. 	The
conversation then continued in the unmarked car, again with the detectives in front
2 References to the trial transcript are citations to “Tr.” See DE [167-3], [167-4], [167-5].
3 Plaintiff was ultimately convicted of the murder, but the jury was not told the nature of the
underlying crime or the substance of Johnson’s confession. See DE [167-3], [167-4], [167-5].
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and Johnson in the back seat. Tr. 133, 387, 490. At this point the conversation turned
to the case the detectives were investigating. 	Tr. 135. 	During this interaction the
three of them took a ride with Plaintiff directing the detectives to various locations
in Bay Shore that Johnson thought would be relevant to the case under investigation.
Tr. 145-46, 152-53, 159, 402-03, 490, 524-25. 	The conversation that day was not
adversarial or aggressive. Tr. 154
During this conversation one of the detectives took notes and Plaintiff was
given a written statement and documentation of the directions he had given. Tr. 135-
36, 526-27. On the one hand Johnson testified that he did not sign the statement or
the directions that day, and the detectives left, although he admits that he did initial
and sign the directions at some point. Tr. 136-37, 159-60. On the other, Defendants
testified that he did sign the statement on that day, the statement is signed by
Johnson on each page, and there are multiple places where Plaintiff initialed his
(Johnson’s) edits. 	See Tr. 391-401, 411 & Exhibit (“Ex.”) PP. 	In addition to this
written statement, Defendants wrote a second statement consisting of the directions
that Johnson gave Soto and Comiskey to visit various locations related to their
investigation. 	Tr. 	406-07 	& 	Ex. 	QQ. 	Johnson 	signed 	the 	directions 	as 	an
acknowledgment of their accuracy after making two corrections, which he initialed.
Tr. 403, 410 & Ex. QQ. At no time during this interaction did Plaintiff have a problem
with Defendants and he did not ask for a lawyer. Tr. 195-96. Nor was Johnson under
arrest at this time. Tr. 523 (Plaintiff was free to go).
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The next time Johnson saw Detectives Soto and Comiskey, or anyone from the
Suffolk County Police Department, was May 24, 2010. 	See Tr. 164-65, 416-17, 490,
530. On that day, while driving his younger brother’s car to drop his wife and brother
off at work, Plaintiff was pulled over by Defendant McQuaid. Tr. 61-62, 178-79, 324,
533. McQuaid asked Johnson for his license and registration, which Plaintiff did not
have, so he provided his New York State identification. Tr. 62, 179, 324; see Tr. 418-
19. McQuaid went back to his car, and then upon his return, directed Johnson to step
out of the car, which he did, and McQuaid arrested and handcuffed him. Tr. 62, 179-
80, 324-25. 	McQuaid then put Plaintiff in McQuaid’s car, while he searched
Johnson’s vehicle. Tr. 63, 180; see Tr. 325. Upon McQuaid’s return he told Johnson
that Detective Soto wanted to speak with him. Tr. 63.
The two traveled to police headquarters in Yaphank, where Plaintiff was
brought in through the loading dock behind police headquarters. Tr. 64, 182, 184-85,
326-27. 	After entering, Johnson saw Soto, whom he recognized from the prior
interaction. 	Tr. 64-65; see Tr. 330. 	Plaintiff was then taken to an interview room
where he was given a chair and handcuffed to a chain connected to the floor. Tr. 65-
66, 189-90, 201, 329, 332-34, 491, 541-42. 	McQuaid then left the room and
Defendants Soto and Comiskey entered. Tr. 66-67, 335.
According to Johnson, he asked to speak with a lawyer and Defendants
refused. Tr. 67. And when he was asked to sign a Miranda form, advising him of his
rights to remain silent and to have an attorney, he declined, asked to speak with a
lawyer again, and in response Soto punched him in the face. 	Tr. 70; see Tr. 194-97.
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Plaintiff eventually signed the Miranda card when he was forced to. Tr. 197. In any
event, after being punched, Johnson fell to the floor, still cuffed, and tried to curl into
a fetal position, while Soto kicked him screaming racial slurs and obscenities. Tr. 70-
71, 197-98, 202-03. The assault took a couple of seconds and Comiskey stood by the
door while it happened, until Comiskey pulled Soto away. 	Tr. 71. 	Both detectives
then left the room. Tr. 71-72.
Defendants told a different story. According to Detective Soto, Johnson signed
the Miranda card and agreed to speak with him. 	Tr. 426-28, 539 & Ex. F. 	The
detectives did not leave the room until after they raised certain inconsistencies in
Johnson’s prior statements after which Plaintiff became “less talkative.” Tr. 430-31.
It was during this break that McQuaid, along with another detective, brought
Johnson’s brother Dartanion Johnson into the precinct. 	Tr. 433-34; see Tr. 495.
Dartanion provided information that was relevant to the investigation, and Soto
subsequently spoke with him. 	Tr. 440-41.
Fifteen minutes later the detectives returned to the room where Johnson was
being held with a third unidentified officer who had a camera and a white jumpsuit.
Tr. 72. According to Johnson, Comiskey then told Plaintiff that his clothes had to be
collected as evidence and that he should change into the jumpsuit, which he did. Tr.
72. According to Soto, Plaintiff was given the jumpsuit because he was cold. Tr. 484.
The third officer then told Johnson that he needed to take pictures of Plaintiff, which
he did. Tr. 72-73, 209-11 (the photos were taken after the first assault), 482 & Exs.
J1-J16. In this regard, the Court notes that, although Plaintiff claims that the photos
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show redness where he was hit, see Tr. 76-77, the photos, including a close-up head
shot, and a picture of Johnson in his boxer shorts, show no physical injury, either to
Plaintiff’s body or face. See Exs. J1-J16.4
After the photos were taken, the third officer left, and Soto and Comiskey
remained in the interview room with Plaintiff. 	Tr. 77. 	According to Johnson, Soto
again asked him to sign the Miranda card, Plaintiff responded that he did not want
to, and Soto replied that he (Johnson) was not getting a lawyer. 	Tr. 77. 	Soto then
again punched Plaintiff in the face sending him to the floor and kicked him a couple
of times. 	Tr. 78, 198-99. 	The assault lasted only a couple of seconds, with Soto
stopping on his own. 	Tr. 78. 	Soto left the room with Johnson still on the floor and
Comiskey remained. Tr. 79. Comiskey then reiterated that Plaintiff should tell Soto
what he wanted to know, and when Johnson asked for a lawyer again, Comiskey
started choking him, punching him in the stomach and screaming at him that he
needed to talk and sign the Miranda card. Tr. 79-80; see Tr. 198-201. This lasted one
or two minutes and then Comiskey left. Tr. 80.
Further according to Johnson, Detective McQuaid then entered the room,
smacked Plaintiff and exited. 	Tr. 81, 215. 	After which, Johnson was left alone for
several hours until Soto and Comiskey re-entered. 	Tr. 82. 	Upon returning the
detectives advised Johnson that they picked up Dartanion, with whom Plaintiff
testified he is close, and who they were beating up in the next room. Tr. 82, 217-18.
4 There was some evidence read into the record about defense counsel at the subsequent arraignment
saying that Plaintiff appears to have injured his shoulder/arm and there was a mark on his eye and
the prosecution disagreeing. Tr. 102-03.
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McQuaid then entered and said the same thing. 	Tr. 83; see Tr. 336 (McQuaid and
another detective arrested Plaintiff’s brother). 	The threats continued and Johnson
asked to speak with his brother. Tr. 83-84, see Tr. 116. Plaintiff was then taken to
Dartanion. 	Tr. 84-85, 218, 221, 443. 	When Johnson entered the room, his brother
was crying and had marks all over him. 	Tr. 85; see Tr. 443, 546. 	McQuaid denied
inflicting any type of physical abuse on Dartanion and denied seeing anyone else
strike Plaintiff’s brother. See Tr. 337, 344. In any event, Plaintiff hugged his brother,
kissed him on the forehead, and told him everything was going to be okay. 	Tr. 85,
221, 346, 550. 	Then, according to Johnson, he turned to Soto, cursed him out and
said he wanted a lawyer, to which Soto responded by punching Plaintiff in the back
of his head. 	Tr. 85. 	Johnson fell to the floor and Soto dragged him out of the room
back to the original interview room. Tr. 86.
At this point Plaintiff said he would cooperate. Tr. 86. At Johnson’s request,
Soto and Comiskey took him out to the loading dock to smoke a cigarette. Tr. 86-87,
223, 444, 498-99, 551. 	The loading dock is not secluded. 	It’s used by employees to
enter and exit the building as well as for deliveries, and it has an entrance for people
with disabilities. 	Tr. 444 & Exs. MM1, MM5, MM11 & MM23. 	Then, according to
Johnson, on the loading dock Plaintiff started screaming at Soto that he would not
speak to them, and he wanted a lawyer. 	Tr. 87. 	Soto then grabbed Johnson and
pinned him against the wall and told Plaintiff he was going to talk and Johnson
agreed. 	Tr. 88. 	Afterwards, Johnson was put back in the interview room and the
detectives left. Tr. 90.
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Not long after that, Soto and Comiskey took Plaintiff in a car to a location
where evidence may have been. 	Tr. 90, 225, 349, 552-53. 	Other officers followed
them there. Tr. 90; see Tr. 348-49, 350-51 (McQuaid and other detectives went also).
Johnson showed them where potential evidence was and was then driven back to
police headquarters where he was put back in the interview room. 	Tr. 91, 242-44,
461, 463-65. 	He was there for approximately a half-hour. 	Tr. 242, 463. 	Several
photographs of Johnson were taken while he was outdoors at the location with the
evidence. 	Tr. 242-43, 351-52, 464-65 & Exs. I1–I4. 	The Court notes that in two of
these four photos Plaintiff’s face is clearly visibly and there are no injuries depicted.
See Exs. I2 & I4. Soto and Comiskey then entered and said that they wanted Plaintiff
to give a statement. 	Tr. 91; see Tr. 466. 	According to Johnson, he (Plaintiff) then
gave them a statement, during which Soto said that Plaintiff is lying, screamed
obscenities, and punched and kicked him again and left the room, while Comiskey,
who was taking notes, remained. 	Tr. 92-93; see Tr. 466, 469 & Ex. E (written
statement given). Comiskey then smacked Johnson, accused him of lying and told
Plaintiff to tell Soto what he wanted to know. Tr. 93. Comiskey then left the room.
Tr. 93.
Both detectives returned sometime later and told Johnson that they wanted
him to sign some statements. Tr. 94. According to Plaintiff, when he replied that he
did not want to sign the statements, and then asked to read them, Soto smacked him
in the head more than once. 	Tr. 94-95. 	Then when Johnson attempted to sign the
statements in a sloppy fashion, Soto hit him again and told him to do it more neatly.
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Tr. 95-96. 	The detectives then left the room. 	Tr. 97. 	Eventually Plaintiff signed a
statement detailing what he did. Tr. 232, 246. According to Johnson, he was forced
to sign it. Tr. 232.
Plaintiff was then taken to the local precinct and to court the next day. Tr. 97-
99. 	After the arraignment Johnson was transported to Riverhead Correctional
Facility (“Riverhead”) where he was photographed, booked and taken to medical. Tr.
109-13 & Ex. K & L2 (a blowup of K). 	Although Plaintiff testified that the photos
depict bruising and a cut, see Tr. 113, the Court notes that the jury could have
reasonably concluded that neither of these pictures show any injuries to Plaintiff’s
face and they essentially show Johnson in the same condition during the events at
issue. 	See Exs. J1-J16 & I1-I4. 	The Court also notes, that in addition to admitting
that he was dishonest during his initial interaction with Suffolk County police officers
on April 6, 2010, he was also dishonest during his interactions with Detectives Soto
and Comiskey. 	Tr. 230. 	Moreover, although Plaintiff contends that he had a scar
over his right eye as the result of being assaulted by Defendants, he concedes that
the photo of him being taken upon admission to Riverhead after his arraignment
shows no scrape, cut or bleeding. Tr. 236-37.
Finally, the Court notes that Defendants deny using any physical force on
Plaintiff at any time, and that Johnson never indicated that he did not want to speak
with them. 	See Tr. 390, 444, 453, 462, 473, 487, 492, 494, 550, 557. 	According to
Defendants, Plaintiff never indicated that he did not want to sign a statement. 	Tr.
522-23, 528.
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B. 	Plaintiff’s Motion
Plaintiff now moves for a new trial arguing that the admission at trial of
certain “testimonial and documentary evidence related to the murder investigation
and Plaintiff’s conviction for murder in violation of the Court’s own motion in limine
rulings . . . constitute[d] prejudicial error.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
for a New Trial (“Pl. Mem.”), DE [167-1] at 1. During oral argument on the various
motions in limine, the Court ruled that the fact of Plaintiff committing or confessing
to the murder that led to the investigation and interrogation by Defendants was
precluded. See Oral Argument Tr. Jan 7, 2025, DE [167-2], Ex. A at 59, 64-65.
The essence of Johnson’s motion is that despite the Court ruling on motions in
limine that evidence concerning his murder conviction was precluded, several pieces
of evidence “directly related to the murder” were nevertheless inappropriately
admitted, the totality of which was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. See
Pl. Mem. at 2-3, 4, 7. Specifically, the Court admitted certain written statements by
Plaintiff, handwritten by Defendants, which Johnson then signed. 	See Exs. E, PP,
RR. 	These exhibits and related testimony concern a woman getting into his car on
the day in question. See Pl. Mem. at 4. Exhibit QQ contains directions to a location
that Plaintiff took Defendants to as part of their investigation, again handwritten by
Defendants and signed by Johnson. 	See Ex. QQ. 	Other purportedly prejudicial
testimony was admitted concerning Johnson taking Defendants to a wooded area
near his home to show Defendants where potential evidence was located, a buccal
swab exemplar, see Ex. V-4, and finally, that during their testimony concerning their
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career background, including various promotions Defendants obtained, that they had
been promoted to homicide detectives. Pl. Mem. at 4-5. When the admission of this
evidence is considered against the totality of the trial evidence, it becomes clear that
a new trial would be inappropriate. Therefore, and for the reasons set forth below,
the motion is denied.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides for a new trial where there are
“substantial errors” in the admission of evidence that cause the jury to reach a
“seriously erroneous” verdict resulting in a “miscarriage of justice.” Stampf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 761 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted); Graham
v. City of New York, 128 F. Supp. 3d 681, 704-05 (E.D.N.Y. 2021). The motion should
be granted where the jury’s verdict is “egregious.” DLC Mgt. Corp. v. Town of New
Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998). 	A new trial should be denied where
there is only harmless error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Harmless error occurs where the
evidence at issue is unimportant relative to the rest of the evidence the jury
considered. See Hynes v. Coughlin, 79 F.3d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 1996).
B. 	Analysis
1. 	The evidence at issue was not admitted in error
Initially, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the evidence at issue was
admitted in error. 	The main thrust of Johnson’s position is that the erroneously
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admitted evidence established that he “hired a sex worker and was convicted of
murder.” Pl. Mem. at 7. The actual evidence at issue demonstrates otherwise.
In pretrial proceedings, the Court ruled that evidence showing that Plaintiff
was convicted of murder was precluded, and it was. With respect to Exhibits E, PP,
QQ, RR and V-4, they were admitted for the limited purpose of allowing Defendants
to argue that Plaintiff’s signature was sufficiently neat and did not show any sign of
the duress he allegedly experienced while in custody. 	The Court went to great
lengths to make sure that unduly prejudicial material in these documents was
redacted before it was presented to the jury. See Oral Argument Tr. Jan. 7, 2025, at
64-66; Tr. 41-43 (concluding on that first day of trial that further redactions were
appropriate). 	Exhibit E is a highly redacted written statement that basically
confirms Johnson’s movements during sometime at the end of March 2010. Exhibit
PP states only that a few weeks prior to that statement Plaintiff called a woman to
meet up with her. 	Exhibit QQ is a series of driving directions which supports
Defendants’ testimony as to what happened during their investigation. Any related
testimony about the location of potential evidence did not address the nature of the
crime being investigated and there was no further testimony about who this woman
was or what, if any, interaction she had with Johnson. 	Exhibit RR confirms that
Plaintiff went with Defendants to certain locations and that he met up with a
girl. There is nothing about a murder or sex work in any of these exhibits. 	Exhibit
V-4 is simply a buccal swab exemplar consent form, which at most demonstrates law
enforcement’s effort to confirm Plaintiff’s identity—it says nothing about the nature
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of the crime being investigated and there was no further testimony about it. Exhibit
V-4 was admitted simply to allow Defendants to support their testimony concerning
the 	timeline 	of 	events. 	Finally, 	as 	to Defendants’ testimony 	concerning 	their
assignments throughout their careers, including to the Major Case Squad of the
Homicide Section during the period in question, this testimony was never connected
to any other testimony or evidence. In short, no evidence was admitted contrary to
the Court’s in limine ruling concerning Plaintiff’s murder conviction, nor was any
unduly prejudicial evidence admitted sufficient to warrant a new trial.
2. 	Even if evidence was erroneously admitted, any error was harmless
as the totality of the evidence was sufficient for the jury to return
a defense verdict.
Even if Johnson is correct, and the evidence at issue was improperly admitted,
any error was harmless, and so a new trial is unwarranted. There are several pieces
of other evidence that are sufficient to support the defense verdict regardless of the
evidence at issue. 	Despite Plaintiff’s claims of physical abuse by Defendants,
numerous photographs of Johnson were submitted into evidence depicting him
throughout the time period when he claims he was subject to excessive force. 	See
Exs. J1-J16, I1-I4, K, & L-2. 	A jury could reasonably conclude that he appears
identical in all of them—with no evidence of injury.
Next, during the course of the trial, all sides testified that at some point during
Plaintiff’s questioning at the Suffolk County police station, his brother Dartanion was
brought in for questioning and the two of them spoke. 	See Tr. 85, 221, 346, 550.
Accordingly, Dartanion, with whom Johnson testified he was close, presumably could
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have corroborated some of Plaintiff’s version of events, at least whether Johnson
appeared injured when they spoke, or that Plaintiff was dragged from the room. Yet
Johnson never called his brother to testify. A reasonable jury could have determined
that Dartanion’s absence was especially glaring because Plaintiff submitted no
evidence 	whatsoever 	to 	corroborate 	any 	portion 	of 	his 	version 	of 	events—no
corroborating witnesses or documents of any kind. While this lack of evidence may
not have been fatal to his claims, the jury was free to weigh this with all the other
evidence submitted.
And though more subtle, but still questionable, was Plaintiff’s testimony that
he was forced to sign hastily a series of statements against his will, but most of these
statements contain edits neatly made and initialed, indicating time taken for a more
thorough review. See, e.g., Exs. E (containing several initialed edits), PP (same), QQ
(same).
Finally, Johnson admitted that he lied to the police during the course of the
investigation. 	See Tr. 230. 	The jury could have relied on all of this to question
Plaintiff’s credibility at trial, and conclude that he failed to prove his case.
When the contested evidence is considered in light of all of this other
testimony, and Plaintiff’s lack of any corroborating evidence, it becomes clear that
even 	if 	the 	evidence 	at 	issue 	was 	admitted 	in 	error, 	any 	error 	was
harmless. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial is denied.
III. 	CONCLUSION
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For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59 is denied.
Dated: 	Central Islip, New York
January 29, 2026
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Steven I. Locke
STEVEN I. LOCKE
United States Magistrate Judge
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