Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
GABRIEL ALEJANDRO MEZA-
FIGUEREDO,
Petitioner,
– against –
PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as
U.S. Attorney General, MARCOS
CHARLES, in his official capacity as
Acting Executive Associate Director,
Enforcement and Removal Operations,
TODD M. LYONS, in his official capacity
as Acting Director, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, MARKWAYNE
MULLIN, Acting Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-cv-01320 (NCM)
NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:
On February 25, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
arrested and detained petitioner Gabriel Alejandro Meza-Figueredo. Verified Emergency
Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) ¶¶ 1, 20, ECF No. 1. Petitioner is currently being
detained by respondents at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, New
York. Pet. ¶ 7; see also Resp’ts Letter dated Mar. 10, 2026 (“Response”) 2, ECF No. 7. He
now petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243.
Pet. ¶¶ 1, 61–64. 1 For the reasons discussed below, the Petition is GRANTED.
1 	The Petition identifies Kristi Noem as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “if the defendant
in an official capacity suit leaves office, the successor to the office replaces the originally
named defendant.” Watt v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 3d 212, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 2024)
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native citizen of Venezuela who came to the United States on
September 12, 2023. Pet. ¶¶ 12–13. Three days after he crossed the border without
inspection, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) briefly detained petitioner and served
him with a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182. See
Pet. ¶ 14; see also Resp. 1. 2 ICE released petitioner on his own recognizance the same day.
Pet. ¶ 14–15; Resp. 1. Petitioner moved to New York where he has “resided while pursuing
protection from removal in immigration court proceedings.” Pet. ¶ 16. Specifically,
petitioner timely filed an application for asylum and for withholding of removal, alleging
that he fears persecution in Venezuela based on his political opposition to the Venezuelan
government. Pet. ¶¶ 17–18. Throughout his time in the United States, petitioner “has
complied with all immigration reporting obligations and has maintained regular contact
with immigration authorities.” Pet. ¶ 19.
On February 25, 2026, petitioner was pulled over by police during a routine traffic
stop. Pet. ¶ 20. Petitioner was then “taken into immigration custody” and detained by ICE.
Pet. 20. Petitioner was transferred to the MDC, where he remains in respondents’ custody.
Pet. ¶ 21; Resp. 2.
On March 6, 2026, petitioner initiated the instant action by filing for a writ of
habeas corpus from this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2243. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 61, 64. The same
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)). Accordingly, the Court substitutes Kristi Noem with the
above-listed defendant. See Feng Chen on behalf of Jiang Jinghon v. Sessions, 321 F.
Supp. 3d 332, 334 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2018). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed
to amend the caption of the case as above.
2 	Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers
assigned in ECF filing headers.
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day, the Court issued an order preserving its jurisdiction, and directing respondents to
state the statutory provision(s) under which respondents assert the authority to detain
petitioner, and to address whether the instant petition is controlled by the Court’s prior
opinions in Y- C- v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06558, 2025 WL 3653496 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025),
Crespo Tacuri v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06896, 2026 WL 35569 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2026),
Terrero v. Tsoukaris, No. 26-cv-00869 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2026). Scheduling Order 2–3,
ECF No. 4. Respondents filed a letter-response in lieu of a formal memorandum of law on
March 10, 2026, which discussed the Court’s prior decisions in Crespo and Y-C-. Resp. 3.
Respondents stated that it is their position that petitioner’s detention is subject to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Resp. 2. Nevertheless, respondents explain that while they “disagree with
the Court’s decisions in Crespo Tacuri and Y-C-, they acknowledge that those decisions
wound control the result in this case . . . as the facts of this case are materially
indistinguishable[.]” Resp. 3.
Although petitioner has not yet filed a reply, “[t]he Court issues the instant Order
before [p]etitioner’s deadline to file a reply in light of its obligation to determine the facts,
and dispose of habeas petitions expeditiously, as law and justice require.” Ccorihuaman v.
Genalo, No. 26-cv-00554, 2026 WL 328983, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2243). 3
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 authorizes federal district courts “to grant a writ of habeas corpus
whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
3 	Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes,
and citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.
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the United States.’” Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3)). Under Section 2241, “[f]ederal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus claims by noncitizens challenging the constitutionality of their 	detention.”
Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-06065, 2025 WL 3314420,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (citing Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir.
2020)).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends, among other things, that he is being detained in violation of
the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 4 Pet. ¶¶ 23–27, 31–34. The
government’s response does not meaningfully dispute these assertions aside from
“rely[ing] upon, and incorporat[ing] by reference, the legal arguments presented by the
Government in Crespo Tacuri and Y-C-,” Resp. 3, and by noting that its position has been
adopted and affirmed by courts within the Second and Fifth Circuits, Resp. 3 n.3. 5
4 	The Court does not reach petitioner’s claims arising under the Administrative
Procedure Act, the Equal Protection Clause, or his “statutory right to seek asylum.” See
Pet. ¶¶ 28–30, 35–37, 40–43.
5 	Respondents also “respectfully disagree that the prior release of petitioner under
Section 1226 is controlling.” Resp. 2 n.2. It’s unclear whether respondents argue that this
petitioner’s prior release by ICE when he crossed the border in 2023 does not control the
outcome here, Resp. 2, or whether they argue that any individual’s prior release by ICE
does not control the determination of which INA provision a subsequent detention is made
pursuant to because “if one presidential administration fails to enforce a statute, the
next administration can[] enforce it . . . [if] the statute clearly applies,” Resp. 2 n.2 (quoting
Xiaoquan Chen v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-08350, 2025 WL 3484855, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
4, 2025)). In any event, neither argument alters the outcome here because, as to the
former, the Court does not—and in its previous decisions, did not—rely upon a petitioner’s
prior release on recognizance pursuant to Section 1226 in reaching its conclusion that
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “does not reach someone who has been residing in the United
States,” because the plain statutory language applies to “individuals seeking admission,”
i.e., “noncitizens actively attempting to enter the United States lawfully at its port of entry.”
Crespo, 2026 WL 35569, at *4–6; see also id. at *6 (rejecting respondents’ attempt to
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Accordingly, for the reasons stated by this Court in Crespo Tacuri and Y-C-, which are
incorporated here by reference, 6 the Court concludes that petitioner is being unlawfully
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and in violation of his rights to due process under the
Fifth Amendment. See Y-C-, 2025 WL 3653496, at *7; Crespo Tacuri, 2026 WL 35569, *7;
Terrero, No. 26-cv-00869 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2026), ECF No. 19; see also Ccorihuaman,
2026 WL 328983, at *2. “Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention”
and “[t]he typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v. Green, 553
U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The Court therefore deems petitioner entitled to immediate release.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that petitioner’s detention violates the
INA and the Due Process Clause. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore
GRANTED.
distinguish between individuals who are apprehended and released on their own
recognizance and explaining that it is not “a relevant difference[,] [a]n individual who has
been within the United States for nearly 30 years cannot be treated as if stopped at the
border simply because he was not previously released on his own recognizance”). And as
to the latter, this Court previously explained that its “prior decisions did not rest on how
previous administrations sought to enforce the INA.” Zapeta-Vicente v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-
01272 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2026), ECF No. 6 at 4 n.6.
6 	For this reason, and for the avoidance of doubt, the Court does not address any legal
or factual argument that respondents do not raise here or did not raise in their briefing
before this Court in Crespo Tacuri and Y- C-. See Catania v. United Fed’n of Tchrs., No. 21-
cv-01257, 2023 WL 1962533, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2023) (“Courts generally do not
decide issues not raised by the parties.” (quoting Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 482 (2009)
(Alito, J., concurring))); see also Russell v. Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs, 1 F. App’x 38, 41 (2d
Cir. 2001) (summary order) (“We are, however, troubled by the district court reaching an
issue neither pressed nor briefed before it, and urge against such a practice in the future.”).
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Respondents are directed to release petitioner from custody within 24 hours of this
Order and to file a letter on the docket no later than 5:00 p.m. on March 11, 2026 certifying
their compliance. For the avoidance of doubt, the Court concludes that petitioner “is
entitled to release from the unlawful restrictions on his liberty—which means, in the
circumstances here, restoration of . . . the status quo ante.” Khabazha v. ICE, No. 25-cv-
05279, 2025 WL 3281514, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025) (ordering government to
release petitioner from “restrictions on his liberty imposed as a result of his unlawful
[detention] . . . including the ankle monitor and reporting requirements”); see also
Ccorihuaman, 2026 WL 328983, at *2. This Order includes “an injunction barring
deprivation of the [petitioner’s] rights without the requisite procedural protections.”
Khabazha, 2025 WL 3281514, at *8; see also Ccorihuaman, 2026 WL 328983, at *2.
Petitioner’s March 13, 2026 deadline to file a reply and the hearing scheduled for
March 16, 2026 are hereby adjourned sine die.
Should petitioner seek an award of reasonable fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, he may file a letter application on the docket within thirty days of
this Order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment consistent with
the Order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Natasha C. Merle
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	March 10, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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