Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JULIO GONZALEZ GUARDADO,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against- 	26-CV-1170 (OEM)
RAUL MALDONADO JR. et al.,
Respondents.
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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:
On February 27, 2026, Petitioner Julio Gonzalez Guardado (“Petitioner”) commenced this
habeas corpus action against Respondents Raul Maldonado Jr., in his official capacity as Warden
of the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (“MDC Brooklyn”); Judith
Almodovar, in her official capacity as Acting New York Field Office Director for U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States; Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of
Homeland Security; and Todd Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE
(collectively, “Respondents”). 	Petitioner seeks his immediate release pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, challenging the lawfulness of his ongoing detention by ICE as a violation of his due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (“Fifth Amendment”). 	See
Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Dkt. 1 (“Petition”
or “Pet.”). Petitioner was arrested by ICE on January 8, 2026, and is currently detained at MDC
Brooklyn. Id. ¶ 7.
For the following reasons, Petitioner’s request for release from custody is granted, and
Respondents are ordered to immediately release Petitioner from custody.
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BACKGROUND1
Petitioner is a citizen of El Salvador. Id. ¶ 23; Declaration of Deportation Officer Dmitry
Rousseau ¶ 1, Dkt. 7-1 (“Rousseau Decl.”). Respondents contend that, on or about April 6, 2003,
Petitioner entered the United States at an unknown location. 	Rousseau Decl. ¶ 3. 	He was not
admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. Id. ¶ 3. Petitioner does not contest
that he entered the United States at an unknown location, however, he contends that he entered the
country “without being admitted or paroled in or around 2006” after surviving “a brutal attack by
members of the MS-13 gang in El Salvador.” Pet. ¶ 23. Petitioner has “continuously resided in
Queens, New York,” since, id. ¶ 24, where he works in construction, attends church, and “us[es]
most of his salary to send money to support his family and their neighbors back in El Salvador,”
id. ¶ 42.
Petitioner has been incarcerated by ICE since January 8, 2026. See Pet. ¶¶ 25-33; Rousseau
Decl. ¶¶ 4-10. The parties disagree about the manner of his arrest.
Petitioner describes a forcible arrest, in which “five unmarked, black vehicles suddenly
pulled into the parking lot” of a Home Depot in Nassau County, New York, on the morning of
January 8, 2026, around 7:30 a.m. Pet. ¶¶ 25-26. Petitioner had been waiting there to meet his
employer. Id. ¶ 25. These cars surrounded him, and “[m]ultiple armed men jumped out . . . and
started heading towards him.” Id. ¶ 26. Petitioner asserts that he “did not understand who they
were, as none of them identified themselves,” and that he “thought that he was being kidnapped.”
Id. ICE officers forcibly restrained him, “pointed a gun to his head,” and searched him. Id. ¶ 27.
“The officers then handcuffed him and threw him into one of the vehicles, ‘like an animal.’” Id.
1 The facts of this case are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
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¶ 29 (quoting Pet., Exhibit 1 ¶ 17, Dkt. 1-2). They did not explain why he was being arrested. Id.
¶ 30.
By contrast, Respondents assert that ICE officers observed Petitioner in a parking lot in
Elmont, New York, on January 8, 2026, and that he “matched the description of their primary
target.” Rousseau Decl. ¶ 4. ICE officers then “approached Petitioner, identified themselves as
ICE officers, and asked for identification.” Id. Respondents claim Petitioner identified himself
and allegedly “admitted that he had entered the United States illegally by crossing the border from
Mexico years ago.” Id. Petitioner was then “placed under arrest and transported to Nassau County
ICE Intake located at 100 Carman Avenue, East Meadow, New York,” where he was processed
and served with a Form 1-200, Warrant for Arrest of Alien, and a Form I-862, Notice to Appear.
Id. ¶¶ 4-5; see Notice to Appear at 1-3, Dkt. 7-2; Warrant for Arrest of Alien at 4, Dkt. 7-2.2
“Following processing, on January 8, 2026, Petitioner was [subsequently] transferred through
several facilities” and was ultimately sent to MDC Brooklyn on January 22, 2026, where he
remains to this day. Rousseau Decl. ¶¶ 7-10.
Prior to this incident, Petitioner alleges, and Respondents do not contest, that he “had never
been arrested nor [did] he have any convictions.” Pet. ¶ 24. Petitioner additionally asserts, and
Respondents likewise do not contest, that Petitioner received no bond hearing or individualized
assessment as to his dangerousness or flight risk. Id. ¶¶ 45, 70; Letter from Petitioner to the Court
at 1 (Mar. 7, 2026), Dkt. 9 (“Reply”).
2 Citations to the Notice to Appear, Dkt. 7-2, and the Warrant for Arrest of Alien, Dkt. 7-2, are to the page numbers
contained in the automatically generated ECF header.
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DISCUSSION
The instant Petition raises two principal issues: (1) whether Petitioner is detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1226 (“§ 1226”) or 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“§ 1225”) and (2) whether Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights have been violated.
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
The Court is bound by a long line of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between
those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the
United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
(2001) (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one
who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
289 (2018) (stating that § 1225(b) governs “aliens seeking admission into the country,” whereas
§ 1226(a) governs “aliens already in the country” who are subject to removal proceedings). Thus,
the Court’s position on whether § 1226 or § 1225 applies in scenarios where a petitioner is detained
after entering the country has not changed since deciding other 28 U.S.C. § 2241 immigration
cases recently. 	See, e.g., J.U. v. Maldonado, 805 F. Supp. 3d 482 (E.D.N.Y. 2025); Artiga v.
Genalo, 25-CV-5208 (OEM), 2025 WL 2829434 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025); Lira Caceres v.
Shanahan, 26-CV-00016 (OEM), 	2026 	WL 233215 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 	28, 2026); Singh 	v.
Maldonado, 26-CV-00019 (OEM), 2026 WL 233216 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2026); Sanchez Atz v.
Noem, 26-CV-00214 (OEM), 2026 WL 320238 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026); Peralta Acuapan v.
Bondi, 26-CV-00384 (OEM), 2026 WL 507889 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2026); Monge-Campos v.
Bondi, 26-CV-1056 (OEM), 2026 WL 603516 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2026).
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The Court is not persuaded by the authorities provided by Respondents, and the parties
agree that there are no distinguishing facts as to Petitioner in this case. See Reply at 1; Letter from
Respondents to the Court at 4 (Mar. 5, 2026), Dkt. 7 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”).3 Therefore, this
Court joins the majority of courts in finding that detention of the nature at issue here cannot be
upheld under § 1225. See Barco Mercado v. Francis, 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases). Mandatory detention under § 1225 is inapplicable
to Petitioner, and he is subject to discretionary detention under § 1226. See J.U., 805 F. Supp. 3d,
at 490 (noting the mutual exclusivity of § 1225 and § 1226).
B. Due Process
The Court now turns to whether ICE’s detention of Petitioner violates his due process
rights. The Mathews test governs this inquiry. See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851
(2d Cir. 2020) (applying the three-factor balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), to determine the adequacy of process in the context of civil immigration confinement).
The determination of what procedures are required under the Fifth Amendment requires
consideration of: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
3 The Court notes that Respondents erroneously addressed their Opposition to Judge Ann Donnelly instead of the
undersigned. 	See generally Opp’n. 	However, in their letter and on the record at oral argument, Respondents
acknowledged that this Court’s decisions “would control the result in this case if the Court adheres to it.” Opp’n at 4.
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With respect to the first prong of the Mathews test, Petitioner invokes “the most significant
liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d
at 851 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)).
With respect to the second prong of the Mathews test, the record demonstrates that no
individualized determination was made prior to or contemporaneously with the decision to detain
him on January 8, 2026. 	Pet. ¶¶ 45, 70. 	Respondents present no articulable facts as to why
Petitioner is dangerous or a flight risk and indeed, at oral argument, they conceded that no
individualized determination was made. Therefore, ICE did not engage in the required deliberative
process during the initial decision to strip Petitioner of his liberty interest, and the risk of erroneous
deprivation of that interest is high. See Chipantiza-Sisalema v. Francis, 25 Civ. 5528 (AT), 2025
WL 1927931, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2025) (stating that ICE must engage in a deliberative
process prior to or contemporaneous with “the initial decision to strip a person of the freedom that
lies at the heart of the Due Process Clause”); Lopez v. Sessions, 18 Civ. 4189 (RWS), 2018 WL
2932726, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018) (finding a risk of erroneous deprivation where the
petitioner was re-detained absent a change in circumstances, procedure, or evidentiary findings).
As to the third and final Mathews prong, “the Attorney General’s discretion to detain
individuals under 8 § U.S.C. 1226(a) [sic] is valid where it advances a legitimate governmental
purpose,” such as “ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings” and
“preventing danger to the community.” Valdez v. Joyce, 803 F. Supp. 3d 213, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(first quoting Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854; then quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 	Here,
there is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community.
Pet. ¶ 24 (noting that Petitioner had never been arrested prior to the January 8, 2026, arrest by
ICE). The record indicates that Petitioner has lived in the United States for approximately 20 years
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without incident. 	Id. ¶¶ 24, 42-43. 	Therefore, Respondents have failed to show a significant
interest in his continued detention.
Taken together, Petitioner’s ongoing detention violates his due process rights. See Valdez,
803 F. Supp. 3d at 219; Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *15. Given the deprivation of Petitioner’s
liberty, the absence of any deliberative process prior to or contemporaneous with the deprivation,
and the statutory and constitutional rights implicated, a writ of habeas corpus is the only form of
relief and the most appropriate remedy. Valdez, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 219; Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726,
at *15.4
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s request for immediate release from custody is
granted. Respondents are ordered to immediately release Petitioner from custody. By March 11,
2026, Respondents shall certify compliance with this order by filing on the docket and noting
specifically that Petitioner has been released. Counsel for Petitioner may file an application for
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412, within the time provided by the Local Rules.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment in accordance with this order
and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ORELIA E. MERCHANT
United States District Judge
March 10, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
4 Because the Court determines that Petitioner’s detention violates his due process rights, it need not address his
remaining claims. See, e.g., Valdez, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 217 n.4 (declining to address remaining APA and Immigration
and Nationality Act claims after determining that the petitioner’s detention violated due process).
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