Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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FABIAN MONGE-CAMPOS,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against- 	26-CV-1056 (OEM)
BONDI et al.,
Respondents.
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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:
Petitioner Fabian Monge-Campos (“Petitioner”) seeks a writ of habeas corpus for
immediate release pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the lawfulness of his ongoing
detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) as a violation of due process
under the U.S. Constitution. 	See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. 1 (the “Petition” or
“Pet.”). Petitioner was arrested by ICE on January 28, 2026, and he is currently detained at the
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (“MDC Brooklyn”).
For the following reasons, the Petition is granted.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, first attempted to enter the United States in
August 2002. 	Pet. ¶ 1; Declaration of Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer Timothy
Nevin ¶ 4, Dkt. 5-1 (“Nevin Decl.”). He voluntarily returned to Mexico on August 6, 2002. Nevin
Decl. ¶ 4. Petitioner re-entered the United States at an unknown location sometime later in 2002
and has remained in the United States since. Id. ¶ 5; Pet. ¶ 1.
On January 28, 2026, ICE officers encountered Petitioner during a traffic stop while
targeting another individual. Nevin Decl. ¶ 7. During this stop, Petitioner admitted that he entered
the United States illegally. Id. After conducting a records check and discovering that Petitioner
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was arrested for driving while intoxicated in violation of New York law on January 3, 2026, ICE
officers arrested Petitioner pursuant to a Form 1-200, Warrant for Arrest of Alien. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The
officers also served Petitioner with a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, marking the initiation of
removal proceedings against him. Id. ¶ 10.
On February 3, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to the MDC Brooklyn, where he has
remained since. Id. ¶ 13.
DISCUSSION
The instant Petition raises two principal issues: (1) whether Petitioner is detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1226 (“§ 1226”) or 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“§ 1225”); and (2) whether Petitioner’s due process
rights have been violated.
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
The Court is bound by a long line of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between
those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the
United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
(2001) (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one
who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
289 (2018) (stating that § 1225(b) governs “aliens seeking admission into the country,” whereas
§ 1226(a) governs “aliens already in the country” who are subject to removal proceedings). Thus,
the Court’s position on whether § 1226 or § 1225 applies in scenarios where a petitioner is detained
after entering the country has not changed since deciding other 28 U.S.C. § 2241 immigration
cases recently. 	See, e.g., J.U. v. Maldonado, 805 F. Supp. 3d 482 (E.D.N.Y. 2025); Artiga v.
Genalo, 25-CV-5208 (OEM), 2025 WL 2829434 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025); Lira Caceres v.
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Shanahan, 26-CV-00016 (OEM), 	2026 	WL 233215 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 	28, 2026); Singh 	v.
Maldonado, 26-CV-00019 (OEM), 2026 WL 233216 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2026); Sanchez Atz v.
Noem, 26-CV-00214 (OEM), 2026 WL 320238 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026); Peralta Acuapan v.
Bondi, 26-CV-00384 (OEM), 2026 WL 507889 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2026).
The Court is not persuaded by the authorities provided by Respondents, and there are no
distinguishing facts as to Petitioner in this case. Therefore, this Court joins the majority of courts
in finding that detention of the nature at issue here cannot be upheld under § 1225. 	See Barco
Mercado v. Francis, 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025)
(collecting cases). 	Mandatory detention under § 1225 is inapplicable to Petitioner, and he is
subject to discretionary detention under § 1226. 	See J.U., 805 F. Supp. 3d, at 490 (noting the
mutual exclusivity of § 1225 and § 1226).
B. Due Process
The Court now turns to whether ICE’s detention of Petitioner violates his due process
rights. The Mathews test governs this inquiry. See Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851
(2d Cir. 2020) (applying the three-factor balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) to determine the adequacy of process in the context of civil immigration confinement).
The determination of what procedures are required under the Fifth Amendment requires
consideration of: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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With respect to the first prong of the Mathews test, Petitioner invokes “the most significant
liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d
at 851 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)).
With respect to the second prong of the Mathews test, the record demonstrates that no
individualized determination was made prior to or contemporaneously with the decision to detain
him on January 28, 2026. 	Respondents present no articulable facts as to why Petitioner is
dangerous or a flight risk. While Respondents note Petitioner’s driving while intoxicated arrest
on January 3, 2026, there is no indication that ICE made an individualized determination as to
Petitioner based on that information. See Nevin Decl. ¶¶ 7-9. Therefore, ICE did not engage in
the required deliberative process during the initial decision to strip Petitioner of his liberty interest,
and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest is high. See Chipantiza-Sisalema v. Francis,
25 Civ. 5528 (AT), 2025 WL 1927931, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2025) (stating that ICE must
engage in a deliberative process prior to or contemporaneous with “the initial decision to strip a
person of the freedom that lies at the heart of the Due Process Clause”); Lopez v. Sessions, 18 Civ.
4189 (RWS), 2018 WL 2932726, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018) (finding a risk of erroneous
deprivation where the petitioner was re-detained absent a change in circumstances, procedure, or
evidentiary findings).
As to the third and final Mathews prong, “the Attorney General’s discretion to detain
individuals under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is valid where it advances a legitimate governmental
purpose,” such as “ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings” and
“preventing danger to the community.” Valdez v. Joyce, 803 F. Supp. 3d 213, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(first quoting Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854; then quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 	Here,
there is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner is a flight risk. There is also nothing in the
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record to suggest that Petitioner is a danger to the community beyond his January 3, 2026, arrest
for driving while intoxicated, which has yet to result in a conviction. Nevin Decl. ¶ 8. The record
indicates that Petitioner has otherwise lived in the United States for over 20 years without incident.
See Pet. ¶ 1. 	Respondents have therefore failed to show a significant interest in his continued
detention.
Taken together, Petitioner’s ongoing detention violates his due process rights. See Valdez,
803 F. Supp. 3d at 219; Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *15. Given the deprivation of Petitioner’s
liberty, the absence of any deliberative process prior to or contemporaneous with the deprivation,
and the statutory and constitutional rights implicated, a writ of habeas corpus is the only form of
relief and the most appropriate remedy. Valdez, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 219; Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726,
at *15.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is granted. Respondents are ordered to immediately
release Petitioner from custody. 	By March 5, 2026, Respondents shall certify compliance with
this order by filing on the docket and noting specifically that Petitioner has been released.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment in accordance with this order
and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ORELIA E. MERCHANT
United States District Judge
March 4, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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