Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
H.A.C.F,
Petitioner,
v.
LaDeon FRANCIS, Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations,
New York Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Todd LYONS,
Acting Director, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Kristi NOEM,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; Pamela
BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW., Raul
Maldonado Jr. Warden, MDC Brooklyn,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
26-CV-00872 (NRM)
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Petitioner 	Hugo 	Alejandro 	Caldera 	Ferrer 	is 	presently 	detained 	by
Respondents at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, New York.
He is a Venezuelan national who entered the United States in 2021 with a visitor
visa, then subsequently applied for and attained Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”)
under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a starting in 2024. 	Petitioner was taken into Respondents’
custody and detained in Delaney Hall in Newark, NJ on February 5, 2026, before
being transferred to his present location at some time on or before February 13, 2026.
On February 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
(the “Petition”), ECF No. 1, alleging that his detention violates his constitutional and
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statutory rights, and seeking entry of an order directing his immediate release from
detention. 	The case was initially assigned to the Hon. Eric Vitaliano, then re-
assigned to the undersigned on February 17, 2026, at which time the Court issued an
Order directing Respondents to file, by 12:00 PM on February 18, 2026, a submission
(1) 	providing 	certain 	information 	about 	Petitioner 	and 	his 	circumstances, 	(2)
indicating the statutory provision under which they assert the authority to detain
Petitioner, and (3) addressing whether there is any basis to distinguish the asserted
grounds for detention from the Court’s decision in Hyppolite v. Noem, No. 25-CV-4304
(NRM), 2025 WL 2829511 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025), or from any other prior decisions
issued by the undersigned in this area of law. ECF No. 5,
The 	Court 	further 	directed 	that, 	if 	Respondents 	asserted 	no 	basis 	to
distinguish this Petition from the Court’s analysis in Hyppolite or another decision of
this Court, the submission could take the form of a letter so stating, and indicating
whether 	Respondents 	oppose 	issuance 	of 	the 	writ, 	subject 	to 	preservation 	of
Respondents’ arguments for appeal. Finally, the Court’s February 17, 2026 Order
directed 	Respondents, 	in 	the 	event 	they 	took 	the 	position 	that 	this 	case 	is
distinguishable from Hyppolite, to respond to the Petition and to show cause as to
why it should not be granted on or before February 20, 2026 at 2:00 PM; to further
affirm that they have provided the Court with all facts material to Petitioner’s claims
and Respondents’ opposition to those claims; and to attach all exhibits related to those
three facts.
At 11:58AM on February 18, 2026 (two minutes before the deadline to file their
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initial submission), Respondents filed a motion for extension of time to file its initial
submission, indicating that they had received consent from Petitioner’s counsel to file
that submission by February 20, 2026 at 2:00PM. ECF No. 6. The Court granted the
motion in part, directing Respondents to file its initial submission by February 19,
2026 at 2:00PM. Later that day, after Petitioner’s counsel filed a letter with the Court
stating that he had not, in fact, consented to the extension request nor communicated
with Respondents’ counsel about it at all, Respondents’ counsel clarified that he had
called the wrong phone number for Petitioner’s counsel, and had not in fact spoken
with Petitioner’s counsel nor received consent for their extension request from anyone
authorized to provide it, and apologized to counsel and the Court for the error. ECF
No. 9.
In their brief letter response filed on February 19, 2026, Respondents took the
position 	that 	this 	case 	was 	distinguishable 	from 	Hyppolite 	because 	here, 	the
government detained Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and Petitioner could
challenge his detention in a “custody redetermination hearing” before an Immigration
Judge, which at the time of the letter had been scheduled for February 24, 2026. ECF
No. 10 at 1. 	The Court then directed Respondents to provide a more complete,
supplemental response to the Order to Show Cause by February 20, 2026, at 2:00PM
indicating whether Petitioner was provided “notice and an opportunity to be heard at
a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker” (and if so, what those
procedure(s) entailed), as this Court had previously determined was required by law
for the reasons stated in its opinion in Hyppolite. 	Hyppolite, 2025 WL 2829511, at
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*16.
On February 20, 2026, at 2:00PM, rather than file the supplemental response
ordered by the court, Respondents filed another motion for extension of time to file
that response. ECF No. 12. The Court then convened a remote videoconference with
the parties on the same day. 	At the conference, the Court invited counsel for
Respondents to provide any and all information it had gathered from its investigation
in the seven days since the petition was filed regarding the circumstances of
Petitioner’s detention, including whether Petitioner was provided notice and/or an
opportunity to be heard on an individualized bond determination prior to his
detention, 	either 	before 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	or 	before 	any 	other 	neutral
decisionmaker. 	Counsel for Respondents stated that he was currently unaware
whether any such pre-detention procedure was provided, but that he nonetheless
believed that Petitioner’s detention was lawful under § 1226(a) because Petitioner
was 	now 	scheduled 	to 	appear 	before 	an 	Immigration 	Judge 	for 	a 	“custody
redetermination hearing” on February 24, 2026. Petitioner’s counsel responded that
although such a hearing had been previously scheduled, it had been withdrawn
pending a request for adjournment due to the hearing scheduled in this case, also set
for that date, and that in any event Petitioner’s detention was unlawful because he
had not been provided with such process prior to his detention.
In sum, at this juncture in the litigation, Petitioner has alleged that he was
arrested and detained on February 5, 2026 without any opportunity to challenge his
custody determination before he was remanded, whether by an Immigration Judge
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or by any other neutral decisionmaker. 	And despite having had Petitioner in their
custody since February 5, and having had the allegations in the petition under
investigation for at least seven days, Respondents have not disputed those assertions.
For both the reasons stated on the record at today’s videoconference and the reasons
that follow, the Petition is granted.
Respondents take the position that this case is distinguishable from the Court’s
decision in Hyppolite because unlike in Hyppolite, they do not dispute that it is
§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b), that governs ICE’s detention authority. 	However, that
ignores a substantial portion of the Court’s analysis in Hyppolite. 	Once it is
determined that a noncitizen has been detained pursuant to the discretionary
authority under § 1226(a) — which Respondents here concede is the case — that
detention must satisfy the constitutional guarantees of the Due Process Clause. See,
e.g., Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020) (noting that “the most
significant liberty interest” recognized under the Constitution is “the interest in being
free from imprisonment”). 	As this Court underscored in Hyppolite, “[s]pecifically,
§ 1226(a)’s implementing regulations require an individualized determination as to
whether the detention of a noncitizen is appropriate after considering whether the
noncitizen (1) is a ‘danger to property or persons’ and (2) is ‘likely to appear for any
future 	proceeding.’” 	Hyppolite, 	2025 	WL 	2829511, 	at 	*13 	(quoting 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 1236.1(c)(8)); see also Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25 CV 5208 (OEM), 2025 WL 2829434,
at *8–9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 493–
95 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25 CV 06924 (EMC), 2025
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WL 2637503, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025). 	To that end, Respondents were
required to provide Petitioner “with notice and a bond hearing before a neutral
magistrate” prior to detaining him. Hyppolite, 2025 WL 2829511, at *2.
Respondents argue that detention here is lawful under § 1226(a) because they
intend 	to 	provide 	Petitioner 	with 	a 	post-deprivation 	“custody 	redetermination
hearing” where Petitioner can seek release from custody. 	However, this Court in
Hyppolite made clear that § 1226(a) and the Due Process Clause requires that
noncitizens be given notice and a bond hearing prior to detention. 	See Hyppolite,
2025 WL 2829511, at *13–16. Given that neither the Second Circuit nor the United
States Supreme Court has yet to address this precise question, the Court adheres to
the reasoning of its earlier decision and the conclusion reached by many other courts
in this circuit. See, e.g., Chipantiza-Sisalema v. Francis, No. 25-CV-5528 (AT), 2025
WL 1927931, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2025) (holding that a “custody redetermination
hearing” is “no substitute for the requirement that ICE engage in a ‘deliberative
process prior to, or contemporaneous with,’ the initial decision to strip a person of the
freedom that lies at the heart of the Due Process Clause” (internal quotation
omitted)); Tumba v. Francis, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3079014, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 4, 2025) (noting that “the Government’s violation of Petitioner’s constitutional
rights originated with her detention in the first instance,” and that “a [post-
deprivation] bond hearing could not cure that constitutional violation”); Rodriguez-
Acurio v. Almodovar, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3314420, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 494–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Singh
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v. Maldonado, No. 26-CV-00019 (OEM), 2026 WL 233216, at *8–10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 2026); O.F.B. v. Maldonado, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3277677, at *8 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 25, 2025); Sidqui v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-9349 (VSB), 2026 WL 251929, at *17
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2026). 	The Court hereby incorporates by reference its earlier
analysis of these issues in Hyppolite, 2025 WL 2829511, at *12–16.
The Court has weighed the factors under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), which sets forth the test that courts in the Second Circuit will apply when
determining 	“the 	adequacy 	of 	process 	in 	the 	context 	of 	civil 	immigration
confinement.” Munoz Materano v. Artera, No. 25 CV 6137, 2025 WL 2630826, at *12
(S.D.N.Y., Sep. 12, 2025). 	Having considered (1) the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
through the procedures used; and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would
entail, see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, the Court finds that the balance of interests
weighs heavily in Petitioner’s favor, and that granting the writ is an appropriate
remedy for the deprivation of his right to procedural due process.
It is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that Respondents must release
Petitioner from custody no later than 10:00AM on Saturday, February 21, 2026.
In light of the fact that Petitioner is presently being held at MDC in Brooklyn,
New York, it is further ORDERED that counsel for Respondents shall keep
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Petitioner’s counsel informed regarding the timing, location, and manner of
Petitioner’s release from custody, so that counsel may be present or arrange to
have a family member or other representative present at the time of Petitioner’s
release.
Respondents, through counsel, shall file a letter on the docket no later
than 1:00 PM on that same date (Saturday, February 21, 2026), confirming that
Petitioner has been released from custody.
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED that Respondents are ENJOINED from
redetaining Petitioner, absent prior authorization of this Court and without notice
and an opportunity to be heard at a pre-deprivation bond hearing, at which
Respondents will bear the burden of showing that his detention is authorized under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The Court’s earlier order scheduling a hearing for February 24, 2026 is hereby
vacated in light of the Court’s resolution of the merits of the petition. 	Petitioner’s
counsel may submit an application for attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act within the time provided by the Local Rules.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: 	February 20, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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