Haynes v. Scott et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
EMMANUEL HAYNES,
Plaintiff,
– against –
PHILLIP SCOTT, SR.; CITY OF NEW
YORK; NYC MARSHAL EDWARD F.
GUIDA, JR., Shield #14,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
26-cv-00612 (NCM) (TAM)
NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:
On February 4, 2026, pro se plaintiff Emmanuel Haynes filed this action against
defendants Phillip Scott, Sr., the City of New York (the “City”), and New York City Marshal
Edward F. Guida, Jr. (the “Marshal”). Compl. 1–2, 1 ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed his complaint
together with a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and an order to show
cause for a preliminary injunction, as well as a request to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). Pl.’s Emergency Ex Parte Mot. for TRO & Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 4; Mot. for Leave
to Proceed IFP, ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP is granted for the limited
purpose of this Order. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff’s request for preliminary
injunctive relief is denied and his complaint is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff resides at an apartment building located in Jamaica, Queens, New York.
See Compl. 5. Defendant Scott holds an ownership interest in the property; in April 2019,
1 	Throughout this Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers
assigned in ECF filing headers.
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Scott transferred ownership of the property to a trust. See Decl. in Supp. of Emergency
Ex Parte Mot. for TRO (“Haynes Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 4-1. In November 2020, Scott
initiated holdover proceedings against plaintiff in Queens County Housing Court. Haynes
Decl. ¶ 3. However, plaintiff alleges that Scott initiated the holdover proceedings in his
individual name, rather than the name of the trust. Haynes Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff also alleges
that, beginning in December 2022, Scott interfered with his mail by removing plaintiff’s
name from his mailbox, thereby “impairing [p]laintiff’s ability to receive timely court
communications 	and 	meaningfully 	participate 	in 	post-judgment 	proceedings” 	in
connection with the holdover action. Compl. 5. Plaintiff further alleges that the City and
Marshal are now enforcing a warrant of eviction with “serious irregularities and
unresolved procedural defects[.]” Compl. 5. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to prevent
defendants from executing the warrant of eviction, as well as compensatory and punitive
damages. See Compl. 6.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 2 “A claim is plausible when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d
57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all
factual allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this rule does not
apply “to legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
2 	Throughout this Order, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes,
and citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.
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Federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, restricting the types of
cases they can hear. See Funk v. Belneftekhim, 861 F.3d 354, 371 (2d Cir. 2017). There are
two types of federal subject matter jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction, which
requires a claim based on a federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction,
which requires a lawsuit with a value of greater than $75,000 and in which no defendant
lives in the same state as the plaintiff, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing either type of subject matter jurisdiction. Makarova v. United States, 201
F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). If the Court “concludes that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction,” it must “dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court “construe[s] [the plaintiff’s]
submissions liberally, as raising the strongest arguments they suggest.” Whitfield v. City
of New York, 96 F.4th 504, 518 (2d Cir. 2024); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (explaining that non-attorney pro se litigants are not expected to meet the
standards for “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). If it is possible that “a valid claim
might be stated,” the Court should give the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend the
complaint. Cuocoࣟ v.ࣟ Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Where amendment
would be “futile,” leave to amend the complaint should be denied. Id.
Regardless of whether a plaintiff has paid the filing fee, a district court has the
inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it determines that the action is frivolous
or the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. See Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh St.
Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363–364 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Jean-Baptiste v. Westside
Donut Huntington Ventures LLC, No. 23-826, 2023 WL 8015698, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 20,
2023) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of pro se complaint without prior
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notice to the plaintiff and reiterating that “[a] district court has the inherent authority to
dismiss a complaint sua sponte, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, when it is
clear that the claims are frivolous”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “[F]ailure of subject matter
jurisdiction is not waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua
sponte. 	If 	subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	is 	lacking, 	the 	action 	must 	be 	dismissed.”
Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000); see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief must be denied, and the complaint must be
dismissed. Specifically, plaintiff’s request to enjoin enforcement of the warrant of eviction
is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Anti-Injunction Act, and plaintiff
otherwise fails to state a plausible federal claim for relief.
I. 	Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “federal district courts lack jurisdiction
over cases that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments.” Vossbrinck v.
Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005)). The doctrine also bars
a federal claim “whether or not raised in state court, that asserts injury based on a state
judgment and seeks review and reversal of that judgment[.]” Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd.
of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2005). That is, claims that are “inextricably
intertwined with the state judgment.” Id. at 86–87. Review of claims is barred under the
doctrine when four requirements are satisfied: (1) the federal court plaintiff lost in state
court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the
plaintiff invites the federal court to review and reject that judgment; and (4) the state
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court judgment was rendered prior to the commencement of proceedings in the district
court. Id. at 85. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine generally applies to claims arising from
state court eviction proceedings. See Thompson v. Donovan, No. 13-cv-02988, 2014 WL
5149037, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2014) (explaining that the plaintiffs’ challenge to state
court’s decision that the landlord could evict the plaintiffs “fit[] within the long line of
cases holding that federal claims arising from eviction proceedings are ordinarily barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”) (collecting cases).
The Rooker-Feldman conditions are satisfied here. Plaintiff appears to have lost in
state court, and a warrant of eviction has been issued. See Compl. 5. He complains of
imminent eviction from his apartment, Compl. 5, thus, his alleged injuries flow from the
state court’s judgment of eviction and related housing proceedings. And plaintiff requests
that the Court stay enforcement of the warrant before adjudicating constitutional claims
relating to “serious irregularities and unresolved procedural defects” in connection with
the proceedings. Compl. 5. Therefore, plaintiff’s attempt to challenge the warrant of
eviction is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Bey v. Ferdinand, No. 24-cv-
06684, 2025 WL 1505041, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2025) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction . . .
when a litigant seeks relief that invites a federal district court to reject or overturn a final
state housing court decision ordering an eviction after a holdover proceeding.”); Viverette
v. Winograd, No. 25-cv-07168, 2025 WL 2577665, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2025)
(explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the plaintiff’s “claims for relief
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seeking the [c]ourt’s enjoining of the execution of a warrant of [the] [p]laintiff’s eviction
from the apartment at issue”) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff’s contention that Rooker-Feldman does not apply is without merit.
Plaintiff argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies when a plaintiff has
“injuries caused by state-court judgments” and the plaintiff “invit[es] district court review
and rejection of those judgments.” Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Ex Parte TRO &
Prelim Inj. (“Mot.”) 3, ECF No. 4-2. And here, plaintiff is “not invit[ing] this Court to
review or reject the state court judgment.” Mot. 3. Instead, according to plaintiff, he seeks
to remedy “independent injuries caused by the [d]efendants’ unconstitutional conduct
that occurred outside of the state court proceedings.” Mot. 3 (emphasis original). The
Court disagrees. To be sure, plaintiff alleges a course of allegedly improper conduct by
defendant Scott that occurred outside the housing proceedings. See, e.g., Compl. 5 (“Scott
. 	. 	. 	interfered with 	mail 	delivery 	at 	the 	premises, 	including 	mail 	addressed 	to
[p]laintiff[.]”). But the ultimate injury which plaintiff seeks to remedy arises from
potential enforcement of the warrant of eviction. See Compl. 5 (“Defendants City of New
York and NYC Marshal Edward F. Guida Jr. . . . are now enforcing a warrant of eviction
despite notice of serious irregularities and unresolved procedural defendants, causing
imminent and irreparable harm to [p]laintiff.”). In other words, plaintiff “is complaining
of an injury caused by [a] state judgment,” and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes
this Court’s review. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87; see also Jordan v. Levine, 536 F. App’x 158,
159 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) (“The[] [Rooker-Feldman] requirements are satisfied
here. [The plaintiff] is seeking an order staying the enforcement of a state court warrant
of eviction. [The plaintiff’s] claim[] against . . . Marshal Locascio[,] unconstitutional
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enforcement of the warrant of eviction[,] arise[s] from and concern[s] only the state court
eviction judgment and were filed after that judgment was entered.”).
Moreover, plaintiff’s insistence that he is not inviting the Court to review the
underlying state court judgment is belied by the relief he seeks. Plaintiff argues that the
warrant of eviction “being relied upon by [defendants] has not been meaningfully
updated, reissued, or reaffirmed by the [h]ousing [c]ourt to account for the . . .
irregularities described [in the complaint], or for intervening litigation activity.” Haynes
Decl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff further argues that he suffered injuries from “[d]efendants’ procedural
irregularities” that deprived him of “a fair proceeding and which the state court refused
to rectify.” Mot. 4. To assess these claims—and determine whether enforcement of the
warrant of eviction should be stayed—the Court necessarily would need to examine the
housing court proceedings and determine whether the state court judgment was issued in
error. Put differently, plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court
eviction order. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 86–87; see also Koziel v. City Ct. of Yonkers, 351 F.
App’x 470, 470 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman
doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims and reasoning that “insofar as [the plaintiff] seeks
to challenge the state procedures for appealing a decision as violating his due process
rights, that claim is inextricably intertwined with the judgment of the state court”).
Accordingly, irrespective of how plaintiff attempts to label or characterize his
claims, determination of his claims would require the Court to assess an underlying state
court judgment, and Rooker-Feldman bars this Court’s review. See Ceccarelli v. Morgan
Stanley Private Bank N.A., 763 F. Supp. 3d 550, 558–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (reasoning that
a demand for relief that requested, in the context of a foreclosure eviction, “vacating,
setting aside and permanently staying enforcement of the improperly procured state
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[j]udgment . . . would require the federal court to review the state proceedings and
determine that the foreclosure judgment was issued in error[,]” and was, therefore,
precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Gotbetter v. Wendt, No. 08-cv-
04868, 2008 WL 5147036, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2008) (“[The] [p]laintiff’s attempt to
invoke subject matter jurisdiction in this [c]ourt by citing both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
Fourteenth Amendment fails because the relief he seeks merely attests to [the] [p]laintiff’s
dissatisfaction with the course his litigation has taken in the state courts.”).
II. 	Anti-Injunction Act
Moreover, plaintiff’s request to enjoin the warrant of eviction is barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act. Pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, “[a] court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. This statute applies where “the requested injunction
would . . . stay the ongoing state proceedings[.]” Kane v. New York, No. 22-cv-03174,
2024 WL 50969, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2024); see also Bey v. Kings Fam. Ct., No. 25-cv-
00809, 2025 WL 1181679, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2025) (“The Anti-Injunction Act
functions 	as 	an 	absolute 	prohibition 	against 	any 	injunction 	of 	any 	state-court
proceedings.” (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektro Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977))). The
Anti-Injunction Act applies to state court eviction proceedings. See Milhaven v. Country
Vill. Apartment, No. 19-cv-02384, 2020 WL 5663380, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2020)
(“Courts in the Second Circuit have long held that the Anti-Injunction Act applies to state-
court eviction proceedings.”) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff seeks an order “restraining [d]efendants from executing the warrant of
eviction and preserving the status quo[.]” Compl. 6. Courts have repeatedly concluded
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that this requested relief is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. See Baumgarten v. County
of Suffolk, No. 07-cv-00539, 2007 WL 1490482, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2007) (“[The]
[p]laintiff seeks an injunction barring her eviction, for which a [w]arrant of [e]viction was
issued[,] . . . [a]ccordingly, the Anti-Injunction Act applies.”) (collecting cases); Gomez v.
Yisroel, No. 21-cv-02172, 2021 WL 2138462, at *2, 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2021) (concluding
that Anti-Injunction At barred injunctive relief against “the execution of [an] eviction
warrant” issued by state court); 273 Lee Ave. Tenants Ass’n v. Steinmetz, No. 16-cv-
06942, 2017 WL 11508017, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2017) (“[The] [d]efendants argue
primarily that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, bars this [c]ourt from granting
a preliminary injunction to stay the warrants of eviction issued by the [h]ousing [c]ourt
against [the] [p]laintiffs. The [c]ourt agrees.”). Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations do not
give rise to a reasonable inference that any of the Anti-Injunction Act’s enumerated
exceptions applies. 3 Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is also barred by
the Anti-Injunction Act.
III. 	Section 1983 Claim
Finally, in addition to the fact that plaintiff’s requests for relief are barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Anti-Injunction Act, dismissal of this action is also
warranted because plaintiff fails to raise a colorable Section 1983 claim. As a threshold
matter, “[a] [Section] 1983 plaintiff suing a municipality or individual officers in their
official capacity must allege that their injury was caused by an official policy or custom.”
Greco v. City of New York, 686 F. Supp. 3d 191, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Montero v.
3 	Although claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are excepted from the Anti-
Injunction Act, the exception only applies where a plaintiff “ma[kes] out a cognizable
Section 1983 claim.” Ram v. Lal, 906 F. Supp. 2d 59, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). And as set forth
more fully below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to raise a plausible Section 1983 claim.
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City of Yonkers, New York, 890 F.3d 386, 403–04 (2d Cir. 2018)). And here, plaintiff
alleges no facts about a city policy, custom, or practice that caused his alleged
constitutional injuries. See generally Compl. Therefore, plaintiff fails to state a Section
1983 claim against the City and Marshal. See Dininny v. Tretanelli, No. 09-cv-06561,
2010 WL 5343180, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2010) ([T]he [c]ourt finds nothing in the
complaint alleging that [the defendant’s] acts were pursuant to a policy or custom of the
municipality. Accordingly, the claims against the City . . . and [the defendant] in his
official capacity must be dismissed.”); see also Gaughan v. Nelson, No. 94-cv-03859, 1997
WL 80549, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (“This failure to allege that a constitutional
injury was the result of a municipal custom or policy requires dismissal of the [Section]
1983 claims against [the city] and the individual [d]efendants in their official capacities.”).
To the extent the Marshal is sued in his individual capacity, plaintiff fails to allege
facts suggesting unlawful conduct independent of potential enforcement of the warrant
of eviction. Indeed, all of plaintiff’s allegations concerning the “unconstitutional conduct
that occurred outside the state court proceedings,” Mot. 3, is limited to defendant Scott,
a private individual, see Compl. 5. It is of course “axiomatic that private citizens and
entities are not generally subject to Section 1983 liability.” Anilao v. Spota, 774 F. Supp.
2d 457, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323
(2d Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff attempts to remedy this deficiency by arguing that the Marshal
is “enforcing a known-fraudulent judgment . . . despite notice of serious irregularities[.]”
Mot. 5. But this argument fails because (1) the facts alleged do not support a reasonable
inference that the warrant of eviction was fraudulent; and (2) even if the warrant was
procured fraudulently, plaintiff alleges no facts explaining how the Marshal knew that to
be the case. Indeed, plaintiff elsewhere argues that Scott’s transfer of ownership of the
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property—one of the alleged “serious irregularities and unresolved procedural defects” in
the housing proceedings, Compl. 5—was “undisclosed” to the housing court, see Haynes
Decl. ¶ 4. Moreover, absent a stay, the Marshal “cannot be held liable for evicting the
plaintiff pursuant to a court order.” Maldonado v. N.Y. Cnty. Sheriff, No. 05-cv-08377,
2006 WL 2588911, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006). This is so because “[i]t is not within the
scope of a [marshal’s] authority to review or question the legality of a court mandate.” Id.
Therefore, the Marshal cannot be held liable pursuant to Section 1983 for enforcing the
warrant of eviction. See id.; see also Tomassi v. Sheehan, No. 15-cv-03605, 2016 WL
4768826, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL
4767539 (Sept. 13, 2016).
In sum, plaintiff’s allegations, even liberally construed, fail to state a claim arising
under the Constitution or federal law. 4 His claims amount to a collateral attack on the
eviction judgment itself, a matter over which this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
See Ally v. Sukkar, 128 F. App’x 194, 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order) (“[The
plaintiff’s] complaint arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute over which the federal courts
simply have no jurisdiction.”); Brennen v. Griffin, No. 25-cv-03464, 2025 WL 3459373,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (explaining that allegations against a private landlord do
not “involve a federal law or cause of action or require resolution of a substantial question
of federal law”).
4 	Moreover, plaintiff does not allege that the Court has diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Compl. 3. Indeed, the complaint lists each defendant’s
address to be New York, where plaintiff also appears to be a citizen. See Compl. 1–2; see
also Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (finding that a case
falls within the federal district court’s diversity jurisdiction “only if diversity of citizenship
among the parties is complete, i.e., only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are
citizens of the same state”).
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Therefore, “given the absence of any plausible federal claim . . . the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction,” and the complaint must be dismissed. Peterec v. Cnty. of
Suffolk Att’y, No. 13-cv-04104, 2013 WL 4500921, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013); see
Kheyn v. City of New York, No. 10-cv-03233, 2010 WL 3034652, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2,
2010) (“A claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction, however, may be dismissed for
want of subject-matter jurisdiction if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is immaterial and made
solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”);
see also McAllan v. Malatzky, No. 97-cv-08291, 1998 WL 24369, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22,
1998) (“Where, as here, the complaint’s constitutional claim appears to be nothing more
than a state court claim recloaked in constitutional garb, the constitutional claim is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction.”).
Moreover, because the defects in plaintiff’s claims are substantive, the Court finds
that amendment would be futile, and plaintiff is denied leave to amend. See Bey, 2025
WL 1181679, at *4; see also Haapaniemi v. TN Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. 23-cv-00554,
2023 WL 5002616, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2023) (“Given that the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be cured in an amended pleading, leave to amend the [c]omplaint
would be futile[.]”).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order
and order to show cause for a preliminary injunction is denied, and the complaint is
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and,
therefore, denies plaintiff in forma pauperis status for the purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, mark this case as
closed, and to mail a copy of this Order to plaintiff and to note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Natasha C. Merle 	__
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: 	February 9, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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