Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ALEJANDRO PERALTA ACUAPAN,
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
- against- 	26-CV-00384 (OEM)
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as
U.S. Attorney General; KRISTI NOEM, in her
official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; RAUL MALDONADO, JR.,
in his official capacity as Warden of the Metropolitan
Detention Center; TODD LYONS in his official capacity
as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and JUDITH ALMODAVAR, in her official
capacity as Acting Field Office Director of the New York
Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:
Petitioner Alejandro Peralta Acuapan (“Petitioner”) seeks a writ of habeas corpus for
immediate release pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the lawfulness of his ongoing
detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) as a violation of due process under
the U.S. Constitution. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Dkt. 1 (the “Petition” or “Pet.”).
Petitioner was arrested by ICE on November 19, 2025, in Brooklyn, New York, and he is currently
detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York (“MDC Brookyln”). For
the following reasons, the Petition is granted.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. 	See Pet. ¶ 11; Declaration of Deportation
Officer Kerryn Irving ¶ 6, Dkt. 7-1 (“Irving Decl.”). 	He first entered the United States without
inspection near Calexico, California, on June 24, 1999. Irving Decl. ¶ 3. He was encountered by
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United States Customs and Border Patrol and granted voluntary return to Mexico that same day.
Id. Petitioner re-entered the United States at an unknown location on an unknown date sometime
later that year. Id.; Pet. ¶ 25.
On November 19, 2025, ICE officers, in conjunction with other federal law enforcement
officers, were conducting an enforcement action in Brooklyn, New York, against another
individual. Irving Decl. ¶ 4. While outside the target’s last known residence, the officers observed
Petitioner, an individual matching the target’s description, exit the residence. 	Id. 	The officers
subsequently approached Petitioner for questioning, and Petitioner admitted that he was born in
Mexico and lacked documents permitting his entry or presence in the United States. Id. ¶ 6. After
confirming Petitioner’s statements with a records check, the officers arrested Petitioner pursuant
to a Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
The same day, ICE issued and served Petitioner with a Form I-862 Notice to Appear
(“NTA”) before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), placing him in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(a). 	Irving Decl. ¶ 8. 	The NTA charged Petitioner with being removable as “[a]n alien
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrive[d] in the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
On November 20, 2025, ICE transferred Petitioner to MDC Brooklyn, where he has
remained since. Irving Decl. ¶ 10.
On December 8, 2025, Petitioner requested a bond hearing under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 	Id.
¶ 16. 	Petitioner argued that he was a member of the class certified in Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, 5:25-cv-1873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), and that
the declaratory relief in Maldonado Bautista entitled him to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1226(a). Irving Decl. ¶ 16. The IJ denied Petitioner’s bond request for lack of jurisdiction on
December 15, 2025. Id. ¶ 17.
Later in December 2025, the Maldonado Bautista court entered a final judgment of
declaratory relief that class members “are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) . . . and are entitled
to consideration for release on bond by immigration officers and, if not released, a custody
redetermination hearing before an immigration judge.” See Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, 5:25-
cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 	In light of this final
judgment, Petitioner once again sought bond. See Irving Decl. ¶ 18; Opp’n at 9. At a second bond
hearing on December 30, 2025, the IJ found that the court had jurisdiction to conduct a custody
determination and granted Petitioner release on bond of $7,000. Pet. ¶ 30.
The Department of Homeland Security subsequently appealed the IJ’s bond decision to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) and requested a discretionary stay, which the BIA
granted. Id. ¶ 31. As a result, Petitioner remains in detention, even after paying his bond. Id.
To the Court’s knowledge, the bond appeal remains pending as of the date of this
Memorandum and Order.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 22, 2026, Petitioner commenced this action by filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. See generally Pet. That same day, the Court issued an order to show cause why
the Petition should not be granted, thereby directing Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem,
Raul Maldonado, Todd Lyons, and Judith Almodovar (“Respondents”) to file a return by January
27, 2026; ordering the parties to appear before the Court for a hearing on January 29, 2026; and
ordering that Respondents not remove Petitioner from this District “until further order of this
Court.” See Order to Show Cause, Dkt. 3 (the “Order to Show Cause”).
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Respondents filed a motion for an extension of time to file a response to the Petition, see
Letter from Respondents to the Court (Jan. 25, 2026), Dkt. 5, which the Court granted on January
26, 2026. In granting the extension, the Court also rescheduled the hearing to February 5, 2026,
at 11:00 a.m. See Order, dated Jan. 26, 2026.
Respondents filed their response on January 30, 2026. 	See Memorandum of Law in
Response to Order to Show Cause Why a Writ of Habeas Corpus Should Not Be Issued, Dkt. 7
(the “Opposition” or “Opp’n”). On February 4, 2026, Respondents filed a letter appending four
supplemental authorities supporting their position. 	See Letter from Respondents to the Court,
(Feb. 4, 2026), Dkt. 8.
The Court held a hearing on the Order to Show Cause on February 5, 2026, at 11:00 a.m.
See generally Transcript of Civil Cause for Order to Show Cause Before the Honorable Orelia E.
Merchant United States District Judge (the “Transcript” or “Tr.”).
Respondents filed two more letters appending supplemental authorities in support of their
position on February 8 and 11, 2026. See Letter from Respondents to the Court (Feb. 8, 2026),
Dkt. 9; Letter from Respondents to the Court (Feb. 11, 2026), Dkt. 10.
DISCUSSION
The instant Petition raises three principal issues: (1) whether Petitioner has exhausted
administrative remedies; (2) whether Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (“Section 1226”
or “§ 1226”) or 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“Section 1225” or “§ 1225”); and (3) whether Petitioner’s due
process rights have been violated.
A. Administrative Exhaustion
Although Respondents do not address administrative exhaustion in their Opposition, they
argued at the Hearing that more administrative process is available to Petitioner such that his
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requested relief is premature. See Tr. Petitioner contends that exhausting administrative remedies
would be futile. Pet. ¶ 20.
Courts generally require “administrative exhaustion before immigration detention may be
challenged in federal court by a writ of habeas corpus.” Quintanilla v. Decker, 21-CV-417 (GBD),
2021 WL 707062, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (citing Joseph v. Decker, 18-CV-2640 (RA),
2018 WL 6075067, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2018)). However, exhaustion is a “prudential matter,”
not a “statutory requirement.” Id. Indeed, courts in this Circuit have excused exhaustion when
“(1) available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury
may occur without immediate judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be futile; and (4) in
certain instances a plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question.” Beharry v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003).
Here, an IJ granted Petitioner release on bond, but the BIA stayed his release pending
appeal of the bond decision. Pet.¶ 31. The Court recognizes that Petitioner is not foreclosed from
arguing in favor of the IJ’s bond decision before the BIA and that the BIA is free to overturn its
prior decisions regarding the relevant detention authority. But there are no administrative remedies
available to Petitioner to address the alleged injury: his initial detention by ICE without an
individualized determination that he posed a flight risk or danger to the community. See Pet. ¶¶ 60-
61. While Petitioner was granted a bond hearing in accordance with § 1226(a), “the implementing
regulations provide that ‘[s]uch hearings . . . are provided for the purpose of custody re-
determination—a hearing held by an immigration judge after ICE makes its initial decision to
detain.’” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Chipantiza-
Sisalema v. Francis, 25 Civ. 5528 (AT), 2025 WL 1927931, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2025)); see
also 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1). As this Court has held previously, post-deprivation review in the form
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of a bond hearing is inadequate to remedy a detention that is unlawful from its inception. See J.U.
v. Maldonado, 805 F. Supp. 3d 482, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, 25-CV-5208 (OEM),
2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025); see also Chipantiza-Sisalema, 2025 WL
1927931, at *3 (stating that a bond hearing “is no substitute for the requirement that ICE engage
in a ‘deliberative process prior to, or contemporaneous with,’ the initial decision to strip a person
of the freedom that lies at the heart of the Due Process Clause.” (quoting Lopez v. Sessions, 18 Civ.
4189 (RWS), 2018 WL 2932726, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018)). Accordingly, Petitioner is
excused from exhausting administrative remedies before seeking relief in this Court.
B. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
As for the core issue of this case, whether Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226 or
§ 1225, the Court is bound by a long line of U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See Leng May Ma v.
Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (“[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between
those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the
United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693
(2001) (“The distinction between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one
who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.”); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
289 (2018) (stating that § 1225(b) governs “aliens seeking admission into the country,” whereas
§ 1226(a) governs “aliens already in the country” who are subject to removal proceedings). Thus,
the Court’s position on whether § 1226 or § 1225 applies in scenarios where a petitioner is detained
after entering the country has not changed since deciding other 28 U.S.C. § 2241 immigration
cases recently. See, e.g., J.U., 805 F. Supp. 3d 482; Artiga, 2025 WL 2829434; Lira Caceres v.
Shanahan, 26-CV-00016 (OEM), 2026 WL 233215 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2026); Singh v. Maldonado,
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26-CV-00019 (OEM), 2026 WL 233216 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2026); Sanchez Atz v. Noem, 26-CV-
00214 (OEM), 2026 WL 320238 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026).
Petitioner’s past entry and voluntary return do not change the conclusion that § 1226 is the
applicable statute. Petitioner has nonetheless “effected an entry” into the United States following
his voluntary return to Mexico on June 24, 1999, see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (quoting Zadvydas 533 U.S. at 693), and therefore was “already in the
country” when he was arrested on November 19, 2025, see Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289; Sanchez
Atz, 2026 WL 320238, at *3 (finding that the petitioner had effected an entry despite an earlier
removal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 265, a public health statue). The fact that Petitioner did not have
contact with immigration authorities upon re-entry similarly has no bearing on the statutory basis
for his detention, as courts have consistently held that noncitizens who enter without such contact
are still subject to § 1226. See, e.g., R.P.L. v. Maldonado, 25-CV-6886 (HG), 2025 WL 3731864,
at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2025); Cuy Comes v. DeLeon, 25 Civ. 9283 (AT), 2025 WL 3206491,
at *1-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2025); Campos v. DeLeon, 25-cv-10099 (LJL), 2025 WL 3514120, at
*1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2025); Rocano Buestan v. McShane, 25-CV-8544 (JGLC), 2025 WL
3496361, at *1-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2025).
The Court acknowledges the supplemental authorities submitted by Respondents, all of
which are nonbinding on this Court. 	See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 25-20496 & 25-40701,
2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026); Saamishvili v. Flanagan, 25-cv-6178 (BMC), 2026 WL
377574 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2016); Arana v. Arteta, 26-cv-240 (GHW), 2026 WL 279786 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 3, 2026); Acosta v. Arteta, 25-cv-9916 (MKV), 2026 WL 263470 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026);
Lopez v. Noem, 26 Civ. 00345 (JHR), 2026 WL 266597 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026); Quintero v.
Francis, 25-CV-10107 (MKV), 2026 WL 265921 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026). While the Fifth Circuit
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adopted Respondent’s position in Buenrostro-Mendez, the majority’s reasoning is not persuasive.
As noted by Judge Douglas in dissent, the notion that there is no meaningful difference between
an “applicant for admission” and “an alien seeking admission” in § 1225 is not “consistent with
the statutory definition of ‘admission,’ the provision’s context, the Supreme Court’s understanding
of the statutory scheme, and the whole history of American immigration law.” Buenrostro-Mendez,
2026 WL 323330, at *11 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This reading of the statute “would mean that,
for purposes of immigration detention, the border is now everywhere. That is not the law Congress
passed, and if it had, it would have spoken much more clearly.” Id. at *18 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Court also respectfully disagrees with Saamishvili, which is, to the Court’s knowledge,
the only decision in this District that has adopted Respondents’ position on the scope of § 1225.
Saamishvili does not reconcile the “whirlpool of statutory confusion” created by Respondents’
interpretation, which “renders ‘an alien seeking admission’ needless surplusage, and makes several
provisions of § 1226 surplusage as well.” Buenrostro Mendez, 2026 WL 323330, at *12 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); see also J.U., 805 F. Supp. at 495 (discussing the statutory surplusage created by
the government’s interpretation of § 1225). Saamishvili also does not address the prior practice of
detaining noncitizens apprehended within this country under § 1226, a practice that was unbroken
for nearly 30 years and stems from a much broader historical context. 	See Buenrostro-Mendez,
2026 WL 323330, at *15 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
As the Court is not persuaded by the supplemental authorities provided by Respondents,
and there are no distinguishing facts as to Petitioner in this case, this Court joins the overwhelming
majority of courts to find that detention of the nature at issue here cannot be upheld under § 1225.
See Barco Mercado v. Francis, 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
26, 2025) (collecting cases). Mandatory detention under § 1225 is inapplicable to Petitioner, and
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he is therefore subject to discretionary detention under § 1226. See J.U., 805 F. Supp. 3d, at 490
(noting the mutual exclusivity of § 1225 and § 1226).
C. Due Process
The Court now turns to whether ICE’s detention of Petitioner violates his due process
rights. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevents the government from depriving any
person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. C ONST . amend. V. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “‘It
is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law’ in the context
of removal proceedings.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 306 (1993)); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); Valdez v. Joyce, 803 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(“Even 	noncitizens 	have a liberty 	interest 	in 	continued 	freedom 	from 	civil 	immigration
confinement.” (citing Lopez v. Sessions, 18 Civ. 4189 (RWS), 2018 WL 2932726, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
June 12, 2018))); Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *12 (“Petitioner’s re-detention, without prior
notice, a showing of changed circumstances, or a meaningful opportunity to respond, does not
satisfy the procedural requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”)).1
1 Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention comports with due process because he is “treated for constitutional
purposes as if stopped at the border.” Opp’n at 22. However, this “entry fiction” doctrine, id. at 22 n.10, is neither
relevant to the statutory analysis set out above nor applicable to the due process analysis. As other courts in this
Circuit have explained, the entry fiction doctrine “dictates what constitutional rights are due to a noncitizen who is
physically present in the United States (for example, because of detention or parole) but hasn’t been lawfully
admitted.” J.G.O. v. Francis, 25-CV-7233 (AS), 2025 WL 3040142, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025). Whatever
procedure Congress authorized is, under this doctrine, due process. Id. Here, however, the question is what process
Congress authorized, so “even assuming that the entry fiction would apply,” it does not affect the “statutory analysis.”
Id.
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The Second Circuit has held that the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), three-
factor balancing test applies when determining the adequacy of process in the context of civil
immigration confinement. 	Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020). 	The
determination of what procedures are required under the Fifth Amendment requires consideration
of: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
With respect to the first prong of the Mathews test, Petitioner invokes “the most significant
liberty interest there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d
at 851 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)). 	A person’s liberty cannot be
abridged without “adequate procedural protections.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner argues
that ICE failed to exercise the discretion required by § 1226 when detaining him. 	Pet. ¶ 60.
Petitioner’s liberty interest is clearly established. See Valdez, 803 F. Supp. 3d, at 218.
With respect to the second prong of the Mathews test, the record demonstrates that no
individualized determination was made prior to or contemporaneously with the decision to detain
Petitioner on November 19, 2025. Respondents present no articulable facts as to why Petitioner
is a dangerous or a flight risk. See Irving Decl. ¶¶ 6-9. Rather, Respondents argue Petitioner’s
arrest and detention is justified by his undocumented entry and his lack of work authorization,
relying on the mandatory detention authority of § 1225. See id. ICE therefore did not engage in
the required deliberative process during the initial decision to strip Petitioner of his liberty interest,
and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest is high. See Chipantiza-Sisalema, 2025 WL
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1927931, at *3; see also Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *11 (finding a risk of erroneous deprivation
where petitioner was re-detained absent a change in circumstances, procedure, or evidentiary
findings).
As to the third and final Mathews prong, “the Attorney General’s discretion to detain
individuals under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is valid where it advances a legitimate governmental
purpose,” such as “ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration proceedings” and
“preventing danger to the community.” Valdez, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 218 (first quoting Velasco Lopez,
978 F.3d at 854; then quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). Here, as stated above, nothing suggests
that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Rather, Petitioner has been employed
as a day laborer in construction for over 20 years, is the father of four U.S. citizens, and is the
primary provider in his household. 	Pet. ¶ 29. 	Respondents have therefore failed to show a
significant interest in his continued detention.
Taken together, Petitioner’s ongoing detention violates his due process rights. See Valdez,
803 F. Supp. 3d at 219; Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726, at *15. Given the deprivation of Petitioner’s
liberty, the absence of any deliberative process prior to or contemporaneous with the deprivation,
and the statutory and constitutional rights implicated, a writ of habeas corpus is the only form of
relief and the most appropriate remedy. Valdez, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 219; Lopez, 2018 WL 2932726,
at *1.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is granted. Respondents are ordered to immediately
release Petitioner from custody. By February 25, 2026, Respondents shall certify compliance with
this order by filing on the docket and noting specifically that Petitioner has been released.
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The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment in accordance with this
Memorandum and Order and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
ORELIA E. MERCHANT
United States District Judge
February 24, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
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