Yaroshevsky v. Karlin et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------- X
EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY,
Plaintiff,
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
-against-
25-CV-2747 (DG) (SDE)
BENJAMIN 	W. 	KARLIN, 	SANDRA
KARLIN, 	WINNIE 	WOODCLIFF 	PARK,
LLC, WOODCLIFF PARK COTTAGES, LLC,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------- X
SETH D. EICHENHOLTZ, United States Magistrate Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Evgeny Yaroshevsky brings claims against Defendants Benjamin W.
Karlin, Sandra Karlin, Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC, and Woodcliff Park Cottages, LLC
(collectively, “Defendants”), in connection with a property dispute. 	Presently before the Court,
on referral from the Honorable Diane Gujarati, United States District Judge, are Defendants’
motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and (6); and, separately, to impose sanctions on Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11. 	As part of his response to Defendants’ Rule 11 motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to
amend his Complaint to partially address the concerns raised in that motion.
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court
deny Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint; grant Defendants’ motion for sanctions, including
the sanction of dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice; and, even if the Court declines
to dismiss the Complaint as a sanction, grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This action is the latest in a years-long landlord/tenant dispute between the parties. The
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facts described below are based on Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint and, where noted, the
hundreds of pages of briefing and exhibits submitted by the parties to this action.
I. 	Underlying Landlord/Tenant Dispute
Woodcliff Park is a seasonal beachfront community of cottages on the North Shore of Long
Island, New York owned by Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC and managed by Woodcliff Park
Cottages, LLC. 1 Plaintiff and his wife have owned a cottage in the Woodcliff Park community
for around 30 years. 	(See Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 14.) 	Both parties agree that
Plaintiff occupied the property pursuant to a yearly lease agreement.2 (See id.; Declaration of Kim
A. Smith in support of Motion to Dismiss, (“Smith Decl.”) Dkt. No. 38-1, ¶ 21.)
Although there have been multiple disputes between Plaintiff and Defendants since at least
2003, the Complaint centers on a dispute arising in 2022. (See Compl. ¶¶ 179, 325; Smith Decl.
¶¶ 8, 26–27.) 	Among other things, Defendants claim Plaintiff failed to return a signed lease
agreement for the 2022 season and occupied the property during that season without paying rent.
(Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff also describes a series of confrontations with Defendants and other tenants at
Woodcliff Park. (See Compl. ¶¶ 120, 122, 131–133, 138, 169; see also Smith Decl. ¶ 33–34.)
As a result of these events, Defendants withdrew their offer to Plaintiff for a 2022 lease,
informed Plaintiff that he and his wife were unlawful holdover tenants, and served them with a 90-
day notice terminating their tenancy. 	(Smith Decl. ¶ 37.) 	Plaintiff did not vacate the premises,
1 Benjamin Karlin is the sole member of Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC and Woodcliff Park
Cottages, LLC. (Smith Decl. ¶ 7; Compl. ¶ 9.) Mr. Karlin’s wife, Sandra Karlin, is named as a
Defendant but holds no position in Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC, nor Woodcliff Park Cottages,
LLC, nor any other entity related to Woodcliff Park. (Smith Decl. ¶ 7.)
2 	Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC rents parcels of the Woodcliff Park property to tenants,
who lease their land but own the cottages and structures that sit on the land. (See Compl. ¶ 27;
Smith Decl. ¶ 7.)
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and on December 23, 2022, Defendants commenced a summary proceeding in the Town of
Riverhead Justice Court to remove him from the property. (Id. ¶ 38.)
II. 	State Court Litigation & Settlement
After fierce litigation, the parties agreed to settle the Justice Court proceeding in October
2023. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 39–51; see also Stipulation of Settlement, (“Settlement”), Dkt. No. 38-12.)
Under the settlement terms, Plaintiff agreed to vacate the property no later than October 15, 2023.
(Settlement § 1.) In exchange, Defendants agreed to purchase Plaintiff’s cottage for fair market
value as determined through an appraisal. (Id. § 2, § 3a–d.) Both parties also agreed to a general
release of all claims they may have had against one another. The release language applicable to
Plaintiff read as follows:
“EVGENY YAROSHEVSKY and YELENA YAROSHEVKY,
their 	principals, 	members, 	heirs, 	executors, 	administrators,
successors, and assigns, as RELEASORS, release and discharge
WINNIE 	WOODCLIFF 	PARK, 	LLC, 	as 	RELEASEE, 	the
RELEASEE, RELEASEE’S principals, members, heirs, executors,
administrators, successors, and assigns, from all actions, causes of
action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money, accounts, reckonings,
bonds, 	bills, 	specialties, 	covenants, 	contracts, 	controversies,
agreements, promises, variances, trespasses, damages, judgments,
extents, executions, claims, and demands whatsoever, in law,
admiralty or equity, which against the RELEASEE and each of
them, the RELEASORS, the RELEASORS’ successors and assigns
ever had, now have or hereafter can, shall or may, have for, upon, or
by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the
beginning of the world until the Effective Date, including any and
all claims that were made or which could have been made in the
summary proceeding in the Town of Riverhead Justice Court
captioned Winnie Woodcliff Park, LLC. v. Yaroshevsky, Docket No.
22-LT-120894.”
(Id. § 7(a) (the “Release”).) The Release also ensured that the Justice Court “retain[ed] jurisdiction
to enforce and to resolve any disputes under this stipulation.” (Id. § 5.) The parties executed the
stipulation on October 10, 2023. (Id. p. 6.)
But the settlement stalled in part because, along with other continued disputes, the parties
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failed to agree on an appraiser and, thus, fair market value for Plaintiff’s cottage. 	(See Compl.
¶ 216; Smith Decl. ¶ 55.) 	Plaintiff further alleges the settlement agreement was fraudulent and
unenforceable for other reasons. (See Compl. ¶¶ 216–217.)
Plaintiff did not vacate the property. 	(Smith Decl. ¶ 61.) 	In March 2024, Defendants
applied to the Justice Court for a Judgment of Possession and Warrant Eviction, claiming Plaintiff
had breached the settlement agreement. 	(Id. ¶¶ 62–63.) 	The Justice Court entered judgment in
Defendants’ favor, and Plaintiff appealed. 	(Id. ¶¶ 76–79.) 	That appeal remains pending.
(Id. ¶ 86.) During the pendency of that appeal, Plaintiff also sought three stays of that judgment
in both the Justice Court and the Appellate Term—two of which were denied and one of which
remains pending. (Id. ¶¶ 87–101.)
III. 	Plaintiff Seeks Relief in Federal Court
On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing his Complaint. Totaling over 374
pages, the Complaint alleges 14 causes of action. (See Compl. p. 1) Among other claims, Plaintiff
asserts Defendants’ actions to evict him from the Property constitute fraud, tax evasion, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, public nuisance, deprivation of constitutional rights, and
conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 	(See id.)
Plaintiff also sought a preliminary injunction. 	(See Compl. § XI; Order to Show Cause for
Temporary Restraining Order, Dkt. No. 5.)
IV. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motions Contain False or Misleading Citations Resulting
in Multiple Warnings About Sanctions
Shortly after filing the Complaint, Plaintiff also moved to disqualify Defendants’ counsel.
(Motion to Disqualify Counsel, Dkt. No. 14.) The Court referred that motion to the then-assigned
Magistrate Judge, Peggy Kuo. (Order Referring Motion dated June 6, 2025.)
Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify alleged that Plaintiff used false
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or misleading citations throughout his lengthy Complaint and other filings. 	(See Defendants’
Opposition to Motion to Disqualify, Dkt. No. 15-10, pp. 4–6.) 	Plaintiff countered that these
assertions were “reckless and untrue,” and said his authorities were legitimate. (Plaintiff’s Reply
in Support of Motion to Disqualify, Dkt. No. 16, ¶¶ 2–3.)
In her opinion denying Plaintiff’s motion, Magistrate Judge Kuo noted that she could not
locate one of Plaintiff’s cited cases and found that two quotations attributed to another case could
not be found in the relevant opinion. (Order, Dkt. No. 20, p.7 n.2.) Without “speculat[ing] as to
how Plaintiff came to include [these] erroneous quotations in his motion papers,” she cautioned
Plaintiff that “even though he is proceeding pro se, he must still comply strictly with the
requirements of representations made to a court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)”
and warned him that failure to do so may result in sanctions. (Id.) This was the first warning given
to Plaintiff about sanctions for this conduct.
The second warning about sanctions would come shortly thereafter, based on false citations
in an entirely separate filing. 	On June 13, 2025, the day after Magistrate Judge Kuo issued her
Order, Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief was argued before Judge Gujarati. The Court denied
Plaintiff’s motion to the extent it sought a temporary restraining order for failure to establish such
a remedy was appropriate. (Transcript of June 13, 2025 Hearing (“June 13 Tr.”), Dkt. No. 50-12,
at 22:17–23:1.) 	The Court also denied Plaintiff’s motion to the extent it sought a preliminary
injunction, noting at the time that Plaintiff’s filings had relied at least in part on nonexistent
citations. (Id. at 23:2–7.).
During argument, Judge Gujarati warned Plaintiff, “[e]ven though you are proceeding pro
se, you must take care to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 11(b),
which relates to representations to the Court.” 	(Id. at 6:2–9.) 	Plaintiff expressly denied using
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generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) to draft his papers and said he had found cases on Google,
other search engines, and legal websites. (See id. at 6:16–22.) Judge Gujarati credited Plaintiff’s
explanation and said she assumed Plaintiff did not know he was using unreliable sources. (See id.
at 6:23–7:7.) Plaintiff “promis[ed] to be more meticulous” in the future. (Id. at 7:5–7.)
At the conclusion of the conference, Judge Gujarati set a briefing schedule for Defendants’
motion to dismiss and told Plaintiff he could renew his motion for injunctive relief with proper
supporting documentation. (Minute Entry dated June 13, 2025.) He did so on July 17, 2025. (See
Plaintiff’s Supplemental Declaration in Support of Renewed Order to Show Cause, Dkt. No. 22.)
V. 	Plaintiff Persists in Filing Documents with False or Misleading Citations
Plaintiff made additional filings after this conference, and Defendants again asserted that
Plaintiff’s filings contained additional nonexistent or misleading citations. (See, e.g., Letter, Dkt.
No. 32.) On August 5, 2025, Judge Gujarati held a conference and heard argument on the alleged
fake citations contained in Plaintiff’s filings. (Minute Entry dated Aug. 5, 2025.) That hearing
resulted in Plaintiff’s third warning from the Court about his conduct and the potential for
sanctions.
During the in-person conference, Judge Gujarati said she had “real concerns” about
Plaintiff’s “very troubling conduct” and warned that he needed to take the issue “extremely
seriously.” (Transcript of Aug. 25, 2025 Conference, (“Aug. 25 Tr.”), Dkt. No. 50-19, at 2:19–
4:2.) The Court asked Plaintiff multiple times if he would like to withdraw his Complaint without
prejudice, remove any incorrect citations, and refile his claims in a new complaint that invitation.
(See id. at 4:19–20; 8:2–10:7; 12:23–13:5; 14:9–11; 16:24–17:2; 19:23–20:5.) Plaintiff declined
to do so but accepted the Court’s corresponding invitation to withdraw his renewed motion for
injunctive relief because it also relied on fake citations. 	(See id. at 12:23–13:20.) 	After again
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explaining the potential consequences of proceeding on a Complaint with incorrect authority, the
Court told Plaintiff “[it] had offered [him] an opportunity, [he was] not interested in the opportunity
to correct [his] mistakes, and so [he was] going to be stuck with the consequences of that decision.”
(Id. at 19:23–20:1.) 	The Court also warned Plaintiff that if there were any fake citations in his
forthcoming briefing in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, he could be sanctioned. (See
id. at 16:1–5.)
After Plaintiff failed to revise his filings, Defendants reviewed Plaintiff’s briefing and
identified at least five cases that did not exist and thirteen instances in which the language Plaintiff
quoted did not appear in the case. (See Declaration of Amanda Star Frazer, (“Frazer Decl.”), Dkt.
No. 50-1, ¶ 40.) In response, Plaintiff said his papers contained “at most, good-faith mislabeling
or citation variations traceable to open-access databases.” (Declaration of Plaintiff in Opposition
to Motion to Dismiss, (“Pl’s. MTD Opp.”), Dkt. No. 39, ¶ 14.) The parties’ fully briefed motion
to dismiss was filed on August 11, 2025.
VI. 	Defendants Provide Plaintiff with Notice of an Anticipated Motion for Sanctions and
Plaintiff Fails to Correct the False and Misleading Citations
Despite the multiple warnings from the Court and continued mention by Defendants that
Plaintiff continued to rely on false or misleading sanctions, Plaintiff failed to take any steps to
correct or withdraw any of his filings at any time.
On December 4, 2025, Defendants served Plaintiff with a complete copy of a proposed
motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. (Letter, Dkt. No. 49-1, p. 1; see also Memorandum in
Support of Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, (“Defs.’ Sanctions Mot.”), Dkt. No. 50-31.) In the
proposed motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff should be sanctioned for his persistent use of
fake and misleading citations. (See Defs.’ Sanctions Mot. pp. 14 –24.) They further argued that
Plaintiff should be sanctioned for bringing claims barred by the Release, and for fabricating facts
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to support his arguments that the Justice Court and Defendants’ counsel acted fraudulently. (See
id.) 	The motion sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and striking of his filings, as well as
costs and attorneys’ fees Defendants incurred in opposing Plaintiff’s arguments. (See id. p. 25.)
Defendants warned Plaintiff that if he did not withdraw his Complaint with prejudice by December
26, 2025, Defendants would move for sanctions. (Id.) Despite the three prior warnings from the
Court, and the benefit of the safe harbor period before Defendants could file their motion for
sanctions, Plaintiff did not correct the prior filings in response to the notice of the motion, nor did
he respond to Defendants at all.
On December 29, 2025, after Plaintiff failed to take corrective action during the safe harbor
period, Defendants filed a letter seeking leave to file their motion for sanctions, which was referred
to the undersigned. (Order dated Dec. 30, 2025.)
VII. 	During 	Argument 	on 	the 	Motion 	for 	Sanctions, 	Plaintiff 	Makes 	Material
Misrepresentations to the Court
After this matter was referred to the undersigned, the Court scheduled a hearing on the
motion for January 7, 2026. 	(Id.) 	The purpose of the hearing was to discuss with Plaintiff the
serious consequences associated with the conduct described by Defendants and to see if there was
any opportunity to resolve the matter short of a decision to sanction Plaintiff.
During the hearing, the undersigned echoed previous warnings about “the seriousness of
the allegations contained in the motion and the seriousness of the potential consequences and
sanctions [he was] facing in this case.” (Transcript of Jan. 7, 2026 Hearing, (“Jan. 7 Tr.”), Dkt.
No. 51, at 2:20–22.) To ensure there was no misunderstanding about Defendants’ allegations, the
Court asked Defendants to explain their argument that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed
for relying on inappropriate citations. 	(See id. at 2:15–3:23.) 	The undersigned also explained
plainly that the issue of fake and misleading citations was “most critical” because it could be a
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basis to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint entirely. (Id. at 5:18–21.)
In response to Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff explained that he had used and relied on
publicly available sources, including Google Scholar, Court Listener, and Justia Law for legal
research. (See id. at 6: 11–9:10.) The undersigned asked Plaintiff multiple times if Plaintiff had
checked every citation in his papers to determine it was accurate, and Plaintiff affirmed he had
done so each time. (See id. at 9:15–11:15.) Ultimately, the undersigned and Plaintiff then had the
following exchange:
“THE COURT: So with all of that said, I will again confirm with
you is your representation to this Court that you’ve checked each
and every citation in your papers filed with the Court, including the
ones in the Rule 11 motion cited by defendant’s counsel, and you've
verified that they all exist and stand for the proposition for which
you cite them?
PLAINTIFF: Yeah. Verified since the last hearing (indiscernible),
so verified those citations and (inaudible). Yes.”
(Id. at 13:18–14:2.)
After the undersigned suggested that he would take a short break from the hearing to
personally verify whether the citations were accurate, Plaintiff began to back away from his prior
representations. 	Without yet acknowledging some of his citations were false or misleading,
Plaintiff instead argued he had not had an opportunity to correct any inaccurate citations because
no one had ordered him to do so. (See id. at 16:2–18:17.) The undersigned rejected this argument.
(See id. at 19:12–20.)
Only then—after at least five prior declarations to the contrary during the conference and
numerous representations over the prior seven months to other judges and counsel—did Plaintiff
finally acknowledge that “[s]ome of [the citations], yeah, definitely were not good and correct.”
(Id. at 19:20–21.) Plaintiff also suggested he wanted the opportunity to amend his complaint to
correct any false or misleading citations contained in the complaint. (See id. at 20:16 –21:6.) The
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undersigned expressed concern that Plaintiff had not yet done so, given that these issues were first
identified seven months prior, but made clear it would not rule on any motion without giving
Plaintiff an opportunity to respond in writing. (See id. at 21:6–24:7.)
Plaintiff then also admitted that, despite his prior representation to Judge Gujarati to the
contrary, he had used AI software, including Gemini, the AI feature built in the Google Chrome
browser, to obtain at least some citations on some legal issues. (See id. at 58:4–6.) When asked
if he had verified any of the case law provided to him by Google Gemini before filing his
Complaint, Plaintiff admitted that he had not. (See id. at 58:19–59:3.)
The undersigned reiterated the “potentially extremely serious consequences” that Plaintiff
faced and then heard argument on Defendants’ other arguments for sanctions or dismissal,
including that Plaintiff’s claims were precluded by the release executed to resolve the Justice Court
proceeding, and that Plaintiff failed to state a civil RICO claim with sufficient specificity.
(See id. at 24:11–12; 24:13–57:25.)
The hearing was briefly adjourned to review Plaintiff’s citations, which confirmed that
some citations did not exist and some did not stand for the propositions asserted. (See id. at 65:8–
16.) The undersigned then permitted Plaintiff an opportunity to decide how he wanted to proceed.
The undersigned reiterated some of the possibilities discussed during the hearing: Plaintiff could
seek to withdraw his Complaint; seek the opportunity to amend, with the understanding that
amending might not fully resolve the conduct at issue and that he could still be subject to Rule 11
sanctions; or move forward with his claims as they stood. (See id. at 69:5–70:20.) The undersigned
also reiterated its serious concerns with granting leave to amend given the belated nature of the
request and directed Plaintiff to confer with Defendants before requesting leave to withdraw or
amend his complaint. 	(See id. at 72:4–16.) 	Plaintiff acknowledged that he understood these
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directions. (See id. at 72:17–18.) The undersigned also made clear that a request to amend at this
stage would likely not address the concerns raised in the Rule 11 motion. 	(See id. at 72:7–8.)
Plaintiff was ordered to file his opposition to Defendants’ motion for sanctions or a status letter
detailing how he intended to proceed by January 14, 2026. (Order dated Jan. 7, 2026.)
VIII. 	Plaintiff Seeks Leave to Amend
On January 13, 2026, seven months after Plaintiff was first warned about false and
misleading citations in his Complaint, Plaintiff filed a letter requesting leave to amend his
Complaint. (Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, (“Pl’s. Mot. to Amend”), Dkt. No. 52.) Invoking his
pro se status, and completely ignoring his prior misrepresentations, Plaintiff argued that any
citation errors were unintentional and “arose from inadvertence and from the practical challenges
of proceeding pro se in a procedurally and factually complex matter.” (Id. p. 1.) On the same day,
Plaintiff also filed his opposition to Defendants’ motion for sanctions. (Opposition to Motion for
Sanctions, Dkt. No. 53.)
On January 16, 2026, Defendants filed an opposition to the request to amend the complaint,
in which they argued that Plaintiff’s request to amend should be denied for futility, undue delay,
and prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 	(See Letter in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend Complaint, Dkt. No. 55.)
On January 21, 2026, Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion for sanctions.
(Reply, Dkt. No. 57.) 	There, Defendants asserted Plaintiff used fabricated authorities in his
opposition to their motion for sanctions and identified each instance where the case cited by
Plaintiff allegedly did not include the quoted material or did not accurately describe the case’s
holding. (See id. pp. 1–4.)
After the motion was fully briefed, the undersigned entered an order to ensure Plaintiff
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clearly understood the posture of the case. 	In that Order, the undersigned “reiterate[d] its prior
Orders and expectations and [gave] Plaintiff one final chance to decide how to proceed.” (Order
dated Jan. 21, 2026).3 On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff confirmed that “[a]fter careful review of the
Court’s clarifications and expectations,” he wanted to proceed with his request to amend. (Letter,
Dkt. No. 58, p. 1.)
DISCUSSION
Although Defendants initially sought dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), because
Defendants’ subsequent motion for sanctions also seeks dismissal with prejudice, the undersigned
addresses that motion first. As part of the consideration into whether sanctions are appropriate,
the undersigned addresses Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the complaint.
I. 	Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions
Defendants argue Plaintiff should be sanctioned (i) for using false and nonexistent legal
authority in his papers submitted to the Court; (ii) for fabricating facts to support his claims
regarding Defendants’ alleged RICO conspiracy and the theories of wrongdoing by Defendants’
counsel and the Justice Court; and (iii) for bringing a frivolous Complaint barred by the Release.
(See Defs.’ Sanctions Mot.) Defendants assert sanctions should include dismissal of the Complaint
with prejudice and striking Plaintiff’s filings from the record. 	(Id. p. 25.) 	The undersigned
recommends the Court grant Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, which should include
dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.
3 	That Order clarified Plaintiff’s obligation to follow all directions and orders from the
Court—even those given orally as opposed to in writing. (Id.) It also explained that the Court had
indeed directed Plaintiff to confer with Defendants before seeking leave to amend, and that the
Court had not found Plaintiff should have an opportunity to amend given the concerns addressed
at the January 7 conference. (Id.)
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A. Standard for Sanctions Under Rule 11
“‘The central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court and thus . . .
streamline the administration and procedure of the federal courts.’” Kumaran v. Northland Energy
Trading, LLC, 762 F. Supp. 3d 322, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990)). To accomplish that purpose, the Rule requires any party filing
papers in federal court to certify those papers are “not being presented for an improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” and that
the arguments within are “warranted by existing law” or “nonfrivolous.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
If, “after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,” a court determines Rule 11 has
been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on “any attorney, law firm, or party.”
Id. at (c)(1). The Rule also allows a court to award reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees,
to the prevailing party on the motion for sanctions. 	Id. at (c)(2). 	A district court has broad
discretion in determining whether to impose any sanction for a Rule 11 violation. See, e.g., Perez
v. Posse Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2004). 	In exercising that discretion, “a district
court is obligated to exercise caution and restraint.” Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Ramierez,
05-CV-2778, 2005 WL 1785113, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2005); see also Galin v. Hamada, 283 F.
Supp. 3d 	189, 	201 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2017) 	(“Rule 	11 	sanctions 	are 	reserved 	for 	extraordinary
circumstances”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff’d, 753 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir.
2018). “[B]ecause the purpose of imposing Rule 11 sanctions is deterrence, a court should impose
the least severe sanctions necessary to achieve that goal.” Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, 04-CV-
5851, 2005 WL 912017, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)). A court
generally considers the following factors when deciding whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions:
“(1) [w]hether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent;
(2) whether it was part of a pattern or activity, or an isolated event;
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(3) whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one particular
count or defense; (4) whether the person has engaged in similar
conduct in other litigation; (5) what effect it had on the litigation
process in time or expense; (6) whether the responsible person is
trained in the law; (7) what amount, given the financial resources of
the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition
in the same case.”
Ratner v. Robinson, 13-CV-6278, 2015 WL 6965077, at *18–19 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2015)
(quoting Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 465, 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d,
205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee’s Note to 1993
Amendment.
Rule 11 also includes two threshold procedural requirements to “safeguard due process
rights.” Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 2000). First,
a motion for sanctions must “be made separately from any other motion and . . . describe the
specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). Second, the Rule’s
“safe harbor provision,” requires a party seeking sanctions to serve their motion on the opposing
party at least 21 days before filing it in court to allow the opposing party the opportunity to
withdraw or correct the challenged representation. Id. A motion that fails to comply with these
requirements must be denied. See, e.g., Bryant v. Britt, 420 F.3d 161, 163 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005).
B. Application of Rule 11 to Pro Se Litigants
The Second Circuit has repeatedly instructed that pro se litigants are deserving of “special
solicitude” and must be held to less stringent standards than lawyers. Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Nevertheless, pro se litigants are “not exempt . . . from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law,” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477, and “[i]t is well-settled that Rule 11
applies to pro se litigants.” Mantis Transp. v. Kenner, 45 F. Supp. 3d 229, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2014);
see also Ekeoma v. City of New York, 23-CV-946, 2025 WL 2952562, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8,
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2025). Although district courts may consider a plaintiff’s pro se status in determining whether to
impose sanctions, see Maduakolam v. Columbia Univ., 866 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1989),“[t]he fact
that a litigant appears pro se does not shield him from Rule 11 sanctions because one acting pro
se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse
already overloaded court dockets.” 	Malley v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 207 F. Supp. 2d 256, 259
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Lipin v. Hunt, 573 F. Supp. 2d 836, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[A] court’s
authority to enjoin vexatious litigation extends equally over pro se litigants and those represented
by counsel, and a court’s special solicitude towards pro se litigants does not extend to the willful,
obstinate refusal to play by the basic rules of the system upon whose very power the plaintiff is
calling to vindicate his rights.”).
Still, courts do not impose sanctions on a pro se litigant lightly. “[W]here a pro se litigant
is alleged to have run afoul of Rule 11, courts generally apply a more lenient standard.” Sachs v.
Matano, 	15-CV-6049, 	2016 	WL 	4179792, 	at *7 	(E.D.N.Y. 	July 	15, 	2016), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4186708 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016). 	Under this more lenient
standard, “Rule 11’s application [is] determined on a sliding scale according to the litigant’s level
of sophistication.” Horton v. Trans World Airlines Corp., 169 F.R.D. 11, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
Sanctions may be more appropriate when a pro se litigant has legal experience or has been
previously warned of possible sanctions. See, e.g., Colida v. Nokia Inc., 07-CV-8056, 2008 WL
4517188, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2008) (imposition of sanctions was warranted against pro se
plaintiff in part because “plaintiff had been previously warned about the possibility of Rule 11
sanctions”); Fariello v. Campbell, 860 F. Supp. 54, 71 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (awarding sanctions where
pro se plaintiff was previously warned that sanctions may be imposed if he filed another action);
Baasch v. Reyer, 827 F. Supp. 940, 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (imposing sanctions when pro se plaintiff
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had “shown some competence in finding and understanding the law,” the court had explained to
plaintiff why his claims had failed and made him “fully aware of the legal and factual requirements
of his claims,” and had also warned plaintiff about possible sanctions, and plaintiff had nonetheless
filed a motion for a new trial).
C. Sanctions Are Appropriate Under the Circumstances Presented Here
The undersigned finds Defendants met Rule 11’s procedural safeguards, and that, even
considering the special solicitude due a pro se litigant, Plaintiff’s persistent and unrepentant use
of false and misleading citations, along with the material misrepresentations he made to three
judges about his conduct, warrants sanctions, which should include dismissal of his claims with
prejudice.
1. 	Defendants Met Rule 11’s Procedural Requirements
The undersigned first considers whether Defendants met the safe harbor notice requirement
of Rule 11 and concludes that they have. As previously discussed, Defendants served a copy of
their motion on Plaintiff 21 days before moving for sanctions.4 	See supra pp. 7–8. 	The
undersigned finds this provided Plaintiff with the requisite notice to correct the alleged misconduct
prior to Defendants seeking sanctions. But Plaintiff wholly failed to do so. Instead, he persisted
in his misconduct by invoking nonexistent and inaccurate authority in his opposition to
Defendants’ motion for sanctions. See supra p. 11.
4 	Plaintiff’s argument that there is overlap between Defendants’ motion to dismiss and
motion for sanctions is irrelevant. 	(See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Sanctions, Dkt.
No. 53-1 ¶ 22.) Both motions may be brought simultaneously so long as a Rule 11 motion is filed
“separately,” as occurred here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); see also JGIAP RH 160 LLC v. CRI
Holding Corp., 21-CV-02489, 2023 WL 5979125 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2023) (addressing Rule 11
motion and Rule 12(b)(6) when both were made separately in compliance with safe harbor
provision) report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6307320 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023).
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2. 	Plaintiff’s Use of False and Misleading Citations Is Sanctionable
Not only is Plaintiff’s Complaint rife with citations to nonexistent cases, but he has
continued to rely on citations to nonexistent authority in almost every filing—including his most
recent filing opposing Defendants’ motion for sanctions. 	See supra p. 11. 	In that opposition,
Defendants identify eight cases that do not stand for the cited proposition or do not include the
purported quotation. 	(See Reply in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. No. 57,
pp. 1–4.) Defendants also identify at least seven cases cited in Plaintiff’s Complaint and five cases
cited in Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss that do not exist at all. (See Frazer
Decl. ¶¶ 5–13; Declaration of Kim A. Smith in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions,
(“Sanctions Decl.”), Dkt. No. 50-1, ¶ 40.) Defendants also identify multiple other cases that do
not stand for the proposition cited in Plaintiff’s filings. 	(See, e.g., Letter, Dk. No. 32, p. 1;
Sanctions Decl. ¶¶ 40, 52). The Court has confirmed Defendants’ findings through its own review
of Plaintiff’s citations.
These errors are only exacerbated by Plaintiff’s use of generative AI as a drafting tool,
without sufficient effort taken to verify the accuracy of the draft product. See supra p. 10. That
kind of conduct, whether undertaken by counsel or a pro se litigant, creates a heavy and undue
burden on opposing litigants and the courts to determine the accuracy and merit of easily generated,
voluminous, yet potentially error-filled, filings. That is why, after warnings and opportunities to
correct, the persistent presentation of nonexistent legal authority or misrepresenting the import of
legal authority resulting from a lack of effort to verify the content of AI-generated drafts is
sanctionable. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Humala, 24-CV-242, 2025 WL 1384161, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May
13, 2025) (listing cases addressing AI-generated citations and finding “the Second Circuit, as well
as district courts across the country, have found the submission of nonexistent case citations in
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filings to the court to constitute sanctionable conduct under Rule 11(b)(2).”); Ferris v.
Amazon.com Services, LLC, 24-CV-304, 2025 WL 1122235, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 16, 2025)
(imposing sanctions against pro se plaintiff who continued to submit false citations generated by
AI after being put on notice by defendant, and ordering plaintiff to pay defendant’s costs).
Here, Plaintiff’s failure to verify and correct his filings has, for months, distracted from
adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims on their merits. Instead, the Court and Defendants’ counsel have
been forced to spend significant time and resources to determine whether the authorities cited in
Plaintiff’s error-filled filings actually support his arguments. Making matters worse, Plaintiff has
misrepresented his conduct on multiple occasions, arguing as recently as oral argument on the
motion for sanctions that he had verified his citations when he actually had not. See supra pp. 9–
10. Given the severity of Plaintiff’s conduct, the undersigned finds sanctions are appropriate even
under the more lenient standard applicable to Plaintiff as a pro se litigant. See, e.g., Williams v.
Off. of Child Support, 21-CV-8235, 2023 WL 2396354, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2023) (imposing
sanctions when pro se plaintiff caused defense counsel and court “to incur substantial time in
disposing of the case” by willfully filing claims plaintiff knew were false), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3967791 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2023); Shepherd v. Annucci,
921 F.3d 89, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming sanction of dismissal when pro se plaintiff acted in
bad faith, even when lesser sanctions were not considered).
a. 	Plaintiff’s Belated Request to Amend Does Not Sufficiently Address His
Misconduct and Should Be Denied
Despite failing to do so for months, Plaintiff now requests an opportunity to amend his
Complaint to address the concerns raised in the Rule 11 motion. 	See supra pp. 9–11. 	The
undersigned notes that such an amendment would not fully resolve the conduct at issue in
Defendants’ Rule 11 motion, which extends beyond citations in Plaintiff’s Complaint to citations
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in other documents and misrepresentations about opposing counsel. 	See supra pp. 10–11. 	Nor
would it address Plaintiff’s persistent misrepresentations to the Court. However, even if it would,
the undersigned respectfully recommends Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend be denied.
Under Rule 15(a)(1), a party may amend a pleading without seeking permission from the
Court once within 21 days of serving it, or 21 days after a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion
is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Otherwise, a party may only amend its pleading after obtaining
written consent from the opposing party or with leave of court. Id. at (a)(2). Rule 15(a) provides
that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” 	But the district court has
broad discretion whether to grant or deny leave to amend. See, e.g., Zahra v. Town of Southold,
48 F.3d 674, 685 (2d Cir. 1995).
“Generally, leave to amend should be freely given, and a pro se litigant in particular should
be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he has a valid claim.” 	Nielsen v.
Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But leave
to amend may still be denied, even to a pro se plaintiff, with “good reason, . . . including futility,
bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Zappin v. Cooper, 23-165, 2024
WL 3084015, at *3 (2d Cir. June 21, 2024) (quoting TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d
493, 505 (2d Cir. 2014)).
Here, Plaintiff had numerous opportunities over the past seven months to amend his
Complaint and address his false and misleading citations. These opportunities include but are not
limited to when Judge Gujarati discussed the deficiencies in his Complaint at the August 5, 2025
conference; after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss; after Defendants sent their safe harbor
letter notifying him of their intention to seek sanctions; after Defendants filed their motion for
sanctions; and finally, after the January 7 conference before the undersigned. See supra pp. 4–11.
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By rejecting these opportunities, Plaintiff has allowed this case to go down a path of intense and
lengthy motion practice that could have been avoided had he amended when these issues were first
brought to his attention. Considering that this prejudice to defendants is one of the most important
considerations in reviewing a motion to amend, the undersigned finds that failure for months to
seek leave to amend his Complaint in the face of persistent warnings, resulting in Defendants
having to file multiple motions, is precisely the kind of bad faith and undue delay that warrant
denial of leave. See Lipin v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 202 F. Supp. 2d 126,
140 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (imposing sanctions on pro se plaintiff “forced” defendants to litigate
meritless claims).
Even if the Court were inclined to grant leave to amend, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the Court sanction Plaintiff for his persistent misrepresentations to the Court and
his inexplicable delay in seeking to correct his Complaint. Thus, the undersigned also recommends
that the Court deny Plaintiff’s request to amend his Complaint as an alternative to sanctions.
b. 	The Relevant Factors Support an Imposition of Sanctions
The relevant factors also weigh in favor of imposing sanctions in this case. 	As detailed
supra, Plaintiff’s conduct exceeds negligence or an innocent error by a pro se litigant. 	Even
assuming he did not know the cases cited in his Complaint were wrong at first, when those issues
were brought to his attention by opposing counsel and three different judges, he denied any
inaccuracies existed and accused Defendants of lying. See supra pp. 5–7, 9. He also continued to
use false or misleading citations in filings. See supra pp. 7, 11. 	In the end, Plaintiff ultimately
admitted he knew his authorities were false despite insisting otherwise for many months. See supra
pp. 8–10. 	Notwithstanding that knowledge, he failed to correct them—despite being asked by
defense counsel and multiple federal judges on at least six occasions to do so. See supra pp. 4–
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12. 	Such overt misrepresentations are willful and warrant serious sanctions. 	Crum v. Dodrill,
562 F. Supp. 2d 366, 382–83 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases and imposing sanction of
dismissal against pro se incarcerated plaintiff for making material misrepresentation in complaint).
But most importantly, this Court’s clear and consistent warnings made Plaintiff fully aware
of the possibility of sanctions. Over a period of more than nine months, the Court explained to
Plaintiff his obligations under Rule 11 and warned him many times of the potential consequences
of his conduct. See supra pp. 5–10. Despite those warnings, Plaintiff continued to file multiple
papers with inaccurate or nonexistent citations—even though he now admits he knew they were
incorrect. 	See supra pp. 7, 10. 	He also affirmatively and repeatedly denied that he was using
nonexistent citations, as recently as the argument about the instant motion. See supra pp. 4–6, 9–
11. 	Even if given the benefit of the doubt as a pro se litigant, Plaintiff responded by, at best,
denying there was an issue, but also arguably making material representations to Judge Gujarati
and the undersigned. See supra pp. 5, 9. Such dogged determination to use reckless or outright
false arguments to the Court despite clear warnings weighs in favor of sanctions.5 See Khudai v.
Akamai Techs., 20-CV-3686, 2023 WL 7174616, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2023) (imposing
sanctions on pro se litigant who continued to make unsubstantiated statements about defendant
and its attorneys for nearly a year), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 2046052
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2024)
3. 	Sanctions Should Include Dismissal with Prejudice
Having found Plaintiff’s conduct is sanctionable, the undersigned now determines what
5 	Although not required to grant Defendants’ motion, such subjective bad faith renders
sanctions even more appropriate in this case. 	Cf. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86
(2d Cir. 2003) (comparing objective reasonableness standard for imposing Rule 11 sanctions
pursuant to motion brought by opposing counsel to subjective bad faith standard for district court’s
inherent authority to impose sanctions sua sponte).
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sanctions should be imposed. 	Under these circumstances, the undersigned finds sanctions less
than dismissal with prejudice would not deter Plaintiff from ongoing misconduct in this case.
Plaintiff is unrepentant and has demonstrated that he will persist in misconduct despite this Court’s
warnings. See supra pp 4–12. Such persistence in making misleading representations warrants
dismissal with prejudice.6 	See, e.g., Saxena v. Martinez-Hernandez, 22-CV-2126, 2025 WL
1194003, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 23, 2025) (“[plaintiff’s] use of AI generated cases—and his
subsequent refusal to accept responsibility for doing so—is just another example of [his] abusive
litigation tactics, and further explains why the court issued case-terminating sanctions”); O’Brien
v. Flick, 2025 WL 242924, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2025) (imposing sanction of dismissal against
plaintiff who filed papers citing to nonexistent cases and unpersuasively represented to the court
that the citations were “the result of an inadvertent mix-up”).
4. 	Shifting of Fees Related to Defendants’ Rule 11 Motion Is an Additional
Appropriate Sanction
Because defense counsel spent a significant amount of time evaluating and verifying
Plaintiff’s citations and authorities as a result of his refusal to admit and correct the citations, the
undersigned recommends that the Court grant Defendants leave to file a formal fee application to
recover fees related to the Rule 11 Motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). The undersigned also
recommends Plaintiff be afforded the opportunity to oppose the amount sought, including by
addressing his ability to pay such a sanction. To the extent Plaintiff makes such an argument, he
must support it with appropriate evidence. 	And to the extent Plaintiff cites legal authority in
response to the fee application, he must check all citations in that filing and include an exhibit with
6 While the undersigned is mindful that dispositive sanctions are disfavored in the Second
Circuit, Weller v. Ichan School of Medicine at Mt. Sinai, 23-CV-4775, 2025 WL 3537854, at *8
(E.D.N.Y Dec. 10, 2025) (internal citations omitted), the facts here present one of those unique
circumstances where a dispositive sanction should be considered.
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copies of all citations to electronic copies of authority.
In other cases, courts have also imposed monetary sanctions against parties who used
incorrect citations in briefs, including when the inaccuracies are a result of using AI software.
See, e.g., Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 466–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (imposing $5,000
monetary penalty on two lawyers for submitting citations to fake opinions). Here, although the
conduct is sufficiently egregious to warrant such sanctions, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, as well
as the likelihood that holding Plaintiff responsible for the fees and costs associated with
Defendants’ motion to dismiss will constitute a substantial financial sanction in and of itself, the
undersigned finds a separate monetary sanction inappropriate and recommends against the Court
issuing one.
II. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants separately move to dismiss the Complaint on several other grounds, each of
which have some degree of merit. (See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No 38-33.) Given
the recommendation to dismiss this matter as a sanction, the undersigned does not address each of
these grounds. 	However, the undersigned notes that, even if the Court were to decide against
dismissing the Complaint as a sanction, one of the grounds in Defendants’ motion independently
and plainly requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint: 	that the claims are barred by a release
Plaintiff signed as part of a prior settlement agreement. (See id. pp. 26–30.)
Plaintiff attaches the release at issue to the Complaint. (See Compl., Ex. 26 p. 3.) It is thus
incorporated by reference and may be considered at the motion to dismiss stage. 	See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court may also take
judicial notice of the Release. See, e.g., In re Nine W. LBO Sec. Litig., 505 F. Supp. 3d 292, 302
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Settlement agreements are documents of which a court may take judicial
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notice in order to determine whether future claims are barred by a previous settlement.”) (quoting
Deylii v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 13-CV-6699, 2014 WL 2757470, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 16,
2014)).
The undersigned finds that the language of the Release unambiguously releases all past and
future claims against Defendants. See supra p. 3. Its terms also appear to encompass all predicate
acts in Plaintiff’s alleged RICO scheme and, thus, would require dismissal of the complaint. See
id; see also, e.g., Johnson v. City of N.Y., 23-CV-3018, 2024 WL 3520445, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y.
July 23, 2024); (finding general release barred pro se plaintiff’s civil rights claims that arose before
execution of the release); Gallo v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys. Inc., 20-CV-4879, 2021 WL 3913539, at *5–
8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2021) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s discrimination claims against former
employer when plaintiff had previously entered into settlement agreement releasing those claims);
Dechberry v. N.Y. City Fire Dep’t, 124 F. Supp. 3d 131, 141–43 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (broad terms of
general release warranted dismissal of pro se plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims);
Interpharm v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 655 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 2011); (“Under New
York law . . . a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject
of the release.”) (internal citation & quotation omitted).
In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff initially argued that the Release is not
so broad as to encompass his claims, and that it is undermined by fraud, coercion, lack of
consideration, and material breach. (See Pl’s. MTD Opp.; Pl’s. Mot. to Amend.) However, during
the January 7, 2026 conference, Plaintiff conceded that all his claims would be covered by the
Release. (See Jan. 7 Tr. at 30:22–31:5.) Plaintiff instead argues that he is not bound by the Release
because he was never paid the settlement amount required under the agreement. (See Pl’s. Mot.
to Amend pp. 2–3; Jan. 7 Tr. at 27:15–29:3.)
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The undersigned finds Plaintiff’s argument unavailing. Plaintiff cannot unilaterally declare
the release void and bring a RICO claim in federal court. Under the parties’ settlement agreement,
the state court retains jurisdiction to enforce the specific terms of that agreement. See supra p. 3.
If, as Plaintiff alleges, Defendants breached the terms of the parties’ agreement, Plaintiff’s remedy
is to seek enforcement in the state court with jurisdiction over the agreement. See, e.g., Town of
Huntington v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 267 F.R.D. 449, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (granting motion to
dismiss claims alleging breach of agreement to settle state court construction litigation because,
inter alia, state court retained jurisdiction over agreement and it was an accessible forum to
continue dispute); Thanning v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Examiners Off., 187 F.R.D. 69, 71 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (“[D]isputes arising out of the alleged breach of the settlement agreement amount to breach
of contract claims that are properly decided in a state forum.”); Scelsa v. City Univ. of N.Y., 76 F.3d
37, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]nforcement of a settlement agreement is for the state courts.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the release from the prior settlement agreement, and the
undersigned recommends they be dismissed with prejudice on that basis.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant
Defendants’ motion for sanctions, including dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice, or,
alternatively, granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with
prejudice. 	The undersigned also recommends that, should it grant the motion for sanctions, the
Court also grant Defendants leave to file a formal application to recover fees related to that motion,
which Plaintiff may oppose under the terms described herein.
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within 14 days after
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service of this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (d) (addressing computation of days). Any requests for an extension
of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Gujarati. Failure to file objections within
this period designating the particular issues to be reviewed waives the right to appeal the district
court’s order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Wagner & Wagner, LLP v.
Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“[A] party [forfeits] appellate review of a decision in a magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation if the party fails to file timely objections designating the particular issue.”);
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (finding Federal Magistrates Act does not forbid court of
appeals from adopting rule conditioning appeal from district court’s judgment that adopts
magistrate judge’s recommendation upon filing of objections to magistrate judge’s report
identifying those issues on which further review is desired).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
February 23, 2026
/S/ SETH D. EICHENHOLTZ
SETH D. EICHENHOLTZ
United States Magistrate Judge
Eastern District of New York
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