USA v. Mcleod

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------------------X
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
ORDER
25-CR-65 (JMA)
-against-
BILLON McLEOD,
Defendant.
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AZRACK, United States District Judge:
Defendant, Billon McLeod, is charged by superseding indictment with three counts of
coercion/enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); three counts of sexual exploitation of a
minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2551(a); and one count of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor,
18 U.S.C. § 2551(a). 	(ECF No. 29.) 	Currently pending before the Court are various pretrial
motions filed by the parties. The Court’s rulings on these motions are set out below.
A. Suppression Motion
Defendant had moved to suppress various statements that he made to federal agents on
February 7, 2025, both before and after his arrest. (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Suppress (“Mot.”),
ECF No. 39; see Gov’t Mem. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Suppress (“Gov’t Opp’n”), ECF No. 43; Def.’s
Reply Supp. Mot. Suppress (“Reply”), ECF No. 46.)
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1. Background1
Early in the morning of February 7, 2025, federal law enforcement agents executed a search
warrant on Defendant’s apartment in Brooklyn. After entering the building, the agents knocked
on the door to Defendant’s apartment and instructed him to open the door. (Def. Ex. A.) When
Defendant did not immediately comply, the agents forcibly entered the apartment. (Id.) Defendant
was briefly restrained and handcuffed in the hallway outside the apartment while his mother was
escorted to the other end of the hall. 	(Def. Ex. C.) 	Defendant was subsequently escorted to a
bedroom inside the apartment. (Def. Ex. B ¶ 3.) While the search was ongoing, Defendant was
joined in the bedroom by multiple FBI agents, including Special Agent Alexandra Chacon and
Special Agent Matthew Deragon, who created an audio recording of the conversation that
followed. (See Def. Ex. D.) The handcuffs had been taken off Defendant by the time the recording
of this conversation with Defendant began.2
The agents began by informing Defendant that he was not presently under arrest and that
he did not have to answer any questions. (Id. at 4:9–17.)3 The agents then asked, “you understand
right now that you’re not under arrest, and you don’t have to answer any questions that we ask
1 The following facts are taken from the parties’ papers and exhibits thereto, including several recordings and
transcripts of the events in question, and the testimony adduced at the December 1, 2025 suppression hearing. (See
Def. Ex. A (video recording of body-worn camera produced at EDNY_00593); Def. Ex. B (Affirmation of Billon
Mcleod); Def. Ex. C (video recording of body-worn camera produced at EDNY_00594); Def.’s Ex. D (audio recording
of pre-arrest questioning produced at EDNY_000001; Def.’s Ex. E (FBI Form FD-302 produced at EDNY_0044512);
Def. Ex. F (video recording of interrogation at FBI building produced at EDNY_000002); see also Tr., Hearing Dec.
2, 2025 (“Hr’g Tr.”).)
2 The audio transcript does not explicitly state that Defendant was no longer in handcuffs when this conversation
began. However, the Court finds, based on the entirety of the recording, that Defendant was no longer in handcuffs
at that time. Defendant was explicitly told, at the outset of this recording, that he was not under arrest, and, in response,
Defendant did not say anything about handcuffs. Later in the conversation, Defendant even asked the agents “if I
open my phone, are you putting me in cuffs because of my phone,” which further confirms that Defendant was not in
handcuffs at the time. (Ex. D at 92.)
3 All citations to the recordings filed as defense exhibits refer to page and line numbers of the transcripts thereof,
which were provided by Defendant—not the recording timestamps. References to features of the recordings that are
not reflected in the transcript are explicitly noted as “timestamp”.
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you[?],” to which Defendant replied “correct . . . I understand the idea I can provoke [sic] the idea
of a lawyer[,]” and expressed a desire to “understand what is going on.” (Id. at 6:7–22.)
The agents proceeded to explain the basis for the search warrant and inquired about
Defendant’s relationship with an alleged minor victim, Jane Doe #1. (Id. at 7:5–23; 8:11–25, 10:1–
17.) 	The agents reiterated, however, that Defendant could decline to answer their questions or
comply with their requests. 	(See id. at 87:2–88:7.) 	At several points when Defendant became
uncooperative, the agents indicated that they were ready to terminate the conversation, but
Defendant urged them to continue speaking to him. (Id. at 89:9–25; 95:21–96:6; 97:2–14.)
Eventually, Defendant agreed to let the agents unlock and review the contents of his cell phone.
(See id. at 120:21–23.)
During the recorded conversation, the search of Defendant’s residence was ongoing. (Hr’g
Tr. 3.)
At various points during conversation, Defendant asked to speak with his mother and the
agents declined to bring her into the bedroom or allow Defendant to speak with her. (Def Ex. D
at 10:24–11:24; 76:2–77:13; 53:10–55:9.)
At one point towards the end of the conversation, Defendant asked if he was “going to be
able to stay in [his] home and eat,” or whether he was “being detained.” 	(Id. 134:12–19.) 	An
agent replied that Defendant was “not free to walk around this house just yet,” to which the
Defendant stated, “I totally get that at this point.” (Def. Ex. D at 134:22–135:2 (emphasis added).)
After roughly an hour, the agents handcuffed and arrested Defendant. (Id. 140:3–17.)
Defendant was subsequently transported to the New York FBI Office at 290 Broadway by
S.A. Chacon, who was seated in the back seat with Defendant, and Special Agent Thomas Jacques
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Jean-Pierre, who was driving.4 (Hr’g Tr. 6:22–8:22.) During this first transport ride, S.A. Chacon
advised Defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), multiple times.
(Hr’g Tr. 9:5–15.) 	Defendant responded that he “understood” and then, during this ride,
“continued going on a rant and talking about several things.” (Hr’g Tr. 9:5–10:6.)
After arriving at the FBI office, Defendant was placed in an interrogation room; the ensuing
interrogation was recorded on video. (Def. Ex. F.) Defendant was again advised of his Miranda
rights, after which the following exchange took place:
S.A. Chacon: 	Do you understand your rights?
Defendant: 	Yes, but I – yes, I do.
S.A. Chacon: 	Okay.
Defendant: 	My question -- can I just ask you a question?
S.A. Chacon: 	Okay. But if you want to talk to me --
Defendant: 	And I have to waive my rights to speak to you
even now while we’re in the room together?
S.A. Chacon: 	Yes. Yes, because you are under arrest.
Defendant: 	You just said that in the car. You just said that
here.
S.A. Chacon: 	Because you are under arrest.
Defendant: 	I just asked you about the duration. You said
that if I waive my rights in the car. And now
it’s the entirety –
S.A. Chacon: 	No. You asked me if you had to. I said, “You
don’t have to waive your rights.”
Defendant: 	So I’m never going to be able to speak to you
because I’m –
4 At the December 2 Hearing, S.A. Jean-Pierre testified about Defendant’s transport from his residence to the FBI
Office and his subsequent transport from the FBI Office to the courthouse. My findings of fact concerning these
events are based on S.A. Jean Pierre’s testimony, which I found credible, along with other evidence in the record.
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S.A. Chacon: 	You -- you --
Defendant: 	-- not comfortable waiving my rights.
S.A. Chacon: 	Okay.
Defendant: 	That sounds ridiculous.
S.A. Chacon: 	Okay. If you don’t waive your rights, then
you understand your rights. That’s all I –
that’s all I care about. Do you understand
your rights?
Defendant: 	Yeah.
S.A. Chacon: 	It’s a simple question. If you understand,
that’s fine (indiscernible).
(Def. Ex. F. at 5:20–8:4.) During this exchange, Defendant was presented with an FD-395 Advice
of Rights form, which he did not sign. 	(Def. Ex. F; Def. Ex. G (Form FD-395 produced at
EDNY_004515).)
As explained infra, at the end of this exchange, Defendant pauses for approximately eight
seconds, and then proceeds to speak, stating: 	“Oh. 	Ma’am, this is an FBI building. I’m here
because I have a relationship with [Jane Doe #1]. This is my end game. . . . You really think that’s
what I’m trying to do? Man, you just went through the house. There’s nothing . . . explicit.” (Def.
Ex. F at 8:5–13.)
The agents then asked Defendant questions about his relationship with Jane Doe #1. (Id.
at 8:19.) Defendant then continued to speak and answer various questions posed about Jane Doe
#1 and other matters. (Id. passim.) After roughly forty-five minutes, Defendant asked for a lawyer
and the agents stopped the interrogation, notwithstanding Defendant’s subsequent request, after
this invocation, to speak to the agents further and answer more questions. (Id. at 77:20–80:19.)
After the post-arrest interrogation was terminated, S.A. Jean-Pierre drove Defendant and
S.A. Chacon to the EDNY courthouse in Brooklyn. 	(Hr’g Tr. 11:9–22.) 	The agents did not
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question Defendant while they were in the vehicle. (Id. at 11:23–25.) Defendant, however, made
various additional statements “without any prompting.” (Hr’g Tr. 12:2–4.) As S.A. Jean-Pierre
credibly explained at the hearing, he was with Defendant for over eight hours and during that
“entire time he was talking”—a point that was corroborated by the video and audio recordings in
the record. (Hr’g Tr. 14:11.)
In a sworn affidavit, Defendant—who did not testify at the hearing—maintained that he
was subjected to further questioning during the ride to the courthouse. 	(See Def’s Ex. B ¶ 10.)
The Court does not credit that affidavit. 	Defendant’s assertion is contradicted by the credible
testimony of S.A. Jean-Pierre.
Upon arriving at the courthouse, Defendant was arraigned on a complaint and detained
pending trial. (ECF Nos. 2 & 7.) On June 17, 2025, a grand jury returned the operative superseding
indictment, which includes counts involving Jane Doe #1 as well as three additional Jane Doe
victims. (ECF No. 29.)
On August 1, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion to suppress evidence of his
statements to the FBI agents throughout the day of his arrest on the grounds that those statements
were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 	(ECF No. 39.) 	The Government filed its
response in opposition to the motion on October 1, 2025, and Defendant filed a reply on October
10, 2025. (ECF Nos. 43 & 46.) I presided over a hearing on the motion on December 2, 2025.
(ECF No. 71.)
2. Analysis
Defendant moved to suppress evidence of statements he made during three different phases
of his interaction with the FBI agents on February 7, 2025.
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i. Pre-Arrest Statements
Defendant first moved to suppress statements made during the pre-arrest interrogation that
occurred in the bedroom of his residence because he was not read his Miranda rights prior to
questioning. (Mot. at 6–11.) At the beginning of the suppression hearing, the Court indicated that
this exchange was not custodial and, as such, Miranda warnings were not required. (Hr’g Tr. 3.)
Subsequently, in the Government’s December 5, 2025 letter, the Government explained
that the only the statements the Government “may seek to elicit” from this pre-arrest interview are
Defendant’s statements “in sum and substance that Jane Doe 1 was his friend and that she was a
‘younger girl.’” (ECF No. 73 at 5.) Given that the Government seeks to only admit these very
limited statements and the question of whether Defendant was in custody during this exchange is
a close one, the Court is inclined to simply exclude this evidence. The Government shall inform
the Court, by 10 p.m. on December 13, 2025, whether it still seeks to introduce this evidence in its
case-in-chief.
ii. Post-Arrest Interrogation at the FBI Office
Defendant also moved to suppress statements that he made during the post-arrest
interrogation at the New York FBI office. (Mot. at 11–13.) Defendant argues that: (1) he invoked
his Miranda rights at the start of the interrogation and (2) any subsequent waiver was not knowing.
(Id.) Defendant’s argument, however, is belied by the video recording of the interrogation. (Def.
Ex. F.)
After Miranda warnings have been given, if an individual invokes his right to remain silent
or speak with an attorney, the interrogation must cease. United States v. O’Brien, 926 F.3d 57, 73
(2d Cir. 2019); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74). 	“In order to require that questioning cease, the
accused must assert his right affirmatively and unambiguously.” O’Brien, 926 F.3d at 73.
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However, even if a suspect does not unambiguously invoke his rights, a statement elicited
during a custodial interrogation may not be admitted at trial unless the government can establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the suspect in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived his
rights when making the statement. 	Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383 (2010). 	To be
“knowing,” a waiver “must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” United States v. Plugh, 648
F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)).
Having viewed the recording of the interrogation in question, I find that Defendant did not
unambiguously invoke his Miranda rights. 	While it is true that Defendant declined to sign the
Advice of Rights form, the law is clear that refusal to sign a waiver is not sufficient to “establish
an unambiguous invocation.” 	Plugh, 648 F.3d at 128. Nor was his statement that he was “not
comfortable waiving [his] rights” an unambiguous invocation—especially when coupled with his
desire to speak with the agents and his decision only moments later to start speaking to the agents
about the case before they had asked him any substantive questions. (See Def. Ex. F at 7:4–25.)
At no point did Defendant state that he wanted to remain silent or refused to answer any questions,
and, when he ultimately did request a lawyer, the questioning ceased. (See id. at 80:1–81:25.)
Defendant, however, also insists that his waiver was not “knowing.” Defendant argues that
his statements at the beginning of the interrogation contain “indicia of misunderstanding” about
his rights.5 (Mot. at 13.) Defendant contends that, on the video, his “insistence that he was not
intending to waive his rights while continuing to answer questions from the agents” shows that he
did not understand this rights. (Id.) While I agree that the record reveals a struggle between two
5 Defendant does not argue that the waiver was involuntary or coerced. (See Mot. at 12–13.)
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conflicting desires—the desire to talk and the desire to remain silent—the evidence does not show
that Defendant was confused about the nature of his rights or the consequences of waiving them.
None of the statements Defendant made at the FBI Office establish that he misunderstood
his rights when he waived those rights and spoke to the agents during this interrogation. Rather,
the record affirmatively establishes that Defendant’s waiver of his rights was “knowing.”
Even before arriving at the FBI Office, Defendant received Miranda warnings while being
transported from his residence and he affirmatively stated that he understood those warnings. That
admission is compelling evidence that Defendant understood his rights when he spoke to the agents
during this car ride and, subsequently, at the FBI Office.
At the FBI Office, Defendant was again given Miranda warnings and again stated that
understood them. (Def. Ex. F. at 6:1–14.) Defendant then asked if he had to waive his rights in
order to speak with the agents “now while [they were] in the room together” at the FBI Office, to
which S.A. Chacon responded “Yes.” (Id. at 6:23.).
Shortly thereafter, Defendant told the agents: “So I’m never going to be able to speak to
you because I’m . . . not comfortable waiving my rights” and “[t]hat sounds ridiculous.” (Id. at
7:15–19.) 	Defendant’s contention that this statement shows he misunderstood his rights is not
persuasive.
Immediately thereafter, Defendant was asked if he understood his rights and responded
“Yeah.” (Id. at 8:1.) That is further evidence that Defendant did, in fact, understand his rights.
Moreover, Defendant’s conduct on the video is compelling evidence that his subsequent
waiver 	was 	knowing. 	During 	this 	exchange 	with 	S.A. 	Chacon, 	Defendant 	pauses 	for
approximately eight seconds and only then begins to talk to the agents about Jane Doe #1 and the
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case against him.6 (Id. at timestamp 13:11–13:19.) This pause is notable. I find that, despite his
earlier statement about not being “comfortable waiving [his] rights,” Defendant subsequently
paused, mulled over whether to talk to the agents, and then decided to proceed, 	The video
recording does not show a person who was confused or unsure about his rights. Rather, the video
shows an individual who—with knowledge and understanding of those rights—decided, after
pausing to deliberate and reflect about the matter, to waive those rights and speak to the agents. I
find, based on the video and the entire record, that Defendant did not speak to the agents because
his misunderstood his rights; he spoke to them because he believed that he could talk himself out
of his predicament and wanted to learn more about the Government’s case against him. 	While
Defendant had, moments earlier, stated “[s]o I’m never going to be able to speak to you because
I’m . . . not comfortable waiving my rights,” after further reflection, he decided to speak to the
agents. 	Given all the evidence in the record, I find that the Government has met its burden to
establish that Defendant’s waiver of his rights was knowing.7
Defendant also contends that later statements on the video recording evince his purported
lack of understanding about his rights. Not long after he waived and began speaking at the FBI
Office, the agents showed Defendant certain text messages that he proceeded to read out loud. (Id.
at 24:20–25:6.) When the agents then asked Defendant to read other apparently incriminating text
messages out loud, Defendant refused. (Id. at 25:4–25:18.) The following exchange ensued:
6 As noted in the transcript, Defendant said “Yeah” after he was asked if he understood his rights. (Id. at 8:1.)
Moreover, even if Defendant had not made this statement, Defendant’s other conduct described above—including his
pause and reflection as well as his earlier affirmative statement during the car ride that he understood his rights—
convinces the Court that Defendant’s waiver was knowing.
7 Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Sultanov, 742 F. Supp. 3d 258, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2024), is misplaced. The
defendant in Sultanov had limited English proficiency, stated “50/50” when asked if he understood the Miranda
warnings, and made other statements suggesting that he did not understand his rights, id. at *275; see also id. at *275
(“So I do not understand . . . .”).
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S.A. CHACON: Can you -- can you read it out loud? You were reading this one
perfectly fine.
MCLEOD: Ma’am, because now you’re –
S.A. CHACON: Can you read it?
MCLEOD: -- asking me to incriminate myself.
S.A. CHACON: I’m not incriminating you.
MCLEOD: It’s almost as if you think I’m stupid.
S.A. CHACON: This is (indiscernible). I’m not (indiscernible).
MCLEOD: It’s almost as if you’re like, hey, you read point A. Why not read point
B? You don’t read point B unless it means something to you. Actually, what I’m
doing is not incriminating myself.
S.A. CHACON: Okay. And that’s fine.
MCLEOD: I’m pleading the fifth. Not incriminating myself.
S.A. CHACON: Good. And you have the right.
MCLEOD: That doesn’t make any sense what you’re asking me to do.
S.A. CHACON: You have the right.
MCLEOD: Waive my rights, read lines that are not my own. Ma’am, I just showed
you in the -- oh, I can make a timeline to show you how frigging dumb this shit
seems. . . .
(Id. at 25:19–26:25.)
This exchange does not indicate that Defendant misunderstood his rights and the consequences of
his waiver. 	Rather, it shows the opposite. 	I find that this exchange shows that Defendant
understood his rights and what waiving those rights entailed, including: 	(1) the fact that any
incriminating statements he made could be used against him; and (2) that he could refuse to talk
to the agents and to answer questions they posed. While Defendant said “[t]hat doesn’t make any
sense what you’re asking me to do,” that remark does not—as Defendants contends—indicate any
--
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confusion about his rights. S.A. Chacon wanted Defendant to read apparently incriminating texts
out loud that he claimed were “not [his] own.” 	(Id. at 26:24–25.) 	Defendant refused to do so,
telling S.A. Chacon that what she wanted him to do did not “make any sense.” (Id. at 25.) That
statement clearly concerned S.A. Chacon’s line of questioning—which Defendant viewed as a
trick question and rebuffed—and does not indicate that Defendant was confused about his rights.
Other statements by Defendant also show that he understood his rights, including the fact
that he eventually invoked his right to counsel at the FBI Office.8
Having reviewed a complete recording of the interrogation and considered all the other
evidence in the record, it is clear to me that Defendant wanted to explain himself to the agents.
Viewing all his statements in context, I find it was Defendant’s desire to try to explain his version
of events and to learn about the case against him that led him to answer the agents’ questions—
not any confusion about the nature of his rights. Because Defendant chose to speak freely, with
full awareness of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them, Plugh, 648 F.3d at 127,
Defendant’s suppression motion concerning his statements at the FBI Office is denied.
iii. Post-Invocation Statements During Transport to the Courthouse
Finally, Defendant moved to suppress statements to the agents during the second transport
from the FBI Office to the courthouse. (Mot. at 14–15.) 	It is undisputed that Defendant had
unambiguously invoked his right to counsel at the FBI Office, thus triggering the protections of
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 	Whether evidence of Defendant’s post-invocation
8 Even during his pre-arrest questioning, when Defendant was told he could “stop answering questions,” Defendant
indicated that he knew that he could request a lawyer if he wanted one. (Def. Ex. D at 6:15–22 (“I understand I can
provoke the idea of a lawyer”).)
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statements may be admitted at trial therefore depends on whether they were made spontaneously,
or in response to questioning by the agents. I find that Defendant’s statements were spontaneous.
Edwards dictates that “a subject who has invoked his right to counsel cannot be ‘subject to
further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication[.]’” United States v. Gogic, 770 F. Supp. 3d 529,
537 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85). Incriminating statements obtained
in violation of that rule are “presumed to be compelled and are therefore excluded for the purposes
of the prosecution’s case in chief.” 	Id. 	However, Edwards does not apply to spontaneous
statements that are “volunteered” in the absence of police questioning. 451 U.S. at 486; see United
States v. Choudhry, 24 F. Supp. 3d 273, 279–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 649 F. App’x 60 (2d Cir.
2016) “An arrestee who invokes his right to counsel, but then initiates an unsolicited conversation
with police, cannot successfully suppress those statements from trial.” Id. at 279. The Government
has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s statements were
spontaneous, rather than the product of interrogation. United States v. Alleyne, 573 F. Supp. 3d
861, 875 (E.D.N.Y. 2021).
Considering the totality of the evidence, I find that Defendant spoke spontaneously during
the second transport ride. I credit S.A. Jean-Pierre’s testimony that Defendant was not questioned
by either agent during the car ride from the FBI Office to the courthouse. 	S.A. Jean-Pierre’s
testimony on this point is corroborated by Defendant’s conduct on the audio and video recordings
and is also consistent with S.A. Jean-Pierre’s other credible testimony indicating that Defendant
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spoke continuously and impulsively during both car rides that day. (Hr’g Tr. at 9:14–16, 12:14–
13:3, 24:4–7.)
Having heard S.A. Jean-Pierre’s testimony and having reviewed the audio and video
recordings from the day of the arrest—during which Defendant talked continuously and frequently
interrupted or ignored the agents—I have no doubt that Defendant acted similarly in the car and
made spontaneous statements that were not prompted by any questioning from the agents.
I do not credit Defendant’s July 30, 2025 affidavit, which states that “[w]hile being
transported, the agents continued to question me.” 	(Def. Ex. B ¶ 10.) Defendant did not testify
at the suppression hearing. Weighed against the credible and corroborated testimony of S.A. Jean-
Pierre, I do not credit Defendant’s bare and self-serving assertion affidavit, which was not subject
to cross-examination.
Finally, Defendant also argues that any spontaneous statements he made during this car
ride should be suppressed because he did not properly understand his rights and did not knowingly
waive them at the FBI Office. (ECF No. 46 at 7–8.) This argument fails because, as explained in
the discussion of Defendants’ statements at the FBI Office, his waiver was knowing.
Given the above, the Court denies Defendant’s suppression motion concerning the
statements he made during this car ride from the FBI Office to the courthouse.9
B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine Concerning Whether Knowledge of Minor Status is an
Element for the Coercion/Enticement Counts under § 2422(b)
The parties dispute whether, for the Coercion/Enticement Counts under 18 U.S.C. §
2422(b), Defendant’s knowledge of a victim’s minor status is a required element. Defendant is
9 It is not clear that Defendant has moved to suppress statements that he made during the first transport from his
residence to the FBI Office. To the extent that Defendant has moved to suppress such statements, that motion is also
denied. During the first transport, Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, stated that he “understood,” and then
proceeded to speak. Accordingly, none of Defendant’s statements during the first transport should be suppressed.
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charged with violating § 2422(b) in Count One (Jane Doe #1), Count Three (Jane Doe #2), and
Count Six (Jane Doe #4). Defendant maintains that, for these counts, the Government must prove
that he knew or believed that the victim was a minor. 	(See ECF Nos. 47, 53, 62-2.) 	The
Government disagrees. (ECF No. 51.)
The parties do agree that to establish the commission of a completed Sexual Exploitation
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), the Government is not required to prove that Defendant knew
or believed that the victim was a minor. Defendant is charged with committing completed Sexual
Exploitation offenses under § 2251(a) in Count Two (Jane Doe #1), Count Four (Jane Doe #2),
and Count Seven (Jane Doe #4). 	The parties also agree that to establish the commission of an
attempted Sexual Exploitation offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e), the Government must prove that
Defendant knew or believed that the victim was a minor. (ECF Nos. 51 at n.1, 62-2.) Defendant
is charged with attempted Sexual Exploitation under § 2251(e) in Count 5 (Jane Doe #3).
The Government’s October 28, 2025 letter as well as the Government’s November 4, 2025
omnibus motion in limine, (ECF No. 54), appeared to assert that if the Court were to accept the
Government’s interpretation of § 2422(b), then Defendant should be precluded from “offering
evidence and argument” that he did not know the ages of Jane Does #1, #2, and #4, and that
Defendant should only be permitted to offer such “evidence and argument” concerning Jane Doe
#3. (ECF No. 51 at n.1.)
However, in the proposed jury instructions submitted by the Government on November 24,
2025, the Government explicitly requests that the jury be instructed, in the alternative, that for
Counts Two, Four, and Seven, Defendant can be convicted of attempted Sexual Exploitation of
Jane Does #1, #2, and #4, respectively, provided that the jury finds, inter alia, that the defendant
knew or believed that the victim was a minor. (Defendant agrees with this general approach, but
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disagrees about the specific phrasing of this element for these attempt charges). The upshot of this
clarification by the Government concerning Counts Two, Four, and Seven is two-fold. 	First,
because attempted Sexual Exploitation requires that the Government prove that Defendant knew
or believed that the victim was a minor, Defendant must, necessarily, be permitted to offer
evidence about his knowledge (or lack thereof) concerning the ages of Janes Does #1, #2, and #4.
Second, and relatedly, because the Government must make this showing to establish attempted
Sexual Exploitation under § 2251, evidence that the Government seeks to admit concerning
Defendant’s knowledge or belief as to the ages of Jane Does #1, #2, and #4 would, of course, also
be relevant.
The Court will ultimately have to determine whether Defendant’s knowledge about a
victim’s age is an element of the Coercion/Enticement charges under § 2422(b). The instant Order
does not resolve that issue, which the Court will address in a separate order. However, given the
discussion above, the Court’s resolution of that issue concerning § 2422(b) is not necessary to
determine what evidence concerning Defendant’s knowledge or belief about the victim’s ages
should be admitted at trial. Both the Government and Defendant may—subject to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 or any other applicable evidentiary rules—offer evidence concerning Defendant’s
knowledge or belief as to the ages of all four Jane Does.
C. The Government’s Motions in Limine
1. Uncharged Conduct Covered by Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414
The Court grants the Government’s motion in limine as to this evidence and will permit
the Government to introduce all the evidence cited in its motion concerning uncharged victims.
The Court has carefully considered Defendant’s arguments that this evidence should be excluded
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under Rule 403, but ultimately finds that the probative value of this evidence is not outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, juror confusion, or delay.
Defendant argues, inter alia, that this evidence about additional uncharged victims is
needlessly cumulative and unnecessary based on the fact that there are already four victims charged
in this case (Jane Does #1–4) and the Government will introduce incriminating text messages and
other evidence involving Jane Does #1–4. The Court is not persuaded. As the Government points
out, it is anticipated that Defendant will seek to dispute his knowledge of the charged victims’ ages
as well as his intentions with respect to meeting with and communicating with those victims. The
evidence of the uncharged victims is relevant to, inter alia, rebutting such arguments. Additionally,
contrary to Defendant’s claims, the evidence involving these additional victims is not different in
kind from the evidence involving the charged victims. (See Hr’g Tr. 44:15–22.)
Moreover, given the nature of the evidence concerning these additional uncharged
victims—which includes a video, a photograph, and text messages recovered from Defendant’s
own phone—there is not a danger of protracted mini-trials concerning these victims that could
delay trial or distract the jury from the charged crimes at issue. And, as the Government points
out, the Government does not have to establish that the uncharged victims were, in fact, minors.
Evidence—such as text messages—which indicates that Defendant believed the uncharged victims
to be minors is also relevant.
The Court is willing to provide a limiting instruction concerning the evidence involving
the uncharged victims. Such a limiting instruction will reduce the alleged risk of unfair prejudice
Defendant cites, including his concern that, because these are uncharged crimes rather than past
convictions, the jury might, in deliberating over the charged crimes, improperly consider the fact
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that Defendant has not already been punished for his actions involving these additional victims.
(Hr’g Tr. 48.)
2. Evidence of Marijuana Use
The Court grants the Government’s motion in limine as to this evidence and will permit
the Government to introduce this evidence. The Court is willing to provide a limiting instruction
concerning this evidence.
3. Evidence of Alleged Violence Involving Jane Doe 4
The Court denies the Government’s motion in limine concerning this evidence. Given the
circumstances of Defendant’s alleged violent conduct toward Jane Doe 4 and the timing of this
incident and Jane Doe 4’s statement about her age (which apparently occurred after the alleged
coercion and sexual contact), the Court’s preliminary determination is that the evidence about the
assault should not be admitted. Accordingly, the Government shall not mention this assault in its
opening statement. Jane Doe 4, however, may still—without mentioning the assault—testify that
she told Defendant about her age at that time.
The Court may revisit this determination depending on the specific evidence introduced,
defenses asserted, and questions asked on cross-examination, at trial.
4. Certifications Concerning Extractions from Electronic Devices
The Government has indicated that the three agents who signed certifications concerning
the extractions of the devices are available to testify. In an abundance of caution, the Court will
not rely on the certifications to authenticate the extractions and directs the Government to call
these three witnesses at trial.
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5. Defendant’s Exculpatory Statements to Law Enforcement
As Defendant has requested, the Court reserves ruling on the potential admissibility of any
of Defendant’s statements to the agents that Defendant seeks to introduce until it becomes clearer
what specific portions of Defendant’s statements the Government will seek to introduce.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	December 12, 2025
Brooklyn, New York
/s/ (JMA)
JOAN M. AZRACK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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