McGregor v. The City of New York et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SHASHALA MCGREGOR,
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
24-CV-6951 (EK) (TAM)
Plaintiff,
-against-
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
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TARYN A. MERKL, United States Magistrate Judge:
On October 2, 2024, Shashala McGregor (“Plaintiff” or “McGregor”) initiated this
action against the City of New York (the “City”), five New York Police Department
(“NYPD”) Officers (the “Officer Defendants”) (together, the “City Defendants”), and
Romel Reuben and Danielle Deane Harewood (together, the “Individual Defendants”)
(collectively, “Defendants”), for claims stemming from an alleged incident where
Defendant Reuben, Plaintiff’s former partner and the father of her children, sideswiped
Plaintiff’s vehicle, and NYPD officers responded to the altercation that followed. See
generally Compl., ECF 1; see also Am. Compl., ECF 39. These claims include, inter alia,
“failure to intercede,” “civil rights conspiracy,” and Monell violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under both § 1983
and common law; and various common law torts against Defendant Reuben alone. See
Compl., ECF 1, ¶¶ 121–252; see also Am. Compl., ECF 39, ¶¶ 123–249. Following the
commencement of discovery, on June 21, 2025, Plaintiff amended her complaint, adding
10 new Officer Defendants and a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983. See
generally Am. Compl., ECF 39.
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Currently pending before the Court are the City Defendants’ motion for a
protective order, ECF 71, and the City and Individual Defendants’ renewed motion to
stay discovery pending adjudication of their motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, ECF 80. See also Reuben Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 56; City Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
88; Harewood Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 94.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that there is good cause to stay
discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. 	Factual Background
The following facts are recited as alleged in the amended complaint solely for the
purpose of illustrating the nature of the claims and discovery needs in this case.
On July 28, 2023, around 7:30 a.m., Plaintiff dropped her sons off at her mother’s
house in Queens before heading to work. Am. Compl., ECF 39, ¶¶ 5, 32–33. Defendant
Reuben, who lived next door to Plaintiff’s mother, was driving behind Plaintiff, as was
Defendant Harewood, who was Defendant Reuben’s romantic partner at the time. Id.
¶¶ 29, 32. The Individual Defendants were “driving in separate vehicles but traveling
together.” Id. ¶ 29. At some point, the traffic pattern shifted such that Plaintiff’s car
became stuck between Reuben and Harewood’s vehicles, and Reuben exited his vehicle
and began to yell at Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 35–37. As traffic began to move again, Defendant
Reuben returned to his vehicle, drove forward, and collided with Plaintiff’s vehicle. Id.
¶ 38. Reuben exited his vehicle, “aggressively approached” Plaintiff’s car while yelling,
opened Plaintiff’s driver-side door, “then lunged into the vehicle and attempted to
punch and drag” Plaintiff out of her car. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff held him off and attempted to
call the police, but Defendant Reuben “forcefully grabbed Plaintiff’s iPhone out of her
hand,” returned to his vehicle, and drove away; a bystander then called 911. Id. ¶¶ 40–
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42. Both Plaintiff and Defendant Harewood recorded videos of the incident. Id. ¶¶ 37,
45–50.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Reuben also called the police, and the first
officers to arrive at the scene were Officer Defendants Caesar and Roman, who
recognized Defendant Reuben “from Instagram.” Id. ¶¶ 51–54, see id. ¶ 28 (describing
Reuben as a “social media personality”). Per the amended complaint, the Officer
Defendants “reviewed only the videos Defendant Reuben and Defendant Harewood
presented,” “concluded that the Plaintiff was the aggressor,” and “were only interested
in corroborating” the Individual Defendants’ “story.” Id. ¶¶ 57–59; see also id. ¶¶ 60–62.
Plaintiff’s sister and brother — who is also Plaintiff’s attorney — arrived at the scene. Id.
¶ 62. Officers Caesar and Roman began questioning Plaintiff and her sister, and asked
her brother to step away; when Plaintiff requested that her attorney be present, the
officers stated that because she was “not under arrest,” her attorney’s presence was not
necessary. Id. ¶¶ 63–64.
More NYPD officers arrived, and Defendant Reuben told them “that Plaintiff
slashed his tire.” Id. ¶¶ 68–69. Around ten minutes later, Officer Caesar handcuffed
Plaintiff and placed her in the back of a squad car. Id. ¶¶ 70, 73. Plaintiff was taken to
the 105th Precinct, then to Central Booking; she was in jail for over 24 hours before
pleading not guilty and being released on her own recognizance. Id. ¶¶ 76–83. Plaintiff
alleges that at her arraignment, she received a copy of the accident report and
Defendant Caesar’s statement that were presented to the assistant district attorney; both
documents allegedly rely on “mislabeled,” “falsified” or omitted evidence to “make the
Plaintiff out to be the ‘aggressor[.]’” Id. ¶¶ 83–92. When Plaintiff and her attorney went
to the 105th Precinct to have the accident report amended and to press charges against
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Defendant Reuben, “[o]fficers at the police station would not allow the Plaintiff” to do
so. Id. ¶ 96; see id. ¶¶ 93–96.
Plaintiff and her attorney were able to amend the report and press charges by
going to “the 105th satellite precinct in Rosedale,” but Plaintiff alleges a pattern of
indifference to these and other claims, which included a later allegation of violence
towards her and Defendant Reuben’s son. Id. ¶ 97; see id. ¶¶ 98–113. In Plaintiff’s view,
this evinces an “ongoing conspiracy between the Defendant Reuben and officers from
the 105th and 116th Precinct to cover up Defendant Reuben’s transgressions against the
Plaintiff and her family.” Id. ¶ 102 (capitalization modified).1
II. Relevant Procedural History
As mentioned, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this case on October 2, 2024.
Compl., ECF 1. Once all of the original defendants were served, the Court extended the
deadline for them to answer. See Nov. 15, 2024 ECF Order; Jan. 15, 2025 ECF Order. An
initial conference was held on March 27, 2025, at which the Court set only Phase I
discovery deadlines and a pre-settlement status conference, which dates were later
extended. Mar. 27, 2025 ECF Min. Entry & Order; June 10, 2025 ECF Order, July 11, 2025
ECF Order. In late June 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Am. Compl., ECF
39.
1 Plaintiff notes that in December 2024, “the 105th satellite precinct became the 116th
precinct,” with some officers formerly associated with the 105th Precinct “now working out of
the 116th [P]recinct.”Am. Compl., ECF 39, at 28 n.5; see Press Release, N.Y.C. Office of the
Mayor, Mayor Adams, NYPD Commissioner Tisch, DDC Commissioner Foley Open New 116th
Precinct Station House in Southeast Queens (Dec. 18, 2024), https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-
office/news/2024/12/mayor-adams-nypd-commissioner-tisch-ddc-commissioner-foley-open-
new-116th-precinct-station-house [https://perma.cc/5EU9-HZCE]; see also Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (observing that
courts may take judicial notice of “documents retrieved from official government websites” and
collecting cases).
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On July 23, 2025, Defendant Reuben filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint.2 Reuben Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 56. A month later, the City Defendants
requested a pre-motion conference ahead of moving to dismiss the amended complaint
and moved to stay discovery given this anticipated motion practice. Mot. for Pre-Mot.
Conference, ECF 58; Mot. for Extension of Time to File, ECF 59. The Court denied the
request for a total stay of discovery, Sept. 8, 2025 ECF Order, but at a pre-settlement
status conference, discussion was held regarding the City Defendants’ desire for a
protective order “given the breadth of the discovery requested,” Sept. 9, 2025 ECF Min.
Entry & Order.
On October 8, 2025, Judge Komitee denied the City Defendants’ request for a pre-
motion conference as unnecessary and directed a briefing schedule on the motion to
dismiss. Oct. 8, 2025 ECF Order (by Judge Komitee). That same day, the parties filed a
letter with a proposed briefing schedule for City Defendants’ motion for a protective
order, which the Court entered. Oct. 8, 2025 ECF Order (by Judge Merkl).
On October 17, 2025, the City Defendants moved for a protective order, which
Plaintiff opposed. City Defs.’ Mot. for Protective Order, ECF 71; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n,
ECF 76. On December 1, 2025, the City Defendants renewed their motion for a stay of
discovery pending the anticipated motion practice, in which the Individual Defendants
joined, and which was also opposed. Defs.’ Mot. to Stay, ECF 80; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n,
ECF 82; City Defs.’ Resp. in Opp’n, ECF 83; Pl.’s Reply in Opp’n, ECF 84.
2 Defendants Reuben and Harewood are proceeding pro se in this action. See Letters, ECF
15 and 16; Reuben Letter, ECF 20; Harewood Pro Se Consent to Elec. Notification, ECF 22.
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On January 7, 2026, the City Defendants filed their motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, and a month later, so did Defendant Harewood. City Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF 88; Harewood Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 94.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Legal Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) allows courts to stay discovery or issue a
protective order “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense,” upon a showing of “good cause.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(1); see Khan v. New York City, 757 F. Supp. 3d 327, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2024)
(collecting cases). The burden is on the movant to show “‘good cause’” for the
protection requested “through ‘particular and specific facts,’” and not mere
“‘conclusory assertions.’” C.K. through P.K. v. McDonald, 345 F.R.D. 262, 268 (E.D.N.Y.
2023) (quoting Rofail v. United States, 227 F.R.D. 53, 54–55 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)); see In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Gordon v. Target Corp.,
318 F.R.D. 242, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
As to temporarily staying discovery, specifically, courts have discretion to stay
discovery “pending the determination of dispositive motions.” Hachette Distrib., Inc. v.
Hudson County News Co., 136 F.R.D. 356, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). However, the filing of a
motion to dismiss does not “automatically stay discovery.” Khan, 757 F. Supp. 3d at 334
(quotation marks omitted); see also Hachette Distrib., Inc., 136 F.R.D. at 358. To determine
whether a party has established good cause sufficient to stay discovery when a
dispositive motion is pending, courts often consider “(1) whether the defendant has
made a strong showing that the plaintiff’s claim is unmeritorious; (2) the breadth of
discovery and the burden of responding to it; and (3) the risk of unfair prejudice to the
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party opposing the stay.” Chesney v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 24, 236 F.R.D.
113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Salese v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 23-CV-0153 (GRB)
(JMW), 2023 WL 5047890, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2023). A moving party makes a
“strong showing” that the opposing party’s claim is unmeritorious when “‘there are no
factual issues in need of further immediate exploration, and the issues before the Court
are purely questions of law that are potentially dispositive[].’” Sharma v. Open Door NY
Home Care Servs., Inc., 345 F.R.D. 565, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (alteration in original)
(quoting Hachette Distrib., Inc., 136 F.R.D. at 358).
Similarly, courts have significant discretion over when to issue a protective order
concerning discovery. “Rule 26(c) empowers the court to make a wide variety of orders
for the protection of parties and witnesses in the discovery process.” 8A Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 2035 (3d ed. 2025); see also id. § 2041;
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (observing that the rule “confers
broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and
what degree of protection is required”). Additionally, under Rule 26(b), the Court, “[o]n
motion or on its own,” “must limit” discovery where “the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C)(i). Ultimately, “‘[t]he grant and nature of protection is singularly within the
discretion of the district court and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of
discretion.’” Dove v. Atl. Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973)).
II. Analysis
Because the Court’s decision on Defendants’ motion to stay discovery obviates
the need for a protective order at this juncture, the Court analyzes that motion first.
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A. Defendants’ Motion to Stay
The Court finds that all three factors favor granting Defendants’ motion to stay.
First, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated that the breadth and burden
of discovery is substantial, given the amount of discovery Plaintiff has requested to
date. Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff’s “122 requests for the
production of documents and 22 revised interrogatories” are unduly burdensome
considering relevant case law, which has found far fewer requests to be burdensome
enough to support a stay of discovery. See Defs.’ Mot., ECF 80, at 3–4; Cohen v. United
States, No. 21-CV-10774 (LJL), 2022 WL 2181457, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2022) (staying
discovery in light of the burden presented by 43 document requests and 11
interrogatories); see also Defs.’ Mot. for Protective Order, ECF 71, at 2 (arguing that
Plaintiff’s requests seek information that is not relevant to her claims or defenses, “not
proportional to the needs of the case, and/or constitute harassment”).
Second, and relatedly, the Court finds that a stay is appropriate at this time in the
interest of judicial economy. Without prejudging the pending motions to dismiss, the
Court notes that they would fully dispose of Plaintiff’s claims if granted in their
entirety. See generally City Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 89 (arguing that
Plaintiff’s claims against the City Defendants depend on whether she has plausibly
alleged a constitutional violation as a matter of law); Reuben Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF 56-2 (arguing that, if Plaintiff’s federal § 1983 claims are dismissed, the
Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims);
Harewood Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 94-1 (same). On its own, this
supports the “strong showing” factor. See Hachette Distrib., Inc., 136 F.R.D. at 358
(observing that discovery should be stayed when “there are no factual issues in need of
further immediate exploration, and the issues before the Court are purely questions of
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law that are potentially dispositive”); Cohen v. Saraya USA, Inc., No. 23-CV-8079 (NJC)
(JMW), 2024 WL 198405, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2024) (granting motion to stay
discovery when 12(b)(6) motion would be fully dispositive and involved pure questions
of law).
More importantly, the pending motions to dismiss, if they do not dispose of all
claims in this case, may substantially narrow the claims, issues, or parties as to which
discovery would be appropriate. See Borjas v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 23-CV-
10829 (OTW), 2025 WL 3227476, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2025) (observing that “a motion
that, if only granted in part, would meaningfully limit the scope of the action can be
sufficient to show good cause for a stay”). Even if Plaintiff is granted leave to amend
her complaint, the appropriate scope of discovery may change significantly following
any decision on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, meaning that “proceeding with
discovery at this juncture may indeed result in a waste of resources.” Conte v. Tapps
Supermarket, Inc., No. 22-CV-3109 (DG) (JMW), 2022 WL 4539267, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
28, 2022).
Third, Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the risk of unfair prejudice do not alter
this analysis. Plaintiff contends that “several categories of electronic evidence are time-
sensitive and at risk of degradation or overwriting if discovery is further delayed” and
“witness recollection will be negatively affected” by a stay. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF 82, at ECF
p. 4. But Defendants point out that any stay would only last through the disposition of
the motions to dismiss. Defs.’ Mot. to Stay, ECF 80, at 4. Further, courts in this district
have found that “the possibility of memories fading” does not, on its own, demonstrate
a risk of unfair prejudice that would militate against a discovery stay. Armstrong v.
Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 25-CV-3611 (RPK) (JMW), 2025 WL 3440499, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2025) (citing Marrazzo v. Flagstar Fin., Inc., No. 25-CV-4183 (JMA)
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(JMW), 2025 WL 2772813, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2025)). Finally, to the extent that
Plaintiff’s position reflects a concern about spoliation, Defendants are under an
obligation to preserve electronic evidence that may be relevant to this case, of which the
Court reminded Defendants at the initial conference. See Mar. 27, 2025 Min. Entry &
Order. “Even without a discovery order, a district court may impose sanctions for
spoliation, exercising its inherent power to control litigation.” West v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). Accordingly, because
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a risk of unfair prejudice would result from a stay,
this factor also favors granting Defendants’ motion to stay discovery.
Finding that the balance of factors favors staying discovery until Judge Komitee’s
decision on Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court finds that Defendants’ motion to
stay should be granted.
B. City Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order
Even if the Court had not found that a stay of discovery is warranted here, the
Court would, in an exercise of its discretion, grant the City Defendants’ motion for a
protective order, at least in part, in light of the burden presented by Plaintiff’s extensive
discovery demands.
The Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated good cause for a protective
order by identifying a litany of objections to Plaintiff’s “122 document demands” and
“22 revised interrogatories”: namely, that they “seek information related to events other
than [Plaintiff’s] arrest at issue in this case”; that they are “vague, overbroad, unduly
burdensome, not limited in time or scope, and not narrowly tailored to the allegations”
inasmuch as they request “all documents” or “all communications” from “an indefinite
number of parties and non-parties”; that they request information that is either not in
the City’s possession or which is equally accessible to Plaintiff; and so on. City Defs.’
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Mot. for Protective Order, ECF 71, passim. In this motion, they request not a total stay of
discovery, but rather to be relieved of the obligation to respond to the discovery
demands identified as overbroad. Id. at 1.
Plaintiff’s rejoinders to Defendants’ arguments do not identify, with specificity,
why the breadth of discovery sought is relevant and proportional to the needs of the
case as pled. Rather, Plaintiff hypothesizes that at least some of the information caught
in her dragnet will bolster her theory of the case. See, e.g., Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n, ECF 76,
at 6 (“The communications may themselves be evidence of a conspiracy and establish a
meeting of the minds[.]”), 8 (“The documents may be determinative of whether officers
acted in concert with the witness/Pro se Defendant, [and] whether probable cause was
pretextually applied.”), 13 (“These communications may reveal off-record coordination
or selective response patterns showing City Defendants’ ongoing entanglement with
Pro se Defendant Reuben.”). Generally, a party may not use discovery in order to gather
evidence with which to state a claim in the first instance. See Bridgewater v. Taylor, 745 F.
Supp. 2d 355, 358–59 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (collecting cases); see also Podany v. Robertson
Stephens, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (observing that “discovery is
authorized solely for parties to develop the facts in a lawsuit in which a plaintiff has
stated a legally cognizable claim, not in order to permit a plaintiff to find out whether
he has such a claim”). And courts in this circuit have found that speculation about what
one may uncover in discovery can amount to an impermissible fishing expedition,
supporting limits on discovery. See Walsh v. Top Notch Home Designs Corp., No. 20-CV-
5087 (GRB) (JMW), 2022 WL 3300190, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2022) (collecting cases).
The Court is especially mindful of the risk, given the procedural history of this
case, that the wide range of discovery requested to date presents nearly limitless
opportunity for meta-litigation over the appropriate scope of discovery,
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transmogrifying the instant case into an unmanageable tangle of discovery disputes
rather than advancing towards resolution. See Park W. Radiology v. CareCore Nat. LLC,
547 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing the risk of “a multi-ringed sideshow
of mini-trials on collateral issues pertaining to the conduct and relationships of third
parties that may have only tangential bearing, if at all, to the issues and claims disputed
in this case”). Unless and until Plaintiff’s claims survive the pending motions to
dismiss, the Court is reluctant to greenlight the requested discovery, in the interest of
“protecting [its] proceedings” and “discharging [its] traditional responsibilities.” SEC v.
Ahmed, 72 F.4th 379, 394 (2d Cir. 2023).
Accordingly, the Court finds that some form of protective order relieving City
Defendants of Plaintiff’s discovery demands would almost certainly be warranted.
However, given the prior determination to stay discovery during the pendency of the
motion to dismiss, the Court declines to conduct a request-by-request analysis at this
time.3
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Defendants have
demonstrated good cause to stay discovery pending the resolution of their motions to
dismiss. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to stay discovery is granted, and discovery is
hereby stayed pending Judge Komitee’s disposition of Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
3 In light of the Court’s decision to stay discovery, the Court makes no finding as to City
Defendants’ request that the Court allow them to “respond to the remaining document requests
not included in [their] motion (as well as Plaintiff’s interrogatories) within 45 days,” and order
Plaintiff to respond to City Defendants’ document demands by the same date. City Defs.’ Mot.
for Protective Order, ECF 71, at 7–8.
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In light of the discovery stay, the City Defendants’ motion for a protective order is
terminated as moot, without prejudice to renew.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
February 19, 2026
_____________________________________
TARYN A. MERKL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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