Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------------- x
ELAINA JUNO,
Plaintiff,
-against-
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
23 Civ. 7378 (EK) (VMS)
----------------------------------------------------------------- x
Vera M. Scanlon, Chief United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Elaina Juno brought this action seeking the review and reversal of the Social
Security Administration’s (the “SSA”) denial of her applications1 for Social Security Disability
(“SSD”) benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, with an onset of disability date of July
7, 2020 (the “Application”). See Compl., ECF No. 1. A final decision in Plaintiff’s favor was
entered by the SSA Appeals Council. See Aff. of Charles Binder (“Atty. Aff.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 16-
3; Notice of Award, ECF No. 16-4 at 7-12.
Before this Court, on referral from the District Court, is Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’
fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). “Motion,” ECF No. 16. For the reasons set forth below,
this Court respectfully recommends that the Motion be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed applications for SSD benefits and Social Security
Income (“SSI”) benefits with an onset of disability date of July 7, 2020. See Atty. Aff. ¶ 1;
Compl. ¶¶ 4-6. After receiving an adverse decision on her SSD benefits applications, Plaintiff
timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on June
1 Plaintiff sought SSD benefits on behalf of herself and her two children. See Notices of Award,
ECF No. 16-4 at 7-23.
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 1 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
7, 2022. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-8. On June 16, 2022, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled.
See id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff timely requested that an Appeals Council review the decision, which it
declined to do. See id. ¶¶ 10-11.
Plaintiff retained counsel on September 9, 2023. See Atty. Aff. ¶ 2; Retainer Agmt., ECF
No. 16-4 at 3. On October 3, 2023, Plaintiff timely commenced this action. See Compl.
On October 17, 2023, the Court directed Defendant to file the administrative record then
to move for judgment on the pleadings. See ECF No. 3. After the administrative transcript was
filed, see ECF No. 5, on January 4, 2024, Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, see
ECF No. 7. On January 31, 2024, the parties jointly moved to remand to the Social Security
Administration, see ECF No. 9, and the case was remanded on February 2, 2024.
On August 30, 2024, the parties stipulated to an award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff,
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), in the amount of $6,950.00, ECF No. 14,
which the Court entered, ECF No. 15.
By Notice of Award dated July 14, 2025, the SSA notified Plaintiff that she and her
children would receive a lump sum award for past-due SSD benefits in the amount of
$124,656.00,2 as well as future monthly checks in the total amount of $2,402.00.3 ECF No. 16-4
at 7, 18, 23.
2 The Notice of Award does not state the total amount awarded in past-due benefits, but it does
state that, in order to pay her representative, the SSA withheld 25% of the past-due benefits
awarded to Plaintiff and her two children, a total of $31,164 ($20,495.00 + $2,624.75.00 +
$8,044.25). See ECF No. 16-1 at 9, 18, 23; see also Atty. Aff. ¶ 11. The Court thus calculates
the total amount of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits by multiplying $31,164.00 by four.
3 The Court calculates the monthly award to Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and her two children,
by adding the amount awarded per month to each individual: $1,540.00, $431.00, and $431.00.
See ECF No. 16-4 at 7, 18, 23.
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 2 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed the Motion. Defendant responded to the Motion
on August 6, 2025, “Response,” ECF No. 17.4
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
In connection with SSD benefits, “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a
claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court
may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in
excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled[.]”
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section “406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the
primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits
claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an
independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v.
Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (footnote omitted).
“The effect of the provision, which was originally passed in 1965, is threefold: it fixes a
maximum percentage for contingent fees of twenty-five percent; it permits recovery of such fees
only out of past due benefits; and it requires court approval for whatever amount of such fees
should be paid.” Fields v. Kijakazi, 24 F.4th 845, 852 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation &
alterations omitted). “When considering a fee application under section 406(b), ‘a court’s
primary focus should be on the reasonableness of the contingency agreement in the context of
the particular case; and the best indicator of the ‘reasonableness’ of a contingency fee in a social
security case is the contingency percentage actually negotiated between the attorney and client,
4 Defendant “neither supports nor opposes counsel’s request for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §
406(b)” because “the Commissioner has no direct financial stake in the outcome” of the Motion.
Response at 1.
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 3 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
not an hourly rate determined under lodestar calculations.’” Yamile B. S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. 19 Civ. 155 (SALM), 2022 WL 1115099, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 14, 2022) (finding
retainer agreement to be reasonable where it provided that an award of attorneys’ fees would not
exceed 25% of the plaintiff’s past-due SSD benefits) (citing & quoting Wells v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 1990)); see Fields, 24 F.4th at 852-53 (holding that a district court may
reduce the amount called for by the contingency fee agreement only when it finds the amount to
be unreasonable).
“When determining the reasonableness of a fee sought pursuant to section 406(b), the
Court considers the following factors: ‘(1) whether the requested fee is out of line with the
‘character of the representation and the results the representation achieved;’ (2) whether the
attorney unreasonably delayed the proceedings in an attempt to increase the accumulation of
benefits and thereby increase his own fee; and (3) whether ‘the benefits awarded are large in
comparison to the amount of the time counsel spent on the case.’” Yamile B. S., 2022 WL
1115099, at *2 (citing & quoting Sama v. Colvin, No. 10 Civ. 1268 (VLB) (TPS), 2014 WL
2921661, at *2 (D. Conn. June 25, 2014)); see Virgil v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19 Civ. 1473
(PKC), 2022 WL 203675, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2022) (same). “In the absence of a fixed-fee
agreement, payment for an attorney in a social security case is inevitably uncertain, and any
reasonable fee award must take account of that risk.” Wells, 907 F.2d at 371.
B. Analysis
1. Counsel’s Requested Attorneys’ Fees Are Reasonable
Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $31,164.00, which constitutes 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due
benefits award, see Pl. Mem. at 2, ECF No. 16-2, and is consistent with the agreement between
Plaintiff and her counsel, see Retainer ¶ 1. As part of the Motion, counsel filed a
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 4 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
contemporaneous record of the attorney hours expended on this matter, a total of 28.9. See Atty.
Hrs., ECF No. 16-4 at 5. Counsel’s request, therefore, represents a de facto hourly rate of
$1,078.34.
Applying the Second Circuit’s four factors to determine the reasonableness of the
attorneys’ fees sought by Plaintiff’s counsel, see Fields, 24 F.4th at 854-55, the Court finds that
there is no evidence that the proposed fees are out of line with the “character of the
representation and the results the representation achieved.” Sama, 2014 WL 2921661, at *2; see
Yamile B. S., 2022 WL 1115099, at *2. Although the de facto hourly rate appears high, the
Court does not stop its analysis at this stage, and finds the total attorney compensation to be
reasonable.
First, counsel achieved a very favorable result for Plaintiff by helping her obtain past-due
SSD benefits for herself and her children, which likely would not have been possible without
counsel’s efforts before the Court. See Yamile B. S., 2022 WL 1115099, at *2. Plaintiff
recovered significant benefits in less than two years.
Second, a review of Plaintiff’s counsel’s time records shows that counsel efficiently and
effectively litigated this action, particularly by securing a stipulated remand to the Social
Security Administration shortly after filing her motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Atty.
Hrs. Nothing in the time records or in the parties’ respective submissions suggests that counsel
was “responsible for undue delay,” Fields, 24 F.4th at 849, of the proceedings to increase the
accumulation of benefits and increase counsel’s fee. See Atty. Hrs. Time entries for work
performed include such tasks as reviewing the administrative record, communicating with
Plaintiff and opposing counsel, and preparing motion papers. See id. Counsel filed the Motion
less than two weeks after having received the Notice of Award, see Atty. Aff. ¶ 11, “thereby
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 5 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
demonstrating diligence and avoiding any delay that might have inflated the past-due amount.”
Meyer v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22 Civ. 5582 (LDH) (JMW), 2025 WL 2879978, at
*3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2025).
Third, nothing in the record leads the Court to find that “there was fraud or overreaching
in the making of the contingency arrangement,” Fields, 24 F.4th at 849, between Plaintiff and her
counsel pursuant to the Retainer.
The Court must assess whether the requested fee of $31,164, which corresponds to an
hourly rate of approximately $1,078.34 for 28.9 hours of work, constitutes a “windfall” to
counsel. Courts in this Circuit evaluate four factors to determine whether a fee would be a
“windfall”: (1) “the ability and expertise of the lawyers” and whether counsel was particularly
efficient, accomplishing in a short time what less specialized lawyers might take longer to do; (2)
“the nature and length of the professional relationship” with the claimant, including any
representation at the agency level; (3) “the satisfaction of the disabled claimant”; and (4) “how
uncertain it was that the case would result in an award of benefits and the effort it took to achieve
the result.” Meyer, 2025 WL 2879978, at *4 (quoting Fields, 24 F.4th at 854-55)).
The Court first considers Plaintiff’s counsel’s level of experience. The attorney who
expended 24.4 of the 28.9 hours on this matter, Daniel Jones, Esq., was admitted to practice in
2010 and “has practiced exclusively in the area of federal court appeals of Social Security
disability claims for over a decade, having worked on over a thousand cases on briefs filed in
every District Court representing all 50 states as well as the Districts for the District of Columbia
and the District of Puerto Rico, [and] having drafted briefs filed in all twelve of the Circuit
Courts that hear appeals of Social Security claims as an attorney during that time.” Atty. Aff. ¶ 8.
Charles Binder, Esq., who expended 4.5 hours of work on this case, “ha[s] handled thousands of
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 6 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
administrative hearings and federal appeals” in Social Security disability cases and has lectured
about litigating disability cases to, inter alia, this District’s pro se panel. Id. ¶ 10. Courts in this
District frequently grant Mr. Binder’s requests for attorneys’ fees for his successful
representation of plaintiffs in Social Security cases. See, e.g., Maniram v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.
Admin., 20 Civ. 4085 (VMS), ECF No. 35 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2025) (awarding Mr. Binder
attorneys’ fees in the amount of 25% of plaintiff’s past-due benefits); Sylvester v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec., 20 Civ. 2903 (EK), ECF No. 31 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2025) (same). Moreover, the Court finds
that 36.4 hours is a reasonable amount of time to have expended on this matter. See Walsh v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17 Civ. 5465 (WFK), 2022 WL 4079588, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,
2022) (finding that counsel’s representation of the plaintiff was “efficient and effective” where
counsel spent 44.4 hours on the plaintiff’s case).
Second, as to the nature and length of the professional relationship, Plaintiff retained
counsel on September 6, 2023, see Retainer, and counsel has represented Plaintiff throughout
these proceedings. See Atty. Aff. ¶¶ 3-4. “This multi-year professional relationship weighs in
favor of approving the contingency fee, as it demonstrates continuity of representation and
sustained advocacy across both the agency and federal levels.” Meyer, 2025 WL 2879978, at *5.
Third, with respect to the “satisfaction of the disabled claimant,” id., the Court notes that
counsel obtained the desired result which allowed Plaintiff to recover substantial past benefits
and future benefits. Although Plaintiff has not submitted an affidavit regarding counsel’s petition
for fees, this does not suggest dissatisfaction. See Schmidt v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
20 Civ. 3594 (KAM), 2025 WL 2689478, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2025). The Court otherwise
finds no evidence in the record that Plaintiff was dissatisfied with counsel’s representation.
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 7 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
With respect to “how uncertain it was that the case would result in an award of benefits
and the effort it took to achieve that result,” Fields, 24 F.4th at 855, the Court notes that
Plaintiff’s claim was rejected twice before the Complaint was filed, see ECF No. 9, and two
additional hearings were required before a fully favorable decision was reached, see Atty. Aff. ¶
5. “A windfall is more likely to be present in a case, unlike this one, where the lawyer takes on a
contingency-fee representation that succeeds immediately and with minimal effort, suggesting
very little risk of nonrecovery.” Finnegan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21 Civ. 2070 (PKC),
2024 WL 4494088, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2024) (quoting Fields, 24 F.4th at 855)).
Considering the above factors, the Court does not find that the requested amount of
attorneys’ fees constitutes a windfall and concludes that counsel’s requested fees are reasonable.
2. Offset of the EAJA Award
As discussed above, counsel has already received an EAJA attorneys’ fee award of
$1,331.33. See Atty. Aff. ¶ 5; ECF No. 15. An attorney cannot recover fees under both EAJA
and § 406(d) and must instead “refund the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Finnegan,
2024 WL 4494088, at *3.
Accordingly, counsel should be directed to promptly refund to Plaintiff the EAJA fees
received, in the amount of $6,950.00, upon receiving the § 406(b) award.
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 8 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court respectfully recommends that the Motion be
granted, Plaintiff’s counsel be awarded $31,164.00, and counsel be directed to promptly refund
to Plaintiff the amount of EAJA fees received, $6,950.00.
Any written objections to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
the Court within fourteen (14) days of service of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 6(a), 72(b). Any request for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to
the District Judge prior to the expiration of the fourteen-day objection period. Failure to timely
file objections will preclude further review of this report and recommendation either by the
District Court or the Court of Appeals. See Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112, 120 (2d
Cir. 2022). Any party who wishes to waive any portion of the fourteen-day objection period
should promptly notify the District Judge in writing.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
January 30, 2026
Vera M. Scanlon
VERA M. SCANLON
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:23-cv-07378-EK-VMS Document 18 Filed 01/30/26 Page 9 of 9 PageID #:
<pageID>