Sablan v. Sablan Corporation et al

1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
MARIA VERNA LIZA SABLAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONRAD MUÑA SABLAN,
Defendant.
________________________________________
CONRAD MUÑA SABLAN,
Counterclaimant,
v.
MARIA VERNA LIZA SABLAN,
Counter-defendant.
Case No. 1:22-cv-00013
DECISION AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
Before the Court is Defendant and Counterclaimant Conrad Muña Sablan’s (“Conrad”)
motion for reconsideration of the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law (“FFCL”), which
judgment was entered based upon. (Mot., ECF No. 104.) Plaintiff and Counter-defendant Maria
Verna Liza Sablan (“Maria”) filed her opposition (Opp’n, ECF No. 105), to which Conrad replied
(Reply, ECF No. 107). The motion was considered without oral argument. (ECF No. 109.) For the
following reasons, the Court DENIES Conrad’s motion.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a] motion to alter or
amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” “[A] Rule
59(e) motion is an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and
conservation of judicial resources.’” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
F I L E D
Clerk
District Court
for the Northern Mariana Islands
By________________________
(Deputy Clerk)
JUN 09 2026
Case 1:22-cv-00013 Document 110 Filed 06/09/26 Page 1 of 4

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). “A district court has
considerable discretion when considering a motion to amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).” Turner
v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations
omitted).
There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: 1) the
motion is “necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the
judgment is based;” 2) the moving party presents “newly discovered or previously
unavailable evidence;” 3) the motion is necessary to “prevent manifest injustice;”
or 4) there is an “intervening change in controlling law.”
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1254 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999).
II. 	DISCUSSION
Conrad initially moved for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (Mot. 2), but now
agrees with Maria that Rule 59(e) provides the governing standard, as judgment has already been
entered on February 25, 2026 (Reply 1–2). The Court agrees, and finds that Conrad has not met
that standard. Conrad does not contend there is any newly discovered evidence or change in
controlling law. Instead, he moves for reconsideration on the basis that it is necessary to correct
manifest errors of law and facts, and to prevent manifest injustice. (See Reply 2.) The Court’s
FFCL details its reasoning for finding the restitution amount due to Maria, in addition to the
appropriate statute of limitations for Conrad’s counterclaim for unjust enrichment. (See FFCL 7–
14, 20–21, ECF No. 102.) As Conrad himself recognizes, he has already presented—whether at
trial or in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law—many of the arguments he now
relies upon in support for reconsideration. (See Mot. 5–6; Reply 4.) As to any arguments that
Conrad has not previously presented explicitly, the Court does not see any reason why the
arguments could not have been raised prior to the entry of judgment; thus, relying on them for
reconsideration at this stage is inappropriate. See Milano v. Carter, 599 Fed. App’x 767, 768 (9th
Case 1:22-cv-00013 Document 110 Filed 06/09/26 Page 2 of 4

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Cir. 2015) (A Rule 59(e) motion may not be used “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments
or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”) (quoting Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008)). Lastly, even if the Court were to consider
Conrad’s arguments in support of reconsideration, it does not find any manifest errors of law or
fact, or manifest injustice that would warrant granting the motion.
The 	Court 	briefly 	addresses 	Conrad’s 	new 	argument 	on 	reconsideration 	that 	his
counterclaim for unjust enrichment for Maria’s failure to pay her share of the marital debt is a
“‘compulsory counterclaim’ required to be filed in this case pursuant to NMI R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1).1”
(See Mot. 8.) Even assuming that Conrad’s counterclaim meets the legal requirements for being a
compulsory counterclaim, the Court agrees with Maria and finds that Conrad’s counterclaim would
still be barred by the applicable statute of limitations—the catch-all six year statute of limitations
outlined at 7 CMC § 2505. (See Opp’n 8.) “[A] compulsory counterclaim relates back to the filing
of the original complaint . . . .” Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 82 F.3d 423, 1996 WL 171443, at *8
(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Emps. Ins. of Wausau v. United States, 764 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1985)). The original complaint in this matter was filed in 2022, more than six years after Conrad’s
claims accrued, which was no later than 2015. (See FFCL 20.) Thus, even if the Court were to
extend every benefit of the doubt to Conrad by assuming his counterclaim is a compulsory
counterclaim, it would still be time-barred.
/ /
1 Conrad cites to Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands law regarding compulsory counterclaims,
but a federal court sitting in diversity applies state substantive law and federal procedural law. See In re
County of Orange, 784 F. 3d 520, 523–24 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996)). “Rules regarding compulsory counterclaims are procedural, and the federal rules
therefore apply.” De Salles v. Cook, No. CV161111DMGPJWX, 2016 WL 9113995, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal.
May 12, 2016) (internal citations omitted). Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
compulsory counterclaims.
Case 1:22-cv-00013 Document 110 Filed 06/09/26 Page 3 of 4

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Conrad has failed to meet his burden of showing that the
extraordinary 	remedy 	of 	reconsideration 	is 	appropriate 	in 	this 	matter, 	and 	therefore 	the
Court DENIES his motion. Because there are no pending claims against any parties in this action,
the Clerk is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of June, 2026.
_______________________
R AMONA V. M ANGLONA
Chief Judge
Case 1:22-cv-00013 Document 110 Filed 06/09/26 Page 4 of 4