Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
RAMON PICHARDO GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00826-SMD-JHR
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,1 et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed by and through his daughter. Doc. 1. The Court has
reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record, and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth
below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Ramon Pichardo Gonzalez, a citizen of Cuba, is currently in the custody of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Otero County Processing Center in
Chapparal, New Mexico. Doc. 1 ¶ 1. Petitioner first entered the United States without inspection
in January of 2022 near Laredo, Texas. Id. ¶ 8. On January 12, 2026, Petitioner appeared at an
immigration court hearing in El Pas, Texas. Id. ¶ 12. Petitioner was then taken into ICE custody.
Id. ¶ 13. Petitioner later had a custody redetermination hearing, where the immigration judge
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the case caption shall be updated to reflect that Markwayne Mullin
is the Secretary of Homeland Security. All future filings should be in the name of the substituted party.
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denied custody redetermination. Id. ¶ 16. Petitioner does not have a criminal record. Id. ¶ 18.2
He now seeks immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, a bond hearing. Id. ¶ 28.
DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant
a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
I. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C §§ 1225 and 1226
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Id. at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer
determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.
Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.”
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond
hearings. See id. at 306.
Sections 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) are mutually exclusive in that both provisions cannot
simultaneously govern Petitioner’s detention. E.g., Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D.
2 The government submits that Petitioner committed a rime when he entered the United States illegally. However,
there is no evidence that petitioner was ever convicted of this crime. Doc. 7 at 2.
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Mass. 2025); see also Patel v. Crowley, No. 25-cv-11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).
Section 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governs Petitioner’s detention because he was
“already present in the United States” at the time of his arrest. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2022 and was detained in the U.S. interior. Doc.
1 ¶¶ 8–12. He is therefore not subject to the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225, which
apply to those seeking admission, specifically noncitizens who present at a port of entry or are
apprehended immediately after entering. Petitioner is instead entitled to a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a). See Requejo Roman v. Castro, __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 125681, at *8 (D.N.M.
Jan. 12, 2026); Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1296 (D.N.M. 2025); Velasquez
Salazar v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-00835, 2025 WL 2676729, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Pu
Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. 2:25-cv-01031, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025);
Ayala v. Moniz, et al, __ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 1031167, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 16, 2026);
Wuilmer v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3236, 2026 WL 458457, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026).
II. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Violates His Fifth Amendment Rights.
The Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment rights.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary
to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. Garcia
Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of Corrections
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “It is well established that the Fifth
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Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Though the Government “may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,” that “limited
period” cannot be indefinite. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). As the length of detention
stretches on, an individual’s due process interests escalate and the government’s burden to justify
continued detention mounts. Id. at 529; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 310–11; Mohamed v. Sec’y Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 2018). The United States’ power to admit
or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien enters the country, because the Due Process
Clause applies to “all persons.” See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien
gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his
constitutional status changes accordingly.”). Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in
remaining free from detention and was deprived of that interest without constitutionally adequate
process.
While the Court recognizes that the length of residency does not constitute legal
authorization to remain in the country, the prevailing interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226,
both by this Court and a majority of courts nationwide, indicates that noncitizens apprehended
within the U.S. interior are entitled to certain constitutional procedural safeguards. The
Government offers neither justification nor process for the continued deprivation of Petitioner’s
protected liberty interest. Doc. 7 at 4. The Government does not contend that he is a flight risk or
that he poses a threat to the community. Id. Their response also lacks any information indicating
that removal to Cuba is reasonably likely in the near future. Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418
F.3d 1116, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) (“There is no contention that conditions in Cuba have changed
so that [petitioner]’s removal to Cuba is reasonably foreseeable.”).
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The Government concedes that the material facts of this case are similar from those in
Martin Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-00063, 2026 WL 381869, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026).
See Doc. 7 at 4. Furthermore, the Government acknowledges that Martin Ramirez controls the
outcome here should the Court adhere to that precedent. See id. Because Respondents have
offered no independent legal basis for continued custody, Petitioner is entitled to relief pursuant to
§ 2241. See Martin Ramirez, 2026 WL 381869 at *7; Cortez-Gonzalez, 811 F. Supp. 3d at 1296.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED:
1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
2) Respondents shall release Petitioner within 48 hours of this Order being entered;
3) Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility
by providing all necessary identity and travel documents to return to his primary
address;
4) Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
5) Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
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6) Respondents SHALL NOT remove Petitioner to any third country to which he does
not have a removal order without first providing him with constitutionally
compliant procedures;
7) The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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