Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ELIAS RECARDO MIELES-PARRAGA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00646-KG-JHR
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Elias Ricardo Mieles-Parraga’s Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, Doc. 3, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 12. For the reasons below, the Court
grants the petition.
I. Background
Mr. Mieles-Parraga, a citizen and native of Ecuador, entered the United States without
inspection in 2024. Doc. 3 at 1–2, 6. Upon entry, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
arrested and detained Mr. Mieles-Parraga and initiated removal proceedings against him. Id. DHS
ultimately released him on his own recognizance under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B), providing him an
ankle monitor “that allowed the Department to track his location.” Id. at 6.
Mr. Mieles-Parraga moved to Albuquerque, New Mexico, “check[ing] in with his
deportation officers” at the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) office to update his
address. Id. He “timely filed an application” for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture based on “discriminatory and homophobic violence” in
Ecuador. Id. at 1–2, 6. Mr. Mielies Parraga “worked...construction jobs” and “lived with his U.S.
citizen boyfriend.” Id. at 7. He has no criminal history. Id. at 5.
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On August 27, 2026, DHS redetained Mr. Mieles-Parraga “outside of the El Paso
Immigration Court...after he had attended one of his preliminary immigration court hearings.” Id. at
2. He remains detained at the Otero County Processing Center in New Mexico. Id. An
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) has ordered him removed to Honduras, but he has appealed that decision
to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)—accordingly, the removal order is not
administratively final. Id. at 7–8.
Mr. Mieles-Parraga argues that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 2, 13. He seeks release, or “a minimum, a
burden-shifted custody redetermination before a neutral arbiter.” Id. at 3.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical confinement.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is available if a noncitizen is
“in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court concludes that (A) 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs Mr. Mieles-
Parraga’s detention, (B) Mr. Mieles-Parraga’s detention violates his right to due process, and (C)
the proper remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
A. Section 1226 governs Mr. Mieles-Parraga’s detention.
The INA establishes distinct detention regimes depending on whether a noncitizen is
“seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking admission” and
“not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” The “provision mandates detention and
affords no bond hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL 3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.)
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(Gonzales, J.). By contrast, § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and detention, “on a warrant issued by
the Attorney General,” of noncitizens “pending a decision on whether [they are] to be removed.”
Noncitizens “detained under this second detention regime are entitled to individualized bond
hearings at the outset of detention.” Id.
Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue and this
Court’s prior findings, the Court concludes that § 1226 governs here. See Barco Mercado v.
Francis, 2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide
and noting that challengers prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges across
fifty courts); Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432 (Gonzales, J.); Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL 45288, at
*2 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a noncitizen
“who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” In contrast, § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s
detention mandate applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” (emphasis added). Noncitizens
“seeking admission” are those who have not “effected an entry” into the United States. DHS v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Noncitizens “who entered the country years earlier” are
not “seeking admission,” and therefore fall under § 1226 rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A). Pu Sacvin,
2025 WL 3187432, at *3. The Court acknowledges the recent Fifth Circuit decision holding that
“[w]hile [noncitizens] remain applicants” for admission, “they are...seeking admission.”
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330, at *5 (5th Cir.). The Tenth Circuit
has not yet addressed this question.
Under this framework, § 1226 governs Mr. Mieles-Parraga’s detention. ICE arrested him
two years after his initial entry into the United States and did not apprehend him at the border.
Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory detention provision does not apply because Mr. Mieles-Parraga
effected an entry into the United States by living here for years.
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B. Mr. Mieles-Parraga’s detention violates his right to due process.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: first, whether there exists “a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,” and second, whether the procedures used to deprive
that interest “accord with the Constitution.” Domingo v. Castro, 2025 WL 2941217, at *3
(D.N.M.). Mr. Mieles-Parraga has a protected liberty interest. By living in the United States,
noncitizens acquire “a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Danierov, 2026
WL 45288, at *2. Mr. Mieles-Parraga’s freedom allowed “him to do a wide range of things,”
including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring
attachments of normal life.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
Mr. Mieles-Parraga was also entitled to procedural safeguards before he was detained. In
determining what process is due, courts consider (1) “the private interest” affected; (2) “the risk of
erroneous deprivation” through the procedures used and the probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) “the Government’s interest,” including the fiscal and administrative burdens of
additional procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To start, Mr. Mieles-
Parraga’s private interest in remaining free from detention is substantial. “Freedom from
imprisonment...lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). There is also a significant risk of erroneous deprivation. Courts
require “a material change in circumstances as to whether the noncitizen poses a danger to the
community or an unreasonable risk of flight” before revoking a noncitizen’s freedom. Danierov,
2026 WL 45288, at *2. Mr. Mieles-Parraga was detained after years in the United States. No
assessment was made as to whether any material facts had changed, creating a substantial risk of
erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest. Finally, the Government’s interest in detaining Mr.
Mieles-Parraga without a hearing is limited, and the administrative burden of providing a bond
hearing is minimal.
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C. The remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
The proper habeas remedy is a prompt bond hearing at which the Government must prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Mieles-Parraga is a flight risk or danger to the
community. Although “under normal circumstances, the burden” at a § 1226 hearing “is on the
noncitizen” to show that detention is unwarranted, Mr. Mieles-Parraga’s “unlawful detention in
violation of his constitutional rights shifts that burden to the Government.” Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL
3187432, at *3. A noncitizen’s “strong private interest in being free from civil detention”
outweighs the Government’s “comparatively minimal burden to justify custody.” Id.
IV. Conclusion
The Court therefore grants Mr. Mieles-Parraga’s petition, Doc. 3. Because relief is
warranted under his statutory and Fifth Amendment claims, the Court declines to address his Fourth
Amendment claim. The Court directs the Government to provide Mr. Mieles-Parraga with a bond
hearing under § 1226(a) before an immigration judge within seven (7) business days of this Order.
At that hearing, the Government must justify Mr. Mieles-Parraga’s detention by clear and
convincing evidence. If the Government fails to do so, it must release him.
The Court also orders the Government to file a status report within ten (10) business days of
this Order confirming compliance.
IT IS SO ORDERED
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its authenticity,
please refer to the Digital File Stamp on the
NEF (Notice of Electronic Filing)
accompanying this document. Electronically
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filed documents can be found on the Court’s
PACER public access system.
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