Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
MOHAMMAD MEHDI KORDIYAN-NAMA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00408-SMD-DLM
MARKWAYNE MULLIN,1 et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Pro Se Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the
record, and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Mohammad Mehdi Kordiyan-Nama, a citizen of Iran, is currently in the custody
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Otero County Processing Center in
Chapparal, New Mexico. Doc. 1 at 1. Petitioner has no criminal history and does not pose a flight
risk as he has extensive family ties in the United States. Doc. 14 at 4. Attached to his petition are
the declarations of his sister, a United States citizen, and his brother-in-law. Doc. 1 at 29–32. Both
attest to their ability to financially support Petitioner upon release. Id. Petitioner has been in
Respondents’ custody for over a year, since February 2, 2026. Id. at 9. Although Petitioner is
subject to a final order of removal, Respondents do not provide any evidence suggesting that his
removal is likely to occur in the near future nor that they have made any efforts to effectuate his
removal. See Doc. 6.
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the case caption shall be updated to reflect that Markwayne Mullin
is the Secretary of Homeland Security. All future filings should be in the name of the substituted party.
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DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1), the Government has a 90-day period in which to remove a noncitizen after a removal
order becomes final. If the Government is unable to effect removal within that 90-day period,
continued detention becomes discretionary. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Indefinite detention,
however, is not permitted. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (“In our view, the statute, read in light of
the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably
necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite
detention.”). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the
court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at
699–700. If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose
of 3 “assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court established
a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of six months “for the sake of uniform
administration in the federal courts.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period, if the noncitizen
provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id. If the Government cannot establish a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute. Id. at 699–700. In that
case, the Government can continue to keep tabs on the noncitizen through reasonable conditions
of supervision while it continues removal efforts.
Petitioner has been in custody since February 2025 and the six-month period for
presumptively reasonable detention has expired. Petitioner plausibly alleges that there is no good
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reason to believe that his removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The
burden therefore shifts to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 701. Respondents have not attempted to meet that burden. See Doc. 6. The Court further
finds that removal is particularly unlikely since the United States has not had diplomatic relations
with Iran since 1980. Thus, under Zadvydas, Petitioner is entitled to release from the Respondents’
custody. Cf. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (“[W]e
hold that the burden is upon the government to show that the detention is still temporary pending
expulsion, and not simply incarceration as an alternative to departure.”).
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED:
1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
2) Respondents shall release Petitioner within 48 hours of this Order being entered;
3) Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility
by providing all necessary identity and travel documents to return to his primary
address;
4) Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
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5) Respondents SHALL NOT remove Petitioner to any third country to which he does
not have a removal order without first providing him with constitutionally
compliant procedures;
6) Petitioner’s motions for appointment of counsel and for leave to file supplemental
authority are DENIED as moot.
7) The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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