Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
RACHIDE MAVINGIDI INTILA,
Petitioner,
v. Civ. No. 26-336 SMD/GBW
WARDEN DORA CASTRO, et al.,
Respondents
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (doc. 1) and Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 7). United States District Judge Sarah
Davenport referred this case to the undersigned under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B), (b)(3),
and Va. Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wood, 901 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1990), “to conduct
hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary hearings, and to perform any legal
analysis required to recommend to the Court an ultimate disposition of the case.” Doc.
5. Having reviewed the briefings and the law, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that
Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. 7) be GRANTED and Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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Petitioner Rachide Mavingidi Intila is an Angolan native who has been present in
the United States since February 4, 2025. Doc. 7-1 at ¶¶ 4-5; doc. 8 at 1. Petitioner
entered the United States without inspection or authorization and was immediately
detained and subjected to expedited removal proceedings. Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 5; doc. 8 at 1.
Petitioner claimed fear of return to Angola, and on or about February 24, 2025,
Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) referred him to U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for a Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) screening.
Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 8. On March 6, 2025, USCIS determined that Petitioner’s fear was credible,
and it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Angola. Id. at ¶
9; doc. 8 at 1.
On or about August 25, 2025, Petitioner officially submitted an asylum
application. Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 11; doc. 8 at 1. The Executive Office of Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) set the case for a final merits hearing on December 12, 2025. Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 11;
doc. 8 at 1. On or about September 17, 2025, Petitioner was notified that his final merits
hearing was being advanced to October 15, 2025. Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 12; doc. 1 at 11. Petitioner
endeavored to compile evidence for his hearing but was limited due to his continued
detention. Doc. 8 at 1.
On October 15, 2025, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s asylum
application and ordered him removed to Angola. Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 13. Petitioner filed a
timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). However, the BIA rejected
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the appeal on procedural grounds because the filing included an incorrect address for
proof of service on Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).1 Doc. 1 at 9.
Petitioner was instructed to correct his appeal and resubmit it to the BIA along with an
accompanying “Motion to Accept Late Appeal.” Id. Petitioner refiled his appeal on
December 2, 2025, but did not submit the supplemental Motion to Accept Late Appeal
as required. Id. at 15. Accordingly, on January 8, 2026, Petitioner’s appeal was
summarily dismissed and the IJ’s decision became final. Id. at 15-16.
On February 9, 2026, Petitioner filed his Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court.
Doc. 1. Respondents submitted their Motion to Dismiss on March 4, 2026. Doc. 7.
Petitioner submitted a “Motion to the Judge” (doc. 8) on March 23, 2026, which the
undersigned construes as a Response to the Motion to Dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
a. Federal Habeas Jurisdiction
Federal courts only possess jurisdiction over matters as authorized by the U.S.
Constitution and statute. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256-57 (2013). 28 U.S.C. § 2241
grants district courts the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus, and district courts
may entertain petitions pursuant to § 2241 in relation to immigration cases. Ochieng v.
1 The specific rejection states that the wrong proof of service was placed on line #13. See doc. 1 at 9.
However, the standard appeal form, EOIR-26, requires the proof of service address at line #12. See
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/eoir26/dl (last visited April 8, 2026). This appears to be an error on the
part of the BIA. See doc. 1 at 15 (stating that a Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR-26) was submitted to the BIA
on November 14, 2025).
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Mukasey, 520 F.3d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008). However, the Tenth Circuit has clarified
that district courts’ habeas jurisdiction is limited regarding orders of removal. See
Thoung v. United States, 913 F.3d 999, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he REAL ID Act
imposes substantial limitations on judicial review, including habeas review, of final
orders of removal.”). Removal orders may be challenged only by way of a petition for
review filed in the court of appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (“a petition for review filed
with an appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for
judicial review of an order of removal”). Accordingly, if a District Court determines
that a habeas petition is ultimately seeking to invalidate a final order of removal, the
Court must dismiss for lack for subject matter jurisdiction. See Thoung, 913 F.3d at 1005.
b. Ripeness Doctrine
“The ripeness doctrine involves both constitutional requirements and prudential
concerns.” United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 2019). Constitutional
ripeness arises from Article III's requirement that federal courts consider only cases or
controversies. Id. Federal courts do not have the power to render advisory
opinions. Id. As such, whether a claim is ripe for review bears on a court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Bolt Factory Lofts Owners Ass’n, 823 F. App’x
686, 690 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d
1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995)).
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Even when Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement is met, the Court must
still consider the prudential ripeness doctrine. Prudential ripeness turns on two factors:
(1) whether the issue is fit for judicial review and (2) the hardship to the parties from
withholding review. Cabral, 926 F.3d at 693; see also Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405,
1415 (10th Cir. 1990). As to the first factor, a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it is
based on “contingent future events that may not occur.” Cabral, 926 F.3d at 693
(quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). The second factor considers
whether the challenged action creates “a direct and immediate dilemma” for the parties.
United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1327 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Respondents urge the Court to dismiss the Petition on two independent grounds:
(1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) Petitioner fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 7 at 1-2. Because the undersigned determines
that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the second ground is not addressed.
a. The Issue of Petitioner’s Detention is Not Yet Ripe
Petitioner is subject to a valid final removal order as of January 8, 2026, and is
detained under 8 U.S.C § 1231(a). Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 14; doc. 7 at 1. See also Demore v. Hyung
Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (recognizing “detention during deportation
proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process”). Although
Petitioner has allegedly been detained since February of 2025, see doc. 8 at 1, under the
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terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001), his detention is not ripe for review.
“[W]hen an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the
alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). This
period of time is the “removal period.” Id. The removal period begins on the latest of:
(1) the date the order of removal becomes administratively final; (2) if the removal order
is judicially reviewed, and the court orders a stay of removal, the date of the court's
final order; or (3) if the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration
process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement. Id. §
1231(a)(1)(B). During the 90-day removal period, the noncitizen must be detained. Id. §
1231(a)(2).
Here, the applicable start for the removal period was when Petitioner’s removal
order became administratively final, meaning when the BIA affirmed the removal
order, or when the time to file an appeal expired. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)2; see also
Izbitski v. Carnes, 2026 WL 102974, at *6 (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2026); Anyimu v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 2017 WL 193180, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2017). The BIA dismissed
2 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B) discusses the term “order of deportation.” An “order of deportation” is the
same as an “order of removal.” See Sosa-Valenzuela v. Gonzales, 483 F.3d 1140, 1143 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007)
(“In 1996, when the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) amended the
relevant statutes, the term ‘order of removal’ replaced ‘order of deportation’ throughout most, but not all,
of the United States Code. The two terms are coterminous when interpreting the statute.”) (internal
citations omitted).
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Petitioner’s appeal and made his removal order a final administrative order on January
8, 2026.3 Doc. 7-1 at ¶ 14. Accordingly, the 90-day removal period expired April 8, 2026.
Although the initial 90-day removal period expired, the government may
continue to detain an “inadmissible” noncitizen beyond the statutory removal period. 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Petitioner is “inadmissible” because he entered the United States
without being admitted or paroled. See doc. 7-1 at ¶ 5; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Under
Zadvydas, the detention of an alien subject to a final order of removal is presumptively
reasonable for up to six months. 533 U.S. at 701. Accordingly, Petitioner’s detention
under his removal order is presumptively reasonable until July 8, 2026, and any
challenge to his detention is not yet ripe. See Cabral, 926 F.3d at 693 (”a claim is
not ripe for adjudication if it is based on contingent future events that may not occur.”).
b. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Address Petitioner’s
Other Claims
While Petitioner is nominally challenging his detention, see doc. 8 at 3, his petition
entirely focuses on the alleged procedural deficiencies he experienced while pursuing
his asylum application. See generally docs. 1, 8. Specifically, Petitioner alleges (1) he was
3 Even though the final administrative order was issued on January 8, 2026, Respondents assert that the
90-day removal period will not expire until April 19, 2026. Doc. 7 at 1. This appears to be because ICE
did not receive approval of travel documents for the Angolan consulate until January 19, 2026. Id. at 2.
Respondents provide the Court with no authority to support the assertion that Petitioner’s removal order
should have been considered “administratively final” on January 19 instead of January 8. The issue is
currently of little consequence, as regardless of the date, Petitioner’s detention claim is not yet ripe.
However, the undersigned construes the true date the order became administratively final to be January
8, 2026. See doc. 7-1 at ¶ 14; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).
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not allowed to present evidence at his asylum hearing; (2) the IJ asked only if he had
paid his asylum application fees, which DHS officials denied despite Petitioner’s having
proof of payment;4 and (3) that his corrected appeal to the BIA was only late because of
difficulties sending and receiving mail in detention. Doc. 8 at 1-2.
While the undersigned does have concerns about the sufficiency of Petitioner’s
asylum hearing, and notes that his appeal to the BIA was denied based on procedural
deficiencies rather than the merits, see doc. 1 at 15, petitioning the District Court for writ
of habeas corpus is not the appropriate method of obtaining relief.
Any claims Petitioner brings regarding the evidence at his asylum hearing are
properly raised by an appeal to the BIA and then, if necessary, to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. See Sarr v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 783, 789 (10th Cir. 2007) (“If the IJ’s
ruling is adverse to the applicant, he may seek review by the BIA. If the BIA ruling is
adverse to the applicant, he may seek review in [the Circuit Court].”) (internal citations
omitted).5 Therefore, this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to address
concerns about the sufficiency of Petitioner’s asylum hearing.
This Court also does not have the power to address the timeliness of Petitioner’s
appeal. Petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s decision was denied by the BIA on timeliness
4 Petitioner’s initial asylum fee was processed on October 4, 2025, eleven days before his asylum hearing.
Doc. 1 at 13.
5 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), immigration petitioners have thirty days from “the final order of removal”
to file a petition for review in a circuit court.
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grounds. See doc. 1 at 15. The BIA “retains jurisdiction over a motion to reconsider its
dismissal of an untimely appeal to the extent that the motion challenges the finding of
untimeliness or requests consideration of the reasons for untimeliness.” Matter of Lopez,
22 I&N Dec. 16, at *17 (BIA 1998).6 As such, any motion for reconsideration of
Petitioner’s appeal is within the sole province of the BIA.
Finally, this Court does not have the ability to address Petitioner’s removal
order. Removal orders may be challenged only by way of a petition for review filed in
the Court of Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (“a petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial
review of an order of removal”).
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s habeas petition based on his
detention is not yet ripe, and this Court does not have jurisdiction to address any
deficiencies with his asylum hearing, the timeliness of his appeal, or his removal order.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Respondents’
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (doc. 7) be GRANTED and
Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (doc. 1) be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
6 A motion to reconsider must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Accordingly, Petitioner would also have to move for the BIA to accept his late
filings.
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_____________________________________________
GREGORY B. WORMUTH
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
THE PARTIES ARE NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN 14 DAYS OF SERVICE of a copy of
these Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition they may file written
objections with the Clerk of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party
must file any objections with the Clerk of the District Court within the fourteen-day
period if that party wants to have appellate review of the proposed findings and
recommended disposition. If no objections are filed, no appellate review will be
allowed.
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