Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
GERMAN SANTIAGO ARROYO LOPEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 2:26-cv-00119-KG-KRS
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on German Santiago Arroyo Lopez’s Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 5, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 11. For the reasons below,
petitioner’s habeas petition is granted.
I. Background
Mr. Arroyo Lopez, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in
1996. Doc. 5 at 1. Prior to his detention, he resided with his wife and three U.S. citizen
children, one of whom is a minor with medical needs. Id. He had worked as a car detailer in
Glenview, Illinois, for approximately twenty years and is the “primary breadwinner” for his
family. Id. He has no criminal history. Id. at 8.
On November 4, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers arrested
Mr. Arroyo Lopez while he was on his lunch break. Id. at 5. Mr. Arroyo Lopez is detained at
the Otero County Processing Center in Chaparral, New Mexico. Id. ICE has initiated removal
proceedings but has not entered an order of removal. Id. at 2.
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II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court finds that (A) 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs Mr. Arroyo
Lopez’s detention, (B) Mr. Arroyo Lopez’s detention violates his right to due process, and (C)
the proper remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
A. Section 1226 governs Mr. Arroyo Lopez’s detention.
The INA establishes distinct detention regimes depending on whether a noncitizen is
“seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89
(2018). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking
admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” The “provision
mandates detention and affords no bond hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL
3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). By contrast, § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and
detention, “on a warrant issued by the Attorney General,” of noncitizens “pending a decision on
whether [they are] to be removed.” Noncitizens “detained under this second detention regime
are entitled to individualized bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Id.
Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue and this
Court’s prior findings, the Court finds that § 1226 governs here. See Barco Mercado v. Francis,
2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide and
noting that challengers prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges across
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fifty courts); Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432 (Gonzales, J.); Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL 45288,
at *2 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). The Court acknowledges the recent Fifth Circuit decision holding
that “[w]hile [noncitizens] remain applicants” for admission, “they are...seeking admission.”
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330, at *5 (5th Cir.). The Tenth Circuit
has not yet addressed this question. Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a
noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” In contrast,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s detention mandate applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” (emphasis
added). Noncitizens “seeking admission” are those who have not “effected an entry” into the
United States. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Noncitizens “who entered the
country years earlier” are not “seeking admission,” and therefore fall under § 1226 rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3.
Under this framework, § 1226 governs Mr. Arroyo Lopez’s detention. ICE arrested him
29 years after his initial entry into the United States and did not apprehend him at or near the
border. Accordingly, § 1225’s mandatory detention provision does not apply because Mr.
Arroyo Lopez effected an entry into the United States by living here for nearly three decades. Pu
Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3. As the Government concedes, the facts of this case are
“substantially similar” to those in Patel v. Noem, 2026 WL 103163 (D.N.M.), where this Court
granted relief. Doc. 11 at 2.
B. Mr. Arroyo Lopez’s detention violates his right to due process.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: first, whether there exists “a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,” and second, whether the procedures used to
deprive that interest “accord with the Constitution.” Domingo v. Castro, 2025 WL 2941217, at
*3 (D.N.M.). Here, Mr. Arroyo Lopez has a protected liberty interest. Once released from
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immigration detention, noncitizens acquire “a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of
custody on bond.” Danierov, 2026 WL 45288, at *2. Mr. Arroyo Lopez’s prior release allowed
“him to do a wide range of things,” including to live at home, work, and “be with family and
friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 482 (1972). Indeed, Mr. Arroyo Lopez has lived in the United States for 29 years, has
worked as a car detailer for twenty years, and has three U.S. citizen children.
Mr. Arroyo Lopez was also entitled to procedural safeguards before he was detained. In
determining what process is due, courts consider (1) “the private interest” affected; (2) “the risk
of erroneous deprivation” through the procedures used and the probable value of additional
safeguards; and (3) “the Government’s interest,” including the fiscal and administrative burdens
of additional procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To start, Mr. Arroyo
Lopez’s private interest in remaining free from detention is substantial. “Freedom from
imprisonment...lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
There is also a significant risk of erroneous deprivation. Although DHS may revoke
release “at any time,” courts require “a material change in circumstances as to whether the
noncitizen poses a danger to the community or an unreasonable risk of flight” before revoking
release. Danierov, 2026 WL 45288, at *2. ICE detained Mr. Arroyo Lopez after 29 years of
liberty without an assessment of any material facts had changed, creating a substantial risk of
erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest.
Finally, the Government’s interest in detaining Mr. Arroyo Lopez without a hearing is
limited, and the administrative burden of providing a bond hearing is minimal. See Danierov,
2026 WL 45288, at *2 (the “cost of providing a bond determination is not terribly burdensome”).
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C. The remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
The proper habeas remedy is a prompt bond hearing at which the Government must
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Arroyo Lopez is a flight risk or danger to the
community. Although “under normal circumstances, the burden” at a § 1226 hearing “is on the
noncitizen” to show that detention is unwarranted, Mr. Arroyo Lopez’s “unlawful detention in
violation of his constitutional rights shifts that burden to the Government.” Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL
3187432, at *3. A noncitizen’s “strong private interest in being free from civil detention”
outweighs the Government’s “comparatively minimal burden to justify custody.” Id.
IV. Conclusion
The Court therefore grants Mr. Arroyo Lopez’s petition, Doc. 5. The Court orders the
Government to provide Mr. Arroyo Lopez with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) before an
immigration judge within seven (7) business days. At that hearing, the Government must justify
Mr. Arroyo Lopez’s detention by clear and convincing evidence. If the Government fails to
provide a bond hearing that complies with these procedures, it must release Mr. Arroyo Lopez.
The Court also orders the Government to file a status report within ten (10) business days of this
Order confirming that it has provided Mr. Arroyo Lopez with a bond hearing or released him.
IT IS SO ORDERED
s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
Filing) accompanying this document.
Electronically filed documents can be found
on the Court’s PACER public access
system.
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