Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
___________________________
JUAN NEGRETE-RAMIREZ,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 1:25-cv-01227-KWR-JMR
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as Secretary
of the United States Department of Homeland Security,
PAM BONDI, in her official capacity as United States Attorney General,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Director of
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, Field Office Director for
Detention and Removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
DORA CASTRO, Warden, Otero County Processing Center,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1),
Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 2), and Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 7). Having reviewed the Petition, briefings, exhibits, and relevant law, the Court finds that
it lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). Accordingly, the Petition and Petitioner’s Motion
are DENIED. Respondents’ Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Juan Negrete-Ramirez has resided in the United States for approximately 21
years. 	Doc. 1 ¶ 13. 	In 2018, the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
initiated removal proceedings. Id. ¶ 13. An immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner removed
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to Mexico, and Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of removal in July 2018. Doc. 1-1
at 3 (IJ Cancellation of Removal Decision).
On or about March 1, 2025, DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers
took Petitioner into custody in Las Vegas, Nevada, and began deportation proceedings. Doc. 1 ¶
14. 	An IJ denied Petitioner’s custody redetermination request on March 31, 2025, and Petitioner
was transferred to the Otero County Processing Center in New Mexico soon after. Doc. 7-1 (IJ
Custody Redetermination Order); Doc. 1-1 at 19 (ICE Notice of Transfer). On August 11, 2025,
an IJ held a merits hearing on Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal. Doc. 1 ¶ 17;
Doc. 1-1. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), the IJ granted Petitioner’s application. See Doc. 1
¶ 17; Doc. 1-1 at 12. 	DHS reserved its right to appeal, and the IJ gave DHS a deadline of
September 10, 2025, to file its appeal. Doc. 1 ¶ 17. 	On the deadline date, DHS filed its notice of
appeal, which was rejected due to an issue with the notice’s certificate of service. Id. ¶ 18. The
following day, on September 11, 2025, DHS filed a corrected notice and a motion to accept an
untimely appeal. Id. ¶ 18. BIA accepted it as timely despite Petitioner’s objection. Id.
On December 10, 2025, Petitioner sought habeas relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Doc.
1, and a preliminary injunction, Doc. 2, to release him from ICE custody. 	Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss Petitioner’s claims. Doc. 7.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who
demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. Section
2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality
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of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a district court’s habeas jurisdiction may include
challenges by noncitizens in immigration-related matters. 	See Ochieng v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d
1110, 1115 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003)).
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the exception rather than the
rule.” Mrs. Fields Franchising, LLC v. MFGPC, 941 F.3d 1221, 1232 (10th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792, 797 (10th Cir. 2019)).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a petitioner must show: “(1) a substantial likelihood of
prevailing on the merits; (2) irreparable harm unless the injunction is issued; (3) that the threatened
injury outweighs the harm that the preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4)
that the injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.” Dine Citizens Against
Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1281 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302
F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002)).
However, as a threshold matter, a district court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over
a petitioner’s claims, and the court has an obligation to raise a jurisdictional issue sua sponte. See
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). 	The party asserting
jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that subject-matter jurisdiction exists. 	Id. 	A court
lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes
apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner’s claims rest solely on the BIA’s decision to accept the September 11 notice of
appeal as timely during his removal proceedings. 	First, Petitioner requests that the Court grant
habeas relief because the BIA failed to enforce its own appellate procedure against DHS—a
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procedure Petitioner claims that it strictly enforces against noncitizens—resulting in his continued
detention. Doc. 1 ¶ 17–18; Doc. 9 at 3. Because this action violated 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and his Fifth
Amendment right to due process, Petitioner seeks declaratory relief and release from custody, as
well as costs and attorney’s fees. Doc. 1 at 7. Second, Petitioner requests that the Court issue a
preliminary injunction that releases him from custody because his detention became unlawful after
DHS failed to meet the deadline to appeal the cancellation of his removal. Doc. 2 at 1–2.
Meanwhile, Respondents request that the Court dismiss Petitioner’s claims because the
Court lacks jurisdiction under § 1226(e). 	Doc. 7 at 6. 	Further, Respondents contend that the
Petition and Motion must be dismissed because Petitioner has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, Petitioner does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and Respondents
have not violated statutory law or Petitioner’s constitutional rights. Id. at 7–8. Petitioner disagrees
with Respondents’ arguments. Doc. 9.
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner’s claims. Although the Court agrees with Petitioner that his claims do not fall under §
1226(e), the Court finds sua sponte that § 1252(b)(9) strips the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Petition and Motion will be denied.
A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 	Section 2241(c)(3). 	“[W]here
Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be
clear.” 	Demore, 538 U.S. at 517. 	To preclude habeas review, Congress must be “particularly
clear” in its intent to do so. Id.
Courts do not have jurisdiction to consider certain immigration-related matters. Relevant
here is § 1252(b)(9), a “general jurisdictional limitation” and “unmistakable ‘zipper’ clause,” that
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“channels review of all decisions and actions leading up to or consequent upon final orders of
deportation in the courts of appeal, following issuance of an order of removal.” Mukantagara v.
DHS, 67 F.4th 1113, 1115 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482–85 (1999)) (citation modified).
Section 1252(b)(9) states that “judicial review of all questions of law and fact . . . arising
from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” It clearly
prevents jurisdiction, by habeas corpus or otherwise, “to review such an order or such questions
of law or fact” unless otherwise provided. Section 1252(b)(9). However, this zipper clause does
not extend broadly “to cut off claims that have a tangential relationship with pending removal
proceedings.” Mukantagara, 67 F.4th at 1116 (quoting Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. USCIS,
964 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020)). Rather, the narrow provision channels actions related to
removal claims into a single petition for review. 	See id. (“A claim only arises from a removal
proceeding when the parties in fact are challenging removal proceedings.”).
Here, Petitioner frames his claim as a challenge to his detention, which may not necessarily
preclude the Court of jurisdiction to hear his claims. 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
294–95 (2018) (plurality opinion). But, in fact, Petitioner is challenging his removal proceedings,
not his detention. 	He is not challenging his mandatory detention under §§ 1225 or 1226. 	See
Ochieng v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that habeas corpus proceeding
under § 2241 is appropriate for challenge to mandatory detention). 	He is not seeking a bond
hearing. See Doc. 9 at 2; Doc. 7 at 8 (noting that Petitioner has not filed a custody redetermination
request since cancellation of removal order). 	He is not challenging a decision that triggered
removal proceedings. See Mukantagara, 67 F.4th at 1116 (holding that challenge to decision to
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terminate refugee status, which triggered removal proceedings, did not fall within the scope of §
1252(b)(9)). And he is not challenging the result of a process separate from removal proceedings.
See Canal A Media Holding, LLC, 964 F.3d at 1253, 1257 (holding that challenge to denial of I-
129 petition, not removal proceedings, did not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9)).
Rather, Petitioner challenges his detention because the BIA accepted DHS’s appeal of his
removal cancellation as timely, which allowed removal proceedings to continue. 	Although
Petitioner seeks release from detention, his claims are grounded in his removal proceedings. And
Petitioner’s claims are intertwined with his removal proceedings—addressing them would
determine whether Petitioner could be lawfully removed. For these reasons, the Court finds that
Petitioner’s claims fall within the narrow scope of § 1252(b)(9).
Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	lacks 	subject-matter 	jurisdiction 	over 	Plaintiff’s 	claims.
Petitioner’s remedy is before the immigration court and then in a petition for review in a court of
appeals. See § 1252(b)(2); see also Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 276 (3d Cir.
2026) (determining that petitioner could litigate his constitutionality challenges after final order of
removal because final order’s validity would be contingent on a policy challenged by petitioner).
Petitioner’s claims are dismissed without prejudice. 	See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434
F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006).
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Motion for Preliminary Injunction are hereby DENIED for reasons described in this
Memorandum Opinion and Order. Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
_____/S/_______________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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