Escano v. Verified Docu Service, Inc. et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
RUBEN ESCANO,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 2:25-cv-00513-JB-JHR
VERIFIED DOCU SERVICE, INC. and
JARREN CLORES a/k/a BRANDON CLORES,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER [DOC. 68]
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Pro Se Plaintiff Ruben Escano’s Plaintiff’s
Motion for Protective Order and to Quash Subpoena to Verizon Business Network Services, LLC
(“motion for protective order”). [Doc. 68]. Defendants filed a response, [Doc. 74], and Escano
filed a reply [Doc. 78]. Having reviewed the briefing, case record, and applicable law, the Court
DENIES Escano’s motion.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Escano filed suit against Defendants on May 9, 2025, in New Mexico state court for
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., the New
Mexico Unfair Trade Practices Act, NMSA 1978, § 57-12-22, and trespass to chattels. [Doc. 1, at
18–23]. Defendants removed to federal court on June 1, 2025, and answered the complaint on June
6th. [Docs. 1, 3, 4]. The Court issued a scheduling order on September 3, 2025, and the parties
began discovery. [Doc. 19].
On February 11, 2026, Escano filed Plaintiff’s Expedited Motion for Protective Order and
to Quash Subpoena to Verizon Wireless Services, LLC. [Doc. 58]. Escano asserted that Defendants
had served Verizon Wireless on January 16, 2026, with a facially overbroad subpoena for his
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phone records. Id. Defendants later withdrew the subpoena, and Escano withdrew the motion.
[Docs. 72, 77]. On February 10, 2026, Defendants served a new subpoena on Verizon Wireless,
seeking Escano’s phone records and the phone records of three other numbers from January 1,
2013, to January 1, 2026. [Doc. 68-8, at 2]. Escano filed the instant motion to quash the subpoena
and for a protective order in response.
II. BRIEFING SUMMARY
Escano argues that Defendants’ subpoena for phone records other than the calls he alleges
came from Verified Docu Service is improper. [Doc. 68, at 8]. Because he has a cognizable privacy
interest in these records, Escano asserts the harm to that interest outweighs the minimal relevance
his calls with other parties might have. Id. at 8–9. As a result, the subpoena constitutes a “harassing
and retaliatory probe.” Id. at 2. Defendants respond that Escano’s motion has been mooted by the
fact that they have since withdrawn the second subpoena as well. [Docs. 73, 74]. Escano concedes
that the withdrawal moots his request to quash the subpoena, but his request for a protective order
pursuant to Rule 26(c) remains live because Defendants refuse to stipulate that they will not serve
subpoenas on Verizon Wireless in the future. [Doc. 78, at 1–2].
III. APPLICABLE LAW
Courts may limit or prohibit discovery for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to
undue expense, needless duplication, or failure to stay within the scope of discovery. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(2)(C), 26(c)(1). “A party or any person from who discovery is sought” may obtain a
protective order if they demonstrate “good cause” that the discovery will inflict “annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” on it. Id. 26(c)(1). Good cause requires
more than speculation; the movant must make “a particular and specific demonstration of fact”
justifying the protective order. S2 Automation LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., 283 F.R.D. 671, 680
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(D.N.M. 2012) (quotation omitted). Courts may grant, deny, or modify protective orders in their
discretion. United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court finds that there is not good cause for a protective order for Escano’s phone
records. As Escano concedes, some of his phone records are relevant and subject to discovery.
E.g., [Doc. 68, at 3]. And the lack of an active subpoena makes a protective order unnecessary.
While Escano argues that Defendants refused to foreclose the possibility of a third subpoena,
Escano does not make a particular demonstration of fact that Defendants intend to serve a facially
overbroad or otherwise improper one. See S2 Automation, 283 F.R.D. at 680. In addition, the Court
finds that limiting future discovery to the phone records Escano concedes are discoverable would
be premature without briefing on what records Defendants intend to seek or how they may be
relevant. Therefore, the Court denies Escano’s request for a protective order.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Escano’s motion for protective order. [Doc. 68].
However, if Defendants serve a subsequent subpoena or discovery request for Escano’s phone
records, Escano has leave of the Court to file a motion for a protective order and/or quash the
subpoena without an informal discovery conference.1
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________
HON. JERRY H. RITTER
United States Magistrate Judge
1 This order does not relieve Escano of his duty to first confer with Defendants to attempt to resolve any discovery
dispute informally. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
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