Omoobajesu v. Martinez et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
BLESSED EMMANUEL OMOOBAJESU,
Petitioner,
v. Civ. No. 23-600 WJ/GBW
RONALD MARTINEZ, et al.,
Respondents.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER comes before me on Petitioner Blessed Emmanuel Omoobajesu’s
Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody
(“Petition”) and accompanying memorandum (docs. 1, 2) and pursuant to the Order of
Reference (doc. 23). I RECOMMEND the Court DENY the Petition for the reasons
explained below.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2018, Petitioner pled no contest to one count of second-degree
armed robbery, one count of third-degree assault with intent to commit a violent felony,
and one count of third-degree tampering with evidence. Doc. 21-1 at 23, 69. On May 1,
2018, the state court entered judgment sentencing him to fifteen years of imprisonment,
three of which were suspended, followed by a two-year term of parole. Id. at 28-31.
Petitioner did not file an appeal. See doc. 1 at 3.
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Petitioner then filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 20, 2021.1
Doc. 21-1 at 40, 59. He argued, as is relevant here, that habeas relief was appropriate
because (1) he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel because he had not
been informed by his attorney of an earlier, more favorable plea offer; (2) he had been
denied the right to a speedy trial; and (3) at a pretrial conference, the state court judge
had pointed Petitioner out to the alleged victim and identified him as the one who
robbed her, creating undue suggestiveness. Id. at 45-50.2
On September 13, 2021, the state habeas court denied relief for petitioner’s claims
of speedy trial violations and undue suggestiveness, see id. at 69-71, and ordered an
amended petition addressing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, id. at 76.
After reviewing the parties’ briefing on the amended petition, the state habeas court
similarly found that Petitioner was not entitled to relief for his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and dismissed the claim on October 13, 2022. Id. at 174-76.
Petitioner then sought state certiorari review, but the New Mexico Supreme Court
denied the petition on February 10, 2023. Id. at 324.
1 Respondents say that the state habeas petition was filed on May 10, 2021. See doc. 21 at 2. However, the
record shows it was filed on May 20, 2021. See doc. 21-1 at 40, 59. The undersigned suspects this is a
typographical error and regardless, the exact date of filing is immaterial to Petitioner’s federal habeas
claim.
2 Petitioner also alleged a violation of double jeopardy, prosecutorial misconduct, and failure to inform
Petitioner of collateral consequences outside of New Mexico of accepting a plea. Doc. 21-1 at 69. These
arguments were not retained in Petitioner’s certiorari petition to the New Mexico Supreme Court, see id.
at 177-78, nor do they appear in his federal habeas petition and memorandum in support, see docs. 1, 2.
As such, they do not require analysis by this Court.
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Petitioner filed his federal § 2254 petition on July 17, 2023, raising claims for
ineffective assistance of counsel; speedy trial violations; and violations of the right to
due process due to improper suggestiveness. Doc. 1 at 6-9. Respondents filed an
answer on August 25, 2025. Doc. 21. Petitioner did not file a reply.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Petitions for habeas relief from a state court judgment are governed by § 2254, as
amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which
provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) Resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) Resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The requirement that the state court’s decision must contravene a decision
“by the Supreme Court of the United States” is strictly construed; lower federal
court precedents, Supreme Court dicta, and Supreme Court “holdings that speak
only at a high level of generality” are all insufficient grounds for relief. Brown v.
Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 136 (2022) (citations omitted). Habeas corpus is “not a
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substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal,” but rather functions as a
“guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 322 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J. concurring)). Accordingly, the writ may issue
only in cases “where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that
the state court’s decision conflicts” with the Supreme Court’s precedents. Id. at
102.
III. ANALYSIS
As previously stated, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief under § 2254: (1)
ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) violation of the right to a speedy trial, and (3)
violation of due process due to improper suggestiveness. After addressing some
preliminary matters, the undersigned will address each in turn.
a. In Custody Requirement
To be eligible for federal habeas, a petitioner is required to be “’in
custody’ when the application for habeas corpus is filed.” Carafas v. Lavallee, 391
U.S. 234, 238 (1968). An individual does not need to be “subject to immediate
physical imprisonment” to seek relief under § 2254, but he must be “subject to
restraints not shared by the public generally that significantly confine and
restrain freedom.” Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing
Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510 (1982)). As
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such, a petitioner may be “in custody” if he is on parole. See Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963).
The Southern New Mexico Correctional Facility website indicates that
petitioner has been released on probation/parole. See
https://www.cd.nm.gov/offender-search/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2026). It is unclear
exactly when Petitioner was released from physical imprisonment, but
regardless, he has met the “in custody” requirement for § 2254.
b. Exhaustion
As a preliminary matter, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has exhausted his
state court remedies. A federal court cannot grant a petition under § 2254 unless the
petitioner “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A). “The exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the federal issue has been
properly presented to the highest state court, either by direct review of the conviction or
in a postconviction attack.” Dever v. Kansas State Penitentiary, 36 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th
Cir. 1994). The petitioner is limited to the arguments raised before the state court. See
Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1011 (10th Cir. 2006).
Here, Petitioner’s claims have all been denied on the merits by the state court
and he has exhausted his available state-court remedies by presenting his three grounds
for relief to the New Mexico Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c).
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c. Timeliness
Petitions for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody must generally
be filed within one year after the defendant’s conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A). The one-year limitation period can be extended:
(1) While a state habeas petition is pending, § 2244(d)(2);
(2) Where unconstitutional state action has impeded the filing of a federal habeas
petition, § 2244(d)(1)(B);
(3) Where a new constitutional right has been recognized by the Supreme Court,
§ 2244(d)(1)(C); or
(4) Where the factual basis for the claim could not have been discovered until
later, § 2244(d)(1)(D).
Equitable tolling may also be available “when an inmate diligently pursues his claims
and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary
circumstances beyond his control.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000).
Petitioner’s federal habeas petition is likely untimely. See docs. 7, 12. However,
Respondents have affirmatively waived this procedural defect. See doc. 21 at 4 (“Mr.
Omoobajesu most likely has not made a showing sufficient to overcome his untimely
filed petition…Respondents also submit the interests of justice are best served by
ignoring this procedural defect…and instead denying the petition on the merits.”)
Although a Court may sua sponte dismiss a habeas petition as untimely, see Day v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006), if a state should “intelligently choose to waive a
statute of limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to disregard that
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choice.” Id. at 210 n.11. Because Respondents have waived timeliness as a defense, doc.
21 at 4, the undersigned will address each of Petitioner’s arguments on the merits.
d. Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As the first ground for relief, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel
because his attorney did not convey a plea agreement to him in which Petitioner would
plead guilty to three of the original six counts against him in exchange for a 13 ½-year
term of imprisonment subject to judicial discretion in initial sentencing. Doc. 1 at 6.
When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must
determine whether a petitioner has shown (1) that counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) it is reasonably probable that but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Where a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to miss
out on a more favorable plea agreement the inquiry under Strickland into whether the
result of the proceeding would have been different “requires looking not at whether the
defendant would have proceeded to trial absent ineffective assistance but whether he
would have accepted the offer to plead pursuant to the terms earlier proposed.”
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally,
[t]o show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea
offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient
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performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability they
would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded
effective assistance of counsel. Defendants must also demonstrate a
reasonable probability the plea would have been entered without the
prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had
the authority to exercise that discretion under state law. To establish
prejudice in this instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable probability
that the end result of the criminal process would have been more
favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison
time.
Id. at 147.
At the state court level, the court applied Strickland and Frye and determined that
(1) the District Attorney would not agree to suspend any of the 13 ½ year prison term;
(2) Petitioner never clearly alleged he would have been willing to serve a 13 ½ year
sentence; (3) any evidence Petitioner could produce as to whether the court would have
suspended a portion of the 13 ½ year sentence would be speculative; and (4) given these
considerations, Petitioner had failed to show actual prejudice.3 Doc. 21-1 at 175-76. The
Court therefore dismissed Petitioner’s habeas petition. Id.
3 The findings regarding suspension of any sentence are important because Petitioner accepted a definite
term of 12 years of incarceration. See doc. 21-1 at 23. If Petitioner had accepted the first plea agreement of
13 ½ years subject to judicial discretion, the sentence would have been shorter only if the sentencing court
had chosen to exercise its discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment. See id. at 208. Though
Petitioner argues that the fact the court was willing to suspend three years on the 15-year plea agreement
suggests that it’s reasonable to believe it would have lessened the 13 ½ year agreement, see doc. 2 at 3,
whether the court would have actually lessened the sentence is entirely speculative. Further, assuming,
arguendo, that the court would have exercised judicial discretion and shown leniency, the amount of time
suspended would also be entirely speculative. Consequently, the state habeas court’s conclusion that
Petitioner could not show actual prejudice under Frye was reasonable.
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To prevail on his federal habeas claim, Petitioner must show that the state court’s
decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” clearly
established federal law, or that it was “based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the state court record.” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 6 (2011) (citing
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The undersigned finds nothing in the
record indicating that Petitioner has met this burden. To the contrary, the state habeas
court properly applied the requirements of Strickland and Frye, and each of the facts
found by that court were reasonable based on the record.
As such, the undersigned recommends denying relief on the first ground.
e. Ground Two: Denial of Right to a Speedy Trial
For his second ground for relief, Petitioner argues that he was denied his right to
a speedy trial because his arraignment was not timely; once he was declared competent,
the matter failed to move apace; and “it took 30 months for [his] case to reach a
resolution.” Doc. 1 at 8, doc. 2 at 22-31.
When evaluating a speedy trial claim, the Tenth Circuit has found that
“[b]ecause speedy trial claims are subject to a balancing test…[h]abeas relief is only
available if there is no possible balancing of the factors that both supports the [state
habeas court’s] decision and is not contrary to clearly established Supreme Court
precedent.” Jackson v. Ray, 390 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). The factors a court must
balance are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the
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defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the
defendant. Id. at 1260-64. These considerations, also known as the Barker factors, “must
be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).
At the state court level, the court applied the Barker factors and found that “[i]n
total, there was [sic] 15 months of neutral time during which the case was pending a
competency determination or was moving at a normal pace toward trial; there was [sic]
6 months that weigh slightly against the State, and there was [sic] 10 months that weigh
heavily against the Petitioner.” Doc. 21-1 at 71. The state habeas court found that since
Petitioner was responsible for the majority of the delay, he only asserted his right to a
speedy trial once, and he did not provide evidence of particular prejudice, he was not
entitled to habeas relief on this ground. Id.
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has not shown that the state habeas court
unreasonably or contrarily applied clearly established federal law or unreasonably
determined the facts when it applied the Barker factors and detailed why they weighed
against him. See id. at 70-71. As such, the undersigned recommends denying relief on
the second ground.
f. Ground Three: Inappropriate In-Court Identification
Petitioner’s final argument for habeas relief is that he was inappropriately
identified by the trial judge in a pretrial hearing with the alleged victim. Doc. 1 at 9; doc.
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2-1 at 29 (“Judge Rael then interrupted the alleged victim and stated[,] ‘when you say
“he” and “him”, your [sic] referring to Mr. Omoobajesu[,] the man standing right there
in the orange.”). Petitioner states that the victim had never identified him as the
assailant and he was “never put in a ‘six-pack,’ ‘line-up’ or any other identification
process.” Doc. 1 at 9. He argues that the Judge’s “unlawfully suggestive” identification
“guaranteed the alleged victim would now label accused as perpetrator and accused
would not receive a fair trial” thus denying him the protections of the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Doc. 2-1 at 32.
While it is true that impermissibly suggestive identification methods can raise
constitutional concerns, “the suggestiveness must create a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.” United States v. Ruiz, 116 F.4th 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2024)
(quotation omitted). Further, “[t]he relevant constitutional concern is that an
eyewitness misidentification may deprive a criminal defendant of his right to a fair
trial.” Id.
Here, the state habeas court found that the robbery was caught on video, so eye-
witness testimony was not necessary to identify Petitioner. Doc. 21-1 at 71. Further,
because Petitioner accepted a plea agreement, no in-court identification was necessary.
Id. As such, there was no possible deprivation of the right to a fair trial and any
suggestive identification would be properly considered as harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Wofford, 766 F. App’x. 576, 579-80 (10th Cir. 2019)
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(noting that unduly suggestive and unreliable identification must satisfy the
constitutional harmless-error standard). This finding is not unreasonable or contrary to
clearly established federal law.
Additionally, Petitioner identifies no United States Supreme Court precedent
that holds a trial judge may not clarify the identity of an individual to whom the victim
is referring. “The absence of clearly established federal law is dispositive under §
2254(d)(1) and results in the denial of habeas relief.” Grant v. Royal, 886 F.3d 874, 889
(10th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). Therefore, the undersigned recommends denying
Petitioner federal habeas relief on the third ground.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds no basis for relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 and therefore RECOMMENDS that the Petition be DENIED.
_____________________________________________
GREGORY B. WORMUTH
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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