Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
RAVEN BREANN WEST
as next friend of
JOB NYABAGA MAGETO,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 1:26-cv-01269-SMD-KRS
WARDEN OF THE TORRANCE COUNTY
DETENTION FACILITY, 	et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER
,
Raven Breann West as next friend.
submissions, the record, and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of Kenya, entered the United States on October 29, 2015, on a B-2
visitor visa. He remained within the United States after April 28, 2016, the expiration date of the
term permitted by his visa. He applied for asylum and withholding of removal on October 2, 2016.
Immigration officials arrested Petitioner on June 4, 2025, at the Newark, New Jersey office of
finding him a flight risk and danger
to the community. 	An immigration judge ordered removal on January 7, 2026, and after an
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became final on March 6, 2026.1 	See 	Doc. 1; Doc. 7 at 2; Doc. 11 at 1. Petitioner asserts that he
was arrested on September 12, 2023, on a charge of endangering the welfare of a child, which was
dismissed on April 12, 2024, and expunged on May 28, 2025. Doc. 11 at 1, 3-4.
Petitioner challenges his detention as unconstitutionally prolonged in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 11 at 2.
LEGAL STANDARD
An application for habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241 may be granted only if the petitioner
U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). Federal courts have habeas jurisdiction to examine the statutory and constitutional
bases for an immigration detention unrelated to a final order of removal. 	See 	Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 517 	18 (2003); 	see also 	Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over a habeas petition challenging
continued detention without a bonding hearing); 	Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Court Has Subject Matter Jurisdiction
See Tuck v. United
, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that a federal court has an
independent obligation to assure itself of subject matter jurisdiction). 	Petitioner challenges his
continued detention as a violation of the Due Process Clause. 	That constitutional claim differs
from a challenge to a removal determination or bond eligibility. 	See Ochieng v. Mukasey, 520
1 	See 	Executive Office for Immigration Review, 	Automated Case Information,
https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation/ 	-number and
nationality).
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F.3d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing 	Demore, 538 U.S. at 517). 	As one court explained,
- 	Noori
v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-01824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025)
(quoting 	Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 2008)). 	The Court finds that
reasoning persuasive.
Additionally,
next friend as Petitioner is presently detained. 	See 	Doc. 3 at 1-2; 	see also Hernandez-Hernandez
as next friend of Hernandez-Hernandez v. Warden, Otero Cnty. Processing Ctr., No. 2:26-cv-
00974-MIS-JHR, 2026 WL 1031228, at *1 (D.N.M. Apr. 16, 2026) (granting petition brought by
next friend).
II. 	Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C. § 1231
Under § 1231(a)(1), the government has a 90-day period in which to remove a noncitizen
after a removal order becomes final. If the government is unable to effect removal within that 90-
day period, continued detention becomes discretionary. 	See 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 	Indefinite
detention, however, is not permitted. 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001)
-removal-period
detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United
States.
In 	Zadvydas
Id. 	at 699
700. 	If removal is not practically attainable, detention no longer serves its statutory purpose of
Id. 	at 699. 	The Court established a
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Id. 	at 701. 	After this six-month period, if the noncitizen
provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, the government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut the showing.
Id.
Courts typically consider the cumulative time spent in detention when evaluating a habeas
claim challenging detention as unreasonable per 	Zadvydas. 	Vo v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-02244-DGE,
detention does not reset each time a noncitizen is detained; rather, the aggregate time in detention
see, e.g., 	Giorges v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-07683-NW, 2025 WL
2898967, at *8 n.5 (N.D. Cal Oct. 10, 2025); 	Bulle v. Wesling, No. 26-cv-00019-JJM-AEM, 2026
WL 183840, at *4 (D.R.I. Jan. 23, 2026).
III. 	Petitioner 	8 U.S.C. § 1231 Because His Removal Is Not
Reasonably Foreseeable
Once the presumptively constitutional six-month period under 	Zadvydas 	elapses, Petitioner
bears the burden to show his detention has become prolonged and potentially unlawful because
there is good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future. 	See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680. 	The Court finds that Petitioner has met his
initial burden of proof and Respondents have failed to rebut this showing.
First 	period exceeds the presumptively constitutional six-month
limit. Petitioner 	. Thus, as of the present date,
he has been detained for over six months. 	See 	Doc. 7 at 2.
In 	Abiodun v. Musakey, the court distinguished 	Zadvydas, noting that the 	Zadvydas
petitioners faced indefinite detention 	.
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264 F. App 	x 726, 729 (10th Cir. 2008). 	Abiodun
had issued travel documents, and ICE had successfully placed the petitioner on chartered flights,
leading the court to find a likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future. The present case is more
analogous to 	Zadvydas 	and distinguishable from 	Abiodun.
Petitioner sets forth that Respondents have detained him since June 2025, and over six
months after his order of removal became final, and has therefore shown there is good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	See
Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 11 at 2. Respondents have not filed any notice setting forth the acquisition of
necessary documents or the scheduling of concrete travel plans. Though the Court recognizes that
Petitioner filed his Petition on April 23, 2026, which was during the 90-day removal period
following the entry of the final order of removal, Respondents have had ample time since that date
to update the Court in regards to their plans to effectuate removal. Nor have Respondents set forth
any facts in that time establishing that Petitioner is responsible for the delay. Thus, Respondents
See Dao v. Rios, No. 2:26-cv-00370-JB-DLM, 2026
WL 1103119, at *6-7 (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2026) ( 	six-month
presumption in 	Zadvydas 	is a practical guide, not a stopwatch. 	Detention beyond six months is
permissible only while removal remains reasonably foreseeable, and courts routinely consider the
total time a noncitizen has been detained under § 1231(a)(6) when applying that standard
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby 	ORDERED:
1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is 	GRANTED;
2) 	Respondents 	SHALL 	release 	Petitioner 	within 	48 	hours, 	without 	any 	new
conditions of release;
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3) 	Respondents 	SHALL 	provide Petitioner with all his personal belongings and
and provide all
necessary identity and travel documents to return to his primary address;
4) 	Respondents are 	ENJOINED 	from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent a
change in circumstances showing that his removal is reasonably foreseeable, for
instance, through the procurement of travel documents and concrete travel plans;
5) 	Respondents 	SHALL NOT 	remove Petitioner to any third country without first
providing him with constitutionally compliant procedures, including written notice
in a language he can understand and the opportunity to challenge his removal and
present a fear-based claim;
6) 	Respondents 	SHALL 	file a notice of compliance within two business days of
. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
7) 	The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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