Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
LEOBARDO HERNANDEZ HERNANDEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-01208-KG-KK
GEORGE DEDOS, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Leobardo Hernandez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 8. Because Petitioner’s challenge
presents purely legal questions, the Court declines to hold a hearing, 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and
denies the petition without prejudice.
I. Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without admission or
parole at an “unknown time and unknown place.” Doc. 8 at 2. On August 19, 2025,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrested Petitioner and subsequently charged
him as a removable alien. Id. On April 21, 2026, an immigration judge (“IJ”) entered a final
removal order to Mexico. Petitioner reserved his right to appeal the removal order, but did not
do so by the May 21, 2026 deadline, making it administratively final that day. Id. He is
currently detained at the Cibola County Correctional Center in New Mexico. Doc. 1 at 2.
Petitioner filed this habeas petition and seeks immediate release, or in the alternative, a
bond hearing within seven days. Doc. 1 at 27. The Government argues that Petitioner is
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and his detention remains lawful. Doc. 8 at 1.
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II. Legal Standard
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
“[H]abeas relief is available only in the district of confinement.” Gamez Lira v. Noem, 2025 WL
2581710, at *2 (D.N.M.).
III. Analysis
After reviewing the record and applicable legal authority, the Court concludes that
Petitioner fails to meet the standards set out in Zadvydas and that his petition is therefore denied
without prejudice.
“[T]he Government ordinarily secures” a noncitizen’s removal during the 90 days after
issuing a final order for the person to be removed. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682; see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1). During that 90-day removal period, the noncitizen is typically detained. Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 682. After that, the Government may continue detaining the noncitizen only for as
long as is “reasonably necessary” to secure their removal. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
Because a statute permitting a noncitizen’s “indefinite detention” would violate due
process, “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer
authorized.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 699. A six-month detention period, the Supreme Court
held, is presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that, if the noncitizen “provides good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,”
the Government “must…rebut that showing” or release the noncitizen. Id. at 701. “[F]or
detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what
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counts as the reasonably foreseeable future…shrink[s].” Id. The remedy for a due process
violation under Zadvydas is typically release of the petitioner under conditions of supervision.
E.g., Gomez v. Mattos, 2025 WL 3101994, at *7 (D. Nev.); Trejo v. Warden of ERO, 2025 WL
2992187, at *10 (W.D. Tex.); Douglas v. Baker, 2025 WL 2997585, at *5 (D. Md.).
Under these principles, the Court denies the petition without prejudice. As of the date of
this order, Petitioner has been detained for less than six months since his order of removal
became administratively final on May 21, 2026, which is less than the presumptively reasonable
six-month period of detention that Zadvydas recognized. Attempting to get around this issue,
Petitioner applies the Zadvydas timer to his original arrest. See Doc. 1 at 24 (“by subjecting him
to prolonged detention for nearly eight months...”). Petitioner’s removal order became
administratively final in May and his § 1231 detention, and the Zadvydas timer, began on that
date. Petitioner’s argument therefore does not persuade the Court, and the petition is denied
without prejudice to its refiling after the Zadvydas’ presumptively reasonable six-month period
expires.
IV. Conclusion
The Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, is denied without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
Filing) accompanying this document.
Electronically filed documents can be found
on the Court’s PACER public access system.
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