Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
RUFAT RAHMATOV,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-01007-SMD-GJF
GEORGE DEDOS, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions, the record,
and the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Rufat Rahmatov, a citizen of Azerbaijan, presented himself at the San Ysidro,
California Port of Entry and applied for admission to the United States on June 10, 2024. Doc. 1-
2 at 1. Petitioner alleges that immigration authorities released him from custody the following day
but does not specify the conditions of his release, such as whether he was released on his own
recognizance or on bond. Id. ¶ 15.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrested Petitioner in January 2026 and
has detained him at the Cibola County Correctional Center since February 2026. Id. ¶ 16. An
immigration judge denied Petitioner’s motion for bond determination for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
¶¶ 17–18.
Petitioner challenges his ongoing detention and seeks immediate release, asserting that the
denial of a bond hearing violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and Due Process. Id. ¶¶ 21–23, 27–31.
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DISCUSSION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to
immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). A district court may grant
a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Respondents argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review § 1225(b)(1)
determinations. See Doc. 9 at 10. While the Tenth Circuit has held that that district courts’ habeas
jurisdiction is limited regarding orders of removal, it has clarified that district courts retain
jurisdiction to hear a noncitizen’s challenge to mandatory detention because that determination is
distinct from a removal order. See Thoung v. United States, 913 F.3d 999, 1001–02 (10th Cir.
2019) (noting that the REAL ID Act limits judicial review of final orders of removal); see also
Ochieng v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that a noncitizen may still
challenge detention through a habeas corpus proceeding because review of detention is distinct
from review of a removal order).
In this case, as in other habeas matters before it, this Court does not review the underlying
immigration proceedings or substantive determinations, such as asylum eligibility. Instead, the
Court focuses exclusively on the constitutionality of the detention itself. Consequently,
Respondents’ jurisdictional challenge is misplaced because it incorrectly implies that the Court is
reviewing substantive immigration decisions.
I. Statutory Framework: 8 U.S.C §§ 1225 and 1226
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–89 (2018). Section 1225(b) “applies
primarily to [noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States”—i.e., “applicants for admission.”
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Id. at 297. Detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is required “if the examining immigration officer
determines that [a noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) cannot be released on bond.
Section 1226(a) sets the “default rule” for detaining noncitizens “already present in the
United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. Under § 1226(a), a noncitizen “may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States.”
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are therefore generally entitled to individualized bond
hearings. See id. at 306.
Sections 1225(b)(2)(A) and 1226(a) are mutually exclusive in that both provisions cannot
simultaneously govern Petitioner’s detention. E.g., Romero v. Hyde, 795 F. Supp. 3d 271, 286 (D.
Mass. 2025); see also, Patel v. Crowley, No. 25-cv-11180, 2025 WL 2996787, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
24, 2025); Artiga v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-5208, 2025 WL 2829434, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2025).
Section 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2), governs Petitioner’s detention because he was
“already present in the United States” at the time of his arrest. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
Petitioner was detained in the U.S. interior and is therefore not subject to the mandatory detention
provisions of § 1225, which apply to those seeking admission, specifically noncitizens who present
at a port of entry or are apprehended immediately after entering. See Doc. 9 at 2. Petitioner is
instead entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a). See Aragon v. Noem, No. 2:26-CV-00065,
2026 WL 458449, at *2 (D.N.M. Feb. 18, 2026); Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___,
2025 WL 3485771, at *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025); Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-00835-
DHU-JMR, 2025 WL 2676729, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, No.
2:25-cv-01031-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2025); see also Figuera v.
Ripa, No. 26-CV-20307-JB, 2026 WL 467569, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2026); Wuilmer v. Noem,
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No. 25-CV-3236 (NEB/JFD), 2026 WL 458457, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026); Villatoro v. Ripa,
No. 2:26-CV-00213-SPC-DNF, 2026 WL 452432, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2026).
II. The Government’s Detention of Petitioner Violates His Fifth Amendment Rights
The Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention violates his Fifth Amendment rights.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary
to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. Garcia
Domingo v. Castro, 806 F. Supp. 1246, 1251–52 (D.N.M. Oct. 15, 2025) (citing Ky. Dep’t of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). “Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “It is well established that
the Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Though the Government “may constitutionally detain
deportable aliens during the limited period necessary for their removal proceedings,” that “limited
period” cannot be indefinite. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003). As the length of detention
stretches on, an individual’s due process interests escalate and the government’s burden to justify
continued detention mounts. Id. at 529; Jennings, 583 U.S. at 310–11; Mohamed v. Sec’y Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 376 F. Supp. 3d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 2018).
The Government has offered neither a justification nor a formal process for the deprivation
of Petitioner’s protected liberty interest. Immigration authorities released Petitioner into the
United States in 2024 after he presented himself at a port of entry, and the record reflects no
significant change in circumstances. See Doc. 9 at 2. While the Court recognizes that neither
authorized release nor length of residency constitutes legal authorization to remain in the country,
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any revocation of the protected interests arising from these circumstances must still comport with
constitutional procedural safeguards.
The United States’ power to admit or exclude aliens is no longer plenary once an alien
enters the country, because the Due Process Clause applies to “all persons.” See Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“Once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”).
Petitioner possesses a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention and was deprived
of that interest without constitutionally adequate process.
The material facts of this case are similar from those in Martin Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-
cv-00063-SMD-GJF, 2026 WL 381869, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026), which granted relief
because the petitioner was arrested inside the United States and was not deemed an arriving alien.
Because Respondents have offered no independent legal basis for continued custody, Petitioner is
entitled to relief pursuant to § 2241. See Martin Ramirez, 2026 WL 381869; Cortez-Gonzalez,
2025 WL 3485771, at *3.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED:
1) The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;
2) Respondents shall release Petitioner within 24 hours of the next business day
following the entry of this Order;
3) Respondents shall facilitate Petitioner’s transportation from the detention facility
by notifying Petitioner’s counsel when and where he can be collected, and by
providing all necessary identity and travel documents to board a domestic flight to
return to his primary address;
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4) Respondents SHALL file a notice of compliance within two business days of
Petitioner’s release. This notice must specify: (1) the date, (2) the time, and (3) the
manner of departure (e.g., transport to a bus station, designated drop-off location,
or other arrangements). Additionally, the notice must include (4) a description or
copies of all discharge and travel documents provided to Petitioner at the time of
release;
5) Respondents SHALL NOT re-detain Petitioner without a pre-deprivation hearing
before a neutral Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
6) Respondents SHALL NOT remove Petitioner to any third country to which he does
not have a removal order without first providing him with constitutionally
compliant procedures;
7) The Court will separately enter Final Judgment in favor of Petitioner but retain
jurisdiction over this matter to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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