Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
JOSE DABOIN MENDEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-00394-KG-JHR
GEORGE DEDOS, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Jose Simon Daboin Mendez’s Motion
to Enforce, Doc. 13, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 16. Mr. Donouvo contends that the
Government failed to comply with this Court’s prior order, Doc. 10. After reviewing a digital
audio recording (“DAR”) of the hearing, the Court agrees that it failed to satisfy the procedures
mandated by its earlier ruling.1 The Court grants Petitioner’s motion and orders the Government
to release him immediately.
I. Background
Petitioner, a 38-year-old native and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United States in
2022 under humanitarian parole. Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 9 at 2–3. In 2024, he applied for asylum.
Doc. 9 at 2–3. He has no criminal history, and lives with his family, which “he works to
support.” Doc. 1 at 4. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested him on
January 5, 2026, in Minnesota. Id. He is currently detained at the Torrence County Detention
Center in New Mexico. Id. This Court concluded that Petitioner’s redetention violated the
1 The DAR of the Bond Hearing (March 11, 2026) is on file with the Court and lodged at
Doc. 15 (“Audio Recording”).
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Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and granted Petitioner’s habeas petition. See Doc. 10.
The Court ordered the Government to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), at which the Government bore the burden of proof of justifying Petitioner’s continued
detention. See Doc. 10 at 5.
On March 11, 2026, an immigration judge (“IJ”) conducted a bond hearing. Doc. 12-1 at
1. At the outset, the IJ noted: “The burden has shifted to the government.” Audio Recording at
00:06–00:13. The Government stated that Petitioner is “not eligible for bond under the statute”
because he “is an arriving alien.” Id. at 2:54–3:45. In the alternative, the Government asserted
that Petitioner “is a flight risk due to no relief in front of the court.” Id. The Government
acknowledged that it did not know “the circumstances” of Petitioner’s initial entry and offered
no additional evidence. Id. at 4:56–5:45, 11:20.
Petitioner’s counsel informed the IJ that Petitioner had a master calendar hearing
scheduled for the following day and requested “no action.” Id. at 13:45. The IJ denied the
request, stating: “If the district court wants to place, impermissible or not impermissible, dates
that are highly inconvenient for everyone else, no. [Bond] is denied.” Id. at 14:13. The IJ stated
that counsel “would have gotten a ‘no action’ if the district court had not imposed these
heightened restrictions on dates and timeliness of the filing and hearing of these hearings.” Id. at
14:45. The IJ also asserted that Petitioner was a flight risk and appeared to lack community ties.
Id. The IJ concluded that “[i]n the alternative, Hurtado applies probably with more force than
ever.” Id. at 16:02.
Petitioner seeks immediate release, arguing that the IJ failed to shift the burden to the
Government at the hearing. Doc. 13 at 2. He reasons that the Government presented no
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evidence at the hearing and the IJ relied on impermissible factors. Id. at 2–3. The Government
opposes the motion. Doc. 16.
II. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court concludes that (A) it has jurisdiction to review the
procedures used at the bond hearing, and (B) release is warranted.
A. The Court has jurisdiction.
First, the Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim. See Tuck
v. United Serv.’s Auto. Ass’n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating that a federal court has
an independent obligation to assure itself of subject matter jurisdiction). The Court
acknowledges that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e), “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding the application of [§ 1226]...shall not be subject to review,” and that “[n]o court may
set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the
detention or release of any alien.” But § 1226(e) only bars review of the Attorney General’s
“discretionary judgment.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003). It does not eliminate
“habeas jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872
F.3d 976, 987 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 351–52 (4th Cir.
2022) (noting that Section 1226(e) does not strip federal courts of jurisdiction to consider
“constitutional challenge[s]” to the “procedures adopted by the Attorney General for all
detention decisions under § 1226(a)”); see also Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1200–02 (9th
Cir. 2011) (collecting cases and holding that § 1226(e) does not limit federal court’s jurisdiction
to review bond hearing determinations for constitutional claims or legal error). This framework
reflects a district court’s authority to ensure compliance with its own habeas orders. See
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) (“Courts have inherent power to enforce
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compliance with their lawful orders.”); Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 235–36
(W.D.N.Y. 2019) (stating that, when addressing a motion to enforce a prior order granting
conditional habeas relief, “the Court is not reviewing a discretionary judgment of the IJ under §
1226,” but “determining whether the order it issued...was followed”).
Under these principles, the Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s motion to
enforce. Petitioner does not challenge the IJ’s discretionary weighing of the evidence or the
ultimate bond determination. Rather, he raises a constitutional claim that the IJ failed to follow
the due process requirements set forth by this Court when denying bond.
B. The bond hearing failed to comply with this Court’s order.
Next, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s bond hearing did not satisfy the due process
requirements set forth in this Court’s prior order. In granting habeas relief, the Court exercised
its discretion to require the Government to justify Petitioner’s detention by clear and convincing
evidence. Doc. 10 at 4–5. That did not occur. At the hearing, the IJ initially stated that the
burden rested with the Government. Audio Recording at 00:06. But the record reflects that the
standard was not meaningfully applied. The Government presented no evidence that Petitioner
poses a danger or flight risk. Instead, it argued that Petitioner “is an arriving alien” and therefore
ineligible for bond—a statutory framework this Court has rejected. Id. at 2:54–3:45; see Doc.
10. When the IJ posed basic questions about Petitioner, including his manner of entry, the
Government lacked basic familiarity with the underlying facts of this case. Id. at 4:56–5:45.
And in denying bond, the IJ relied in part on considerations unrelated to flight risk or danger,
including this Court’s timeline. Id. at 14:45. Because of these deficiencies, the hearing did not
comply with this Court’s order and release is warranted.
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III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court orders that:
1. Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce, Doc. 13, is granted. The Government shall release him
within 24 hours of this Order. The Government shall not impose any new conditions of
release beyond those in place prior to Petitioner’s detention.
2. The Government is enjoined from redetaining Petitioner absent a predetention hearing
before a neutral IJ under § 1226(a), at which the Government must establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger or flight risk.
3. The Government shall file a status report within ten (10) business days of this Order
certifying compliance.
IT IS SO ORDERED
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
Filing) accompanying this document.
Electronically filed documents can be found
on the Court’s PACER public access
system.
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