Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
JOSE DABOIN MENDEZ,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:26-cv-00394-KG-JHR
GEORGE DEDOS, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Jose Daboin Mendez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Doc. 1, and the Government’s Response, Doc. 9. Because his challenge presents a
purely legal question, the Court declines to hold a hearing, see 28 U.S.C. § 2243, and grants the
petition for the reasons below.
I. Background
Mr. Daboin Mendez, a 38-year-old native and citizen of Venezuela, entered the United
States in 2022 under humanitarian parole. Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 9 at 2–3. In 2024, Mr. Daboin
Mendez applied for asylum. Doc. 9 at 2–3. He has no criminal history, and lives with his
family, “whom he works to support.” Doc. 1 at 4. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) agents arrested him on January 5, 2026, in Minnesota. Id. He is currently detained at
the Torrence County Detention Center in New Mexico. Id.
II. Standard of Review
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks “release from unlawful physical
confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973). Habeas corpus review is
available under § 2241 if a noncitizen is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687.
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III. Analysis
For the reasons below, the Court finds that (A) 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs Mr. Daboin
Mendez’s detention, (B) his detention violates his right to due process, and (C) the proper
remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
A. Section 1226 governs Mr. Daboin Mendez’s detention.
The INA establishes distinct detention regimes depending on whether a noncitizen is
“seeking admission” to the United States. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89
(2018). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to “applicant[s] for admission” who are “seeking
admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” The “provision
mandates detention and affords no bond hearing.” Pu Sacvin v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL
3187432, at *1 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). By contrast, § 1226(a) authorizes the arrest and
detention, “on a warrant,” of noncitizens “pending a decision on whether [they are] to be
removed.” Noncitizens “detained under this second detention regime are entitled to
individualized bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Id. at *1.
Consistent with the overwhelming majority of district courts to consider the issue and this
Court’s prior findings, the Court concludes that § 1226 governs here. See Barco Mercado v.
Francis, 2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.) (collecting 362 district-court opinions nationwide
and noting that challengers prevailed in at least 350 of them, in decisions by over 160 judges
across fifty courts); Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432 (Gonzales, J.); Danierov v. Noem, 2026 WL
45288 (D.N.M.) (Gonzales, J.). Section 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as a
noncitizen “who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” In contrast,
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s detention mandate applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission” (emphasis
added). Noncitizens “seeking admission” are those who have not “effected an entry” into the
United States. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Noncitizens “who entered the
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country years earlier” are not “seeking admission,” and therefore fall under § 1226 rather than
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Pu Sacvin, 2025 WL 3187432, at *3. The Court acknowledges the recent Fifth
Circuit decision holding that “[w]hile [noncitizens] remain applicants” for admission, “they
are...seeking admission.” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 323330, at *5
(5th Cir.). The Tenth Circuit has not yet addressed this question.
Under this framework, § 1226 governs Mr. Daboin Mendez’s detention. Mr. Daboin
Mendez entered the United States in 2022 and has lived here since. ICE arrested him four years
after his initial entry and did not apprehend him at or near the border. Id. Accordingly, § 1225’s
mandatory detention provision “does not apply” because Mr. Daboin Mendez “already effected
an entry” into the United States by living here for years. Nava Hernandez, 2025 WL 2996643, at
*5; see also Salazar, 2025 WL 2676729, at *4.
B. Mr. Daboin Mendez’s detention violates his right to due process.
Courts analyze due process claims in two steps: first, whether there exists “a protected
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause,” and second, whether the procedures used to
deprive that interest “accord with the Constitution.” Domingo v. Castro, 2025 WL 2941217, at
*3 (D.N.M.). To start, Mr. Daboin Mendez has a protected liberty interest. Once released from
immigration detention, noncitizens acquire “a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of
custody on bond.” Danierov, 2026 WL 45288, at *2. Over the past four years, Mr. Daboin
Mendez’s freedom has allowed “him to do a wide range of things,” including to live at home,
work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal
life.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
Mr. Daboin Mendez was also entitled to procedural safeguards before he was detained.
In determining what process is due, courts consider (1) “the private interest” affected; (2) “the
risk of erroneous deprivation” through the procedures used and the probable value of additional
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safeguards; and (3) “the Government’s interest,” including the fiscal and administrative burdens
of additional procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Here, Mr. Daboin
Mendez’s private interest in remaining free from detention is substantial. “Freedom from
imprisonment...lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
There is also a significant risk of erroneous deprivation. Although DHS may revoke
release “at any time,” courts require “a material change in circumstances as to whether the
noncitizen poses a danger to the community or an unreasonable risk of flight” before doing so.
Danierov, 2026 WL 45288, at *2. Mr. Daboin Mendez was detained after residing in the United
States for four years without a bond hearing. Doc. 2 at 3. No assessment was made as to
whether any material facts had changed, creating a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of
his liberty interest.
Finally, the Government’s interest in detaining Mr. Daboin Mendez without a bond
hearing is limited. Although the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring his appearance
at future immigration proceedings, the record demonstrates that detention has not been necessary
to serve that interest. Since 2022, Mr. Daboin Mendez has complied with the conditions of his
parole and pursued relief through an application for asylum. See Doc. 1 at 4–5. Moreover, the
administrative burden of providing a bond hearing is minimal. See Danierov, 2026 WL 45288,
at *2 (the “cost of providing a bond determination is not terribly burdensome”).
C. The remedy is a bond hearing where the Government bears the burden of proof.
The proper habeas remedy is a prompt bond hearing at which the Government must
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mr. Daboin Mendez is a flight risk or danger to the
community. Although “under normal circumstances, the burden” at a § 1226 hearing “is on the
noncitizen” to show that detention is unwarranted, Mr. Daboin Mendez’s “unlawful[] detention[]
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in violation of his constitutional rights” shifts that burden to the Government. Salazar, 2025 WL
2676729, at *6. This Court joins other district courts in concluding that a noncitizen’s “strong
private interest in being free from civil detention” outweighs the Government’s comparatively
minimal burden to justify custody. Id. (collecting cases).
IV. Conclusion
The Court therefore grants Mr. Daboin Mendez’s petition, Doc. 1. The Court orders that
the Government provide him with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) before an immigration judge
within seven days of this Order. At that hearing, the Government must justify Mr. Daboin
Mendez’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence. If the Government fails to do
so it must release him. The Court further orders the Government to file a status report within ten
days of this Order confirming that it has either provided Mr. Daboin Mendez with a bond hearing
or released him.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
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