Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
JOSE CABALLERO GUTIERREZ, RAMIRO LOPEZ
CEDILLO, and JOEL SIERRA DELCID
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 2:25-cv-001145-WJ-KRS
JOEL GARCIA, Field Office Director of
Enforcement and Removal Operations, El Paso
Field Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
TODD LYONS, Acting Director and Senior
Official Performing the Duties of the Director
of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
GEORGE DEDOS, Warden of Cibola County
Correctional Center; in their official capacities,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AS TO BOND HEARING
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Petitioners Ramiro Lopez Cedillo’s and Joel
Sierra Delcid’s (together, “Petitioners”)1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Petitioner Lopez Cedillo, a citizen of Mexico, and Sierra Delcid, a citizen of Honduras, have
resided in the United States without legal status since 2007 and 2010, respectively. 	Petitioners
were apprehended in Florida, transferred to federal immigration custody, and are presently
detained at Cibola County Correctional Center in New Mexico pending removal proceedings.
Petitioners request habeas relief in the form of release on their own recognizance or, in the
1Pursuant to Petitioners’ unopposed motion, Petitioner Jose Caballero Gutierrez has been dismissed from this action.
[See Docs. 20, 22].
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alternative, bond hearings before this Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
As set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioners with bond hearings before an immigration judge.
Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that a hearing before this Court would not
aid the resolution of the Petition. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion for a Hearing [Doc. 18] will
be DENIED. See D.N.M. LR-Civ. 7.6(a).
BACKGROUND
On or about July 15, 2025, Petitioner Lopez Cedillo was arrested by local law enforcement
in Florida for driving without a license. [Docs. 1 at 13 ¶ 51; 15 at 3]. A few days later, he was
remanded into ICE custody and charged with being a noncitizen2 present in the United States
without admission or parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and, who, at the time of application
for admission, lacked valid entry documentation under § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). [Doc. 15 at 3].
On or about August 6, 2025, Petitioner Sierra Delcid was detained by Florida Highway
Patrol during a traffic stop. [Docs. 1 at 15 ¶ 57; 15 at 4; 15-6 at 3]. Tampa Border Patrol agents
arrived at the scene and conducted a records check, which showed Petitioner Sierra Delcid lacked
legal authorization “to enter or remain in the United States legally.” [Doc. 15-6 at 3]. Petitioner
Sierra Delcid was arrested and transported to the Tampa Border Patrol station. [Id.] He was then
remanded to ICE custody and charged with being a noncitizen present in the United States without
admission or parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
Petitioner Sierra Delcid was denied bond by an immigration judge, who denied jurisdiction
“due to manner of entry” because Petitioner “entered the US in 2010 without inspection.” [Docs.
16 at 5–6; 16-8]. 	Two immigration judges have denied bond as to Petitioner Lopez Cedillo,
2 This Memorandum Opinion and Order “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’”
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3))
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likewise asserting lack of jurisdiction. [Docs. 16 at 4–5; 16-5; 16-11]. Each Petitioner has thus
been detained without an opportunity for meaningful bond consideration pursuant to the Executive
Branch’s recent interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which eliminates bond eligibility for noncitizens
who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their length of residence in the United States
at the time of their placement in immigration custody. See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec.
216 (BIA Sep. 5, 2025); ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for
Applicants 	for 	Admission (July 	8, 	2025), https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-
guidance-regarding-detention-authority-for-applications-for-admission (last visited, Feb. 3, 2026);
[Doc. 15 at 2].
DISCUSSION
For the reasons that follow, the Court determines that interpreting § 1225 to mandate the
detention of noncitizens like Petitioners is incorrect as a matter of law. Instead, noncitizens, like
Petitioners, who are apprehended within the interior of the United States after residing in the
country for some time, are properly classified under § 1226(a). 	Individuals detained under
§ 1226(a) are entitled to meaningful custody determination pursuant to the discretionary detention
framework set forth in the INA and its implementing regulations. Therefore, the Court holds that
Petitioners are entitled to bond hearings before a neutral immigration judge.
I. 	This Court Exercises Habeas Jurisdiction
The Court’s jurisdiction is uncontested by Respondents. Nonetheless, a district court has an
independent duty to assess its jurisdiction before turning to the merits of a § 2241 petition. See
Palma-Salaza v. Davis, 677 F.3d 1031, 1038 n.3 (10th Cir. 2012). District courts are authorized
to entertain petitions for habeas corpus “within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(a). Petitioners are detained within New Mexico and name Respondent Dedos, the
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warden of Cibola County Correctional Center, the facility in which they are detained. See
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004) (holding that, in Ex Parte Endo, 542 U.S. 426,
441 (2004), an immigration-related habeas case, the district court “acquired jurisdiction . . .
because Endo properly named her immediate custodian and filed in the district of
confinement.”). Because Petitioners are confined within this district and have named their
immediate custodian, this Court properly exercises habeas jurisdiction.
Additionally, § 2241 empowers district courts to entertain habeas petitions challenging the
lawfulness of detention under the federal immigration laws and the United States Constitution. 8
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004). Petitioners challenge the legality
of their continued detention without bond under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the
Fifth Amendment. [Doc. 1 at 16–18]. Therefore, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 2241.
II. 	Governing Detention Authority
Broadly speaking, federal immigration law vests the Attorney General with two primary
sources of authority to detain noncitizens pending a decision on removability: 8 U.S.C. § 1225
and § 1226. The distinction between these provisions matters here because each establishes
materially different detention regimes and affords materially different procedural protections.
Section 1226 governs the detention of noncitizens who are already present in the United
States and are placed in removal proceedings. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303
(2018) (“[Section] 1226 applies to [noncitizens] already present in the United States” and
“creates a default rule for those aliens.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). With the exception of certain
narrowly defined provisions requiring detention of individuals with specified criminal history,
§ 1226 permits the Attorney General to detain noncitizens pending a decision on removability or
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to release them on bond or conditional parole. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(A)–(B); § 1226(c)(1)–
(4); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (“1226(a) . . . permit[s] . . . but [does] not requir[e] . . . the
Attorney General to issue warrants for [the] arrest and detention [of]” noncitizens already present
in the United States; “Section 1226(a) also permits the Attorney General to release those
[noncitizens] on bond[.]”).
Section 1225, by contrast, governs the inspection and detention of certain “arriving aliens”
and other noncitizens seeking admission to the United States. See, e.g., §§ 1225(b)(1), (b)(2)(A).
Under § 1225(b), detention is generally mandatory and does not permit release on bond or
parole, subject to limited statutory exceptions. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), (b)(2)(A).
Because the availability of release on bond turns entirely on which statutory provision
governs detention, the threshold question in this case is whether Petitioners are detained pursuant
to § 1225(b) or § 1226(a).
A. Petitioners Are Detained Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
Respondents assert that Petitioners’ detention is required by § 1225(b)(2)(A) and that they are
therefore ineligible for bond hearings. [Doc. 15 at 9–13]. Petitioners maintain that their
detention is instead properly classified under § 1226(a), and, accordingly, they are entitled to
bond hearings. [Doc. 16 at 7–10]. In line with other courts in this District and the
overwhelming majority of courts across jurisdictions, the Court agrees with Petitioners. See
Melchor-Rios v. Ortiz, No. 2:25-cv-01055, 2025 WL 3764775, at *2 (D.N.M. Dec. 30, 2025).
When read within the context of the statutory and regulatory scheme governing immigration
detention, it is clear that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies in circumstances not present here — namely, to
the inspection and detention of individuals seeking admission at or near the border. See Tanchez
v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-1150, 2026 WL 125184, at *7 (D. Utah Jan. 16, 2026) (Ҥ 1225 applies to
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noncitizens at or near the border who are entering or who have recently entered[.]”). Within that
context, properly understood, Petitioners — who have lived in the United States for 15 and 18
years — and were apprehended in the interior of the United States, are not subject to detention
under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court examines first the plain text of the relevant statutory text. Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to “inspection of other aliens,” § 1225(b)(2)(A), and provides, in full:
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of a[] [noncitizen]
who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration
officer determines that a[] [noncitizen] seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the [noncitizen]
shall be detained for a proceeding under Section 1229a of this title.
The threshold question, then, is the scope of the detention authority Congress conferred by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).
Respondents assert that the clear statutory language mandates detention of any noncitizen
present in the United States, “regardless of the duration of the [noncitizen]’s presence in the
United States or the alien’s distance from the border.” [Doc. 15 at 10]. Relying on § 1225(a)’s
definition of “applicant for admission,” which comprehends a noncitizen who either “arrives in
the United States” or who is “present in the United States who has not been admitted,”
Respondents argue that any citizen who is present in the United States without lawful status,
qualifies as an “applicant for admission.” [Id. at 9–10].
This argument finds some support in the text of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) defines
“admitted” as “the lawful entry of the [noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.” On Respondents’ view, a noncitizen present in the
United States who, at one time, entered the United States without inspection and authorization
could qualify as an “applicant for admission.” However, even granting, ad arguendo, that the
statutory definition of applicant for admission encompasses noncitizens present in the United
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States who entered without inspection or authorization, section 1225(b)(2)(A), by its terms,
authorizes an immigration officer to detain a noncitizen who is not admitted, only if that
noncitizen is “seeking admission.”
Respondents understand “applying” to necessarily imply seeking, such that an applicant for
admission is also one seeking to be admitted. [Doc. 15 at 10 n.5]. By that token, Respondents
assert that § 1225(b)(2)(A) authorizes — indeed, requires — the detention of noncitizens present
in the United States who have not been lawfully admitted. In support, Respondents argue that, in
common linguistic usage, to “apply” necessarily means “to seek.” [See id.]. Respondents are
correct that, in one context, the word, “apply,” is used to mean seek, as in, to seek a certain
benefit, such as employment or admission. See American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 87 (4th ed. 2006) (among other definitions, “apply” may mean “[t]o request or seek
assistance, employment, or admission”).
But the statute does not turn on ordinary usage alone. Rather, it turns on how Congress used
the phrase “seeking admission” within the INA’s detention framework. Viewed through that
lens, Respondents’ interpretation would stretch the text of § 1225 beyond its plain language and
collapse the distinction Congress established between discretionary detention under § 1226 and
mandatory detention under § 1225.
Returning to the text of § 1225(b)(2)(A), the provision attaches only if the noncitizen subject
to inspection qualifies both as an applicant for admission and as seeking admission. If Congress
intended “seeking admission” to bear an identical meaning to “applicant for admission” it need
not have included both phrases. Generally, when subject to competing interpretations, statutory
language is not interpreted to include redundancies. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561,
574 (1995). This longstanding canon of statutory interpretation counsels against interpreting
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“applicant for admission” as coterminous with “seeking admission” within the meaning of the
mandatory detention framework set forth in § 1225.
Moreover, the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), recently amended section
1226’s mandatory detention provision, § 1226(c), to require detention of individuals who are
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as being present without admission or parole,
and are charged with, arrested for, convicted of, or have admitted to committing certain crimes.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Interpreting § 1225(b)(2)(A) to require detention of
“all noncitizens who have not been admitted,” regardless of criminal status, would render this
amendment meaningless. Elias v. Knight, No. 1:25-cv-00594, 2025 WL 3228262, at *6 (D.
Idaho Nov. 19, 2025).
Further, the statue’s use of the active, present-tense verb forms “seeking” and “examining”
reflects Congress’s focus on detention during the pendency of the inspection process rather than
on continued detention after that process has concluded. Cortez-Gonzalez v. Noem, ---F. Supp.---
-, 2025 WL 3485771, at *4 (D.N.M. Dec. 4, 2025) (“The active construction of ‘the phrase
“seeking admission” necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.’”) (quoting Martinez
v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. 2025))). The phrase describes a current legal
posture — participation in inspection and admissibility determinations — rather than a
generalized or enduring objective to enter the United States. See Tanchez, 2026 WL 125184, at
*8 (“These active verbs suggest a moment in time when a noncitizen is crossing or has recently
crossed a border, not an indefinite status that applies whenever a noncitizen charged with
inadmissibility encounters an immigration official.”).
The surrounding provisions of § 1225 reinforce this reading. Section 1225(b)(2) appears
within a statutory section governing the inspection of noncitizens at or near the border, and its
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neighboring provisions repeatedly reference noncitizens who are arriving in the United States or
undergoing initial admissibility determinations. See, e.g., § 1225(b)(1) (entitled “Inspection of
[noncitizens] arriving in the United States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted
or paroled”) (emphasis added); § 1225(b)(2)(c) (providing a procedure for noncitizens “arriving
on land . . . from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States.”); § 1225(b)(2)(B)
(providing an exception for noncitizens who are members of a ship crew or “stowaway[s]”). An
understanding that § 1225 is limited spatially and temporally to noncitizens arriving or recently
arrived at the border is also reflected in the section’s title, “Inspection by immigration officers;
expedited removal by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens;
referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (title); Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-2720,
2025 WL 2962908, at *6 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2025) (finding that section 1225’s title indicates
congressional intent for the section to “apply to inspections that occur at the ports of entry or
near the border”); see also Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120–21 (2023) (a statute’s title
and a section’s heading are viable tools of statutory construction). Read as a whole, § 1225 is
cabined both spatially and temporally to the inspection process.
Section 1225 thus applies to noncitizens who are placed in the statutory process for
admission, including inspection and admissibility determinations at the border or port of entry.
By contrast, § 1226 governs detention once a noncitizen has been placed in removal proceedings,
regardless of whether the noncitizen may still be understood, in statutory terms, to be an
applicant for admission. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Petitioners have resided in the
United States for a substantial period of time prior to their apprehension and placement in
removal proceedings. They are not individuals apprehended at or near the border, nor are they
properly characterized as arriving aliens within the meaning of § 1225(b). Thus, they cannot be
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said to be “seeking admission” to the United States so as to justify their detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).
Courts across jurisdictions have consistently rejected the proposition that current residents of
the United States may be retroactively reclassified as arriving aliens for purposes of mandatory
detention under § 1225(b). See, e.g., Castañon-Nava v. DHS, 161 F.4th 1048, 1061–62 (7th Cir.
2025); Requejo Roman v. Castro, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 125681, at *5 (D.N.M. Jan. 12,
2026); Tanchez, 2026 WL 125184, at *5–16; Luna v. Warden, No. 25-cv-565, 2025 WL 3787494,
at *8–11 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2025); Falcon v. Florentino, No. 25-17164, 2025 WL 3677578, at
*2–3 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2025); Chavez v. Director of Detroit Field Office, No. 4:25-cv-02061,�
2025 WL 2959617, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025
WL 3187080 (Nov. 14, 2025). The decisions of a limited minority of courts that have endorsed
Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225, [see Doc. 15 at 12], does not change the Court’s
conclusion, which rests on the plain language of the relevant statutory text as properly
understood within the mandatory and discretionary detention framework codified in the INA and
implementing regulations.
Apart from § 1225(b)(2), Respondents identify no statutory authority that would require
Petitioners’ continued detention without the possibility of bond. Respondents do not
persuasively argue that § 1225 is intended to apply retroactively to any noncitizen who entered
the United States without admission or inspection irrespective of when entry was made.
Therefore, the Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs Petitioners’ detention.
III. 	The Appropriate Habeas Relief is a Bond Hearing Before an Immigration Judge
Having established that Petitioners are detained pursuant to § 1226(a), the question becomes
what process is due. That question is answered by the statutory and regulatory framework
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governing discretionary detention under § 1226(a), which provides for an individualized bond
hearing before an immigration judge. See Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. 1:25-cv-835, 2025
WL 2676729, at *5 (D.N.M. Sep. 17, 2025) (“Because . . . § 1226 governs Petitioner's detention,
the due process owed to Petitioner is that provided for in § 1226—namely, an individualized
bond hearing before an IJ.”).
Section 1226(a) authorizes detention pending removal proceedings but expressly permits
release on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Attorney General has
implemented this discretionary detention authority through binding regulations that provide for
custody determinations by immigration judges. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d); 1236.1(d); 1003.19.
Under those regulations, a noncitizen detained pursuant to § 1226(a) is entitled to an
individualized custody determination before a neutral immigration judge. This regulatory
scheme reflects the Executive’s judgment as to how discretionary detention authority should be
exercised and reviewed. Where detention is authorized only through such a discretionary
scheme, continued detention without affording the custody determination required by regulation
exceeds the authority conferred by statute.
This conclusion is bolstered by DHS’s decades-long practice of administering discretionary
detention under § 1226(a) on the understanding that noncitizens are entitled to an individualized
custody determination before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d), 1236.1(d);
1003.19. 	See Tanchez, 2026 WL 125184, at *12 (discussing “DHS’s longstanding practice” of
administering bond hearings for noncitizens present in the United States who have not been
admitted and finding that record “more persuasive” than the agency’s recent interim guidance).
That approach, adhered to until recently, is reflected in an interim rule issued shortly after the
passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996) by the
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agencies then charged with enforcing federal immigration law, in which the agencies explained
that:
Despite being applicants for admission, aliens who are present
without having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as
aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and
bond 	redetermination . . . . The 	effect 	of 	this 	change 	is 	that
inadmissible aliens, except for arriving aliens, have available to
them bond redetermination hearings before an immigration judge,
while arriving aliens do not.
62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997). 	Consistent with that guidance, immigration judges
have routinely conducted bond hearings for individuals like Petitioners as a matter of agency
practice, and the Government has defended detention decisions in federal court on that same
premise.
Petitioners were erroneously classified as subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)
and, as a result, were denied the custody determinations contemplated by § 1226(a) and its
implementing regulations. That misclassification has resulted in Petitioners’ continued detention
without the process prescribed by law. This violation violates Petitioners’ rights under the INA
and warrants habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
As discussed above, the governing discretionary detention framework requires an
individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. Petitioners further argue that
additional process is warranted, urging that this Court should conduct the bond hearing itself and
that, at any such hearing, the Government should bear the burden of proof to justify continued
detention. [Docs. 1 at 18; 16 at 11–12]. Petitioners’ argument regarding burden-shifting was
raised for the first time in reply and is therefore likely forfeited. SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc.,
578 F.3d 1201, 1226 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting the general rule in the Tenth Circuit that a party
waives “issues and arguments raised [in a reply brief] for the first time”).
Even assuming Petitioners had preserved an argument for additional constitutional process,
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the Tenth Circuit has not addressed what standard governs whether the Constitution mandates
additional process beyond that provided by statute in the immigration detention context. Some
courts, in analogous circumstances, have applied the balancing test articulated in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 429 U.S. 319, 341–47 (1976). See, e.g., L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1181
(D. Colo. 2024). The Court need not resolve that question here. Having concluded that
Petitioners are detained pursuant to § 1226(a) and were erroneously denied the individualized
custody determinations required by statute and regulation, the relief ordered below fully
remedies the statutory violation.3 Accordingly, the appropriate habeas relief is an order requiring
Respondents to provide Petitioners with prompt individualized bond hearings before an
immigration judge.4
In support of their argument that any bond hearing should be held before this Court,
Petitioners cite the immigration court decisions denying bond as to Petitioners and a finding by
the United States District Court for the Central District of California that certain immigration
courts in its jurisdiction had disregarded court-ordered class-wide habeas relief directing bond
hearings. See [Doc. 16 at 11 (citing Ex. 3 at 8-9 (Civil Minutes, Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz Jr., No. 5:25-cv-01873 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025))); Ex. 5 (Doc. 16–5); Ex. 8 (Doc.
16-8)]. 	Petitioners also note that at least one other district court has ordered a bond hearing in
the district court under analogous circumstances. Order, Jimenez v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 25-
cv-326 (D.N.H. Sep. 8, 2025). Here, however, the Court concludes that the process
3 Section 1226(a) is silent as to who bears the burden of proof at a bond hearing. See Basri v. Barr, 469 F. Supp. 3d
1063, 1073 (D. Colo. 2020) (holding that Section 1226(a) does not require that the government bear the burden of
proof to justify continued detention) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306). In the pre-removal detention context, federal
regulation and BIA precedent suggest the burden is ordinarily on the noncitizen to justify release. 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.1(c)(8); In re Adeniji, 22 I&N Dec. 1102, 1116 (BIA 1999). In the absence of a statutory mandate or binding
precedent requiring burden shifting, the Court declines to specify or alter the burden of proof at this stage.
4 Because the Court grants relief that fully remedies the statutory violation identified and resolves Petitioners’ detention
claim, the Court declines to issue additional declaratory relief.
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ordered — including a status report certifying compliance — is appropriate in light of the
statutory violation that has occurred. Absent evidence demonstrating a likelihood of
noncompliance with this Court’s order, the Court does not find it necessary to hold a hearing
itself in the first instance.
IV. 	The Court Preserves Jurisdiction Until a Custody Determination Has Occurred
Petitioners request the additional relief of an order preventing their removal from New
Mexico or the United States while this proceeding is pending. Respondents do not oppose the
grant of this relief in their response to the Petition. Federal courts possess inherent authority and
authority under the All Writs Act, to issue orders where necessary or appropriate to protect their
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991)
(recognizing the “control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630–631 (1962)). Because removal could moot the Petition and transfer could
frustrate the Court’s ability to effectuate habeas relief, limited ancillary relief is warranted. The
Court therefore grants an order in aid of jurisdiction to the extent necessary to ensure that its
habeas relief is not rendered ineffectual.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that:
• 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is GRANTED to the extent set forth
in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
• 	Respondents SHALL, within ten (10) days, provide Petitioners Sierra Delcid and
Lopez Cedillo with individual bond hearings before an immigration judge under the
appropriate statutory and regulatory framework. Pursuant to this Memorandum
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Opinion and Order, bond shall not be denied on the ground that Petitioners are
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
• 	Within three (3) days of any bond hearing, Respondents SHALL certify compliance
with this Order by filing a status report with the Court, including if and when the
bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the
reasons for the denial.
• 	Respondents shall NOT remove Petitioner Sierra Delcid or Petitioner Lopez Cedillo
from the United States or transfer them outside the District of New Mexico until the
ordered custody determination has occurred.
• 	The Motion for a Hearing on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 18] is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/______________________________________
WILLIAM P. JOHNSON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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