Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
PAUL M. R.,1
Plaintiff,
v. 	1:25-cv-01071-JMR
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant’s Opposed Motion for Remand to
Agency Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), filed on January 6, 2026. Doc. 9. In
response, Plaintiff agrees the case should be remanded, but he argues that it should be remanded
for an immediate award of benefits rather than for a rehearing. Doc. 11. In reply, Defendant
urges the Court to remand for a fourth hearing rather than ordering an immediate award of
benefits. Doc. 12. Plaintiff filed a surreply. Doc. 15. The parties consented to my entering final
judgment in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and FED. R. C IV. P. 73(b). Docs. 4, 7, 10.
Having meticulously reviewed the record and being fully advised in the premises, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s request to remand but DENIES Defendant’s request to remand for further
administrative proceedings. Instead, the Court remands for an immediate award of benefits.
1 Due to sensitive personal and medical information contained in this opinion, the Court uses
only the Plaintiff’s first name and middle and last initials. In so doing, the Court balances the
Plaintiff’s privacy interest in his personal medical information, United States v. Dillard, 795 F.3d
1191, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 2015), and the public’s interest in accessing the opinion, FED. R. C IV.
P. 5.2(c)(2)(B).
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I. 	Applicable Law and Sequential Evaluation Process
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is unable “to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A);
20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).
When considering a disability application, the Commissioner is required to use a five-
step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140
(1987). At the first four steps of the evaluation process, the claimant must show: (1) the
claimant is not engaged in “substantial gainful activity”; (2) the claimant has a “severe medically
determinable . . . impairment . . . or a combination of impairments” that has lasted or is expected
to last for at least one year; and (3) the impairment(s) either meet or equal one of the Listings2 of
presumptively disabling impairments; or (4) the claimant is unable to perform his or her “past
relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i–iv), 416; Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257,
1260–61 (10th Cir. 2005). If the claimant cannot show that his or her impairment meets or
equals a Listing but proves that he or she is unable to perform his or her “past relevant work,” the
burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner, at step five, to show that the claimant is able to
perform other work in the national economy, considering the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work experience. Id.
II. 	Background and Procedural History
This is Plaintiff’s third appeal to the United States District Court regarding his
application for benefits.
2 Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.
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A. Plaintiff’s First Appeal
Nearly seven years ago, on June 12, 2019, Plaintiff filed an application for Social
Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”). AR 169–77.3 In his initial application, Plaintiff alleged
disability since January 13, 2018, due to post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), depression,
nerve damage in his arms, and problems with both shoulders, both hands, his left ankle, and his
left knee. AR 171, 220, 1031. Plaintiff’s application was denied at the initial level on October
22, 2019 (AR 109–12) and at the reconsideration level on January 13, 2020 (AR 114–17).
Plaintiff requested a hearing (AR 123–24), which ALJ Stephen Gontis held on September
11, 2020 (AR 32–71). On October 19, 2020, ALJ Gontis issued his decision, finding Plaintiff
not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation process. AR 12–26. Following the Appeals
Council’s denial of his request for review (AR 1–6), Plaintiff filed his first appeal to this Court
on March 22, 2021 (AR 1198–99). In his first appeal, Plaintiff raised several claims of error
related to his RFC—asserting that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately consider medical
opinions and evidence in formulating his mental RFC. Romero v. Saul, 21cv249 KK, Doc. 18 at
9–25. On May 17, 2022, this Court found that the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s mental RFC
by failing to
(1) provide a legally adequate explanation for rejecting Dr. Krueger’s medical
opinion that Mr. Romero has a marked limitation in interacting with others; (2)
account for Mr. Romero’s moderate limitations in concentrating, persisting,
and maintaining pace in his assigned RFC or otherwise explain why he is not
so limited; and, (3) properly account for the moderate limitations to which the
state agency psychologists opined.
3 Documents 5-1 through 5-20 comprise the sealed Administrative Record (“AR”). When citing
to the record, the Court cites to the AR’s internal pagination in the lower right-hand corner of
each page, rather than to the CM/ECF document number and page.
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AR 1217. The Court remanded the case to allow the Commissioner an opportunity to correct
these RFC errors. AR 1217–18.
B. Plaintiff’s Second Appeal
On July 5, 2022, more than three years after Plaintiff applied for benefits, the Appeals
Council remanded the case to an ALJ. AR 1220–21. The Appeals Council noted that Plaintiff
had filed a subsequent claim for SSDI on July 6, 2021, and consolidated the claims files. AR
1222. On February 3, 2023, ALJ Michael Leppala held a second hearing. AR 2945–75. On
March 10, 2023, ALJ Leppala issued his decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled at step five of
the sequential evaluation process. AR 2906–24. Plaintiff filed his second appeal to this Court on
May 11, 2023. Romero v. O’Malley, 23cv410 GBW, Doc. 1.
In his second appeal, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ committed legal error in assessing his
RFC by failing to comply with this Court’s mandate in assessing mental limitations assessed by
two separate doctors. Id., Doc. 17 at 3, 14–23. On January 4, 2024, the SSA filed an Unopposed
Motion for Remand to Agency Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which the Court
granted. Id., Docs. 22–23.
C. Plaintiff’s Third Appeal
On February 27, 2024, almost five years after Plaintiff initially applied for benefits, the
Appeals Council once again remanded the case to an ALJ. AR 2939–42. The Appeals Council
noted that the ALJ had failed to adequately evaluate “opinion evidence and prior administrative
findings in assessing the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” AR 2941. On remand, the
Appeals Council ordered the ALJ to do the following: (1) “[g]ive further consideration to the
medical source opinion(s) and prior administrative medical findings” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c; (2) further consider claimant’s maximum RFC and to “provide appropriate rationale
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with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations;” and (3)
obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert if needed. AR 2942.
On June 13, 2025, ALJ Michael Leppala held the third ALJ hearing in this case. AR
2866–94. ALJ Leppala issued his unfavorable decision on July 9, 2025. AR 2829–54. The ALJ
noted that Plaintiff was insured through December 31, 2023. AR 2834. At step one, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 13, 2018, his
alleged onset date. Id. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease of the
shoulders, finger contracture, and PTSD. AR 2835. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s prostate cancer,
obesity, and angina to be non-severe. Id.
At step three, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in
combination, met or medically equaled a Listing. AR 2836–40. Because the ALJ found that
none of the impairments met a Listing, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC. AR 2840–53. The
ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC to
perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except Claimant is
capable of occasionally lifting and/or carrying 50 pounds, frequently lifting and/or
carrying 25 pounds, standing and/or walking for about six hours in an eight[-]hour
workday, all with normal breaks. 	This hypothetical individual can occasionally
reach overhead bilaterally and can frequently reach in all other directions
bilaterally. He can frequently handle and finger bilaterally. 	The Claimant can
frequently climb ramps or stairs and occasionally climb ladders ropes or scaffolds,
frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The Claimant can understand, carry out,
and remember simple instructions and make commensurate work-related decisions,
respond appropriately [to] supervision, coworkers, and work situations, deal with
occasional changes in work setting, and maintain concentration, persistence, and
pace for up to and including two hours at a time with normal breaks throughout
normal workday. 	He is limited to occasional interaction with coworkers,
supervisors, and the general public.
AR 2840.
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At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have any past relevant work.4 AR 2853.
The ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled at step five because he could perform jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy—such as floor waxer, warehouse worker, and
automobile detailer. AR 2853–54.
Plaintiff timely filed his appeal to this Court on October 28, 2025. Doc. 1.5 On January
6, 2026, before Plaintiff filed his opening motion, Defendant filed an Opposed Motion for
Remand to Agency Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Doc. 9. Defendant states
that he “has reviewed the case and determined that a remand for further administrative
proceedings is warranted.” Id. at 1. Defendant’s motion provides no explanation of why remand
for rehearing is warranted, or what errors he plans to remedy through further administrative
proceedings.6 Id. Plaintiff counters that this case should be remanded for an immediate award
of benefits. Doc. 11.
III. 	Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff agrees with Defendant that remand is appropriate but urges the Court to remand
for an immediate award of benefits, rather than for a rehearing. Doc. 11 at 1. Plaintiff urges the
4 Prior to his alleged onset date, Plaintiff served in the National Guard for 36 years and worked,
in a civilian capacity, as a welder. AR 40–41. However, this work does not qualify as past
relevant work because it was not done within the past five years. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1565(a)
(effective June 21, 2024).
5 A claimant has sixty days to file an appeal. The sixty days begins running five days after the
decision is mailed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; see also AR 2830.
6 Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s failure to “provide any argumentation to explain his
position” amounts to a concession that an immediate award of benefits is appropriate. Doc. 11 at
1. The Court acknowledges that raising an argument without support or argumentation is not
ideal, but declines to find that the Commissioner has waived his right to contest an immediate
award of benefits.
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Court to remand for an immediate award of benefits due to the protracted nature of the case and
because further fact-finding is unlikely to be useful. Id. at 13–16.
Plaintiff asserts that the third ALJ adjudication—like the first two ALJ adjudications—
failed to properly assess his RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ made several errors
in assessing his physical RFC. Doc. 11 at 8–13. 	First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to
adequately discuss his subjective symptom allegations. Id. at 9. Second, Plaintiff asserts that the
ALJ cherry picked and mischaracterized Plaintiff’s treatment records in order to reject Plaintiff’s
shoulder limitations. Id. at 9–12. Third, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected
medical source opinions that supported greater physical and reaching RFC limitations.7 Id. at 8–
13. The Commissioner does not contest these RFC errors. See Doc. 12 at 6 (asserting that
“whether the ALJ erred is a moot point [because] the Commissioner has stated that the case
should be remanded”).
The Commissioner admits that the Court has discretion to order an immediate award of
benefits, but urges the Court not to do so here. Doc. 12. The Court agrees with Plaintiff and will
remand for an immediate award of benefits.
IV. 	Analysis
This Court has discretion “to remand either for further administrative proceedings or for
an immediate award of benefits.” Ragland v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993)
(citations omitted). Among the relevant factors the court may consider in making this decision
7 These medical source opinions include the following: (1) Dr. Mark Evanko, who opined that
Plaintiff was limited to “[n]o physical tasks involving overhead lifting or the lifting of objects
over 10 pounds” (AR 2637); (2) Dr. George E. Higgins, who confirmed Plaintiff had “bilateral
chronic shoulder pain diagnosed as rotator cuff tendonitis” and limited Plaintiff to “[n]o physical
tasks involving overhead lifting” (AR 539, 548); and (3) Dr. Em Ward, who opined that Plaintiff
was “severely limited” in his ability to do overhead work, and limited in his abilities to
frequently squat, rise, and sit (AR 2710).
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are (1) “the length of time the matter has been pending” and (2) “whether or not given the
available evidence, remand for additional fact-finding would serve any useful purpose but would
merely delay the receipt of benefits.” Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 626 (10th Cir. 2006)
(cleaned up).
In assessing the second factor, the Court may consider whether the record conclusively
supports a finding of disability, but the Court is not required to find that it does before remanding
for an immediate award of benefits. See, e.g., Ragland,8 992 F.2d at 1060 (finding the record
inadequate to “satisfy the [Commissioner’s] step five burden” and remanding for an immediate
award of benefits without assessing whether further fact-finding applying the right standards
might result in denial of benefits); Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1122 (10th Cir. 1993)
(directing immediate award of benefits despite need for additional fact-finding because of
agency’s failure to follow regulations, claimant’s advanced age, and length of time case
pending); Huffman v. Astrue, 290 F. App’x 87, 89–90 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (remanding
for an immediate award of benefits where the ALJ’s decision was too vague to review).
The Court does not “take its discretion [to remand for an immediate award of benefits]
lightly and is generally opposed to reaching beyond its ordinary role in these cases.” Romero v.
Kijakazi, No. 22-cv1237-MDB, 2023 WL 4545158, at *5 (D. Colo. July 7, 2023). However, the
Commissioner “is not entitled to adjudicate a case ad infinitum until [he] correctly applies the
proper legal standard and gathers evidence to support [his] conclusion.” Sisco v. U.S. Dep’t of
8 The Commissioner attempts to cabin the import of Ragland by arguing that it “does not reflect
the current state of the law.” Doc. 12 at 2 n.1. The Commissioner asserts that Ragland may
have relied on a different burden of proof at step five in deciding to remand. Id. The Court need
not reach this argument because the Court does not cite Ragland based on step five errors in
particular. Instead, the Court cites Ragland for the broader proposition that a remand for an
immediate award of benefits is appropriate when the Commissioner creates long delays through
erroneous disposition(s) of the case.
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Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739, 746 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotation omitted); see
also Railey v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 383 (10th Cir. 1998), 1998 WL 30236 (unpublished table decision)
(remanding for an immediate award of benefits in part because of “the Commissioner’s inability
to produce an affirmable decision after four administrative hearings”).
A. 	The Commissioner’s view of the scope of the Court’s discretion is overly
narrow.
The Commissioner paints a narrow picture of the scope of the Court’s discretion to
remand for an immediate award of benefits. The Commissioner argues that an immediate award
of benefits is appropriate only if a “finding of disabled [would have been] inevitable” had “the
ALJ not made the [claimed] errors.” Doc. 12 at 6. However, Tenth Circuit case law does not
support such a narrow reading. The cases the Commissioner cites do not persuade the Court
otherwise.
First, the Commissioner cites Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 978 (10th Cir. 1996) for the
proposition that the Court must remand where there is conflicting evidence because courts
“cannot re-weigh the evidence in Social Security cases.” Doc. 12 at 3. Miller, however, is not
so proscriptive. While the Miller court exercised its discretion to remand for further fact-finding,
the court also warned the Commissioner as follows:
After four administrative hearings, two of which were held pursuant to explicit
instructions by the district court to address the [closed period of time], we would
caution the agency that “the [Commissioner] is not entitled to adjudicate a case ad
infinitum until [he] correctly applies the proper legal standard and gathers evidence
to support [his] conclusion.”
Miller, 99 F.3d at 978 (citing Sisco, 10 F.3d at 746). Thus, while Miller shows that a court may
remand for further fact-finding when the record contains conflicting evidence, Miller does not
proscribe this as the only option.
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Second, the Commissioner cites Lopez v. Colvin, 642 F. App’x 826, 832 (10th Cir. 2026)
(unpublished) for the proposition that the Court must remand where there is conflicting evidence.
Doc. 12 at 3, 6. In Lopez, despite the case pending for over seven years, the circuit court
exercised its discretion to remand to allow the Commissioner to properly address the medical
opinions. Lopez, 642 F. App’x at 832. Again, Lopez shows only that a court may remand for
further fact-finding, but it does not proscribe this as the only option.
Like other judges in this district, I find the Court has discretion to remand either for
further fact-finding or for an immediate award of benefits without first finding that the record
conclusively supports a finding of disability. See, e.g., Mendoza-Martinez v. Kijakazi, No.
20cv310 SMV, 2021 WL 5207074, at *9 (D.N.M. Nov. 9, 2021) (Vidmar, J.) (immediate award
of benefits not contingent on “the record fully support[ing] that the Plaintiff is disabled as a
matter of law”); Samadi v. Kijakazi, No. 21cv314 JFR, 2022 WL 2286834, at *5 (D.N.M. June
24, 2022) (Robbenhaar, J.) (same); Maldonado v. Kijakazi, No. 22cv554 DLM, 2023 WL
4235637, at *4 (D.N.M. June 28, 2023) (Martinez, J.) (“[T]he Commissioner offers no authority
to suggest that an immediate award of benefits is precluded by a record that does not wholly
support a favorable disability determination.”).
B. 	The factors in this case support an immediate award of benefits.
The factors in this case support an immediate award of benefits. See Salazar, 468 F.3d at
626 (appropriate factors to consider include (1) “the length of time the matter has been pending”
and (2) “whether or not given the available evidence, remand for additional fact-finding would
serve any useful purpose but would merely delay the receipt of benefits.”).
First, the “length of time this matter has been pending”—nearly seven years—supports an
immediate award of benefits. The Tenth Circuit has granted immediate awards of benefits as the
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result of delays of four to eight years. Groberg v. Astrue, 415 F. App’x 65, 73 (10th Cir. 2011)
(unpublished) (awarding benefits after five-year delay); Huffman, 290 F. App’x at 89–90
(awarding benefits after six-year delay); Salazar, 468 F.3d at 626 (awarding benefits after five-
year delay); Bowman v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1351, 2000 WL 1034628, at *1 (10th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished) (awarding benefits after seven-year delay); Havice v. Chater, 105 F.3d 669, 1997
WL 8852, *7 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (awarding benefits after eight-year
delay); Sisco, 10 F.3d at 741, 746 (awarding benefits after seven-year delay); Long v. Shalala, 9
F.3d 117, 1993 WL 425430, at *3 (10th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision) (awarding
benefits after four-year delay); Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1122 (awarding benefits after four-year
delay). Judges in this district have also remanded for an immediate award of benefits in cases
pending for similar lengths of time. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Kijakazi, No. CV 22-120 KWR-JFR,
2023 WL 2135564, at *12 (D.N.M. Feb. 21, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023
WL 2413778 (D.N.M. Mar. 8, 2023) (remanding for an immediate award of benefits where case
had been pending for six years); Maldonado, 2023 WL 4235637, at *3–4 (seven years); Padilla
v. O’Malley, No. 1:23-CV-0394-DLM, 2024 WL 2896074, at *3 (D.N.M. June 10, 2024) (eight
years). Like these courts, I find the length of time this case has been pending weighs in favor of
remanding for an immediate award of benefits.
Second, the procedural history of this case cuts against finding that remanding for
additional fact-finding would serve any useful purpose. Despite repeated opportunities to
produce a RFC free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner
has failed to do so. In Plaintiff’s first appeal, the Court found that the ALJ erred by failing to
properly consider medical opinions and evidence in promulgating Plaintiff’s mental RFC and
remanded on this basis. AR 1204–17. A second ALJ held a hearing and issued a second
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unfavorable decision. AR 2945–75, 2906–24. In his second appeal to this Court, Plaintiff once
again argued that legal errors plagued the RFC. See Romero v. O’Malley, 23cv410 GBW, Doc.
17 at 7–23. The SSA filed an Unopposed Motion for Remand Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), (id., Doc. 22) and, on remand, the Appeals Council noted that the ALJ had once
again failed to adequately evaluate “opinion evidence and prior administrative findings in
assessing the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” AR 2941. The Appeals Council generally
admonished the ALJ to further consider claimant’s maximum RFC and to “provide appropriate
rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations.”
AR 2942. A third ALJ hearing was held, resulting in the unfavorable decision now on appeal.
AR 2829–54, 2866–94. On his third appeal to this Court, Plaintiff once again argues that the
ALJ failed to properly consider medical opinions and evidence in promulgating his RFC. Doc.
11 at 8–13. In response, the Commissioner essentially concedes the error, choosing only to
argue about the proper remedy.9 See Doc. 12. The SSA has had three separate chances to
produce a RFC that is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence, but has failed
to do so. These repeated reversals of the ALJ’s decision for legal errors in assessing the RFC
weigh in favor of an immediate award of benefits. The Commissioner “is not entitled to
adjudicate a case ad infinitum until [he] correctly applies the proper legal standard and gathers
evidence to support [his] conclusion.” Sisco, 10 F.3d at 746; see also Serafin v. Berryhill, No.
18cv1053 SMV, 2019 WL 3843051, at *6 (D.N.M. Aug. 15, 2019) (“The Court declines to
remand a third time to give [the Commissioner] another mulligan to meet his burden.”).
9 The Commissioner does not argue that the ALJ did not err in this case, instead arguing that
“whether the ALJ erred is a moot point.” Doc. 12 at 6. The Court does not agree that the ALJ’s
error is a “moot point” because it does not agree with the Commissioner’s position that an
immediate award of benefits is only available if a “finding of disabled would have been
inevitable.” Id.
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Like other courts, I find that remanding for additional fact-finding would not be useful
because the Commissioner has repeatedly failed to conduct and/or articulate the correct analysis
of the evidence already in the record despite clear instructions to do so by the Court and the
Appeals Council. See Huffman, 290 F. App’x at 90 (unpublished) (remanding for an immediate
award of benefits where the ALJ’s decision was too vague for meaningful review, the case had
previously been remanded, and the matter had been pending for over six years); Serafin, 2019
WL 3843051, at *6 (remanding for immediate benefits where, “[d]espite . . . explicit instructions,
and despite clear law on the evaluation of medical source opinions, the Commissioner failed to
apply the correct legal standards in evaluating” the medical source opinions); Herrera v.
Kijakazi, No. 21cv227 KBM, 2022 WL 604728, at *4 (D.N.M. Mar. 1, 2022) (“[T]he ALJ’s
disregard of the Appeals Council’s unambiguous instructions on remand undermines the Court’s
confidence that the Agency would, on yet a fifth opportunity to review the evidence in this case,
apply the proper legal standards and render a decision supported by substantial evidence.”).
The Commissioner asserts that an immediate award of benefits is not warranted in this
case because the ALJ in this case did not make exactly the same RFC error three times in a row.
See Doc. 12 at 5–6. In the Commissioner’s view—because the first two remands were based on
errors in formulating Plaintiff’s mental RFC, and the current briefing asserts errors in
formulating Plaintiff’s physical RFC—the Commissioner should be given another opportunity to
assess Plaintiff’s RFC. Id. The Court is not persuaded.
First, while Plaintiff may not have previously argued to this Court that the ALJ erred in
formulating his physical RFC, he has repeatedly raised physical limitations and limitations with
his shoulders throughout all three adjudications at the administrative level. See, e.g., AR 55–56,
239–54, 264–71, 1494–1501, 2951–56, 2874, 2879. Ample medical evidence and opinion
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evidence also documented and raised these limitations. See, e.g., Doc. 11 at 5–8 (Plaintiff’s
summary of medical evidence and opinions related to his shoulder impairments). Second, the
ALJ has repeatedly been instructed to adhere to the correct legal standards governing RFC
assessment in this case. See AR 1204–17, 1220–21, 2941–42. These legal standards governing
proper RFC assessment apply to both mental and physical RFC assessments. The Court declines
to give the Commissioner yet a fourth chance to produce an RFC that is legally sufficient and
supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner has had three opportunities to fulfill his
fact-finding role in accordance with the applicable regulations and has not met his burden of
doing so, causing years-long delay in the disposition of this case. See Ragland, 992 F.2d at 1060
(remanding for an immediate award of benefits “[i]n light of the [Commissioner’s] patent failure
to satisfy the burden of proof at step five, and the long delay that has already occurred as a result
of the [Commissioner’s] erroneous disposition of the proceedings . . . . ”).
The length of time this matter has been pending and the fact that remand for additional
fact-finding would not serve any useful purpose both weigh in favor of remanding for an
immediate award of benefits. The Court, therefore, will grant Plaintiff’s request to remand for an
immediate award of benefits.
V. 	Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Opposed Motion for Remand to
Agency Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Doc. 9), is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. The Court grants Defendant’s request to remand this case but denies
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Defendant’s request to remand for further administrative proceedings. Instead, the Court
remands this case for an immediate award of benefits.
________________________________
JENNIFER M. ROZZONI
United States Magistrate Judge
Presiding by Consent
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