Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
HUGO E. VALLE VARGAS,
Petitioner,
vs. 	No. CIV 25-0834 JB/GBW
MARY DE ANDA-YBARRA, Field Office
Director of Albuquerque Office of Detention and
Removal, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; KRISTI
NOEM, in her official capacity, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; PAM
BONDI, in her official capacity, Attorney
General of the United States; and RYAN
ELLISON, in his official capacity, U.S. Attorney
of New Mexico,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings
and 	Recommended Disposition Regarding Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, filed
January 8, 2026 (Doc. 29)(“PFRD”). Objections were due by no later than January 22, 2026. The
parties have not filed any objections. Because the Court concludes that the PFRD is not clearly
erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion, the Court adopts the
PFRD and denies the Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. 2241, filed
August 27, 2025 (Doc. 4)(“Petition”) .
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LAW REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
District courts may refer dispositive motions to a Magistrate Judge for a recommended
disposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1) (“A magistrate judge must promptly conduct the
required proceedings when assigned, without the parties’ consent, to hear a pretrial matter
dispositive of a claim or defense or a prisoner petition challenging the conditions of confinement.”).
Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs objections to recommendations
from a Magistrate Judge and provides that, “[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the
recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed
findings and recommendations.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 	Under the rule, when resolving
objections “the district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to by a party. The district judge may accept, reject, or
modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 636 provides:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of
the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or 	recommendations 	to 	which
objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The
judge may also 	receive 	further 	evidence 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the
magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
“The filing of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the district judge to focus
attention on those issues -- factual and legal -- that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.”
United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, with Buildings, Appurtenances, Improvements &
Contents, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)(quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147
(1985))(“One Parcel”). 	As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit notes, “the
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filing of objections advances the interests 	that underlie the Magistrate’s Act,1 including
judicial efficiency.” 	One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (citing Niehaus v. Kan. Bar Ass’n, 793 F.2d
1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986) and United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949 (6th Cir. 1981)).
The Tenth Circuit holds “that a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the
district court or for appellate review.” 	One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. 	“To further advance the
policies behind the Magistrate’s Act, [the Tenth Circuit], like numerous other circuits, ha[s]
adopted ‘a firm waiver rule’ that ‘provides that the failure to make timely objections to the
magistrate’s findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal
questions.’” One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (citations omitted). In addition to requiring specificity
in objections, the Tenth Circuit has stated that “[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to
the magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.” Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421,
1426 (10th Cir. 1996). See United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001)(“In
this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s report are
deemed waived.”). In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit states that “the district court
correctly held that [a petitioner] had waived [an] argument by failing to raise it before the
magistrate.” Pevehouse v. Scibana, 229 F. App’x 795, 796 (10th Cir. 2007)(unpublished). 2
1 Congress enacted the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39, in 1968.
2 Pevehouse v. Scibana is an unpublished opinion, but the Court can rely on an unpublished
Tenth Circuit opinion to the extent its reasoned analysis is persuasive in the case before it. See
10th Cir. R. 32.1(A) (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be cited for their
persuasive value.”). The Tenth Circuit has stated:
In this circuit, unpublished orders are not binding precedent, . . . and we have
generally determined that citation to unpublished opinions is not favored. However,
if an unpublished opinion or order and judgment has persuasive value with respect
to a material issue in a case and would assist the court in its disposition, we allow
citation to that decision.
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In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit, in accord with the other United States Courts of
Appeals, expands the waiver rule to cover objections that are timely but too general. 	See One
Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. 	The Supreme Court of the United States -- in the course of approving
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s use of the waiver rule -- notes:
It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review
of a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other
standard, when neither party objects to those findings. The House and Senate
Reports accompanying the 1976 amendments do not expressly consider what sort
of review the district court should perform when no party objects to the
magistrate’s report. See S. Rep. No. 94-625, pp. 9-10 (1976) (hereafter Senate
Report); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, p. 11 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1976, p. 6162 (hereafter House Report). 	There is nothing in those Reports,
however, that demonstrates an intent to require the district court to give any more
consideration 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	report 	than 	the 	court 	considers
appropriate. Moreover, the Subcommittee that drafted and held hearing on the
1976 amendments had before it the guidelines of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts concerning the efficient use of magistrates. 	Those
guidelines recommended to the district courts that “[w]here a magistrate makes
a finding or ruling on a motion or an issue, his determination should become that
of the district court, unless specific objection is filed within a reasonable time.”
See Jurisdiction of the United States Magistrates, Hearings on S. 1283 before the
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1975)(emphasis added)(hereafter
Senate Hearings). 	The Committee also heard Judge Metzner of the Southern
District of New York, the chairman of a Judicial Conference Committee on the
administration of the magistrate system, testify that he personally followed that
practice. See id., at 11 (“If any objections come in, . . . I review [the record] and
decide it. If no objections come in, I merely sign the magistrate’s order.”). The
Judicial Conference of the United States, which supported the de novo standard
of review eventually incorporated in § 636(b)(1)(C), opined that in most
instances no party would object to the magistrate’s recommendation, and the
litigation would terminate with the judge’s adoption of the magistrate’s report.
See Senate Hearings, at 35, 37. Congress apparently assumed, therefore, that any
party who was dissatisfied for any reason with the magistrate’s report would file
objections, and those objections would trigger district court review. There is no
indication that Congress, in enacting § 636(b)(1)(C), intended to require a district
United States v. Austin, 426 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005)(citing In re Citation of
Unpublished Opinions/Orders & Judgments, 151 F.R.D. 470 (10th Cir. 1993)). 	The Court
concludes that Pevehouse v. Scibana has persuasive value with respect to a material issue, and will
assist the Court in its disposition of the matters now before it.
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judge to review a magistrate’s report to which no objections are filed. It did not
preclude treating the failure to object as a procedural default, waiving the right
to further consideration of any sort. 	We thus find nothing in the statute or the
legislative history that convinces us that Congress intended to forbid a rule such
as the one adopted by the Sixth Circuit.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 150-52 (footnotes omitted).
The Tenth Circuit also notes, “however, that ‘[t]he waiver rule as a procedural bar need
not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate.’” 	One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060 (quoting
Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)(“We join those circuits that have
declined to apply the waiver rule to a pro se litigant’s failure to object when the magistrate’s order
does not apprise the pro se litigant of the consequences of a failure to object to findings and
recommendations.”)(citations omitted)). Cf. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 154 (noting that, while
“[a]ny party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask,”
a failure to object “does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the
request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard”). In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit notes
that the Honorable H. Dale Cook, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, decides sua sponte to conduct a de novo review despite the lack of specificity in the
objections. See One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. The Tenth Circuit, however, holds that it deems the
objections waived on appeal, “because only an objection that is sufficiently specific to focus the
district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute will advance the
policies behind the Magistrate’s Act that led us to adopt a waiver rule in the first instance.” One
Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060-61 (citing cases from other Courts of Appeals where district courts elected
to address merits despite potential application of waiver rule, but the Courts of Appeals enforce
the waiver rule).
Where a party files timely and specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed
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findings and recommendations “on . . . dispositive motions, the statute calls for a de novo
determination, not a de novo hearing.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980). “[I]n
providing for a ‘de novo determination’ rather than a de novo hearing, Congress intended to permit
whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a
magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and citing Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976)). The Tenth
Circuit requires a “district court to consider relevant evidence of record and not merely review the
magistrate judge’s recommendation” when conducting a de novo review of a party’s timely,
specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report. In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 583-84 (10th Cir.
1995). 	“When objections are made to the magistrate’s factual findings based on conflicting
testimony or evidence . . . the district court must, at a minimum, listen to a tape recording or read
a transcript of the evidentiary hearing.” Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 1987).
A district court must “clearly indicate that it is conducting a de novo determination” when
a party objects to the Magistrate Judge’s report “based upon conflicting evidence or testimony.”
Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d at 1009. 	On the other hand, a district court fails to meet 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)’s requirements when it indicates that it gives “considerable deference to the magistrate’s
order.” 	Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988). 	A district
court need not, however, “make any specific findings; the district court must merely conduct a de
novo review of the record.” Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 766 (10th Cir. 2000).
“[T]he district court is presumed to know that de novo review is required. Consequently, a brief
order expressly stating the court conducted de novo review is sufficient.” Northington v. Marin,
102 F.3d 1564, 1570 (10th Cir. 1996)(citing In re Griego, 64 F.3d at 583-84). 	“[E]xpress
references to de novo review in [a district court’s] order must be taken to mean it properly
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considered the pertinent portions of the record, absent some clear indication otherwise.” Bratcher
v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42, 8 F.3d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1993). The Tenth Circuit holds
that a district court properly conducts a de novo review of a party’s evidentiary objections when
the district court’s “terse” order contains one sentence for each of the party’s “substantive claims”
and does “not mention his procedural challenges to the jurisdiction of the magistrate to hear the
motion.” Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d at 766. The Tenth Circuit explains that brief
district court orders that “merely repeat the language of § 636(b)(1) to indicate its compliance”
are sufficient to demonstrate that the district court conducts a de novo review:
It is common practice among district judges in this circuit to make such a
statement and adopt the magistrate judges’ recommended dispositions when they
find that magistrate judges have dealt with the issues fully and accurately and
that they could add little of value to that analysis. We cannot interpret the district
court’s statement as establishing that it failed to perform the required de novo
review.
In re Griego, 64 F.3d at 584. 	Notably, because a district court may place whatever reliance it
chooses on a Magistrate Judge’s PFRD, a district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1),
as “Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” 	United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676 (emphasis omitted). See Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 42, 8 F.3d at 724-25 (holding that the district court’s adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s
“particular reasonable-hour estimates” is consistent with the de novo determination that 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and United States v. Raddatz require).
Where no party objects to the Magistrate Judge’s PFRD, the Court still reviews the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendations. In Pablo v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CIV 11-0132 JB/ACT,
2013 WL 1010401 (D.N.M. Feb. 27, 2013)(Browning, J.), the plaintiff fails to respond to the
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Magistrate Judge’s PFRD and thus waives his right to appeal the recommendations, but the Court
nevertheless conducts a review. 	The Court generally does not “review the PF[]RD de novo,
because the parties have not objected thereto, but rather review[s] the recommendations to
determine whether they are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of
discretion.” 	Pablo v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 2013 WL 1010401, at *4. 	The Court, thus, does not
determine independently what it would do if the issues had come before the Court first, but rather
adopts the PFRD where “[t]he Court cannot say that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation . . .
is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion.” Pablo v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., 2013 WL 1010401, at *3. 	See Alexandre v. Astrue, No. CIV 11-0384 JB/SMV,
2013 WL 1010439, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 27, 2013)(Browning, J.)(“The Court rather reviewed the
findings and recommendations of the Honorable Stephan M. Vidmar, United States Magistrate
Judge, to determine if they are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse
of discretion. 	The Court determines that they are not, and will therefore adopt the PFRD.”);
Trujillo v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CIV 12-1125 JB/KBM, 2013 WL 1009050, at *5 (D.N.M. Feb.
28, 2013)(Browning, J.)(adopting the PFRD, and noting: “The Court did not review the [PFRD]
de novo, because Trujillo has not objected to it, but rather reviewed the . . . findings and
recommendations to determine if they are clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law,
or an abuse of discretion, which they are not.”). This review, which is deferential to the Magistrate
Judge’s work when there is no objection, nonetheless provides some review in the interest of
justice, and seems more consistent with the waiver rule’s intent than no review at all or a full-
fledged review. 	Accordingly, the Court considers this standard of review appropriate. 	See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 151 (“There is nothing in those Reports, however, that demonstrates
an intent to require the district court to give any more consideration to the magistrate’s report than
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the court considers appropriate.”). The Court is reluctant to have no review at all if its name is
going at the bottom of the order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s PFRD.
ANALYSIS
The Court carefully reviews the PFRD and the docket in this case. 	The Court does not
review the PFRD de novo, because the parties have not objected to it. Instead, the Court reviews
the PFRD to determine if it is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse
of discretion, and has determined that the PFRD is not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously
contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion.
IT IS ORDERED that: (i) the Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings and Recommended
Disposition, filed January 8, 2026 (Doc. 29), is adopted; (ii) the Respondents’ Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, filed October 14, 2025 (Doc. 23), is granted;
(iii) the Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed August 27, 2025 (Doc. 2) is denied;
(iv) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2214, filed August 27, 2025 (Doc. 4), is
denied; (v) this case is dismissed without prejudice; and (vi) the Court will enter a separate
Judgment disposing of the case.
_____________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Parties:
Karen Monrreal-Salazar
Law Office of Karen S. Monrreal
Reno, Nevada
Attorney for the Petitioner
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Ryan Ellison
Acting United States Attorney
Ryan Posey
Assistant United States Attorney
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Attorneys for Respondents Mary De Anda-Ybarra, Todd M. Lyons, Kristi Noem, Pam
Bondi, and Ryan Ellison
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