Chavez et al v. Chen et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
___________________________
JOSEPH CHAVEZ,
HARLAND TODECHEENIE, and
NEAL TSOSIE,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00552-KWR-JHR
JACK CHEN,
1 EXPRESS, INC.,
TOP 1 EXPRESS, INC.,
US TRUCKING SERVICES, INC.,
UNITED SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
PLATINUM TRANSPORT INSURANCE RRG, INC.,
ALL AMERICAN CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, INC.,
HARISH KAPUR,
GARY PAUL MATHAROO,
DESIREE GONZALEZ,
PAULINA VILLAREAL,
GARRETT PRESZLER,
KANWARPREET GILL, also known as KANWAR GILL,
BILL SANFORD, Esq., and
VIVIANA NIEVA,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO
REMAND
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Joseph Chavez, Harland Todecheenie, and
Neal Tsosie’s (“Plaintiffs”) Motion to Remand (Doc. 12). This Motion to Remand turns on
Defendant All American Claims Solutions, Inc.’s (“Defendant AACS”) failure to obtain the
consent of Defendant Top 1 Express, Inc. (“Defendant Top 1”). Defendant AACS requests that
this Court adopt an exception to the unanimity requirement that excuses nonunanimous consent if
the removing defendant demonstrates that they exhausted all reasonable efforts to obtain a
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co-defendant’s consent. Having reviewed the parties’ pleadings, exhibits, and the relevant law, the
Court declines to adopt Defendant AACS’s proposed exception to the unanimity requirement, and
therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 12) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring claims arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December
11, 2020. Doc. 1-1 at 20–25. Defendant Chen was driving a tractor trailer and rear-ended
Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Id. at 21. On December 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint
against Defendants Jack Chen, 1 Express, Inc., Top 1, US Trucking Services, Inc., and United
Specialty Insurance Company. Id. at 34–43.
After filing their original complaint, Plaintiffs struggled to find and serve Defendants Chen
and Top 1 for several months. Doc. 1-2 at 24. Plaintiffs obtained the state court’s permission to
serve Defendants Top 1 and Chen by publication on October 25, 2024, and March 18, 2025,
respectively. Id. at 57–58, 95–96. Plaintiffs filed notices that Defendants Top 1 and Chen were
served by publication. Id. at 62, 103.
Plaintiffs sought an entry of default judgment against Defendant Chen on June 26, 2024,
see id. at 17, and against Defendant Top 1 on November 15, 2024, see id. at 60. On July 17, 2025,
the state court entered, nunc pro tunc following the hearing on January 17, 2025, an order of default
judgment against Defendant Top 1, Doc. 38-3, and an order denying default judgment against
Defendant Chen, Doc. 38-4. On May 19, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint
adding Defendant AACS and alleged violations of the Trade Practices and Fraud Article
(“TPFA”), NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20 (2025). Doc. 1-1 at 26–29. On May 21, 2025, Plaintiffs
filed the operative Second Amended Complaint. Id. at 17. On June 11, 2025, Defendant AACS
removed the action to this Court. See Doc. 1.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A defendant seeking removal must
overcome the presumption against removal. See Fajen v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 331,
333 (10th Cir. 1982). Removal statutes are strictly construed, and ambiguities are resolved in favor
of remand. Id. The removing party bears “the burden to establish that [federal jurisdiction] is
proper, and there is a presumption against its existence.” Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Okla. Inc.,
762 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation modified).
DISCUSSION
Defendant AACS acknowledges that the unanimity requirement was not met, but it
requests that the Court adopt an exception based on its reasonable efforts to obtain unanimous
consent. Doc. 38 at 12–15. Further, Defendant AACS argues that Plaintiffs’ failure to join it until
after a year had passed was in bad faith and deprived it of its right to removal. Id. at 6–11. The
Court addresses each argument in turn.
I. 	Defendant AACS’s removal violates the unanimity requirement.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant AACS failed to join and obtain the consent of Defendants
United Specialty Insurance Company (“Defendant USIC”), Bill Sanford, Jack Chen, and Top 1
before filing its Notice of Removal. Doc. 12 at 8. Defendant AACS contends that the only
defendant whose consent is at issue is Defendant Top 1. Doc. 38 at 13. The Court agrees that
Defendant Top 1’s consent is at issue.1 Defendant AACS requests that the Court adopt an exception
1 Based on the record, it is unclear whether Defendant Chen has been properly served. Once a case
is removed, a federal court looks to the law of the forum state to determine whether service of
process was perfected before removal. Wallace v. Microsoft Corp., 596 F.3d 703, 706 (10th Cir.
2010). Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Chen was properly served under NMRA Rule 1-004(F)(2)
because: (1) Plaintiffs first tried to personally serve Defendant Chen on March 16, 2024; and (2)
after failing to personally serve Defendant Chen, Plaintiffs served “a resident of the abode who
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to the unanimity requirement in light of the default judgment entered against Defendant Top 1 and
defense counsel’s inability to obtain consent from Defendant Top 1, despite exhausting all
reasonable efforts to obtain consent. The Court will not adopt the requested exception, and
therefore, Defendant AACS’s removal violates the unanimity requirement. Accordingly, the Court
remands the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
“When a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have
been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(2)(A). A removal notice is procedurally defective, which requires the district court to
remand the case, if one defendant fails to join in the removal notice. Brady v. Lovelace Health
Plan, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172–73 (D.N.M. 2007) (citing Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685,
686 (10th Cir. 1981)). The unanimity requirement, however, is not required in the following
situations: (1) if the defendant is a nominal or formal party and (2) if the defendant has not yet
been served with process. Id. at 1173 (citing Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1939)).
was over the age of fifteen.” Doc. 1-2 at 31. These steps alone are insufficient. Rule 1-004(F)(2)
requires that “service may be made by delivering a copy of the process to some person residing at
the usual place of abode of the defendant who is over the age of fifteen (15) years and mailing by
first class mail to the defendant at the defendant’s last known mailing address a copy of the
process.” Plaintiffs never provided proof, or even claimed, that they also mailed a copy of the
process to the home of Defendant Chen. On April 8, 2025, Plaintiffs filed proof of service on
Defendant Chen by publication. Doc. 1-2 at 102–03. But, on July 17, 2025, the state court entered
an order nunc pro tunc denying default judgment against Defendant Chen “following 01-17-2025
Hearing.” Doc. 38-4. The state court did not provide a ground for declining to enter default
judgment against Defendant Chen. Based on the record before the Court, it is unclear whether
Defendant Chen has been properly served. Because the failure to obtain Defendant Top 1’s consent
is dispositive, the Court need not decide whether Defendant Chen’s consent is also required.
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A. The unanimity requirement requires Defendant Top 1’s consent.
Here, Defendant AACS does not argue that Defendant Top 1 is a “nominal or formal party”
or that Defendant Top 1 was not properly joined and served.2 See Doc. 38 at 13 (claiming that “the
only defendant whose consent is at issue is Defendant Top 1”). The state court granted default
judgment against Defendant Top 1 and found that Defendant Top 1 was properly served and
defaulted pursuant to NMRA Rule 1-055. Doc. 38-3 at 1–2. Thus, Defendant Top 1’s consent is
required for removal. See § 1446(b)(2)(A).
It is undisputed that Defendant Top 1 did not consent to removal as required by
§ 1446(b)(2)(A). See Doc. 38 at 13–15. In requesting that the Court adopt and apply an exception
to the unanimity requirement, Defendant AACS directs the Court’s attention to White v.
Bombardier Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (N.D. Fla. 2004). In White, the district court noted that
“in order to excuse such consent, the removing defendant must allege with specificity in its petition
for removal, and prove upon challenge by a timely motion to remand, that the removing defendant
has unsuccessfully exhausted all reasonable efforts to locate the defaulted defendant to obtain its
consent.” 313 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.
Defendant AACS contends that it attempted to locate Defendant Top 1, but that its attorney
had “never been successful in contacting” anyone associated with Defendant Top 1. Doc. 38 at 14.
2 To the extent that Defendant AACS’s single sentence noting that the “unanimity requirement has
been excused for a nominal or formal party” is argument that Defendant Top 1 is a nominal party,
the Court disagrees. See Doc. 38 at 13. Plaintiffs sued Defendant Top 1 in tort for the crash
allegedly caused by Defendant Chen. See Doc. 1-1 at 17–28. Defendant Top 1 appears to be a
dissolved California corporation. Doc. 1-2 at 65. The capacity to sue Defendant Top 1 is
determined under California law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2). Under California law, a dissolved
corporation “continues to exist for the purpose of . . . prosecuting and defending actions by or
against it.” Cal. Corp. Code § 2010(a). In California, a corporation’s dissolution is “best
understood not as its death, but merely as its retirement from active business.” Penasquitos, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 812 P.2d 154, 160 (Cal. 1991). Thus, Defendant Top 1, despite its default, is not
a nominal party and still faces liability for its pre-dissolution activities.
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Counsel for Defendant Top 1 was also advised that it “went out of business in early 2022 and its
owner relocated to China.” Id. Defendant AACS contends that its efforts demonstrate that it
“unsuccessfully exhausted all reasonable efforts to locate Defendant Chen and Defendant Top 1
to obtain their consent.” Id. at 15. Although defense counsel exhausted all reasonable efforts to
locate Defendant Top 1, excusal of the unanimity requirement requires that the Court adopt the
White exception put forth by Defendant AACS. For several reasons, the Court will not adopt the
White exception.
Not only has the Tenth Circuit not addressed this exception, but several courts have rejected
such an exception entirely.3 See, e.g., Romero v. Knee, No. 1:17-cv-01273-RB-KBM, 2018 WL
3966275, at *3 (D.N.M. Aug. 17, 2018) (noting that the question “is not whether the removing
defendant did everything it could to obtain consent, but whether all properly-served defendants
consent to removal”); First Indep. Bank v. Trendventures, LLC, No. 2:07-cv-14462-BAF-DAS,
2008 WL 253045, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2008) (finding that despite “strenuous and diligent
efforts” to obtain consent, the court was “without authority under clearly established law to excuse
noncompliance with the rule of unanimity”); Am. Asset Fin., LLC v. Corea Firm, 821 F. Supp. 2d
698, 701 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2011) (remanding case when defendant failed to obtain defaulting
defendant’s consent and noting that “remand has been granted in cases where the removing
3 Relatedly, it is immaterial that Defendant Top 1 is a dissolved corporation. Under California law,
Defendant Top 1 remains liable for its allegedly tortious conduct, and courts have found no reason
to disregard the unanimity requirement just because a properly joined and served defendant is a
dissolved entity. See, e.g., Williams v. Cecchi, No. 2:12-cv-02391-JFW-SH, 2012 WL 12952315,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2012) (“[T]he Court concludes that there is no reason a dissolved entity
would be exempt from the rule of unanimity.”); Town of Moreau v. State Dep’t of Env’t
Conservation, No. 5:96-cv-00983-NPM-GJD, 1997 WL 243258, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 1997)
(“True Abalene is a dissolved corporation. That does not affect Abalene’s ability to sue and be
sued. Consequently, [defendant’s] argument that Abalene was not required to join in the Notice of
Removal because of its dissolution is unavailing.” (citation modified)).
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defendant was in all likelihood unable to obtain the co-defendant’s consent”). The text of the
removal statute does not provide district courts discretion to overlook a party’s procedural failures
unless the district court finds bad faith. See § 1446(c). The Court will not find judicial discretion
where it does not exist. See United States v. Koerber, 10 F.4th 1083, 1112 (10th Cir. 2021) (noting
that, in statutory interpretation, a court should “first examine the statute’s plain text” and “[a]bsent
ambiguity,” the analysis ends there).
Adhering to the text of § 1446(b)(2)(A) aligns with the long-standing principles that
removal statutes should be strictly construed and ambiguity should be resolved in favor of remand.
See Fajen, 683 F.2d at 333. While the Court appreciates Defendant AACS’s attempts to reach
Defendant Top 1, the Court will adhere to settled law and find that removal is not appropriate when
fewer than all defendants, properly joined and served, consent to removal. See § 1446(b)(2)(A);
see 	also 	Romero, 	2018 WL 3966275, 	at 	*3 	(“If 	fewer 	than 	all 	defendants 	consent 	to
removal . . . removal is not appropriate, regardless of the fact that the removing defendant tried its
best to obtain consent.”). Accordingly, since the unanimity requirement has not been met, the Court
remands the case pursuant to § 1447(c).4 See City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d
1089, 1094–95 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding that failing the unanimity requirement is grounds for
remand under § 1447(c)).
4 The record does not reflect, and neither party presents evidence, that Defendant Sanford was
served. Thus, the Court will not consider whether Defendant Sanford needs to be joined for the
purposes of the unanimity rule. See Brady, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (noting that the unanimity
requirement is not required if the defendant has not yet been served with process).
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B. The Court need not decide whether Defendant USIC’s consent was proper.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant USIC is in default and Defendant AACS has not provided
proof of Defendant USIC’s consent. Doc. 12 at 8. Since Plaintiffs have not formally moved for
default against Defendant USIC, the Court will construe Plaintiffs’ argument as one that Defendant
USIC did not properly consent to removal thereby violating the unanimity requirement. Defendant
AACS contends that it removed with “the express consent” of Defendant USIC. Doc. 38 at 13;
Doc. 1 ¶ 6. This disagreement boils down to the split in which some courts have required
“independent and unambiguous” consent from all Defendants, see Vasquez v. Americano U.S.A.,
LLC, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1258 (D.N.M. 2008), and other courts have allowed for the removing
defendant to vouch for another defendant’s consent, see Szuszalski v. Fields, No. 1:19-cv-0250-
RB-CJ, 2019 WL 5964602, at *7–8 (D.N.M. 2019). While the Tenth Circuit “has not stated what
is necessary to satisfy the requirement that all defendants join in the removal petition,” see Tresco,
Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1248 (D.N.M. 2010) (citation modified), so long as
the split exists, the best practice is to obtain “independent and unambiguous” consent from each
party to avoid this dispute. Since Defendant AACS’s removal already violates the unanimity rule
by failing to obtain Defendant Top 1’s consent, the Court need not decide whether Defendant
AACS’s “voucher” approach also violates the unanimity rule.
Based on the lack of Defendant Top 1’s consent to removal, the Court must remand the
case pursuant to § 1447(c) for violation of the unanimity rule.5
II. 	Additionally, removal is improper under § 1446(c)(1) since Plaintiffs did not act in
bad faith.
5 Since the Court remands the case on these grounds, the Court will not consider Plaintiffs’
argument that Defendant cannot show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in
controversy requirement is met. See Doc. 12 at 9–10.
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Defendant AACS takes the position that Plaintiffs’ failure to name Defendant AACS until
after the one-year removal deadline constitutes bad faith under § 1446(c)(1). Doc. 38 at 3.
Plaintiffs contend that the delays in the underlying litigation were not the result of bad faith and
that they could not join Defendant AACS until liability had been established in the underlying
collision in light of Hovet v. Allstate, 2004-NMSC-010, 135 N.M. 397, 89 P.3d 69. Doc. 12 at 6.
The Court cannot find that that Plaintiffs delayed joining Defendant AACS in a bad faith effort to
prevent removal, and thus, removal is improper under § 1446(c)(1).
Section 1446(c) provides that a “case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) on the
basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 more than 1 year after commencement of the action,
unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant
from removing the action.” § 1446(c)(1).
In New Mexico, the TPFA provides that insurance companies may not engage in “unfair
and deceptive practices.” Section 59A-16-20. In Hovet, the New Mexico Supreme Court found
that Section 59A-16-30 grants a private right of action to any person covered by the TPFA “who
has suffered damages as a result of a violation of that article by an insurer or agent.”
2004-NMSC-010, ¶ 1. However, an action for unfair claims based on a failure to settle “may only
be filed after the conclusion of the underlying negligence litigation, and after there has been a
judicial determination of fault in favor of the third party and against the insured.” Id. ¶ 25. A
third-party claimant may not sue both the insured and the insurer in the same lawsuit, and the
third-party claimant “will not even have an action under Section 59A-16-20(E), unless and until
there has been a judicial determination of the insured’s fault and the amount of damages awarded
in the underlying negligence action.” Id. ¶ 26.
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The Court cannot find that Plaintiffs’ failure to join Defendant AACS until after a year had
passed warrants a finding of bad faith. A court in this district has put forth the following two-step
standard for determining bad faith: (1) consider whether there was active litigation against the
removal spoiler in state court, and if so, then this creates a rebuttable presumption of good faith;
and (2) if the plaintiffs show they actively litigated against the removal spoiler, then the defendant
may introduce rebuttal evidence that he has on hand. See Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp.
3d 1225, 1274–76 (D.N.M. 2014). The Court notes that the Aguayo two-step does not perfectly fit
the facts of this case since Defendant AACS asks the Court to find bad faith in Plaintiffs’ failure
to join them until after a year had passed. See Doc. 38 at 6. Thus, the Court will consider whether
there appeared to be active litigation in the state court prior to joining Defendant AACS, and if so,
whether Defendant AACS presents sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of good faith.
Plaintiffs appear to have made their best effort to advance the litigation in state court.
Plaintiffs struggled to find and serve Defendants Top 1 and Chen for several months. Doc. 12 at
4– 5; Doc. 1-2 at 24. Even Defendant Top 1 and Defendant Chen’s attorney struggled to make any
sort of contact with them beyond a single phone call with Defendant Chen. See Doc. 1-2 at 63.
Plaintiffs originally filed their complaint on December 11, 2023. Doc. 1-1 at 1. On March 20,
2024, Plaintiffs attempted to serve Defendant Chen before leaving service with someone that lived
at his believed residence. See Doc. 1-2 at 24–27. On September 25, 2024, Plaintiffs sought the
state court’s permission to serve Defendant Top 1 by publication. Id. at 41. The state court granted
Plaintiffs’ request to serve Defendant Top 1 by publication. Id. at 57–58. On February 12, 2025,
Plaintiffs sought the state court’s permission to serve Defendant Chen by publication. Id. at 69.
On March 18, 2025, the state court found that Plaintiffs had “made diligent efforts to serve
Defendant Jack Chen” and granted Plaintiffs’ request to serve Defendant Chen by publication. Id.
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at 95–96. Plaintiffs filed proof of service by publication on April 8, 2025. Id. at 102–03. On July
17, 2025, the state court ordered default judgement against Defendant Top 1 and denied default
judgment against Defendant Chen. Doc. 38-3; Doc. 38-4. In light of Plaintiffs’ efforts to locate,
serve, and pursue default judgments against Defendants Chen and Top 1, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs actively litigated their case in the state court prior to joining Defendant AACS. Therefore,
the record supports a presumption of good faith that Defendant AACS must overcome.
The Court finds that Defendant AACS does not meet its burden demonstrating that
Plaintiffs engaged in bad faith before joining them. Defendant AACS’s argument relies on
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s history of joining liability insurers prematurely in light of Hovet. See Doc. 38
at 9–10. Defendant AACS contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel usually joins liability insurers before
receiving a judgment and damages determination as required by Hovet, and thus, Plaintiffs’
counsel’s failure to join Defendant AACS until receiving a default judgment against the insured
should be inferred to be in bad faith. See id. Hovet, however, specifies that a third-party claimant
will “not even have an action under Section 59A-16-20(E), unless and until there has been a
judicial determination of the insured’s fault and the amount of damages awarded in the underlying
negligence action.” 2004-NMSC-010, ¶ 26. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, which also joined
Defendant AACS, specifically alleges a violation of Section 59A-16-20(E). Doc. 1-1 at 11. Under
Hovet, such a claim would not be available “unless and until there has been a judicial determination
of the insured’s fault and the damages awarded in the underlying action.” Id. Plaintiffs contend
that they could not join Defendant AACS until “liability for the underlying collision had been
established” against the insureds. Doc. 12 at 6. Just because Plaintiffs’ counsel appears to have not
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adhered to the Hovet procedure in the past, an attempt to adhere to the Hovet procedure now will
not be deemed bad faith.6
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not acted in bad faith in an attempt to
prevent removal, and thus, removal is improper under § 1446(c).
III. 	An award of costs and fees is not warranted.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendant AACS’s removal was “fatally defective” for several
reasons, and thus, an award of costs and fees is warranted. Doc. 12 at 10–11. Defendant AACS
argues that, even in the event of remand, it demonstrated a reasonable basis for removal and an
award of fees should be denied. Doc. 38 at 19–20. In light of the Court’s analysis and the unique
issue regarding Defendant Top 1, the Court agrees that an award of fees and costs is not warranted.
Pursuant to § 1447(c), an “order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and
any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” A district court
retains the discretion to award fees, but “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award
attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable
basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005).
Here, given Defendant AACS’s appeal to White v. Bombardier Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1295
(N.D. Fla. 2004), the Court cannot say that Defendant AACS’s removal lacked an objectively
6 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs argue that default judgments were entered against both
Defendants Top 1 and Chen, but the state court failed to enter a written order as to the default
judgment against Defendant Chen. Doc. 41 at 3. Plaintiffs’ counsel provides the Court with no
evidence that this is the case. Rather, the Court is only presented with the state court’s July 17,
2025, order denying default judgment against Defendant Chen. Doc. 38-4. Further, Hovet indicates
that establishing liability is only half the battle, and there must also be a judicial determination of
the “amount of damages awarded in the underlying action” before the third-party has a claim under
Section 59A-16-20(E). 2004-NMSC-010, ¶ 26. Thus, it remains unclear whether Defendant AACS
is properly joined at this point. However, since the Court lacks jurisdiction due to Defendant
AACS’s failure to adhere to the unanimity rule, the Court will not decide whether Defendant
AACS is properly joined at this juncture.
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reasonable basis. While success under the theory proved to be unlikely, the Court cannot conclude
that appealing to the White exception—in these circumstances—was objectively unreasonable.
Therefore, the Court finds that an award of fees and costs is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Defendant AACS did not obtain Defendant Top 1’s consent to removal as required
by § 1446(b)(2)(A). Lack of unanimity is a procedural defect that precludes removal, and thus, the
Court remands the action pursuant to § 1447(c). See Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah &
Ouray Reservation, 797 F.3d 800, 805–06 (10th Cir. 2015). Although Defendant AACS’s removal
failed to comply with the unanimity requirement, an award of fees and costs is not warranted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (Doc. 12) is hereby
GRANTED pursuant to § 1447(c). The Clerk of the Court is direct to take the necessary action to
REMAND the case to the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, County of Cibola, State of New
Mexico.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant AACS’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT.
____/S/______________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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