Saenz-Carmona v. USA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
_____________________
EMANUEL SAENZ-CARMONA,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 25-cv-0202-KWR-GJF
No. 22-cr-1168 KWR-GJF
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court based on Petitioner Emanuel Saenz-Carmona’s failure
to prosecute his Motion to Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (CV Doc. 1; CR Doc. 52) (Motion).
Petitioner was incarcerated in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody when he filed this case. 	After his
release from BOP custody, Petitioner severed contact with the Court in violation of D.N.M. Local
Civil Rule 83.6. 	See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (reflecting that Petitioner was released from
BOP custody on October 17, 2025). 	By an Order entered November 12, 2025, the Court directed
Petitioner to provide an updated address within thirty days. 	See Doc. 5; D.N.M. Local Civil Rule
83.6 (“All … parties appearing pro se have a continuing duty to notify the Clerk, in writing, of any
change in their … mailing addresses”). 	The Order warns that the failure to timely comply may
result in dismissal of the Motion without further notice, and any future § 2255 motions may be
time-barred.
The deadline to provide an updated address expired on December 12, 2025. 	Plaintiff did
not comply, show cause for his failure, or otherwise respond to the Order. 	Accordingly, the Court
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KWR-GJF Document 6 Filed 12/19/25 Page 1 of 4

2
will dismiss the Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for “failure to prosecute [and] comply
with the … court’s orders.” 	Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 3 (10 th Cir. 2003). 	The
dismissal will be entered without prejudice to refiling. 	However, the Tenth Circuit holds that
where a Rule 41 ruling can be construed as a dismissal with prejudice - based on the potential
statute of limitations - courts must weigh the factors set forth in Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d
916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992). 	The Court is not convinced Ehrenhaus applies under the circumstances
of this case. 	This is not a situation where the movant filed a timely claim, but the claim would be
time-barred if filed anew. 	The instant § 2255 Motion was already time-barred when Petitioner
filed this case. 	The criminal Judgment (CR Doc. 43) was entered on May 24, 2023 and became
final on June 8, 2023, the first day after expiration of the 14-day direct appeal period. 	See United
States v. Mathisen, 822 Fed. App’x 752, 753 (10th Cir. 2020) (“For purposes of § 2255, … [the]
criminal conviction became final when his time for filing a direct appeal expired—fourteen days
after the district court entered its judgment of conviction”). 	The one-year habeas limitation period
expired on June 8, 2024. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (absent tolling, a § 2255 motion must be filed
within one year after the judgment becomes final). 	Petitioner filed the Motion over eight months
later, on February 26, 2025. 	He will therefore be in the same situation after dismissal as he was
when he filed this case.
Alternatively, even if Ehrenhaus does apply, the factors support a dismissal in this case.
The factors include: “the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; the amount of interference
with the judicial process; the culpability of the litigant; whether the court warned the party in
advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and the efficacy
of lesser sanctions.” 	Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe Cty. Justice Center,
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KWR-GJF Document 6 Filed 12/19/25 Page 2 of 4

3
492 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2016). 	The prior Order contains a dismissal warning, and
Petitioner is culpable for severing contact with the Court following his release. 	See Theede v. U.S.
Dep’t of Lab., 172 F.3d 1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999) (dismissing appeal and noting pro se parties
“bear the burden of filing notice of a change of address”); Faircloth v. Hickenlooper, 758 Fed.
App’x 659, 662 (10th Cir. 2018) (affirming Rule 41 dismissal and noting the inmate-plaintiff is
“solely responsible for his failure to update his address”). 	The alternative to dismissal - which is
sua sponte excusing Petitioner’s failure to prosecute and waiting to see if he reestablishes contact
- would materially interfere with the Court’s ability to enforce Orders and close inactive cases.
Lesser sanctions will not work here, as Petitioner severed contact. 	Moreover, Respondent will be
prejudiced if the Court requires an answer to a motion that Petitioner is no longer prosecuting. 	In
sum, dismissal is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
The Court will finally deny a certificate of appealability (COA) under Habeas Corpus Rule
11 - as the failure to prosecute this case is not reasonably debatable - and deny Petitioner’s pending
Motion to Appoint Counsel (CV Doc. 2) as moot. 	See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000) (a COA issues in state habeas cases where “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment … debatable or wrong”); DeAtley v. Williams, 782 Fed. App’x 736, 737 (10th Cir.
2019) (declining to issue a COA after district court dismissed a habeas filing for failure to prosecute
under Rule 41).
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Emanuel Saenz-Carmona’s Motion to Vacate Under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (CV Doc. 1; CR Doc. 52) is DISMISSED without prejudice; his Motion to
Appoint Counsel (CV Doc. 2) is DENIED; and the Court will enter a separate judgment closing
the civil habeas case.
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KWR-GJF Document 6 Filed 12/19/25 Page 3 of 4

4
SO ORDERED.
______/S/_____________________________
HON. KEA RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:25-cv-00202-KWR-GJF Document 6 Filed 12/19/25 Page 4 of 4