USA v. Lee

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 1:25-cr-05048-KG
SAMANTHA LEE,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Samantha Lee’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment, Doc. 21, the Government’s Response, Doc. 25, and Defendant’s Reply, Doc. 31. For
the reasons below, the Court denies the motion.
I. Background
Defendant is accused of arson in the October 14, 2024, burning of a storage warehouse in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Doc. 1 at 1. According to the indictment, Defendant “maliciously
damaged and destroyed, by means of a fire, a storage warehouse for the Crowne Plaza Hotel and
The Querque Hotel.” Id. The indictment alleges that the building “was used in interstate
commerce and in an activity affecting interstate commerce.” Id.
Defendant moves to dismiss the indictment, arguing that “the storage warehouse is too
tangential of a link to interstate commerce” to establish federal jurisdiction. Doc. 21 at 1. She
contends that because “the storage warehouse did not house guests and had no markings”
indicating ownership, the simple fact that it was “allegedly owned by a hotel or motel and used
by the hotel...does not transform this case into a federal matter.” Id. at 2, 4. As a result,
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Defendant concludes that this case involves “a purely intrastate allegation of arson” that does not
implicate federal jurisdiction. Id. at 6.
The Government urges the Court to deny Defendant’s motion. See Doc. 25. It argues
that Defendant improperly “challenges the strength of the evidence she believes the United
States will present at trial.” Id. at 4. As a result, the Government reasons that Defendant’s
motion is “premature and outside of the Court’s authority at this stage of the case” and “strongly
objects” to the Court’s consideration of the sufficiency of their evidence.” Id. at 1, 4.
II. Legal Standard
An indictment is sufficient if it “sets forth the elements of the offense charged, puts the
defendant on fair notice of the charges against which he must defend, and enables the defendant
to assert a double jeopardy defense.” United States v. Todd, 446 F.3d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir.
2006); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). Courts are generally bound by the allegations within
the indictment when a defendant challenges an indictment’s sufficiency and should refrain from
considering any evidence outside of the indictment. See United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1084,
1087 (10th Cir. 1994). Moving to dismiss an indictment “is not a means of testing the strength
or weakness of the government’s case, or the sufficiency of the government’s evidence.” Id.
Rather, “the allegations are to be taken as true” and the indictment should only be tested “on the
basis of the allegations.” Id.; see also United States v. Samspon, 371 U.S. 75, 78–79 (1962)
(reasoning that dismissal of an indictment is a question of “its sufficiency to charge an offense”
rather than sufficiency for conviction.) An exception to the general rule exists only if “the
operative facts are undisputed and the government fails to object to the district court’s
consideration of the undisputed facts in making the determination.” Id. at 1088.
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III. Analysis
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, Doc. 29, is denied. First, the indictment
adequately sets forth the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which criminalizes arson under federal
law. Section 844(i) prohibits the malicious destruction by means of fire or explosive any
property “used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign
commerce.” Id. Here, the indictment charges that Defendant “maliciously damaged or
destroyed, by means of fire” the hotel warehouse “which [] was used in interstate commerce and
in an activity affecting interstate commerce.” Doc. 1 at 1. The charge of the indictment
adequately sets forth the elements of § 844(i), satisfying the first part of the sufficiency test set
forth in Todd. 446 F.3d at 1067.
Next, the indictment provided fair notice to Defendant of the charges against her by
specifying the date of the alleged arson, “on or about October 14, 2024,” and the specific
warehouse that burned down, “for the Crowne Plaza Hotel and The Querque Hotel,” enabling her
to also assert any potential double jeopardy defense, satisfying the second part of the sufficiency
test set forth in Todd. See Doc. 1 at 1; Id.
Lastly, the exception to the rule set forth in Hall, allowing district courts to consider
evidence outside of the indictment, does not apply. See Hall, 20 F.3d at 1088. Here, the
Government “strongly objects” to the Court’s consideration of facts beyond the face of the
indictment. Doc. 25 at 1; Id. As a result, the Court declines to measure the sufficiency of the
Government’s evidence at this stage. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
Defendant’s counterarguments are also unpersuasive. She attempts to square the facts of
this case with the legal reasoning in United States v. Chavarria, 140 F.4th 1257 (10th Cir. 2025).
In Chavarria, the indictment alleged that the defendants “used a motor vehicle, a means facility
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and instrumentality of interstate commerce” to commit kidnapping that resulted in death. Id. at
1260. The federal kidnapping statute requires that the Government prove that a defendant either
transports the victim “in interstate or foreign commerce” or uses “the mail, or any means,
facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce” in committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). Because the conduct in that case was entirely intrastate, the indictment was
found to be insufficient because the use “of a common vehicle,” without anything more, was not
enough to serve as an instrumentality of interstate commerce. United States v. Chavarria, 2023
WL 3815203, at *8 (D.N.M.). The Tenth Circuit affirmed this Court’s dismissal of that
indictment and held that “motor vehicles” are not automatically presumed to be
“instrumentalities of interstate commerce” for purposes of asserting federal jurisdiction in a
kidnapping case. Chavarria, 140 F.4th at 1265.
Chavarria is inapposite to the facts of this case. Arson becomes a federal crime if the
offender sets fire, or attempts to set fire, to a property “used in interstate or foreign commerce or
in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” § 844(i). The language “affecting
interstate or foreign commerce” provides broader latitude than the kidnapping statute and could
encompass instrumentalities that, standing alone, may not implicate interstate commerce. Id.
(emphasis added); see Grassie, 237 F.3d at 1208 (“Both the indictment and the jury instructions
in this case required the jury to find that the Roswell church and Jensen’s vehicle were used in an
activity affecting interstate commerce.”); see also 10th Cir. Pattern Crim. Jury Instruction No
1.39.1 (“If you decide that there was any effect at all on interstate commerce, then that is enough
to satisfy this element.”). Whether or not this particular storage warehouse affected interstate
commerce is a question to be resolved at trial.
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, Doc. 21, is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Kenneth J. Gonzales___________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Please note that this document has been
electronically filed. To verify its
authenticity, please refer to the Digital File
Stamp on the NEF (Notice of Electronic
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