Maturin v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
CARLOS MATURIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. No. 24-1125 JCH/SCY
T-MOBILE USA, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On September 18, 2025, Defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc., (“Defendant” or “T-Mobile”)
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law (Dkt. No. 75). Plaintiff Carlos
Maturin (“Plaintiff” or “Maturin”) did not file a response in opposition to the motion and the
deadline for doing so has passed. See D.N.M. Local Rule 7.4(a) (“A response must be served and
filed within fourteen (14) calendar days after service of the motion.”). The Court, having
considered the motion for summary judgment, the evidence, and the relevant law, concludes that
the motion should be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND 1
1 A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “must file a response containing a short, concise statement of the
reasons in opposition to the motion with authorities.” D. N.M. Local Rule 56.1(b). The response must also “contain a
concise statement of the material facts cited by the movant as to which the non-movant contends a genuine issue does
exist.” Id. “Each fact in dispute must be numbered, must refer with particularity to those portions of the record upon
which the non-movant relies, and must state the number of the movant's fact that is disputed.” Id. “All material facts
set forth in the Memorandum will be deemed undisputed unless specifically controverted.” Id. Plaintiff failed to file a
response to the motion for summary judgment and to cite to the evidence in the record he believes supports his position
in accordance with this District’s local rules. Consequently, the Court deems the facts set forth in Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment undisputed when considering the motion for summary judgment. See Reed v. Bennett, 312
F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002) (“By failing to file a response within the time specified by the local rule, the
nonmoving party waives the right to respond or to controvert the facts asserted in the summary judgment motion.”);
D.N.M. Local Rule 56.1(b). See also Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that
court is not required to comb record for previously available evidence to make a party’s case for it). The following are
the undisputed facts for purposes of resolving the motion for summary judgment.
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Carlos Maturin worked for T-Mobile from July 2013 until January 2, 2024. Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. (“MSJ”), Undisputed Fact (“UF”) ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 75. From June 2022 through 2023, he
worked at the Menaul Customer Experience Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where Katye
Minge supervised him. Id., UF ¶ 2. While there, Plaintiff received a promotion to Coach. Id.
In May 2022, Maturin was approved for intermittent FMLA leave of up to three days per
week for a medical condition. Id., UF ¶ 3. Beginning on June 26, 2022, he was absent for more
than eight consecutive workdays. Id., UF ¶ 4. Consistent with T-Mobile practice, his leave was
converted to continuous leave status and updated medical certification was requested. Id. Maturin
provided the certification and remained on approved leave. Id. He was later approved for additional
medical leave, including other medical or company leave in the fall of 2022. Id., UF ¶ 5.
On October 6, 2022, Maturin participated in a “Formal Discussion” with his supervisors,
conducted by phone, regarding workplace comments his supervisors considered inappropriate. See
id., UF ¶ 7. Specifically, Plaintiff had referred to one employee as “ignorant” and suggested to
another employee that he should worry about his job. See id. After the October 6, 2022 discussion,
Maturin remained in Good Standing. Id., UF ¶ 8. His pay, title, and benefits were unaffected, and
he was eligible for transfers and promotions. Id.
In October 2022, Maturin filed an internal complaint alleging discrimination by a
supervisor. Id., UF ¶ 9. Employee Relations Partner Janis Hite investigated the matter by
interviewing 	witnesses 	and 	reviewing 	records, 	and 	she 	determined 	his 	allegations 	were
unsubstantiated. See id., UF ¶ 10.
In late 2022, Maturin applied for both Manager and Coach positions at T-Mobile’s
Customer Experience Center in Kingsburg, California. See id., UF ¶ 11. Ryan Bowman
interviewed him. Id., UF ¶ 12. Based on his interview and positive feedback from Albuquerque,
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Bowman recommended him for the Coach position but not for the Manager position. See Defs.’
MSJ, UF ¶ 12, Dkt. No. 75. When Bowman selected Maturin for the Coach position, he based his
decision solely on Maturin’s application and interview. Id., UF ¶ 14. Bowman did not know about
Maturin’s medical condition, his leave history, or any internal complaints made in Albuquerque.
Id. Maturin accepted the offer for the Coach position in Kingsburg. Id., UF ¶ 13. No one required
him to relocate. Id.
While employed at Kingsburg, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge in April 2023 and an
amended charge in May 2023. Def.’s MSJ, UF ¶ 20, Dkt. No. 75; Def.’s Ex. 7, Dkt. No. 75-7. The
April 6, 2023 Charge alleged discrimination and retaliation against him based on his disability in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Def.’s Ex. 7 at 1, Dkt. No. 75-7. He
asserted that on or about July 11, 2022, a supervisor forced him out of the premises because he
went outside the parameters of his approved intermittent leave and could not come back until he
was approved for continuous leave, and that multiple times he was forced to visit his doctor to get
disability paperwork. Id. In the May 3, 2023 Amended Charge, Maturin added that he was denied
the Team Manager position twice between November 2022 and March 2023 because of his
disability. See id. at 3-4.
While assigned to the Kingsburg Center as a Coach in 2023, he was scheduled to be
realigned to Brian Clark’s team, but before that realignment took place, he went on leave and did
not return. Id., UF ¶ 15. On January 2, 2024, Maturin sent his Kingsburg supervisor, Brian Clark,
an email stating that he was resigning effective immediately. Id., UF ¶ 17; Def.’s Ex. 1, Dkt. No.
75-6. Clark understood this to be Plaintiff’s decision and did not tell him that his job was ending
or that he had to resign. Def.’s MSJ, UF ¶ 18, Dkt. No. 75. T-Mobile accepted Maturin’s voluntary
resignation. Id., UF ¶¶ 18-19. T-Mobile did not terminate his employment. Id., UF ¶ 19.
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Neither the Charge nor Amended Charge alleged constructive discharge. See Def.’s MSJ,
UF ¶ 20; Def.’s Ex. 7, Dkt. No. 75-7. On August 6, 2024, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter. Def.’s Ex. 8, Dkt. No. 75-8.
Maturin filed a seven-count complaint against T-Mobile on November 4, 2024. Compl,
Dkt. No. 1. He alleges five claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”):
disability discrimination (Count I), retaliation (Count II), hostile work environment (Count III),
constructive discharge (Count VI), and failure to engage in the interactive process (Count VII). Id.
¶¶ 42-60, 73-89. Maturin additionally asserts two Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
claims: interference (Count IV) and retaliation (Count V). Id. ¶¶ 61-72.
II. 	SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party initially bears the burden of showing
that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat’l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033,
1036 (10th Cir. 1993). Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must “come
forward with specific facts showing” that genuine issues remain for trial. Id. The nonmoving party
must go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). A court must construe all facts
and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Quaker State Minit-
Lube, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d 1522, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995). Only disputes of fact
that might affect the outcome of the case will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. ADA discrimination and accommodation claims (Counts I and VII)
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Plaintiff asserts in Count I that Defendant discriminated against him by (1) failing to honor
his intermittent leave request and converting it to continuous leave without his consent; (2) failing
to engage in a good-faith interactive process to explore reasonable accommodations; and (3)
denying additional accommodations he requested. Compl. ¶¶ 43-48, Dkt. No. 1. In Count VII,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to engage in a good-faith interactive process, instead
unilaterally converting his approved intermittent leave to continuous leave; restricting his
approved leave to only one day per week; and forcing him to relocate in Kingsburg. Id. ¶¶ 79-89.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on his ADA discrimination and
accommodation claims because T-Mobile granted him the leave he requested and did not deny any
accommodation.
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against “a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to … the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees … and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Unlawful discrimination
under the ADA includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
To succeed on an ADA discrimination claim, a plaintiff must prove that he (1) is disabled
under the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the
essential job functions of the job held or desired; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action
by an employer or prospective employer because of that disability. Scheer v. Sisters of Charity of
Leavenworth Health Sys., Inc., 144 F.4th 1212, 1215 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. C.R. England, Inc., 644
F.3d 1028, 1038 (10th Cir. 2011)). To demonstrate an adverse employment action, the plaintiff
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must show he experienced some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment
as a result of the action. Id. at 1216. In other words, the employer’s action must have left the
plaintiff worse off, but not necessarily significantly so. Id. (quoting Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,
601 U.S. 346, 349 (2024)). An employer’s failure to make reasonable accommodations to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability may
constitute prohibited discrimination under the ADA. Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.,
298 F.3d 955, 967 (10th Cir. 2002). A request for medical leave may qualify as a reasonable ADA
accommodation. See id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot succeed on his ADA discrimination because he has
not produced evidence that he was ever denied an accommodation he requested. “When alleging
a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating the existence of a facially
reasonable accommodation.” Hennagir v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, 587 F.3d 1255, 1264 (10th
Cir. 2009). Defendant produced evidence that it approved Plaintiff’s requests for leave based on
his medical condition. Plaintiff failed to produce evidence in response to the summary judgment
motion to show that he requested a reasonable accommodation that T-Mobile denied or that T-
Mobile refused to engage in an interactive process. Nor has he provided evidence that one or more
of his leave requests were not approved. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on
Counts I and VII.
B. Retaliation in violation of the ADA (Count II) and FMLA (Count V) and
constructive discharge (Count VI)
Plaintiff asserts in his complaint that, following his objections to the conversion of his
leave, T-Mobile issued a retaliatory Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) against him, denied
his requests for additional accommodation, forced his relocation under threat of termination, and
constructively discharged him in violation of the ADA and FMLA. Defendant argues that
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Plaintiff’s retaliation claims fail because the only disciplinary action was a minor counseling that
carried no consequences, and he voluntarily transferred to Kingsburg.
“The FMLA makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee for
exercising her rights to FMLA leave.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir.
2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)). To state a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must
show that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) his employer took an action that a reasonable
employee would find materially adverse; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse action. Id. at 1193; Metzler v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464
F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006). Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the second and
third elements.
As for the PIP, the Court agrees with Defendant that it does not amount to a materially
adverse action. The undisputed evidence before the Court is that Maturin had a “Formal
Discussion” with his supervisors after he referred to one employee as “ignorant” and suggested to
another employee that he should worry about his job. But following the October 6, 2022
discussion, Maturin remained in Good Standing; his pay, title, and benefits were unaffected; and
he was eligible for transfers and promotions. Furthermore, as discussed supra, Defendant produced
evidence that it approved Plaintiff’s requests for leave and Plaintiff failed to produce admissible
evidence that he requested reasonable accommodations that T-Mobile denied. It is further
undisputed on this record that Plaintiff voluntarily transferred to Kingsburg and voluntarily
resigned. Plaintiff brought forth no evidence to show such intolerable working conditions that a
reasonable person would feel compelled to resign to sustain a constructive discharge claim. See
Exum v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 389 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004) (“A constructive
discharge occurs when an employer, through unlawful acts, makes working conditions so
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intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel forced to resign.
Working conditions must be so severe that the plaintiff simply had no choice but to quit. In
contrast, a plaintiff who voluntarily resigns cannot claim that he or she was constructively
discharged.”) (internal citations omitted). None of these actions therefore amount to a materially
adverse action that can sustain a retaliation claim.
A failure to promote may constitute a materially adverse action. Here, however, it is
undisputed that the supervisor in Kingsburg who hired Plaintiff to the Coach position, but not the
Manager position, had no knowledge that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Plaintiff thus
cannot establish that T-Mobile’s failure to promote him to the manager position was connected to
his protected activity. Cf. Singh v. Cordle, 936 F.3d 1022, 1043 (10th Cir. 2019) (“a plaintiff who
seeks to show causation in this manner still must present evidence that the decisionmakers knew
of the protected conduct”); Hinds v. Sprint/United Management Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1203 (10th
Cir. 2008) (explaining that to show requisite causal connection between his protected conduct and
termination, plaintiff had to “first come forward with evidence from which a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that those who decided to fire him had knowledge of his protected activity”).
Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim, Defendant additionally asserts that
Plaintiff cannot bring the claim because he never presented it to the EEOC. A plaintiff must timely
file an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC before filing suit under the ADA.
See McDade v. Weston County Hospital District, No. 24-8031, 2025 WL 415481, at *4 (10th Cir.
Feb. 6, 2025). Discrete acts such as termination constitute a separate actionable unlawful
employment practice that must be administratively exhausted before bringing a lawsuit. See
Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff filed a charge and amended
charge with the EEOC in April and May 2023. There is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff
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filed a new or amended charge after he left T-Mobile’s employment in January 2024.
Consequently, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his constructive
discharge claim, so Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Count VI for this alternative
reason. Cf. Chapman v. Carmike Cinemas, 307 F. App’x 164, 174 (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 2009)
(explaining that, because plaintiff did not file an administrative charge arising from her
constructive discharge, defendant was entitled to summary judgment because she failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies).
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
retaliation and constructive discharge claims.
C. Hostile work environment claim (Count III)
According to Plaintiff’s complaint, he was subject to a hostile work environment when
Defendant consistently disregarded his approved accommodations and altered his leave status
without consent, issued a retaliatory PIP and denied additional accommodations, and imposed a
forced relocation. Compl. ¶ 57, Dkt. No. 1. The summary judgment evidence, however, does not
support the allegations or satisfy the necessary elements for a hostile work environment claim.
To succeed on an ADA hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must show the
workplace 	“was 	permeated 	with 	discriminatory 	intimidation, 	ridicule, 	and 	insult, 	that 	is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment.” Williams v. FedEx Corporate Services, 849 F.3d 889, 897 (10th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.
1998)). Defendant asserts in its summary judgment motion that Plaintiff has no evidence of severe
or pervasive harassment necessary to sustain a hostile work environment claim. The Court agrees.
The record does not show a workplace permeated with intimidation, ridicule, and insult. Nor is
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there evidence of severe or pervasive misconduct that would alter the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment. Rather, it is undisputed that, after Plaintiff referred to one
employee as “ignorant” and suggested to another employee that he should worry about his job, T-
Mobile engaged in a “Formal Discussion” with Plaintiff, after which he remained in Good
Standing; his pay, title, and benefits were unaffected; and he was eligible for transfers and
promotions. There is no evidence that T-Mobile denied Plaintiff any accommodation requests or
forced him to relocate. Consequently, T-Mobile is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
hostile work environment claim.
D. FMLA interference (Count IV)
Plaintiff asserts that T-Mobile interfered with his FMLA rights by unlawfully converting
his intermittent leave to continuous leave without his consent, failing to account for his approved
leave days, and enforcing discriminatory attendance policies. Compl. ¶ 64, Dkt. No. 1. Defendant
requests summary judgment on Count IV because T-Mobile never denied Plaintiff a request for
leave or penalized him for taking leave.
The FMLA provides eligible employees with 12 weeks of leave, including taking leave
intermittently when medically necessary, during any 12-month period if a “serious health
condition” prevents such an employee from performing the functions of his job. See 29 U.S.C. §
2612(a)(1)(D), (b)(1). “The FMLA makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain,
or deny the exercise or attempt to exercise any right provided under the FMLA.” Brown v.
ScriptPro, LLC, 700 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)). To succeed
on an FMLA interference claim, “an employee must show that (1) he was entitled to FMLA leave,
(2) an adverse action by his employer interfered with his right to take FMLA leave, and (3) this
adverse action was related to the exercise or attempted exercise of the employee’s FMLA rights.”
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Id. A plaintiff may satisfy the second element by showing that he was prevented from taking the
full 12 weeks of leave guaranteed by the FMLA, denied reinstatement following leave, or denied
initial permission to take leave. Campbell v. Gambro Healthcare, Inc., 478 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th
Cir. 2007).
Defendant has produced evidence that it approved Plaintiff’s requests for FMLA leave,
that Plaintiff remained in good standing with the company after taking leave, and that his pay, title,
and benefits were unaffected. Plaintiff failed to produce evidence to establish the second element
necessary to succeed on a an FMLA interference claim – that T-Mobile took an adverse action that
interfered with Plaintiff’s right to take FMLA leave. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on Count IV.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum of Law (Dkt. No. 75) is GRANTED. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment
on all claims against it and all Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED.
_______________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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