Hunt-Brown v. New Mexico General Services Department et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
KIMBERLY HUNT-BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 1:23-cv-00782-SMD-KK
NEW MEXICO GENERAL
SERVICES DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Kimberly Hunt-Brown’s (“Plaintiff’s”)
motion to remand the suit to the First Judicial District Court for the State of New Mexico. Doc.
147 (“Mot. for Remand”). Defendants filed their response and Plaintiff replied. See Doc. 148
(“Defs.’ Resp.”); Doc. 149 (“Pl.’s Reply”). Upon careful review of the law and relevant facts, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for remand.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants on August 15, 2023, in the First Judicial District
Court, Santa Fe County, in the State of New Mexico. Doc. 1 at 1. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants
violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and New Mexico Human Rights Act
(“NMHRA”). 29 U.S.C. § 2601; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7 (2024). On September 13, 2023,
Defendants removed this case to federal court on federal question jurisdiction. Id. The parties
proceeded with discovery and, following its conclusion, filed cross motions for summary
judgment. See Docs. 98, 99, 100. At the time these motions were filed, trial was set for March 9,
2026. See Doc. 69. Both parties submitted exhibit lists, witness lists, and motions in limine in
Case 1:23-cv-00782-SMD-KK Document 152 Filed 03/10/26 Page 1 of 6

2
preparation for conference. However, the Court held a scheduling conference on January 27, 2026,
and reset trial for May 4, 2026. Doc. 143. On February 6, 2026, the Court granted Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to all but one of Plaintiff’s claims—the allegation that
Defendants’ failure to accommodate her disability violated the NMHRA. Doc. 146 (“Order”). No
federal claims remain. See id.
Plaintiff now seeks remand to the First Judicial District Court for Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Mot. for Remand at 5. Plaintiff argues that “there exists no good reason for this Court to continue
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” Id. at 3. Regarding
the efforts already expended on pretrial filings, Plaintiff underscores that the Court’s summary
judgment decision “substantially changed the case so parties will have to prepare these trial
documents again.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff posits that reworking these filings means “there will be no
efficiency or economy from remaining in federal court, versus having to prepare them again in
state court.” Id. Defendants oppose remand. See Defs.’ Resp. They anticipate that securing a
new trial date in state court will only prolong the already protracted litigation. Defendants also
highlight that Plaintiff’s current position conflicts with her prior opposition to delaying trial. Id.
at 1. Lastly, Defendants argue that because New Mexico courts rely on federal law in interpreting
failure to accommodate claims under the NMHRA, there is little risk of the Court muddying the
waters of state law if it retains jurisdiction. Id. at 4.
LEGAL STANDARD
The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). The supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, articulates four relevant factors for conducting this analysis: whether (1) the claim
raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the
Case 1:23-cv-00782-SMD-KK Document 152 Filed 03/10/26 Page 2 of 6

3
claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances,
there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Plaintiff’s
motion to remand arises out of the third scenario—whether the Court should exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over her state claim following its dismissal of her federal claims. To answer that
question the Court must “consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the
values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to
exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims.”
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); Brooks v. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213,
1230 (10th Cir. 2010). Typically, the balance of these interests compels remand. As the Supreme
Court explained in Gibbs, when “federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not
insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n,
149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998). This practice effectuates the core federalist principle “that
a state court try its own lawsuits.” Thatcher Enters. v. Cache Cnty. Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478
(10th Cir. 1990). Still, remand is not mandatory. A court may retain jurisdiction over the state law
claims if judicial economy and fairness provide compelling reasons to do so. Brooks, 614 F.3d at
1230.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue left in this suit is Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants failed to accommodate
her disability and therefore violated the New Mexico Human Rights Act. Though the NMHRA is
a state statute, New Mexico courts look to federal precedent from the American with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”) when deciding failure to accommodate claims. See Trujillo v. N. Rio Arriba Elec.
Case 1:23-cv-00782-SMD-KK Document 152 Filed 03/10/26 Page 3 of 6

4
Coop., 41 P.3d 333 (N.M. 2001); Goodman v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC, 461 P.3d 906, 914 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2019). Defendants thus urge that the Court can decide Plaintiff’s case without overstepping
into the province of state courts. The Court disagrees. Although concerns of comity are lessened
here, they are not wholly absent. Compare Birdwell v. Glanz, 790 F. App’x 962, 964 (10th Cir.
2020) (reversing district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction and remanding case to state
court when all that remained was “an undecided issue of state law, involving interpretation of an
assumption stated in a footnote to a recent opinion of the Oklahoma Supreme Court”), with New
Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1179 (D.N.M. 2003) (finding that novelty of state
law questions “carr[ied] less than their usual weight given the dependency of the state claims upon
definition supplied pursuant to [federal law]”). Federal courts must always avoid rendering
“[n]eedless decisions of state law . . . both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between
the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
726. If this Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction, its decision will not create binding
precedent for New Mexico courts. Nor is it in the best position to predict exactly how the New
Mexico legislature intended for the NMHRA to operate. This case is therefore better suited for
state court. Proceeding in that forum will enable New Mexico courts to create persuasive and
binding precedent for future NMHRA litigants that aligns with the law’s animating purpose.
Federal courts simply cannot do the same. Merrifield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Cnty. of Santa
Fe, 654 F.3d 1073, 1086 (10th Cir. 2011).
The Court finds that Defendants’ worries about judicial economy do not overcome these
federalist principles. For one, remand is often granted after the summary judgment stage. “When
defendants properly obtain summary judgment on all federal claims, ‘we have declined to exercise
our supplemental jurisdiction over issues of state law, and instead, when in the interests of comity
Case 1:23-cv-00782-SMD-KK Document 152 Filed 03/10/26 Page 4 of 6

5
and justice, remanded with instructions to dismiss.’” Birdwell, 790 F. App’x at 964 (quoting Est.
of Reat v. Rodriguez, 824 F.3d 960, 967 (10th Cir. 2016)). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has repeatedly
reversed district courts for retaining jurisdiction over state law claims following a grant of
summary judgment on federal claims. See, e.g., id. (reversing district court’s decision to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claim following grant of summary judgment on federal
claims); Aery v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Tulsa Cnty., 696 F. App’x 360, 361 (10th Cir. 2017)
(reversing district court for granting summary judgment on a state tort claim after dismissal of all
federal claims); Brooks, 614 F.3d at 1229–30 (finding that district court erred in granting summary
judgment against plaintiff on state tort law claim because only the state-law issue was left for
decision).
Although trial is approaching in this case, proceeding in state court will necessitate few
duplicative efforts. The Court has not ruled on the motions in limine, made any evidentiary
findings, or admitted witnesses. And in either forum, the parties will need to amend their motions
to accord with the Court’s grant of summary judgment (as evidenced by Defendants’ recent request
to amend their motion in limine (Doc. 151)). The only identifiable advantage this Court compared
to a New Mexico court is its familiarity with the case. But with one claim left in the suit, and a
straightforward factual record, the court can easily acquaint itself with the relevant law and facts.1
Thus, “[t]here is no guarantee that the Court can, even with its experience in the case, do the work
better or faster than the state court.” Salazar v. San Juan Cnty. Det. Ctr., 301 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1004
1 Defendants primarily rely on Henderson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 412 F. App’x 74 (10th Cir. 2011) in their
response. See Defs.’ Resp. at 2–3. There, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to remand where the
parties had “filed a Joint Status Report and Provisional Discovery Plan, prepared and served disclosure statements as
required by [Fed.] R. Civ. P. 26(a), attended a scheduling conference, exchanged written discovery, taken multiple
depositions, participated in a telephonic status conference, and designated expert witnesses” and a trial date had been
set. Id. at 79. The court found that “[b]ecause the district court did not make any erroneous conclusions of law or
fact, we uphold its discretionary choice to refuse to remand this case to state court.” Id. But finding that the district
court did not err in exercising supplemental jurisdiction does not dictate the inverse, i.e. that it would have abused its
discretion if it chose to remand.
Case 1:23-cv-00782-SMD-KK Document 152 Filed 03/10/26 Page 5 of 6

6
(D.N.M. 2017). The Court therefore finds that “the interest in comity—leaving to the states to
decide novel questions of state-law—clearly predominates here” and declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NMHRA claim. Merrifield, 654 F.3d at 1086.
CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion to Remand, Doc. 147, is GRANTED;
(2) The case is remanded to the First Judicial District Court, County of Santa Fe, State of
New Mexico.
________________________________
SARAH M. DAVENPORT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:23-cv-00782-SMD-KK Document 152 Filed 03/10/26 Page 6 of 6