First State Bancorporation

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
In re: 	FIRST STATE BANCORPORATION, 	No. 7-11-11916 JA
Debtor.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the following three fee applications: 1) Second
Application for Allowance of Compensation for Attorney for Trustee (Linda S. Bloom, P.A.)
(“Bloom’s Second Application”) and Addendum to Second Application for Allowance of
Compensation for Attorney for Trustee (Linda S. Bloom PA) (“Bloom Addendum”) 1 (Bloom’s
Second Application and the Bloom Addendum together, the “Bloom Fee Application”) (Docket
Nos. 181 and 189); 2) Third Application for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and
Reimbursement of Expenses and Costs (“Pierce Fee Application”)(Docket No. 190); and 3) First
Interim Fee Application for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses by Kozyak Tropin
& Throckmorton, P.A. as Special Litigation Counsel for the Trustee (“KT&T Fee
Application”)(Docket No. 193). The Federal Deposit Insurance Company, as Receiver for First
Community Bank (“FDIC-R”) objected to the Bloom Fee Application, the Pierce Fee
Application and The KT&T Fee Application. See Docket Nos. 184, 192, 196, and 200.2 The
1Linda S. Bloom filed the Bloom Addendum in an effort to address FDIC-R’s objection that some of the time entries
in Bloom’s Second Application were “lumped.” FDIC-R objected to Ms. Bloom’s submission of the Bloom
Addendum, arguing that Ms. Bloom should not be allowed to re-construct her time entries after the fact to break
down the components of lumped time entries. At the final hearing, Ms. Bloom testified that she kept
contemporaneous time records and that she was able to discern from those records the amount of time spent on each
task contained in the lumped entries. Based on this testimony, the Court will consider the Bloom Addendum
together with Bloom’s Second Application. FDIC-R’s objection to Ms. Bloom’s submission of the Bloom
Addendum is overruled.
2The FDIC-R filed the following objections to the three fee applications:
1. 	Objection to Second Application for Allowance of Compensation for Trustee (Linda S. Bloom, P.A.) –
Docket No. 184 (Exhibit 2);
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Court held final hearings on the three fee applications and took the applications under
advisement.
Linda S. Bloom is the Chapter 7 Trustee in First State Bancorporation’s Chapter 7 case
(Linda S. Bloom in her capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee hereafter is called “Chapter 7 Trustee” or
“Trustee”). She also serves as counsel for the Trustee.3 Chris W. Pierce of Hunt & Davis, P.C.
serves as general counsel for the Chapter 7 Trustee.4 Corali Lopez-Castro and David A. Samole
of Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A. (“KT&T”) serve as special litigation counsel for the
Trustee.5 One of the FDIC-R’s primary objections to the three fee applications is the alleged
duplication of services by Linda S. Bloom, P.A. (the “Bloom Firm”) as attorney for the Trustee,
Chris W. Pierce, as general counsel for the Trustee, and KT&T as special litigation counsel for
the Trustee. To avoid a duplication of the Court’s efforts, the Court will address all three fee
applications in one Memorandum Opinion. 	As explained below, the Court will grant, in part,
and deny, in part each of the three fee applications.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
First State Bancorporation filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code on April 27, 2011. Linda S. Bloom was appointed as Chapter 7 Trustee. 	She filed an
2. 	Supplement to Objection of Federal Deposit Insurance Company, as Receiver for First Community
Bank, To Second Application for Allowance of Compensation for Attorney for Trustee (Linda S.
Bloom, P.A.) – Docket No. 192 (Exhibit 7);
3. 	Objection of Federal Deposit Insurance Company, as Receiver for First Community Bank, to Third
Application of Hunt & Davis, P.C. (Chris W. Pierce) for Allowance and Payment of Compensation
and Reimbursement of Fees and Costs – Docket No. 196 (Exhibit 11);
4. 	Objection of Federal Deposit Insurance Company, as Receiver for First Community Bank, to First
Interim fee Application of Kozyak Tropin and Throckmorton, P.A., as Special Litigation Counsel for
Trustee, for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses – Docket No. 200 (Exhibit 13).
3See Order Authorizing Employment of Attorney for Trustee (Linda S. Bloom, P.A.)(“Bloom Employment Order”)
– Docket No. 9.
4See Order Approving Trustee’s Application to Employ Counsel for the Trustee (Hunt & Davis, P.C.) (“Pierce
Employment Order”) – Docket No. 37.
5See Order Granting, In Part on Certain Conditions, and Denying, In Part, Trustee’s Application for Employment of
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton, P.A. as Special Litigation Counsel (“Special Counsel Employment Order”) –
Docket No. 170.
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application to employ the Bloom Firm as counsel for the Trustee on April 28, 2011. See Docket
No. 7. The Bloom Employment Order was entered the next day. See Docket No. 9. 	The
Chapter 7 Trustee sought to employ Hunt & Davis, P.C. (Chris W. Pierce) as general counsel for
the Chapter 7 Trustee on June 13, 2011. See Docket No. 30. 	The Pierce Employment Order
was entered on July 12, 2011. See Docket No. 37. The Chapter 7 Trustee initially sought to
employ Alston & Bird LLP as special litigation counsel to represent her in connection with
potential tax refund litigation and litigation against FDIC-R. See Application to Retain Alston &
Bird LLP as Special Litigation Counsel Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), (c), and 328(a) – Docket
No. 44 and Trustee’s First Amended Application to Retain Alston & Bird LLP as Special
Litigation Counsel Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), (c), and 328(a) – Docket No. 119 (together,
“Application to Employ Alston & Bird”).
On March 6, 2013, the Court denied the Chapter 7 Trustee’s Application to Employ
Alston & Bird. 	See Docket No. 158. The Trustee then sought to employ KT&T as special
litigation counsel. See Docket No. 159. 	The Special Counsel Employment Order was entered on
March 28, 2013. See Docket No. 170. The applications to employ Hunt & Davis, P.C. and
KT&T each represent that the attorneys will not duplicate work performed by other attorneys
employed by the Trustee. See Application to Employ Counsel for Trustee (Hunt & Davis, P.C.)
– Docket No. 30 (“Attorney will not duplicate any work performed by Linda S Bloom, P.A. in its
capacity as attorney.”); Trustee’s Application for Employment of Kozyak Tropin &
Throckmorton, P.A. as Special Litigation Counsel – Docket No. 159 (“The Trustee and the Firm
will use their reasonable efforts to ensure that the services performed by the Firm will not
duplicate or overlap with the services being performed by other professionals retained by the
Trustee in this Chapter 7 Case.”).
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So far, the Court has approved the following compensation for the Bloom Firm as
counsel for the Chapter 7 Trustee, and Hunt & Davis, P.C. as general counsel for the Chapter 7
Trustee:
Applicant 	Application 	Time Period 	Amount
Approved
Bloom 	First Application for
Compensation
(Docket No. 109)
4/29/11 to 7/17/12 	$21,810.806
Pierce 	First Application for
Compensation
(Docket 93)
Second Application for
Compensation
(Docket 163)
6/13/11 to 5/31/12
6/1/12 to 2/28/13
$32,704.107
$54,626.148
TOTAL: 	$109,141.04
The total of the compensation requested in the three pending fee applications is $181,963.45.9
Hunt & Davis, P.C. and the Bloom Firm each offered testimony in support of their respective fee
applications.10 KT&T did not offer any testimonial evidence in support of its fee application.
6See Default Order Approving First Application for Allowance of Compensation for Attorney for Trustee (Linda S.
Bloom P.A.) – Docket No. 113.
7 See Default Order Granting Application for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement of
Expenses and Costs – Docket No. 108.
8 See Default Order Granting Second Application for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement
of Expenses and Costs – Docket No. 172.
9The Bloom Fee Application requests approval of $12,160.02. See Docket No. 181. The Pierce Fee Application
requests approval of $15,971.22. See Docket No. 190. The KT&T Fee Application requests approval of
$153,832.21. See Docket No. 193.
10 Chris Pierce participated in the final hearing on the Bloom Fee Application by making oral argument and
questioning Linda S. Bloom on the witness stand. He also charged for time spent prior to the hearing assisting Ms.
Bloom in responding to FDIC-R’s objection to the Bloom Fee Application. FDIC-R objects to Mr. Pierce’s
representation of Linda S. Bloom, P.A in connection with the Bloom Fee Application because Mr. Pierce represents
Linda S. Bloom as Chapter 7 Trustee and does not represent her law firm, Linda S. Bloom, P.A. An attorney may
be compensated from the estate for preparing and defending a fee application. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(6)(“Any
compensation awarded for the preparation of a fee application shall be based on the level and skill reasonably
required to prepare the application.”); In re Smith, 317 F.3d 918, 928 (9 th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds
by Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 531-39, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004)(observing that §
330(a) does not expressly forbid compensation for time spent litigating fee applications, and finding that
compensation may be awarded for such services provided the applicant satisfies all of § 330(a)’s requirements); In
re Millennium Multiple Employer Welfare Benefit Plan, 470 B.R. 203, 217 (Bankr.W.D.Okla. 2012)(noting a split in
authority on the issue of whether fees incurred defending fee applications are compensable, and concluding that
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Instead, counsel for KT&T made oral argument and relied on the KT&T Fee Application itself in
support of its requested compensation.
FEE STANDARDS
A Chapter 7 case trustee may hire herself as counsel. See In re Kusler, 224 B.R. 180, 193
(Bankr.N.D.Okla. 1998)(trustees are not precluded from hiring their own firms to represent
them). See also, 11 U.S.C. § 327(a)(“the trustee . . . may employ one or more attorneys . . . to
represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties under this title.”). 	But it is not
typical for a case trustee to employ herself as counsel and also to hire separate counsel as general
counsel for the estate. 	Because the Chapter 7 Trustee in addition hired special litigation counsel,
there are three law firms employed by the Chapter 7 Trustee.
Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code governs compensation of professionals employed by
the case trustee.11 To be compensable, the amount of the requested attorneys’ fees must be
“allowing fees for the defense of a fee application is consistent with the overall purpose of § 330 of the Bankruptcy
Code, and provides a benefit to the bankruptcy estate and to the bankruptcy system.”)(citation omitted). But see In
re Brous, 370 B.R. 563, 572 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2007)(pointing out that “[t]here is no parallel statutory requirement to
defend against an objection to a fee application, or to receive compensation for the legal fees incurred in that
defense[,]” and that some courts decline to award fees for defending a fee application if a good faith objector
prevails). If the Bloom Firm employed more than one attorney, that attorney could have assisted Ms. Bloom with
the hearing and the Bloom Firm could have charged for that other attorney’s time. But here, Ms. Bloom is the only
attorney in her firm. Mr. Pierce questioned Ms. Bloom on the witness stand so that Ms. Bloom would not have to
provide a narrative testimony or pose questions to herself. Under these unique circumstances, the Court will allow
Mr. Pierce to charge for his time assisting Ms. Bloom in defending the Bloom Fee Application notwithstanding the
fact that he does not represent Linda S. Bloom, P.A. The potential impact on the estate is substantially the same as it
would have been had Ms. Bloom and another attorney in her firm charged for their time in defending the Bloom Fee
Application. Further, the estate has an interest in obtaining a just determination of the amount it should pay its
professionals.
11 Section 327(a) provides, in relevant part:
[T]he trustee, with the court’s approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants, appraisers,
auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and
that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties under this
title.
11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
Section 330(a) provides, in relevant part:
After notice . . . and a hearing . . . the court may award . . . a professional person employed under section
327 . . .
(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the . . . professional
person . . . and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person; and
(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.
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reasonable, and the services provided must be actual and necessary. 11 U.S.C. §
330(a)(1)(A)(“the court may award . . . a professional person employed under section 327 . . .
reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services . . .”). Expenses likewise must be actual
and necessary to be compensable from the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(B)(“the court may
award . . . . reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”).
“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The Court must
consider the factors enumerated in 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)12 as well as the relevant Johnson
factors13 to assess the reasonableness of requested compensation. In re Market Center East
Retail Property, Inc., 730 F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 2013)(holding that the bankruptcy court is
required to “properly consider the § 330(a)(3) and Johnson factors in evaluating whether the
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1).
12 The § 330(a)(3) factors are:
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the
service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the
complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed;
(E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise has
demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and
(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably
skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3).
13 The Johnson factors are:
(1) The time and labor required.
(2) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case.
(5) The customary fee.
(6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances.
(8) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys.
(10) The “undesirability” of the case.
(11) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(12) Awards in similar cases.
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 – 719 (5 th Cir. 1974).
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compensation is reasonable.”). See also, In re Commercial Financial Services, Inc., 427 F.3d
804, 811 (10 th Cir. 2005)(the determination of the reasonableness of a requested professional fee
“takes into account each of the factors specifically mentioned in § 330(a)(3) plus additional
relevant factors . . . [a]s articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.”).
Known as the adjusted “lodestar” method, this method of assessing the reasonableness of
requested fees encompasses the factors that 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) directs the Court to consider,
and has long been applied in bankruptcy cases to professionals hired under 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).14
The party seeking an award of compensation bears the burden of demonstrating that the services
provided were actual and necessary and otherwise satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 330.
See Commercial Fin., 427 F.3d at 811 (“The burden is on the party requesting fees to prove its
request is reasonable.”); In re Berg, 268 B.R. 250, 257 (Bankr.D.Mont. 2001)(“The burden of
proof to show entitlement to all fees requested from the estate is on the applicant.”)(citation
omitted). 	The Court may award less compensation than requested. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2).
“Lumping” of time entries where multiple tasks are described and associated with one
block of time, without an allocation of time for each entry, is generally insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 330. See In re Recycling Indus., Inc., 243 B.R. 386, 406
(Bankr.D.Colo. 2000)(noting that “‘[‘lumping’ is a] practice universally disapproved by the
bankruptcy courts for two reasons. One, it permits an applicant to claim compensation for rather
minor tasks which, if reported individually, would not be compensable. Two, it prevents the
Court from determining whether the individual tasks were expeditiously performed within a
reasonable period of time because it is impossible to separate into components the services which
14See Market Center, 730 F.3d at 1246 (“In this circuit, the adjusted lodestar approach is used to calculate reasonable
attorney’s fees under 11 U.S.C. § 330(a).”)(citing Commercial Fin., 427 F.3d at 811); In re Miniscribe, Corp. 309
F.3d 1234, 1244 (10 th Cir. 2002)(noting that the Tenth Circuit “has long applied the Johnson lodestar factors to
assess ‘reasonableness’ of attorney’s fees in a variety of contexts . . . and has also specifically determined that the
test applies to attorney fee determinations under § 330(a)(1)”)(citation omitted).
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have been lumped together.’”)(quoting In re Leonard Jed Co., 103 B.R. 706, 713 (Bankr.D.Md.
1989), amended by 118 B.R. 338 (Bankr.D.Md. 1990), on reconsideration, 118 B.R. 339
(Bankr.D.Md. 1990)).15 On the other hand, the Court is mindful that the general prohibition
against “lumping” should not be used “to inflict upon counsel unreasonable and unrealistic
billing record requirements” to itemize each and every possible severable task in a separate time
entry. In re Reconversion Technologies, Inc., 216 B.R. 46, 58 (Bankr.N.D.Okla. 1997).
An attorney requesting compensation must exercise billing judgment to ensure that the
compensation requested is actual and necessary. See In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 131
B.R. 474, 486 (Bankr.D.Utah 1991)(“The standard of section 330 that compensation be for
actual and necessary services makes the exercise of ‘billing judgment’ a mandatory requirement
in bankruptcy fee matters.”)(citation omitted); Reconversion Tech., 216 B.R. at 57 (applying to
bankruptcy cases the billing judgment principles set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at
434, which require counsel to “make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that
are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”). Not all work performed by an attorney
whose employment has been approved is compensable simply by virtue of the fact that the
attorney has actually performed the work. The Court will disallow fees resulting from excessive
time spent to complete a task. See In re Vista Foods USA, Inc., 234 B.R. 121, 130
(Bankr.W.D.Okla. 1999)(“services found to be excessive, redundant, or unnecessary are not
compensable.”)(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
In addition, compensation will not be awarded for “unnecessary duplication of services.”
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A)(i). The risk of duplication of services is particularly great where there
15See also, In re Fincher, 2012 WL 1155719, *7 (Bankr.D.N.M. Apr. 5, 2012)(noting that “‘[l]umping of tasks into
one time entry does not appear to comply with the requirements of NM-LBR 2016-1.1” and stating further that
“[l]umping of time entries . . .is particularly inappropriate in the bankruptcy context because it impedes the Court’s
ability to assess the reasonableness of the time expended to perform each task.”)(citation omitted).
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are three law firms employed by the Chapter 7 Trustee, and two of those firms are employed as
general counsel. Cf. Brous, 370 B.R. at 573 (disallowing compensation to trustee’s general
counsel where the services performed duplicated the services performed by special counsel); In
re Stevens, 407 B.R. 303, 309 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 2009)(trustee who employed her own firm as well
as other, independent attorneys as special counsel and as general counsel, was not entitled to
compensation for services by her own firm that unnecessarily duplicated the services of special
counsel).
When a Chapter 7 Trustee hires her own firm as counsel for the Chapter 7 Trustee there
is an inherent risk that the firm may charge for work that generally would be performed by the
Chapter 7 Trustee in her capacity as trustee. See Kusler, 224 B.R. at 192 (observing that “[t]he
trustee who hires his or her own firm as counsel is at a disadvantage as he or she reviews the
professional fees sought by his or her own firm. Many times the tasks at issue have been
performed by the trustee . . .”).16 Section 328(b) makes clear that a case trustee authorized to
serve as an attorney for the estate may be compensated “only to the extent that the trustee
performed services as attorney . . . for the estate and not for performance of any of the trustee’s
duties that are generally performed by a trustee without assistance of an attorney . . . for the
estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 328(b). See also, In re Garcia, 335 B.R. 717, 725 (9th Cir. BAP
2005)(“Section 328(b) provides that an attorney or accountant may not receive compensation for
the performance of any trustee’s duties that are generally performed by a trustee without the
assistance of an attorney or accountant.”)(citation omitted). Counsel for a Chapter 7 Trustee may
not be compensated for performing the trustee’s statutory duties. See, In re Virissimo, 354 B.R.
16See also, In re Kurtzman, 220 B.R. 801, 804 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 220 B.R. 538 (S.D.N.Y.
1998)(observing that, “[s]ince a bankruptcy trustee is responsible for monitoring all fees requested in a case, and has
a statutory duty to object to any inappropriate fees, a conflict develops when the trustee’s own law firm is retained as
his counsel . . . ”)(citation omitted).
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284, 289 (Bankr.D.Nev. 2006)(“The roles of trustee and attorney are distinct . . . and 11 U.S.C. §
328(b) prohibits an attorney-trustee from being paid for performing the statutory duties of a
trustee.”)(citation omitted); Kusler, 224 B.R. at 193 (“The trustee is not entitled to compensation
as an attorney for services ‘which can and should be performed by the trustee.’”)(quoting
Hansen, Jones & Leta, P.C. v. Segal, 220 B.R. 434, 458 (D.Utah 1998)(citation omitted));
Stevens, 407 B.R. at 308 (“the threshold issue, posed by section 328(b), is whether professional
services performed by an attorney for the trustee were required to be performed by a lawyer or
were instead within the scope of the trustee’s duties.”); In re Polk, 215 B.R. 250, 253
(Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1997)(“The statutory duties of the trustee are noncompensable as professional
time if performed by the trustee’s attorney.”)(citation omitted). Compensable services provided
by a trustee-attorney are restricted to those services that “can be performed legally only with a
law license.” Virissimo, 354 B.R. at 290. With these standards in mind, the Court will address
each of the three fee applications. 	The Court has considered and applied each of the section
330(a)(3) factors and the relevant Johnson factors in relation to each of the three fee applications
before the Court.
A. Bloom Fee Application
The Bloom Application seeks allowance and payment of compensation for the period
from July 18, 2012 to June 30, 2013 in the total amount of $12,160.02 consisting of: 1) fees in
the amount of 11,186.00; 2) costs in the amount of $178.50; and 3) tax on fees and costs in the
amount of $ 795.52. 	Ms. Bloom’s hourly rate charged in the Bloom Application is $235.00.
FDIC-R did not object to Ms. Bloom’s hourly rate and the Court finds such rate reasonable.17
17 Section 330(a)(3)(F) directs the court to consider “the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled
practitioners in cases other than cases under this title” when assessing the reasonableness of the requested hourly
rate. The reasonableness of a requested hourly rate falls within the Court’s discretion, and the Court can rely on its
own experience and knowledge of customary hourly rates to establish a reasonable hourly rate. See Smith v.
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Upon review of the Bloom Fee Application, the Court finds that compensation for the
following services will be disallowed because the services constitute non-attorney work that
should be performed by the trustee as part of her regular trustee duties:
Date 	Description 	Time 	Amount
Disallowed
08/09/12 	Re FDX sale – emails to title
company
.2 	$47.00
09/13/12 	Conference CPA re consolidated
return issues
.2 	$47.00
09/13/12 	Telephone conference with IRS re
refunds
.1 	$23.50
10/23/12 	Submit order re 2nd fee
application18
.1 	$23.50
11/07/12 	Email attorney Pierce re Amended
Application to employ special
counsel
.1 	$23.50
02/06/13 	Review FDIC proof of claim re
“undetermined” claims 19
.2 	$47.00
02/20/13 	Draft motion and order re blanket
bond payment
.5 	$117.50
02/20/13 	Email UST re bond order20 .1 	$23.50
Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 1122 (10 th Cir. 1990)(noting that “[t]he establishment of hourly rates in awarding
attorneys’ fees is within the discretion of the trial judge who is familiar with the case and the prevailing rates in the
area” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and that “[a] district judge . . . may also ‘turn to her own
knowledge’ to supplement the evidence.”)(quoting Bee v. Greaves, 910 F.2d 686, 689 n.4 (10 th Cir. 1990));
Recycling Indus., 243 B.R. at 404 n. 6 (noting that when there is no evidence of prevailing market rates, the court “
may use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to establish the rate.”)(citation omitted). 	See also,
Vista Foods, 234 B.R. at 	128 n.20 (whether a requested hourly rate is reasonable falls within the court’s discretion
and should be based on the current case and prevailing rates)(citing Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d at 1122).
18 This service also appears to constitute non-legal clerical work. Clerical tasks are generally not compensable from
the bankruptcy estate. See In re Wheeler, 439 B.R. 107, 110 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 2010)(“Clerical services should not
be billed separately to clients, but should be included in the office overhead.”)(citation omitted); CF & I
Fabricators, 131 B.R. at 489 (stating that “[i]f clerical or secretarial services shift to the paraprofessional, the
service is overhead and is not a reasonable charge to the estate.”).
19 Under 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5), a chapter 7 trustee is charged with examining proofs of claims. See 11 U.S.C. §
704(a)(5)(“The trustee shall – if a purpose would be served, examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of
any claim that is improper.”).
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03/11/13 	Telephone conference with law
firms re employment of special
counsel re FDIC issues
.1 	$23.50
TOTAL: 	$376.00
Ms. Bloom also billed one hour of her time to “review and revise settlement documents”
in connection with the “FDX sale.” See Bloom Fee Application – Time Entry on 08/09/12. The
review of settlement documents in connection with a Chapter 7 Trustee’s sale of property can
fall within the trustee’s regular duties. 	Cf. Virissimo, 354 B.R. at 295 (finding that
communicating with the realtor and opposing counsel about the sale of real property, and
reviewing a title report fell within the scope of regular trustee duties, absent a description in the
fee application of attendant legal issues that would require the services of an attorney). But
where the assistance of an attorney is required to complete the task, the time spent is
compensable provided the requested compensation is reasonable and necessary. See, Virissimo,
354 B.R. at 290 (observing that “[t]he role of counsel for the trustee . . . is to perform those tasks
that require special expertise beyond that expected of an ordinary trustee[,]” and acknowledging
that “[l]aw practice is not limited to conducting litigation, but includes the preparation of
documents requiring the use of legal knowledge or skill.”)(citation omitted).
Here, Ms. Bloom testified that there were questionable title issues relating to the sale and
that the work she performed included preparation of transactional documentation for the sale.
The Court accepts this testimony as sufficient supporting evidence that the work performed
under the description “review and revise settlement documents” required the use of legal skills
outside the scope of a trustee’s ordinary duties.
20 This service also appears to constitute non-legal clerical work.
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13
FDIC-R also asserts that the Bloom Firm spent excessive time preparing the Bloom Fee
Application. This Court agrees. The Bloom Fee Application is a three-page document that Ms.
Bloom billed 2.5 hours to prepare, and appears to be largely based on a form. See Bloom Fee
Application – time entry on 6/25/13. The Court will cut 1.5 hours of the time requested to
prepare the Bloom Fee Application and disallow $352.50.
With respect to the time spent preparing the second fee application for the accountants
employed by the Chapter 7 Trustee, the Court finds that compensation is appropriate as
requested. FDIC-R points out that the Chapter 7 Trustee has not been hired as the attorney for
the accountants. But in preparing the accountants’ fee application, Ms. Bloom performed a legal
service for which a professional employed by the estate may be compensated. 	Accountants who
do not regularly provide services in connection with bankruptcy cases would not be familiar with
the requirements for filing a fee application in a bankruptcy case. There is no evidence before
the Court that the accountants also charged for preparing their fee application. It is in the estate’s
interest to provide counsel to assist professionals who do not regularly perform services in
bankruptcy cases with employment and fee applications. Otherwise, the estate may have to pay
other professionals to perform those services at a much greater cost to the estate. Further,
requiring all non-bankruptcy attorney professionals to retain their own counsel in connection
with employment and fee applications could impact the ability of the estate to retain competent
professionals at a reasonable cost. It is not inappropriate for the Chapter 7 Trustee’s counsel to
complete that work and seek compensation for it as part of counsel’s own fee application.
FDIC-R also complains that Ms. Bloom improperly charged for responding to FDIC-R’s
discovery requests in connection with the application to employ Alston and Bird, LLC as special
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14
litigation counsel.21 FDIC-R characterizes this work as the duty of a party litigant to respond to
an opposing party’s discovery requests. 	The Court agrees that work by a Chapter 7 trustee to
gather responsive documents as part of the discovery process would not constitute compensable
legal work. Consequently, the Court will disallow compensation in the amount of $658.00 for
work described as “responding FDIC discovery re employment of special counsel” on August
11, 2012. It is not possible to discern from this description that the work performed required the
use of legal services. 	Nor is Ms. Bloom’s testimony that she was required to conduct legal
research and respond to legal issues raised by the discovery requests sufficient to explain why
that time entry describes legal work. 	Two other time entries in this category do appear to
describe legal work. See n. 19 below, items 2 and 3. Unless such work unnecessarily duplicates
services by another professional employed by the Chapter 7 Trustee, the Court finds that the
work described in the time entries on January 23, 2013 and February 6, 2013 constitutes
compensable legal services.
The possible duplication of services among the attorneys hired to represent the Chapter 7
Trustee raises some serious concerns. Because the Chapter 7 Trustee hired not only the Bloom
Firm as general bankruptcy counsel, but also hired Davis & Hunt, P.C. as general bankruptcy
counsel, she must give particular care to clearly define the legal services that she will perform for
the Trustee as the sole lawyer employed by the Bloom Firm and the legal services that her other
21 FDIC-R objected to the following time entries:
Date 	Description 	Time 	Amount
1 	08/11/12 	Responding FDIC discovery
reemployment of special
counsel
2.8 	$658.00
2 	01/23/13 	Research attorney work product
re privilege log [FDIC also
contends this is duplicative of
H & D work]
2.5 	$587.50
3 	02/06/13 	Research duty to supplement
discovery responses
1.4 	$329.00
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15
general counsel and her special counsel will perform in order to minimize the inefficient
duplication of efforts. Ms. Bloom testified in conclusory terms that she and Mr. Pierce divided
their tasks and did not duplicate work even though they both performed legal research with
respect to the tax refund and other issues involving the FDIC-R. 	This testimony is insufficient
to establish that no improper duplication of work occurred. Some of the descriptions of work in
the Bloom Fee Application appear to overlap work performed and charged by Mr. Pierce. 22 The
evidence does not adequately explain how such work differed. All three firms participated in the
preparation of KT&T’s employment application.23 After hiring Hunt & Davis, P.C. as her
general counsel, Ms. Bloom, as the Chapter 7 Trustee, became Hunt & Davis, P.C.’s client. 	It is
not appropriate for Ms. Bloom to charge fees as an attorney for conferences with Mr. Pierce
where his firm was acting as general counsel for the Chapter 7 Trustee. After reviewing the
22 For example:
Bloom Fee Application 	Date 	Pierce Fee Application 	Date
Research fraudulent transfer claim v. FDIC
(2.8)
03/11/13 	Legal research and review of case law
regarding FDIC priority claim, 548 actions,
grounds, elements, capital maintenance
claims, defenses (1.2)
03/01/13
Research, review documents re: capital
maintenance claim of FDIC (1.8)
03/13/13 	Continued review of FDIC POC, legal
research for capital maintenance claim, 548
defense, bank united opinion (.3)
03/12/13
Other time descriptions in the Bloom Fee Application appear to duplicate work completed by Mr. Pierce for which
he has already been compensated as part of his Second Application for Compensation. For example:
Bloom Fee Application 	Date 	Hunt and Davis, P.C.’s Second
Application for Compensation
Date
Legal analysis re work product (1.0) 	01/23/13 	Legal research for attorney work product
immunity
01/16/13
Review cases re FDIC claims (2.8) 	02/04/13 	Legal research for all cases cited by FDIC
in original and amended objection
02/04/13
23
Bloom Fee Application 	Pierce Fee Application 	KT&T Fee Application
Revise Trustee amended Application
to employ special counsel and
declaration (.80)
E-mails (3X) (.3) to employ Kozyak,
Tropin and Throckmorton; Review
and Revise Application, Review
Court’s Opinion, Prepare
Application for Filing (1.2)
Per comments from Trustee, revise
and supplement retention application
and affidavit and review and
incorporate further comments and
work with trustee’s counsel finalize
and have filed (1.5) Review and
revise retention papers (.4)
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16
Bloom Fee Application, the Pierce Fee Application, and the KT&T Application, the Court finds
that, to a certain degree, Ms. Bloom has not carried her burden to show that her work did not
duplicate work the services of other professionals retained to represent the Chapter 7 Trustee.
For example, the Trustee did not identify any differences in the tax, fraudulent transfer,
discovery, or FDIC-R claim issues that she and Hunt & Davis, P.C. researched.
Because Ms. Bloom is also the Chapter 7 Trustee who hired all three law firms, she is
ultimately responsible to ensure that tasks are assigned and completed efficiently. 	This is not to
say that it is never appropriate for more than one attorney or more than one law firm to work on a
particular matter. Cf. In re Trailer Source, Inc., 474 B.R. 846, 852 (Bankr.M.D. Tenn.
2012)(finding that trustee’s service as co-counsel with special counsel for the trustee was not
unreasonable nor duplicative, pointing out that the opposing parties often each had two or three
attorneys working on the case). But where multiple law firms all work on some of the same
matters, the requested fees will be carefully scrutinized to ensure that compensation is not
allowed for an “unnecessary duplication of services.” 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A)(i).
The Court will discount the following portions of Ms. Bloom’s requested fees to adjust
for the apparent unnecessary duplication of services:
Date 	Description 	Time 	Amount
Requested
Amount
Disallowed
11/07/12 	Revise Trustee amended Application
to employ special counsel and
declaration
.8 	$188.00 	$94.00
01/03/13 	Research re FDIC/tax refund issues 	2.4 	$564.00 	$282.00
01/23/13 	Telephone conference with Trustee
Attorney re work product motion to
compel
.2 	$47.00 	$47.00
01/23/13 	Legal analysis re work product 	1.0 	$235.00 	$117.50
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17
01/24/13 	Research FDIC tax refund, POC issue;
review similar cases other court
rulings
4.8 	$1,128.00 	$564.00
01/24/13 	Research privilege, discovery issues re
Alston & Bird employ, review file
docs re same
1.6 	$376.00 	$188.00
01/28/13 	Review court order re FDIC motion to
compel, analysis re discovery issues
.8 	$188.00 	$94.00
02/04/13 	Review cases re FDIC claims 	2.8 	$658.00 	$329.00
02/06/13 	Research and analysis re FDIC
priority and other claims
2.6 	$611.00 	$305.50
02/06/13 	Research BK rules re limitations
period on avoidance actions
1.3 	$305.00 	$152.75
03/07/13 	Research Capital Maintenance priority
claim/FDIC and document review re
same
2.6 	$611.00 	$305.50
03/11/13 	Research fraudulent transfer claim v.
FDIC
2.8 	$611.00 	$305.50
03/11/13 	Analysis re FDIC issues re employ
employment special counsel
2.0 	$470.00 	$235.00
03/13/13 	Research review documents re Capital
Maintenance Claim of FDIC
1.8 	$423.00 	$211.50
03/14/13 	Review and revise Kozyak Tropin &
Throckmorton employment
application, 2014 stmt, and notice
1.8 	$423.00 	$423.00
TOTAL: 	$3,654.25
Based on the foregoing, the Court will disallow from the Bloom Fee Application a total of
$5,040.75, plus applicable gross receipts taxes on that amount. 	The balance of the requested
fees and all of the requested expenses, plus applicable New Mexico gross receipts taxes, in the
Bloom Fee Application are allowed.
B. Pierce Fee Application
The Pierce Fee Application seeks allowance and payment of compensation for the period
from March 1, 2013 to September 12, 2013 in the total amount of $15,971.22 consisting of: 	fees
in the amount of $14,827.50; 2) expenses in the amount of $101.76; and 3) taxes in the amount
of $1,037.93. At the final hearing on the Pierce Fee Application, Mr. Pierce testified that he was
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18
required to research the tax refund and capital maintenance guaranty issues involving FDICI-R
because it was not clear whether the Chapter 7 Trustee would be able to employ special counsel
to assist her with that task. The Chapter 7 Trustee’s first attempt to hire special counsel was
unsuccessful. 	At the time the Court denied the application to employ Alston & Bird, the
Chapter 7 Trustee was faced with a fast-approaching expiration of a statute of limitations period.
Chris Pierce testified that because the special counsel had not been approved, he was required to
research the Chapter 7 Trustee’s potential claims for which she sought special counsel to
represent her. 	Once KT&T’s employment was approved, Mr. Pierce brought KT&T up to speed
with the issues relating to those potential claims and counseled KT&T with respect to local
procedures and practices. 	KT&T filed its Complaint for Avoidance of Fraudulent Conveyance
and Objection to Claim No. 9-2 on April 26, 2013. See Adversary Proceeding No. 13-1033 –
Docket No. 1. After that time, it was not appropriate for Mr. Pierce to provide legal services on
the same matters for which KT&T was hired to serve as special litigation counsel except to the
extent Mr. Pierce provided guidance to KT&T with respect to local practices. 	To continue
working on matters that KT&T was retained to handle caused an unreasonable duplication of
services contrary to the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 330.
The Court will disallow the following amounts requested in the Pierce Fee Application,
totaling $2002.50, for the reasons stated:
Date 	Description 	Time 	Amount 	Amount
Disallowed
Reason for
Disallowance
04/29/13 	Review filed complaint; e-
mails with C. Lopez-Castro
regarding Judge Code,
procedure
.5 	$112.50 	$67.50 	(.3) Lumping;
review of filed
complaint is
unnecessary
service
06/10/13 	e-mails with L. Bloom, David
Samole regarding FDIC
motion to dismiss, response;
.9 	$202.50 	$202.50 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
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19
telephone conference with
trustee regarding same and
review motion
06/11/13 	e-mails (7x) L. Bloom, D.
Samole regarding IRS refunds,
claims procedures, FDIC
Motion to Dismiss, Responses
Hearings
1.10 	$247.50 	$123.75 	Duplication;
Motion to
dismiss is a
special counsel
task
06/12/13 	Conference with client
regarding hearing, motion to
dismiss IRS issues
.5 	$112.50 	$112.50 	Duplication;
Unnecessary
service
06/19/13 	Conference with L. Bloom
regarding FDIC motion to
dismiss, tax refund status,
hearing on scheduling
.5 	$112.50 	$56.25 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service; Motion
to Dismiss is a
special counsel
task
06/20/13 	Emails with client, D. Samole
regarding hearing on August
12, motion to dismiss
scheduling conference
.3 	$67.50 	$67.50 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
06/21/13 	Prepare for and telephonic
appearance at scheduling
conference
.6 	$135.00 	$135.00 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
6/24/13 	Emails with client, D. Samole
regarding hearing on motion to
dismiss; review court docket
minutes regarding adversary
proceeding, review motion to
dismiss, case law regarding
same
.8 	$180.00 	$180.00 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
06/25/13 	Review scheduling notice
regarding adversary, e-mails
with client regarding same
.2 	$45.00 	$45.00 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
06/28/13 	Conference with client
regarding motion to dismiss,
status of response, hearing, tax
refund, Mr. C De Baca Letter
.5 	$112.50 	$112.50 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
07/03/13 	Conference with Trustee
regarding . . . status of FDIC
Motion to Dismiss Hearing
.7 	$157.50 	$45.00 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service –
disallow .2
07/10/13 	e-mails with D. Samole, C.
Lopez-Castro regarding draft
of response to FDIC Motion to
Dismiss (.3); Review same,
.9 	$202.50 	$202.50 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
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20
file, motion, review case law,
format (.6)
07/12/13 	Review e-mails from Corali
Lopez-Castro, FDIC regarding
Scheduling Order, Conference
with Trustee regarding
Scheduling, hearing, motion to
dismiss response
.4 	$90.00 	$90.00 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
07/15/13 	e-mails with D. Samole, L.
Bloom regarding filed brief,
scheduling, hearing (.2);
review brief case law on
response to motion to dismiss
(.2)
.4 	$90.00 	$90.00 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
07/19/13 	Conference with client
regarding filed response to
FDIC’s motion to dismiss, case
law on transfers, fraudulent
transfers, defenses, issues
regarding IRS refunds, status
.6 	$135.00 	$135.00 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
07/30/13 	Review FDIC reply brief on
motion to dismiss, objection to
Trustee’s Fee Application (.4);
e-mails (5X) with David
Samole, Linda Bloom
regarding same, response to
Fee App. Objection, hearing,
Case law on Motion to Dismiss
(.5)
.9 	$202.50 	$202.50 	Duplication;
unnecessary
service
07/31/13 	Conference with client
regarding FDIC reply, hearing
on motion to dismiss, FDIC
objection to Fee App, Hearing
defense, settlement
.6 	$135.00 	$135.00 	Duplication;
Unnecessary
Service
TOTAL: 	$2,002.50
The balance of the requested fees and all of the requested expenses, plus applicable New Mexico
gross receipts taxes, in the Pierce Fee Application are allowed.
C. KT&T Fee Application
The KT&T seeks allowance and payment of compensation for the period from March 15,
2013 through September 30, 2013 in the total amount of $153,832.21 consisting of: 1) fees in
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21
the amount of $143,182.00; and 2) expenses in the amount of $10,650.21. The hourly rates of the
attorneys who worked on the case range from $275.00 to $495.00. FDIC-R did not object to the
reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by KT&T. The Court finds that such rates are
reasonable.24 FDIC-R objected to the KT&T Fee Application on the following grounds: 1)
impermissible duplication of services performed by Hunt & Davis, P.C. and among attorneys
within KT&T; 2) performance of non-legal work; and 3) vague task descriptions.
Some of FDIC-R’s duplication objections target conferences between Chris Pierce of
Hunt & Davis, P.C. and attorneys at KT&T. Mr. Pierce helped bring KT&T up to speed with
respect to the issues for which KT&T was retained to represent the Chapter 7 Trustee. It is not
unreasonable for Hunt & Davis, P.C. and KT&T each to charge for those conferences, provided
the time spent is not excessive. Mr. Pierce was relaying important information and knowledge to
the attorneys at KT&T, and the attorneys at KT&T were receiving such information and
contributing their own experience and knowledge to the exchange of information. With respect
to the alleged duplication of services among attorneys employed by KT&T, the Court finds that
some reduction in fees is appropriate. The billing statements attached to the KT&T Fee
Application reflect that David Samole is a partner at KT&T and Corali Castro-Lopez is a senior
partner at KT&T. Both Mr. Samole and Ms. Castro-Lopez worked on some of the same matters.
KT&T presented no testimony in support of the KT&T Fee Application, instead choosing to rely
solely on the KT&T Fee Application itself to establish the reasonableness and necessity of its
requested compensation. 	Absent evidence of how and why KT&T divided tasks among its
attorneys, why it was appropriate for one partner to routinely review and revise another partner’s
24 The Court acknowledges that the rates charged by KT&T are high compared with customary rates charged by
attorneys who live and practice in New Mexico, but finds, based on its own experience, that KT&T’s hourly rates
are not out of line with rates regularly charged for attorneys of comparable skill performing work of similar
complexity employed by out of state law firms in larger cities. The Court also determines that it was appropriate
for the Trustee to retain counsel at such rates on the matters for which she retained KT&T.
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22
work, and why it was necessary for both partners to attend and bill for their appearance at
hearings, the Court finds that a portion of the requested fees must be disallowed.
Attached as Exhibit A is a chart summarizing the work performed by KT&T attorneys in
connection with FDIC-R’s first motion to dismiss (“Fee Summary Chart”).25 The Fee Summary
Chart reveals that KT&T spent a total of 131.6 hours at a cost of $50,593.50 in responding to
FDIC-R’s Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Trustee’s Complaint (“FDIC-R’s Motion to
Dismiss”). This is a significant portion of the total compensation requested in the KT&T Fee
Application. Except for the time spent preparing case summaries and a portion of the travel
time, the Court finds that most of the time spent in connection with FDIC-R’s is reasonable and
necessary.
Though Ms. Castro-Lopez stated in argument that the case summaries were extremely
helpful to her in preparing for the oral argument on FDIC-R’s motion to dismiss, her argument is
not the equivalent of testimony. Based solely on the time entries described in the KT&T Fee
Application for this work, the Court’s familiarity with the briefs filed by the parties, the relevant
case law, and the nature and complexity of the issues, the Court finds that the time spent
preparing case summaries was excessive. 	The Court will reduce the 32.8 hours spent preparing
case summaries by one-third. 	In addition, both Mr. Samole and Ms. Castro traveled to
Albuquerque for the oral argument on FDIC-R’s first motion to dismiss. Yet, Mr. Samole did
not present any argument to the Court at the hearing. 	Mr. Samole billed 10 hours for time spent
travelling to Albuquerque, including time preparing Ms. Castro-Lopez for the hearing, and 10
hours for the return trip, including 2.4 hours attending the final hearing. 	Ms. Castro-Lopez
25 The Court created the Fee Summary Chart based on its review of the bills attached to the KT&T Fee Application.
Its purpose is to give a general approximation of the total time spent by the attorneys at KT&T completing certain
categories of tasks. The summary reflects the dates for actual time entries, but is not intended to be a comprehensive
summary of all the time entries that relate to each of the Court’s categories of work. In some instances, the Court
had to make an educated guess based on the description whether to include the time in the summary.
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23
likewise billed 20 hours of time in connection with her participation in person at the final hearing
on FDIC-R’s first motion to dismiss. See Fee Summary Chart. Travel time may be
compensable, especially where an attorney performs work during travel.26 But here, Mr. Samole
did not actively participate at the final hearing, Ms. Castro-Lopez was armed with extensive case
summaries, and there is no evidence why Mr. Samole’s appearance at the oral argument was
necessary. Each attorney billed ten hours per day in connection with the oral argument,
including travel time, for a total of 40 hours at a total cost of $17,900.00. The Court finds that
some reduction in compensation for this work is appropriate.
Upon review of the KT&T Fee Application, the Court will disallow the following
amounts for the reasons stated:
Date 	Description 	Time 	Amount 	Amount
Disallowed
Reason for
Disallowance
03/18/13 	Review and revise retention
papers (CLC)
.4 	$190.00 	$190.00 	unnecessary
duplication of work
performed by DAS
03/18/13 	Leave voice mail for J.
Sandell (CLC)
.1 	$ 49.50 	$49.50 	Clerical/non-
billable
03/19/13 	Review emails and respond.
Review court’s opinion and
other documents (CLC)
.8 	$380.00 	$148.50 	Lumped time - cut
by .3
03/21/13 	Receive and review
responsive correspondence
from Mr. Pierce to FDIC
counsel on retention issues
and pending settlement
discussions and related
matters and follow up
regarding same. (DAS)
.2 	$80.00 	$80.00 	Unnecessary
duplication of work
performed by CLC
03/22/13 	Review emails re: new
matter and confer with D.
.8 	$160.00 	$80.00 	Lumped
time/clerical work –
26See, In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., 526 F.3d 824, 828 (5 th Cir. 2008)(observing that some bankruptcy courts allow
attorneys to charge their full hourly rate “for travel time that is necessary pursuant to § 330” while many other courts
“discount non-working (and even working) travel time.”)(citations omitted). The rationale for allowing an attorney
to bill the full hourly rate for travel time is that “a lawyer travel[ing] for one client . . . incurs an opportunity cost that
is equal to the fee he would have charged that or another client if he had not been traveling.” Henry v. Webermeier,
738 F.2d 188, 194 (7 th Cir. 1984).
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24
Samole re: case background;
Retrieve proofs of claim
filed in bankruptcy (YCC)
cut by .4
03/27/13 	Attend telephonic status
conference and memorialize
Court’s additional language
as to specific tasks and scope
of retention employing
KT&T (DAS)
1.3 	$520.00 	$520.00 	Unnecessary
duplication of work
performed by CLC
03/27/13 	Finalize engagement letter
and disclosure (CLC)
.5 	$247.50 	$247.50 	Unnecessary
duplication of work
performed by DAS
03/28/13 	Retrieve and review notice
of hearing minutes of
preliminary hearing
approving KT&T retention
and vacating final hearing
set for tomorrow (DAS
.1 	$40.00 	$40.00 	Excessive time
spent on task 27
04/02/13 	Telephone conference with
L. Bloom re: strategy (CLC)
.8 	$396.00 	$396.00 	Unnecessary
duplication of work
performed by DAS
attending the same
teleconference
04/10/13 	Phone conference with
FDIC-R counsel as to
escrow agreement concept
(DAS)
.2 	$80.00 	$80.00 	Unnecessary
duplication of work
04/16/13 	Prepare for and participate in
conference (DAS)
1.0 	$400.00 	$400.00 	Unnecessary
duplication of work
performed by CLC
attending same
conference
04/22/13 	Research re: background
(CLC)
1.4 	$693.00 	$693.00 	Description fails to
adequately describe
the work
performed 28
04/24/13 	Telephone conference with
D. Samole re: status of copy
job (YCC)
.2 	$40.00 	$40.00 	Clerical work
04/29/13 	Confer with IT folks about
imaging/copying digitized
.3 	$120.00 	$120.00 	Overhead/clerical
27 Just because the minimum billing increment is one-tenth of an hour does not mean that tasks which likely take less
than one minute to complete should be billed at .1. At $400 or more per hour, minor tasks each billed at one-tenth
of an hour quickly add up to a significant amount.
28Cf. In re Threadneedle Street, LLC, 2012 WL 243765, *9 (Bankr.D.Colo. Jan. 25, 2012)(disallowing fees based
on an “insufficient description of the tasks performed”).
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25
records (DAS)
05/02/13 	Review summons and
calendar date of scheduling
conference; deal with service
of summons on FDIC and
verify service upon the
appropriate designees;
confer with D. Samole re:
same; review certificate of
service and comment on
same (YCC)
1.2 	$240.00 	$80.00 	Lumped time
entry/cut by .4
05/22/13 	Telephone conference with
C. Pierce re: continuance
(.1); telephone conference
with C. Wilson re: same (.1);
draft email to opposing
counsel (.1); review response
(.1) (CLC)
.4 	$198.00 	$198.00 	Unnecessary
duplication of work
performed by C.
Pierce
05/23/13 	Review stipulated order
vacating scheduling
conference and continuing
scheduling conference and
calendar same (YCC)
.1 	$20.00 	$20.00 	Clerical task
06/06/13 	Review stipulated order
extending time for FDIC to
file answer; calendar date
(YCC)
.1 	$20.00 	$20.00 	Clerical task
06/25/13 	Review court notice
scheduling continued status
conference and deadlines
related to final hearing n
FDIC’s motion to dismiss;
calendar same (YCC)
.1 	$20.00 	$20.00 	Clerical task
07/22/13 	Receive voicemail from J.
Wayser (CLC)
.1 	$49.50 	$49.50 	Excessive time
billed for task
08/07/13 	Deal with hearing binder re:
FDIC’s motion to dismiss
(YCC)
.2 	$40.00 	$40.00 	Unnecessary
duplication of work;
clerical task
08/08/13 	Travel to Albuquerque and
work with Ms. Lopez-Castro
to prepare for hearings and
follow up meeting with
Trustee (DAS)
10.0 	$4,000.00 	$2,000.00 	Travel to NM
unnecessary;
preparation for
hearing is
compensable (cut
by 5.0)
08/08/13 	Travel to Albuquerque (read
cases and prepare for oral
10.0 	$4,950.00 	$990.00 	Excessive time
billed for travel
Case 11-11916-j7 Doc 232 Filed 03/24/14 Entered 03/24/14 14:48:17 Page 25 of 31

26
argument during travel)
(10.0); meet with Trustee to
discuss approach to hearing
(CLC)
time; reduced to 8.0
hours of billable
time
08/09/13 	Prepare for and attend
hearings on motion to
dismiss (2.4); confer with
trustee about hearing and
next steps and travel back to
Miami (7.2) receive and
review hearing minutes (.1);
perform preliminary research
on general prohibition
against successive motions
to dismiss (.3) (DAS)
10.0 	$4,000.00 	$3,840.00 	Travel and
attendance at
hearing unnecessary
(cut by 9.6)
08/09/13 	Final preparation and
attendance at hearing in
opposition to motion to
dismiss; travel to Miami
from Albuquerque (CLC)
10.0 	$4,950.00 	$990.00 	Excessive time
billed for travel
time; reduced to 8.0
hours of billable
time
07/19/13
07/22/13
07/23/13
07/30/13
07/31/13
08/05/13
08/06/13
08/07/13
Review, Key Cite, prepare
case summaries, and prepare
talking points for cases cited
in Motion to Dismiss . . .
(DRM)
32.8 	$9,020.00 	$2,997.50 	Excessive time
billed for task (cut
by 10.9 hours)
09/03/13 	Confer with D. Samole re:
preparing KT&T’s first
interim application; review
and revise August bill
(YCC)
.4 	$80.00 	$80.00 	Clerical/office
overhead29
09/28/13 	Work on exhibits to fee
application (YCC)
1.7 	$340.00 	$340.00 	Clerical/office
overhead
TOTAL: 	$14,749.50
FDIC-R also objects to the travel costs for which KT&T requests reimbursement. These
expenses represent roundtrip airfare from Miami to Albuquerque for five people as follows:
29See CF & I Fabricators, 131 B.R. at 485-86 (finding that time spent creating time records and billing statements is
part of office overhead and is not compensable: “[p]osting the information contained in the daily time sheets into an
accounting system and printing the bill is a routine overhead expense . . .” Likewise, “[p]roofreading the data
contained in the application, as with any other clerical or secretarial task, is not compensable.”).
Case 11-11916-j7 Doc 232 Filed 03/24/14 Entered 03/24/14 14:48:17 Page 26 of 31

27
Travel Dates 	Airfare 	Other Related Travel Costs
04/22/13 – 04/24/13 	$1,582.60 	$220.00
(flight change fee)
04/22/13 – 04/24/13 	$1,582.60
04/22/23 – 04/24/13 	$945.60 	$24.30
(mileage)
08/08/13 – 08/09/13 	$915.60
08/08/13 – 08/09/13 	$915.60
No evidence was presented which might justify or explain the higher fare charged for two of the
three tickets purchased for the trip in April 2013, nor for the flight change-fee, nor for the
mileage. 	The Court will therefore reduce the requested travel expenses for the April 2013 trip to
the least expensive airfare and disallow the additional travel expenses representing the flight
change fee and mileage.30 Cf. In re Geneva Steel Co., 258 B.R. 799, 804 (Bankr.D.Utah
2001)(allowing reasonable airfare costs but reducing the compensable fare to the lesser amount
charged by other professionals in the case).31 Having determined that insufficient evidence was
presented to establish that it was necessary for Mr. Samole to travel to Albuquerque for the final
hearing on August 9, 2013, the Court will also disallow $915.00 representing the airfare for that
trip. In sum the Court will disallow a total of $2,433.9032 from the requested expenses and
$14,749.50 of the requested fees from the KT&T Fee Application. 	The balance of the requested
expenses and the balance of the requested fees in the KT&T Fee Application are allowed.
30 Each of the $1,582.60 fares will be reduced to equal the lower fare of $945.60.
31See also, In re EWI, Inc., 208 B.R. 885, 897 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1997)(disallowing airfare expense absent receipt of
supporting documentation).
32
Description 	Amount Disallowed
Airfare of $1,582.60 	$1,582.60 - $945.60 = 637.00
Airfare of $1,582.60 	$1,582.60 - $945.60 = 637.00
Mileage 	$24.30
Flight Change Fee 	$220.00
Airfare 	$915.60
TOTAL: 	$2,433.90
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28
Based on the foregoing, the Court will allow, in part, and disallow, in part each of the
three pending fee applications. 	The Court will enter separate orders consistent with this
Memorandum Opinion.
____________________________________
ROBERT H. JACOBVITZ
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Date entered on docket: March 24, 2014
COPY TO:
Linda S Bloom
Linda S. Bloom, P.A.
Attorney for Chapter 7 Trustee
13170 Central Ave SE Ste B #318
Albuquerque, NM 87123-5588
Chris W Pierce
Hunt & Davis, P.C.
Attorney for Chapter 7 Trustee
2632 Mesilla St. NE
Albuquerque, NM 87110
Corali Lopez-Castro
David A. Samole
Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton PA
Special Counsel for the Chapter 7 Trustee
2525 Ponce De Leon 9th Floor
Miami, FL 33134
Jeffrey A. Sandell
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1601 Bryan St, 15th Floor
Dallas, TX 75201
Joshua David Wayser 	United States Trustee
Katten Muchin Roseman LLP 	PO Box 680
Attorney for FDIC-R 	Albuquerque, NM 87103
2029 Century Park East, Ste 2600
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Case 11-11916-j7 Doc 232 Filed 03/24/14 Entered 03/24/14 14:48:17 Page 28 of 31

EXHIBIT A
1
Research/
Review 1
Draft Brief 	Hearing Prep/Travel 	Case Summaries 	Conferences re: MTD
issues/legal research, etc.
Hearing Time/
Travel
DAS 	06/10/13
06/13/13
06/17/13
06/18/13
06/23/13
06/26/13
07/09/13
07/15/13
07/30/13
07/30/13
07/30/13
07/31/13
07/31/13
08/01/13
08/04/13
.7
1.0
.6
1.8
.4
.4
1.0
2.8
.7
.4
.6
.6
.5
1.2
.6
06/19/13
06/20/13
06/21/13
06/24/13
06/26/13
07/15/13
1.6
1.3
1.0
2.2
.7
.3
07/30/13
08/05/13
08/05/13
08/05/13
08/06/13
08/06/13
08/06/13
08/06/13
08/07/13
08/07/13
08/08/13
.2
.4
.6
.3
.3
.6
.2
1.6
1.5
.5
10.0
(includes
travel
time)
06/18/13
06/19/13
06/21/13
06/21/13
06/23/13
06/26/13
07/02/13
07/03/13
07/05/13
07/10/13
07/10/13
07/17/13
07/30/13
07/31/13
07/31/13
08/05/13
.2
.2
.2
.2
.1
.3
.4
.1
.3
.5
.3
.3
.3
.6
.3
.2
8/09/13
8/9/13
2.4
7.6
(includes
travel
time)
TOTAL: 13.3 hrs
$5,560.00
TOTAL: 	7.1 hrs
$2,840.00
TOTAL: 16.2 hrs
$6,480.00
TOTAL: 4.5 hrs
$1,800.00
TOTAL: 10 hrs
$4,000.00
1 The Court attempted to include only the legal research that related to FDIC‐R’s motion to dismiss and to exclude legal research that related to the adversary
proceeding generally. In some instances the Court had to guess based on the time entry description whether to include the time as work related to FDIC’R’s
motion to dismiss.
Case 11-11916-j7 Doc 232 Filed 03/24/14 Entered 03/24/14 14:48:17 Page 29 of 31

EXHIBIT A
2
Research/
Review
Draft Brief 	Hearing Prep/
Travel
Case summaries 	Conferences re: MTD
issues/legal research, etc.
Hearing Time/
Travel
CLC 	6/11/13
7/11/13
7/15/13
.3
.8
.6
7/05/13
7/10/13
.9
1.2
7/12/13
7/15/13
7/19/13
8/05/13
8/06/13
8/07/13
8/08/13
.6
.4
.8
1.8
2.2
2.0
10.0
(includes
travel
time)
10.0
(includes travel time)
TOTAL: 1.7 hrs
$841.50
TOTAL: 2.1
$1,039.50
TOTAL: 17.8 hrs
$8,811.00
TOTAL: 10 hrs
$4,950.00
DRM 	6/24/13
6/26/13
7/10/13
7/10/13
6.2
3.5
1.4
2.6
8/05/13
8/06/13
8/06/13
8/07/13
8/07/13
.8
.5
.5
.3
.5
7/19/13
7/22/13
7/23/13
7/30/13
7/31/13
8/05/13
8/06/13
8/07/13
5.5
6.2
5.5
2.8
1.8
5.5
4.0
1.5
06/26/13
07/10/13
.1
.2
TOTAL: 16 hrs
$4,400.00
TOTAL: 2.8 hrs
$770.00
TOTAL: 32.8
$9,020.00
TOTAL: .3
$82.50
Case 11-11916-j7 Doc 232 Filed 03/24/14 Entered 03/24/14 14:48:17 Page 30 of 31

EXHIBIT A
3
TOTAL BY CATEGORY:
Research/Review 	Draft Brief 	Hearing Prep/
Travel
Case Summaries 	Conferences re: MTD
Issues/legal research,
etc.
Hearing Time/
Travel
Total Hours 	31 	9.2 	36.8
(including 20 hrs
of travel time)
32.8 	4.8 	20
Total Cost 	$10,801.00 	$3,879.00 	$16,061.00 	$9,020.00 	$1,882.50 	$8,950.00
TOTAL: $50,593.50
Case 11-11916-j7 Doc 232 Filed 03/24/14 Entered 03/24/14 14:48:17 Page 31 of 31