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3:25-cv-17339Njd21 févr. 2026

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ROLANDO LOPEZ SALAS,
Civil Action No. 25-17339 (MAS)
OPINION
Petitioner,
v.
LUIS SOTO, et al.,
Respondents.
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) and motion
for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 10) challenging his ongoing immigration detention.
Following an order to answer, the Government filed responses to the petition and motion (ECF
Nos. 5, 12), to which Petitioner replied (ECF Nos. 6, 13-14). 	For the following reasons,
Petitioner’s habeas petition shall be granted to the extent that Petitioner shall be afforded a bond
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and his motion seeking a temporary restraining order shall be
denied as moot in light of the granting of the petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua. (ECF No. 1-1 at 23.) On October 18, 2021,
Petitioner crossed the Rio Grande River near Eagle Pass, Texas, and presented himself to
immigration officials to seek asylum. (ECF No. 1 at 8; ECF No. 8-1.) Petitioner was taken into
custody, and immigration officials determined that Petitioner was not entitled to entry into the
United States and was instead subject to the expedited removal process of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
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(ECF No. 8-1.) 	Because Petitioner expressed a fear of return to his home country, he was not
issued a final expedited removal order at that time, but was instead referred for a credible fear
interview. (ECF No. 8-1; ECF No. 1-1 at 15.) On October 22, 2021, Petitioner was “released” by
border officials pursuant to “the authority contained in [8 U.S.C. § 1226] and part 236 of title 8,
Code of Federal Regulations.” 	(ECF No. 1-1 at 27.) 	Following this release, Petitioner initially
went to California, where, on November 1, 2021, the Government provided Petitioner with
documents that indicated that the Government had granted him humanitarian parole into the United
States pursuant to its discretionary humanitarian parole authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
(ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) Petitioner was informed in that document that his parole was discretionary in
nature and could be terminated “at any time and for any reason” in the Government’s discretion.
(Id.)
Petitioner filed paperwork seeking asylum, but that application was eventually denied in
light of Petitioner’s initial finding of inadmissibility. 	(ECF No. 1-1 at 12.) 	Petitioner was
thereafter instructed to appear for a credible fear interview to be held on September 23, 2025. (Id.
at 15.) Following that interview, at which Petitioner was found to have a credible fear of return to
his home country, Petitioner was arrested and taken back into custody, and his parole was revoked.
(ECF No. 1 at 10.) Petitioner has remained in immigration custody since that time.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), a federal court has jurisdiction over a habeas petition and
habeas relief may be extended to a petitioner only if the petitioner is “in custody” and the custody
is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3); 	Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner challenges his ongoing immigration detention without a bond hearing, which he
asserts can only lawfully arise under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Government contends that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). 	Aliens who attempt to enter the United States
illegally and who are detained shortly after making an unlawful crossing of the border are treated
as applicants for admission and are subject to the terms of § 1225(b)(1). 	Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139-40 (2020). 	As the Third Circuit has explained,
[u]nder 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and its companion regulations, two
classes of aliens are subject to [detention and] expedited removal
[proceedings 	under 	§ 	1225(b)(1)] 	if 	an 	immigration 	officer
determines they are inadmissible due to misrepresentation or lack of
immigration papers: (1) aliens ‘arriving in the United States,’ and
(2) aliens ‘encountered within 14 days of entry without inspection
and within 100 air miles of any U.S. international land border.
Castro v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 2016). Aliens subject
to this provision will generally be issued an expedited removal order unless they indicate to
immigration officers that they have a credible fear of persecution should they be deported, in which
case they may be referred for further proceedings. 	Id. 	Pursuant to the statute, aliens who are taken
into custody under § 1225(b)(1) are subject to mandatory detention throughout removal or credible
fear proceedings. In its discretion, however, the Government may temporarily parole such aliens
“for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 	See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 287-88 (2018). Detention under the statute remains mandatory until the conclusion of
the alien’s credible fear or removal proceedings, after which an alien would have a final order of
removal and detention under the statute ends. 	Id. 	at 300-03.
Section 1226(a), instead, provides that an alien already present in the United States who is
subject to removal proceedings “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the
alien is to be removed from the United States.” When the Government takes an alien into custody
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under this statute, however, the alien is entitled to seek release on bond through a hearing before
an immigration judge at which the alien bears the burden of showing that they are neither a flight
risk nor a danger to the community. 	See Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d
274, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2018). Aliens taken into custody within the United States after having entered
and remained in the United States for several years are therefore generally entitled to a bond
hearing under the statute. 	See, e.g., 	Aguilar Ramos v. Soto, No. 25-15315, 2025 WL 3251447
(D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2025).
Here, the parties dispute whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). 	Here, Petitioner presented himself to immigration officials shortly after
crossing the Rio Grande at a border crossing station. Petitioner was originally encountered within
fourteen days of illegally crossing the border and within 100 air miles of the border. 	Petitioner,
therefore, was at that time subject to the expedited removal provisions of § 1225(b)(1). 	Castro,
835 F.3d at 425. Indeed, the Government clearly considered Petitioner subject to the statute as the
Government issued Petitioner a determination of inadmissibility on a notice and order of expedited
removal form. (ECF No. 8-1.) That Petitioner was paroled would not change the applicability of
section 1225(b)(1) and its mandatory detention requirements with respect to him. 	See Faqirzada
v. Rokosky, No. 25-16639, 2026 WL 63614, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2026). As this Court explained
in 	Faqirzada,
Even where an alien is granted humanitarian parole prior to a final
decision on his removal proceedings, he does not cease being
subject to § 1225(b)(1). As the parole statute makes clear,
such parole of an alien shall not be regarded as an
admission of the alien and when the purposes of such
parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from
which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall
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continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that
of any other applicant for admission.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Aliens who are paroled are thus subject
to the “entry fiction” in which they are legally considered as if they
remained at the border throughout and after their parole until
removal or credible fear proceedings conclude. 	See, e.g., 	Doe v.
Rodriguez, No. 17-1709, 2018 WL 620898, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 29,
2018); 	see also Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi, No. 25-1094; 2025 WL
2490657, at * 1-2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2025). Federal courts generally
lack jurisdiction to review the exercise of discretion embodied in the
Government’s decisions to grant or deny parole. 	See Ashish v. Att’y
Gen., 490 F. App’x 486, 487 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(d)(5)(A) & 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)).
Faqirzada, 	2026 WL 63614, at *2-3. 	Aliens who are paroled from mandatory detention thus
remain 	subject 	to 	mandatory 	determination 	when 	their 	parole 	is 	terminated. 	Upon 	the
Government’s discretionary decision to terminate parole, aliens are to be returned to custody and
detained throughout their proceedings as if they had remained at the border throughout the entirety
of their parole. 	Id.
It is clear, then, that if Petitioner had been released from mandatory detention through the
Government’s humanitarian parole authority under § 1182(d)(5)(A), Petitioner would now
continue to be subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1). 	Faqirzada, 	2026 WL 63614, at
*2-3. That, however, is not what actually happened in Petitioner’s case. Instead, on October 22,
2021, several days before the Government decided that Petitioner was entitled to parole, Petitioner
was outright released from detention by the Government pursuant to its authority under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). (ECF No. 1-1 at 27.) Although that decision was at least partially based on concerns
related to COVID-19 (see id. 	at 28), and a since reversed and vacated injunction entered by the
Central District of California, 	see Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 16 F.4th
613 (2021), the fact remains that Petitioner was, in fact, released from custody 	prior 	to the decision
to grant him humanitarian parole. 	Indeed, Petitioner was not granted humanitarian parole until
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November 1, 2021, ten days after his release. 	(ECF No. 1-1 at 4-5.) 	Thus, while 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) does require that, upon the termination of his parole, Petitioner be returned “to
the custody from which he was paroled,” Petitioner was not in mandatory detention at the time of
his parole. Instead, he was released pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Thus, in Petitioner’s case, following the termination of his parole, the only detention to
which he could be returned is the detention to which he was potentially subject at the time of his
parole – detention under § 1226(a), the statute under which he had been released. Pursuant to that
section, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge at which he must be
provided the opportunity to show that he is neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk.
Borbot, 906 F.3d at 278-79. 	The appropriate remedy in this matter is therefore not the outright
release that Petitioner seeks, but rather a bond hearing. 	See Aguilar Ramos, 2025 WL 3251447, at
* 1-2. Petitioner’s habeas petition shall therefore be granted, and the Government shall provide
him with a bond hearing within seven days.1 	Because the petition shall be granted to the extent
that Petitioner shall be provided a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Petitioner’s motion
seeking a temporary restraining order as to his continued detention under § 1225(b)(1) shall be
denied as moot.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Petitioner’s habeas petition (ECF No. 1) is 	GRANTED,
Petitioner shall be provided with a bond hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within seven days, and Petitioner’s motion seeking a temporary restraining order (ECF
1 	To the extent Petitioner contends that the Government’s decision to terminate his parole and take
him into custody of any kind was improper, this Court lacks the authority to review the
discretionary decision to terminate parole. 	See Ashish, 490 F. App’x at 487; 	Doe, 2018 WL
620898, at *8; 	see also 	8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A) (decision to terminate humanitarian parole is in
the Government’s discretion) & 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (habeas courts have no jurisdiction to consider
challenges to such discretionary decisions in the immigration context).
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No. 10) is 	DENIED 	as moot in light of the granting of his petition. An order consistent with this
Opinion will be entered.
____________________________
MICHAEL 	A. SHIPP
UNITED 	STATES 	DISTRICT 	JUDGE
Dated: February 	_______, 2026	21st
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