3:25-cv-06139•DEVELOPERS SURETY AND INDEMNITY COMPANY v. CAPITAL PAVING AND CONTRACTING, LLC et al
DEVELOPERS SURETY AND INDEMNITY COMPANY v. CAPITAL PAVING AND CONTRACTING, LLC et al
3:25-cv-06139Njd9 janv. 2026
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DEVELOPERS SURETY AND
INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-6139 (RK) (RLS)
Vv.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
CAPITAL PAVING AND CONTRACTING,
LLC et al.,
Defendants.
KIRSCH, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Developers Surety and Indemnity
Company’s (‘Plaintiff’) unopposed Motion for Default Judgment against four of the nine
defendants in this action—Defendants Capital Paving and Contracting, LLC, Capital Trucking,
LLC, Brent Mitzak, and Keri Mitzak (collectively, the “Defaulted Defendants’). (““Mot.,’’ ECF
No. 21.) Plaintiff and the five other named defendants (collectively, the “Answering Defendants”’)
are presently engaged in discovery. (See ECF Nos. 19, 22.) The Court has considered the parties’
submissions and resolves the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Motion for
Default Judgment is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed this breach of contract action, (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1),
against two entities and seven individuals (collectively, “Defendants”) who allegedly entered an
Indemnity Agreement (the “Agreement’’) with Plaintiff on January 24, 2024, (id. ¢ 13). Plaintiff
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
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alleges it agreed to issue Performance and Payment Bonds covering various projects undertaken
by Capital Paving and Contracting, LLC (“Capital Paving”), and Defendants in return agreed to
exonerate and indemnify Plaintiff against any claims arising from those projects. Ud. J§f 13-14.)
According to Plaintiff, when two claims were later made “seeking to secure performance and/or
recover damages associated with the failure of Capital [Paving] to satisfy its obligations under the
various agreements which were secured by the Subject Bonds,” (id. { 16), Plaintiff made good on
its promises by resolving the claims, (see id. J] 16-18; see also ECF No. 21-2 J¥ 7-15), but
Defendants failed to indemnify, reimburse, or exonerate Plaintiff in violation of their contractual
obligations, (Compl. Jf 19, 22—23, 26, 31, 37!). Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiff filed
a five-count Complaint, asserting three claims against all Defendants for indemnification and
reimbursement, specific performance, and exoneration, (id. J§ 13-19, 24-32), and two claims
against Capital Paving only, as the designated principal under the Agreement, for common law
indemnification and common law exoneration, (id. J] 20—23, 33-37).
Five defendants answered Plaintiff's Complaint. On July 24, 2025, Shannon Lazrovitch,
Anthony Guidi, Jr., and Jennifer Lalor filed an answer, (ECF No. 7), with crossclaims against all
co-defendants for contribution and indemnification, (id. at 10), and on August 12, 2025, Steven
and Jennifer Spadacinni filed an answer, (ECF No. 8). After the remaining defendants—Capital
Paving, Capital Trucking, LLC, and Brent and Keri Mitzak—failed to appear, answer, or otherwise
defend against Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff requested and obtained Clerk’s entries of default against
them. (See ECF Nos. 11, 17.)
1 Plaintiff appears to have mistakenly numbered paragraph 37 of its Complaint as a second paragraph 31; the paragraph
immediately follows paragraphs 35 and 36 but is numbered paragraph 31. The Court thus refers to this Complaint
paragraph, which spans pages 8-9 of the Complaint, as paragraph 37.
2
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Plaintiff now moves for default judgments against the Defaulted Defendants pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b). (See Mot.) No Defendant has responded to the Motion, and
the Defaulted Defendants still have not appeared, nor have they attempted to set aside the defaults
entered against them.
IL. LEGAL STANDARD
“(T]he entry of a default judgment is left primarily to the discretion of the district court.”
Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984). However, that discretion is not
unbounded, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has a “preference” for
decisions on the merits. Jd. at 1181. Moreover, “if default is entered against some defendants in a
multi-defendant case, the preferred practice is for the court to withhold granting default judgment
until the action is resolved on its merits against non-defaulting defendants: if plaintiff loses on
merits, the complaint should then be dismissed against both defaulting and non-defaulting
defendants.”? Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat’! Metals & Mins. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 2d 842, 849 (D.N.J. 2008) (citing Jefferson v. Briner, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D. Va.
2006) (relying on Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552 (1872))). Specifically, courts should
deny default judgments when granting such a judgment “would create the risk of potentially
? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) similarly provides that “[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for
relief... or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). Whether “there is no just reason for delay” is informed by several factors, including
“the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; the possibility that the need for review might or
might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; [and] the possibility that the reviewing court might
be obliged to consider the same issue a second time.” Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir.
2006) (numbering omitted) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 363 (3d Cir. 1975),
abrogated on other grounds by, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1980)). These factors
warrant the denial of default judgment here, for the reasons explained below; the Court’s analysis is the same whether
framed in terms of these factors or concerns about inconsistency. See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Tickle, No.
12-01874, 2014 WL 1051821, at *5—7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2014) (denying default judgment based on both the goal of
preventing inconsistent outcomes and the Rule 54(b) factors).
3
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inconsistent judgments based on identical allegations.” Eteam, Inc. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings,
Inc., No. 15-5057, 2016 WL 54676, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2016). That risk is especially high in
cases involving joint and several liability. See, e.g., Alpine Fresh, Inc. v. Jala Trucking Corp., 181
F. Supp. 3d 250, 258 (D.N.J. 2016) (citing Farzetta v. Turner & Newall, Ltd., 797 F.2d 151, 154
(3d Cir. 1986).
WI. DISCUSSION
The risk of inconsistent judgments warrants the denial of default judgment here.
The same factual allegations underly Plaintiff's claims against the Defaulted Defendants
and Answering Defendants alike—namely that Plaintiff has incurred losses and liabilities in
connection with projects it bonded pursuant to the parties’ Indemnity Agreement, for which
Defendants have failed to indemnify, reimburse, and exonerate Plaintiff. (See Compl. {J 13-19.)
In the course of defending against these allegations, the Answering Defendants may well present
evidence that undermines not only their individual liability but the liability of all Defendants. Cf
Farzetta, 797 F.2d at 154 (“[I]f at trial facts are proved that exonerate certain defendants and that
as a matter of logic preclude the liability of another defendant, the plaintiff should be collaterally
estopped from obtaining a judgment against the latter defendant even though it failed to participate
in the proceeding in which the exculpatory facts were proved.”). The Answering Defendants
indeed appear to dispute both their own roles in any injury or damages sustained by Plaintiff as
well as the occurrence of any such injury or damages in the first place.* (See ECF No. 7 at 7-9;
3 Inconsistency remains a risk even if Defendants are “not... similarly situated as to their defenses.” Joe Hand
Promotions, 2014 WL 1051821, at *6. If, for example, “the Court were to enter default judgment against [the
Defaulted Defendants], and the Plaintiff chooses to enforce the judgment against those only [sic] Defendants rather
than continue with the burden of litigating against [the Answering Defendants],” the latter “would escape liability, the
[Defaulted] Defendants would unjustly bear the burden of judgment, and the result would be incongruous.” Jd.
4
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ECF No. 8 at 6-8.)
So too, three of the Answering Defendants have asserted crossclaims for indemnification
and contribution against all other Defendants, (ECF No. 7 at 10), which “further reinforce[s]” the
appropriateness of denying default judgment at this stage. S. A. Communale Co. Inc. v. Reddy-
Buffaloes Fire Pump, Inc., No. 19-2219, 2019 WL 13394977, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2019); see
Alpine Fresh, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (declining to grant default judgment against defaulted
defendant where liability was joint and several and where answering defendant brought
crossclaims for contribution and indemnification). Finally, as Plaintiff notes, (ECF No. 21-2 ¢ 16
n.2 (citing ECF No. 1-1 at 1)), the Indemnity Agreement imposes joint and several liability, (ECF
No. 1-1 at 6). Thus, this a case in which the “preferred practice” of “withhold[ing] granting default
judgment until the action is resolved on its merits against non-defaulting defendants” is “strictly
applied.” Alpine Fresh, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 258 (quoting Animal Sci. Prods., Inc., 596 F.Supp.2d
at 849; citing Farzetta, 797 F.2d at 154).*
For its part, Plaintiff makes no argument for why the Court should deviate from this
preferred practice. It does not address the risk of inconsistency posed by entering default judgments
here, nor does it demonstrate that it would be prejudiced by the denial of default judgments pending
the resolution of the Answering Defendants’ liability. See Obembe v. Tata Consultancy Servs.,
Ltd., No. 25-01027, 2025 WL 2550522, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2025) (citing W. Am. Ins. Co. v.
Boyarski, No. 11-2139, 2012 WL 4755372, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2012)); (see also Mot. at 3-4
“ The risk of inconsistency is no less great with respect to the two claims Plaintiff asserts against Capital Paving only.
These common law claims parallel Plaintiffs contractual claims against all Defendants and, again, are premised on
shared factual allegations. (Compare Compl. {f 13-19, 28-32 (respectively alleging claims of indemnification and
exoneration against all Defendants), with id. JJ 20-23, 33-37 (respectively alleging claims of common law
indemnification and common law exoneration against Capital Paving).)
5
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(addressing the general default judgment factors but not the issue of potential inconsistency and
asserting, without elaboration, that “Plaintiff is prejudiced by the continued delay in Indemnity
Defendants filing an answer’’)). Plaintiff thus fails to justify the entry of default judgments against
the Defaulted Defendants at this time.
Therefore, IT IS on this 9th day of January, 2026,
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, (ECF No. 21), is DENIED
without prejudice, and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court TERMINATE the Motion pending at ECF No. 21.
a
Wa
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ROBERT KIRSCH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEVous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
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