3:22-cv-05398•LAROCHELL BEAUTY, LLC v. BEAMING WHITE, LLC et al
Texte intégral
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 1 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 2 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 3 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 4 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 5 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 6 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 7 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 8 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 9 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 10 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document 130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 11 of 11 PageID: <pageID>
OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 1 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LAROCHELL BEAUTY, LLC,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 22-5398 (MAS) (JBD)
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BEAMING WHITE, LLC, ef al.,
Defendants.
SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Counterclaim Defendants LaRochell Beauty,
LLC (“LaRochell”), Ayman A. Khourshed (“Khourshed’’), and Sally I. Alkamary’s (““Alkamary,”
and collectively with LaRochell and Khourshed, “Counterclaim Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 110) the Amended Counterclaims of Counterclaim Plaintiff Beaming White, LLC
(“Beaming White”) (ECF No. 103). After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the
Court decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b)!
and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies
in part Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
' All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 2 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
I. BACKGROUND?
A. Factual Background
This action arises out of allegations of trademark infringement, unfair competition, and
violations of the Lanham Act. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 19.) LaRochell operates a business that
markets and sells oral care products, including toothbrushes and electric toothbrushes, under the
trademark PEARLY. Ud. 4] 13, 15.) LaRochell owns U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 6,232,120
(the “’120 Registration”) and 6,359,658 (the “’658 Registration”), both for the mark PEARLY.
(Am. Compl. § 13; Am. Countercls. § 12, ECF No. 103.) Both registrations were filed under
Section 1(a) of the Lanham Act based on actual use in commerce. (Am. Countercls. § 13, 35.) |
Beaming White sells electric toothbrushes under the name “Pearly.” (Am. Compl. § 21;
Answer §{§ 31-32, ECF No. 28.) On November 2, 2020, Beaming White filed a federal trademark
application for the mark “Pearly,” which the United States Patent and Trademark Office (the
“USPTO”) refused due to a likelihood of confusion with LaRochell’s mark in the °120
Registration. (Am. Compl. § 29; Answer § 29.) LaRochell alleges that despite this refusal,
Beaming White “continued to sell directly competing [products] bearing the [i]nfringing [m]ark.”
(Am. Compl. § 30.)
In March 2022, counsel for LaRochell sent Beaming White a cease-and-desist letter,
objecting to Beaming White’s sale of toothbrushes under the name Pearly (the “Accused
Products”). (Am. Compl. § 31; Answer 4 31.) Beaming White agreed to cease selling the Accused
Products after a sell-off period. (Am. Compl. 4/32; Answer { 32.) LaRochell alleges that Beaming
White nevertheless “belied” its representations to cease sales, did not respond to correspondence
* For the purposes of considering the instant motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual
allegations underlying the Amended Counterclaims as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 3 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
for “extended periods,” attempted to lengthen the sell-off period, and entered into consignment
sales agreements with Defendants Boxy Charm, Inc. and FabFitFun, Inc. (collectively, the
“Retailer Defendants”). (Am. Compl. J§ 32-34.)
LaRochell commenced this action against Beaming White on September 2, 2022, asserting
claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition based on both its federal registrations
and common-law rights. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) On November 28, 2022, LaRochell filed an
Amended Complaint, asserting the same claims and adding the Retailer Defendants.? (See
generally Am. Compl.) None of the Defendants moved to dismiss LaRochell’s claims. (Answer
{ 1; Boxy Charm Answer { 1, ECF No. 32; FabFitFun Answer § 1, ECF No. 34.)
While discovery was ongoing, Beaming White sought leave to file amended counterclaims
against LaRochell (ECF No. 100), which the Court granted (ECF No. 102). Beaming White asserts
three counterclaims: (1) cancellation of the ’120 Registration (“Counterclaim One”);
(2) cancellation of the ’658 Registration (“Counterclaim Two”); and (3) tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage (“Counterclaim Three”). (See Am. Countercls.) For the tortious
interference counterclaim, Beaming White names Alkamary and Khourshed as individual
counterclaim defendants, and seeks to hold them personally liable by piercing the corporate veil.
(Id. § 110; see Countercl. Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 15-19, ECF No. 112.) Counterclaim Defendants move to
dismiss Beaming White’s counterclaims for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 110.) That motion
is ripe for adjudication.
> LaRochell also sought to add Luis Lajous as a defendant to this action. (See Am. Compl.) Lajous
moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 29), which the Court granted, finding that it
lacked personal jurisdiction over him (ECF No. 41).
3
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 4 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Courts evaluate a motion to dismiss a counterclaim under the same standard as a motion to
dismiss a complaint. See, e.g., Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).
A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
“First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Jd.
(alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court
must accept as true all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and “construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court, however, may ignore legal conclusions or
factually unsupported accusations that merely state that the defendant unlawfully harmed the
plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).
Finally, the court must determine whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Jgbal, 556
U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 210 (quoting Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Ona
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been
presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc.
v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 5 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
Ill. DISCUSSION
The Court considers Beaming White’s counterclaims in turn.
A. Cancellation of the ’120 and ’658 Registrations (Counterclaims One and Two)
Beaming White seeks cancellation of LaRochell’s PEARLY trademarks on the grounds that
the marks were fraudulently obtained. (Am. Countercls. §§ 77-92; see Countercl. Defs.’ Moving
Br. 8-13, ECF No. 110-1.)
Section 37 of the Lanham Act authorizes district courts, in an action involving registered
trademarks, to determine the right to registration and to order the cancellation of registrations. 15
USS.C. § 1119; see Zinn v. Seruga, No. 05-3572, 2006 WL 2135811, at *7 (D.N.J. July 28, 2006).
This authority is concurrent with trademark cancellation proceedings before the USPTO. Zinn,
2006 WL 2135811, at *7 (citing Simmonds Aerocessories v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of Am., 257
F.2d 485, 491 (3d Cir. 1958)). A registered mark may be cancelled at any time if it was obtained
fraudulently. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192-193 (3d Cir. 2001).
Fraudulent procurement occurs when an applicant “knowingly makes false, material
representations of fact in connection with an application” with the intent to deceive the USPTO.
Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Network Inc., 104 F.3d 336, 340 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted); see Marshak, 240 F.3d at 196. The party seeking cancellation bears the burden of proving
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. /d. Fraud in this context involves either misrepresentations
or omissions “of material information or facts which, if disclosed to the [USPTO], would have
resulted in the disallowance of the registration sought or to be maintained.” La Cena Fine Foods,
Ltd. v. Jennifer Fine Foods, No. 01-5746, 2006 WL 2014503, at *4 (D.N.J. July 18, 2006) (citation
omitted). Moreover, allegations of fraud must satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130_ Filed 02/10/26 Page 6 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
Here, Beaming White alleges that LaRochell falsely represented to the USPTO that it had
used the PEARLY mark in commerce as of November 20, 2019, when in fact it had not made any
bona fide commercial use of the mark when it filed its trademark applications on May 24, 2020.
(Am. Countercls. §§ 13, 15, 21, 33, 35, 37, 50-52, 77-92.) Beaming White does not allege that
LaRochell simply misstated a date of first use in its trademark applications—rather, it alleges
LaRochell had not made any bona fide use of the mark in commerce at all as of May 24, 2020,
when the applications were filed. (/d. {| 33-34, 50-52.) Because use in commerce is a statutory
prerequisite to registration under Section 1(a) of the Lanham Act, Beaming White plausibly alleges
that LaRochell made material misstatements to the USPTO by representing that such use had
occurred when it allegedly had not. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a); Couture v. Playdom, Inc., 778 F.3d 1379,
1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (affirming cancellation of trademark registration where trademark
owner had not rendered services to any customer until “well after the application was filed”);
Tapestry, Inc. v. Chunma USA, Inc., No. 20-271, 2021 WL 1534988, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2021).
Beaming White further alleges facts supporting an inference that LaRochell knowingly
misrepresented its use in commerce and did so with intent to deceive the USPTO. Specifically,
Beaming White alleges that the specimens LaRochell submitted with its applications exhibited
indicia of fabrication, including affixed labels rather than integrated packaging, apparent
overlaying of the PEARLY mark over other markings, and irregular labeling inconsistent with
bona fide commercial packaging. (See Am. Countercls. § 18 (alleging “noticeable pealing and
texture differences indicating an affixed label rather than genuine packaging”); id. (alleging the
“wording ‘Pearly’ appears to be covering other markings, particularly under the ‘ear’ on the handle
of the toothbrush”); id. § 20 (alleging the label on the canister “was printed out and affixed to the
top” and “appears to not be a perfect circle, as one would expect from a professional labelling
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 7 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
machine’). From these alleged discrepancies, Beaming White plausibly alleges that the specimens
were staged to create the false appearance of use in commerce when none existed. (See id.
q{ 16-53.)
At the pleading stage, allegations that an applicant submitted fabricated or contrived
specimens in support of a claim of use in commerce, coupled with allegations of non-use at the
time of filing, are sufficient to support a claim for cancellation based on fraudulent procurement.
See Smith v. Dir.’s Choice, LLP, No. 15-81, 2017 WL 2955347, at *7 (D.N.J. July 11, 2017)
(denying motion to dismiss cancellation counterclaim where defendant alleged plaintiff made false
statements in its trademark application regarding the “date of the first use of the mark” and the
“date of first use in commerce’); Gross v. Guzman, No. 11-23028, 2012 WL 12863969, at *5 (S.D.
Fla. July 5, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss cancellation counterclaim where defendant alleged
plaintiff “misrepresented [] the first date of use of the mark in commerce”).
Beaming White also satisfies Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Beaming White identifies who committed the alleged fraud (LaRochell), what was misrepresented
(use of the PEARLY mark in commerce), when and where the misrepresentations were made (in
the trademark applications filed with the USPTO on May 24, 2020), and how the fraud was
accomplished (by submitting allegedly fabricated specimens and falsely claiming use in
commerce). (Am. Countercls. §§ 9, 11, 13, 15-21, 27, 29, 83-86.) Accepting these allegations as
true, Beaming White plausibly alleges that LaRochell knowingly made material
misrepresentations to the USPTO regarding use in commerce with the intent to deceive. See Smith,
2017 WL 2955347, at *7. Beaming White, accordingly, states claims for cancellation of the ’120
and ’658 Registrations. Counterclaim Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counterclaims One and Two
is therefore denied.
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 8 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
B. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage (Counterclaim
Three)
Beaming White also alleges that LaRochell tortiously interfered with its prospective
business relationships by naming its downstream retailers as defendants in the Amended
Complaint. (Am. Countercls. J 94-97 (alleging LaRochell “sued the [Retailer D]efendants in this
action in an intentional and malicious effort to disrupt Beaming White’s relationships’’).)
To state a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage under New
Jersey law, a plaintiff must adequately allege:
(1) a reasonable expectation of economic advantage from a
prospective contractual or economic relationship; (2) the defendant
intentionally and maliciously interfered with the relationship; (3) the
interference caused the loss of the expected advantage; and
(4) actual damages resulted.
New Skies Satellites, B.V. vy. Home2US Communications, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 459, 472 (D.N.J. 2014)
citations omitted).
As a threshold matter, New Jersey’s litigation privilege “ensures that ‘[s]tatements by
attorneys ... made in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged
and immune from liability.’” Giles v. Phelan, Hallinan & Schmieg, L.L.P., 901 F. Supp. 2d 509,
523 (D.N.J. 2012) (citation omitted); Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J. Super. 282, 293-94 (App. Div.
2001) (“The [litigation] privilege promotes the unfettered expression that is critical to the
administration of justice. Such freedom would be defeated if participants in the process feared later
tort liability.”). This immunity has been applied broadly to a wide range of tort claims, and extends
to “attorneys, parties, and their representatives.” Baran v. ASRC MSE, No. 22-4391, 2023 WL
2344634, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2023) (internal citations omitted); Peterson v. HVM LLC, No.
14-1137, 2016 WL 845144, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2016) (quoting Giles, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 523).
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 9 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
Given the broad scope of the litigation privilege, the Court finds persuasive Counterclaim
Defendants’ argument that LaRochell’s naming of the Retailer Defendants in the Amended
Complaint is protected conduct and cannot form the basis of a tortious interference claim. See
Simon Prop. Grp., Inc. v. Palombaro, 682 F. Supp. 2d 508, 512 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (dismissing
tortious interference counterclaims based on counterclaim defendant’s “initiation and publication
of [a] lawsuit” as barred by the judicial and/or financial interest privileges).
Even assuming, however, that the litigation privilege does not apply, Beaming White still
fails to adequately plead malice or wrongful conduct as required to sustain a tortious interference
claim.* Lamorte Burns & Co., Inc. v. Walters, 770 A.2d 1158, 1170-71 (N.J. 2001). The filing of a
complaint, even if motivated by a competitive purpose, is a lawful use of the judicial process unless
it is objectively baseless. In re Jeep Eagle 17, Inc., No. 09-23708, 2010 WL 4864171, at *5 (Bankr.
D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2010) (explaining that, while abuse of legal process may constitute tortious
conduct under certain circumstances, such a claim requires conduct that is “inflicted intentionally
and without justification or excuse”); Organon Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 453,
460 (D.N.J. 2003). Here, Beaming White’s counterclaim rests entirely on LaRochell’s decision to
name certain downstream retailers as defendants in the Amended Complaint, yet it alleges no facts
‘ The Amended Counterclaims only offer the conclusory statement, “LaRochell intentionally and
maliciously sought to interfere with Beaming White’s distribution relationships by suing Beaming
White’s downstream resellers.” (Am. Countercls. § 51; see also id § 76.) This is insufficient to
plausibly allege that LaRochell acted maliciously. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550
USS. at 555); Onyx Enters. Canada, Inc. v. Royzenshteyn, No. 23-02913, 2025 WL 62834, at *14
(D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2025) (dismissing tortious interference claim where plaintiff failed to adequately
plead malice “[a]part from conclusory statements that [defendants] acted intentionally and without
justification or excuse”).
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 _ Filed 02/10/26 Page 10 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
suggesting abuse of legal process or that LaRochell lacked a colorable basis for including the
Retailer Defendants in this action.° (See Am. Countercls. §§ 93-116.)
Moreover, Beaming White fails to allege that it lost any specific contract or identifiable
prospective economic relationship as a result of LaRochell’s conduct. (/d. J 96 (alleging only a
generalized “reasonable expectation of economic benefit from its reseller and distribution
relationships”); see Engineered Framing Sys., Inc. v. Vescom Structures, Inc., No. 05-1461, 2005
WL 8174971, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2005) (dismissing tortious interference claim for failure to
plead a specific prospective economic advantage that was lost as a result of the defendant’s
actions). Because Beaming White’s tortious interference counterclaim rests solely on LaRochell’s
filing of an amended complaint, and fails to identify any prospective economic advantage lost, it
must be dismissed as insufficiently pleaded. See Walters, 770 A.2d at 1165.°
° To the contrary, as Counterclaim Defendants note, trademark plaintiffs routinely name
downstream sellers where contributory infringement or injunctive relief may be implicated.
(Countercl. Defs.” Moving Br. 5-6); see, e.g., Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 854 (1982) (explaining that a manufacturer or distributor can be held contributorily liable for
trademark infringement if it “continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason
to know is engaging in trademark infringement”).
6 With respect to Beaming White’s tortious interference counterclaim, Beaming White names
Khourshed and Alkamary as individual counterclaim defendants and asks the Court to pierce the
corporate veil with respect to these two defendants. (See Am. Countercls. { 110 (“The corporate
veil should be pierced and Khourshed and Alkamary should be held liable for LaRochell’s tortious
interference.”) Because the Court dismisses the underlying tortious interference counterclaim,
Beaming White’s request to pierce the corporate veil necessarily fails. The Court, accordingly, will
dismiss Khourshed and Alkamary as individual counterclaim defendants from this action.
10
Case 3:22-cv-05398-MAS-JBD Document130 Filed 02/10/26 Page 11 of 11 PagelD:
<pagelD>
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Counterclaim Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in
part and denied in part. The Court will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
7
MICHAEL A. SHIPP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
tt
DateD: February /U_, 2026
11Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.