3:18-cv-14089•BRADSHAW v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARLON E. BRADSHAW, SR.,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 18-14089 (RK) JBD)
v.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al.,
Defendants.
KIRSCH, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant Dr. Ashraf E. Haggag’s (“Dr.
Haggag” or “Defendant’”) Motion for Summary Judgment.! (“MSJ,” ECF No. 151.) Through
counsel, Plaintiff Marlon E. Bradshaw Sr. (“Mr. Bradshaw” or “Plaintiff’), a state prisoner
incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”’), opposed the motion (“Opp.,” ECF No. 159),
and Dr. Haggag replied (“Reply,” ECF No. 162).” The Court has carefully considered the parties’
submissions and resolves the matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
' The four other defendants in this action, who are also healthcare professionals, have separately moved for
summary judgment. (See ECF No. 155.) That motion will be addressed in a separate Opinion.
? The parties initially filed their briefing in the same docket entry, such that ECF No. 151 includes
Defendant’s summary judgment motion, (ECF No. 151-2), Plaintiffs response brief, (ECF No. 151-9), and
associated exhibits, (ECF Nos. 151-12 to 151-18), and Defendant’s reply brief, (ECF No. 151-19). Plaintiff
subsequently refiled his response, (ECF No. 159), and Defendant refiled his reply, (ECF No. 162). The later
filings appear identical to the original filings and indeed contain the same pagination.
AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO
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I. BACKGROUND*®
A. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 24, 2018, Plaintiff, then proceeding pro se, brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for alleged Eighth Amendment violations. (ECF No. 1.) Dr. Haggag was not named in
Plaintiff’ s initial complaint. On May 26, 2020, pro bono counsel was appointed for Plaintiff. (ECF
No. 54.) A scheduling order was entered, (ECF No. 61), and subsequently extended several times,
(ECF Nos. 84, 104, 110, 114). On July 7, 2022, Plaintiff, through counsel, filed an Amended
Complaint, adding Dr. Haggag as a defendant. (““AC,” ECF No. 89; see ECF No. 88 (consent order
granting Plaintiffs request to amend complaint).) On June 2, 2023, Dr. Haggag filed an answer to
the AC as well as crossclaims for indemnification and contribution against the four other
defendants. (ECF No. 120.)* Most recently, in June of 2025, Dr. Haggag moved for summary
judgment. (MSJ.)°
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In support of his motion, and as required by this District’s Local Civil Rules, see L. Civ.
R. 56.1(a), Dr. Haggag filed a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ““SSUMF,” ECF No. 151-
3). Plaintiff, in contravention of Local Civil Rule 56.1(a), failed to file a responsive statement. See
L. Civ. R. 56.1 (‘The opponent of summary judgment shall furnish, with its opposition papers, a
3 This case has an extensive procedural history. It has been litigated for over seven years and involves five
total defendants, four of whom have brought a separate summary judgment motion not at issue here, (ECF
No. 155). The Court thus presents an abridged recitation of events and allegations, laying out only what is
relevant to the instant motion.
* On May 15, 2023, this case was reassigned from Judge Shipp to the undersigned. (ECF No. 115.)
> Mr. Bradshaw filed an opposition brief also styled as a cross-motion to compel Dr. Haggag’s deposition.
(Opp.) The Honorable J. Brendan Day, U.S.M.J., denied that motion, (ECF No. 163), reasoning that “[iJn
the two-plus years since fact discovery closed, Bradshaw filed no request or motion seeking to compel Dr.
Haggag’s deposition; indeed, only after Dr. Haggag had filed his summary judgment motion was this
midstream request raised to the Court,” (id. at 2).
2
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responsive statement of material facts, addressing each paragraph of the movant’s statement,
indicating agreement or disagreement and, if not agreed, stating each material fact in
dispute ... .”). Plaintiff instead expressly “relies on and incorporates” Dr. Haggag’s statement of
the facts.° (Opp. at 1.) The Court follows suit.
Plaintiff is “a chronic care patient” whose “blood needs monitoring every three months to
track his heart and liver health and to ensure his prostate cancer remains in remission.” (SUMF 3
(citing AC { 34).) “Accordingly, Plaintiff requires blood work prior to most of his chronic care,
medical tests, and other medical procedures.” (Ud. J 4 (citing AC § 29).)
Defendant is a medical doctor at NJSP. (See MSJ at 2-3, 6.) He has provided Plaintiff with
treatment since about 2018. (See SUMF 5 (citing AC § 28).) During the course of that treatment,
“Plaintiff has requested that Dr. Haggag . . . draw blood from behind his left knee, citing concerns
about his venous access,” (id. J 6 (citing AC Jf 32—33)), but Defendant “has opted to draw blood
from the radial veins in the Plaintiffs wrist,” (id. J 5 (citing AC { 28)). “Plaintiff asserts that Dr.
Haggag’s refusal to comply with his specific preference for where his blood should be drawn
causes him pain, leads him to decline the procedure altogether, and puts him at risk of serious and
permanent damage to his radial veins and nerves in his wrist.” (Id. J 7 (citing AC 35).)’
6 Plaintiff specifies that he “has no objection to any of the facts as written in the ‘Statement of Facts’ section
of Defendant’s Brief in Support of Defendant’s Summary Judgment Motion and therefore relies on and
incorporates such section.” (Opp. at 1 (emphasis omitted).) The Court notes that the facts as written in
Defendant’s summary judgment brief are identical to those in Defendant’s attached SUMF. (Compare MSJ
at 2~3, with SUMEF at 1-2.)
7Tn a section of his opposition brief titled “Counterstatement of Facts,” Plaintiff adopts and incorporates
Defendant’s SUMF, then purports to “also offer[] [two] material facts,” (Opp. at 1)—that Plaintiffs blood
was drawn from behind his left knee “without any pain or complications” while he was incarcerated at a
different state prison, (id. at 1-2) and that “[p]hlebotomists at New Jersey State Prison will take patient
preferences regarding where to draw blood from into account,” (id. at 2). Even if the Court were to disregard
Plaintiffs noncompliance with Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) and consider these factual allegations, they are not
“material” for the reasons explained below and thus do not defeat summary judgment.
3
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On these facts, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has been deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (AC { 39.)
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Put another way, “[s]ummary judgment is
designed ...to assess whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether a trial is
necessary.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995). A dispute is “genuine” if
the evidence permits a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant, and a fact is
“material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986).
If the party seeking summary judgment carries its initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jd. at 256. “[A] plaintiff cannot resist a
properly supported motion for summary judgment merely by restating the allegations of his
complaint,” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)),
and a court’s duty to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party does not extend to “the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings” unsupported by factual
evidence, Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 571 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting D.E. v. Cent.
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2014)). “Nor will ‘[b]are assertions, conclusory
allegations, or suspicions’ suffice.” Jd. (alteration in original) (quoting Jutrowski v. Township of
Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2018)); see also Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 228
(3d Cir. 2010) (“Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue,
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the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment.”). Likewise, the movant may
establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by showing that the plaintiff's evidence is
insufficient to establish an essential element of his claim. This showing “necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial,” such that “there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact” for a jury
to decide. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted).
I. DISCUSSION
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription on the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”
encompasses “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Eighth Amendment medical care claims have two elements: (1) the
plaintiffs serious medical need and (2) the defendant’s deliberate indifference to that need. See
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)). This dispute centers on the deliberate
indifference element.
Where, as here, a plaintiff claims that the medical care he was given was inadequate, rather
than that such care was outright denied or delayed, the element of deliberate indifference has both
a subjective and an objective prong. See Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 536 (3d
Cir. 2017). First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant possessed “a ‘sufficiently culpable
state of mind,”” i.e., “knew of an excessive risk to [the plaintiff’ s] health or safety and affirmatively
disregarded that risk.” Watts v. Herbik, 364 PF. App’x 723, 725 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)); see Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard of liability
consistent with recklessness as that term is defined in criminal law.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Pearson, 850 F.3d at 539 (“It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in
good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
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Clause ....’” (omission in original) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986))).
Second, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s particular treatment “fell below a professional
standard of care.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 536. This is so because courts begin with a presumption
that medical treatment provided to an incarcerated person is proper, and that presumption can only
be overcome with objective evidence to the contrary. See id. To satisfy the adequacy-of-care
element of the deliberate indifference prong, extrinsic evidence, often medical expert testimony,
is necessary unless it would be “obvious to a layperson” that the treatment at issue was inadequate.
Id. “{E]valuating whether medical treatment is adequate presents an objective question typically
beyond the competence of a non-medical professional.” Jd.
As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Dr. Haggag has provided ongoing medical
treatment to Mr. Bradshaw. Since about 2018, Dr. Haggag has drawn Plaintiff's blood—
specifically “from the radial veins in the Plaintiff's wrist,” (SUMF 5 (citing AC { 28))—as part
of routine blood work that Plaintiff gets in advance of his various medical procedures and in order
to “monitor[]” his various health conditions, (id. {| 3-4 (citing AC {J 29, 34)). Because that blood-
draw site “causes [Plaintiff] pain .. . and puts him at risk of serious and permanent damage to his
radial veins and nerves in his wrist,” Plaintiff has asked Dr. Haggag to instead draw his blood from
behind his left knee, but Dr. Haggag has not done so. Ud. [| 6—7 (citing AC {J 32-33, 35).)
Plaintiff relies almost entirely on these sparse complaint allegations to argue that Dr.
Haggag is not entitled to summary judgment. They fall far short of stating a viable Eighth
Amendment claim, let alone demonstrating a genuine dispute of material fact requiring submission
to a jury. Importantly, neither negligence nor medical malpractice rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017), and “courts are
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound
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in state tort law,” id. at 228; see also id. at 227 (“[P]rison officials are afforded considerable latitude
in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.”); Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274,
278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is well established that as long as a physician exercises professional
judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”); Gaines v. Busnardo,
735 F. App’x 799, 804 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Perhaps crutches or an ankle brace of some
type would have better alleviated Gaines’s pain. But that is not the relevant question under the
Eighth Amendment.”). Likewise, “mere disagreement” with a physician’s exercise of professional
judgment or the course of treatment given “does not create an actionable constitutional violation.”
Romero vy. Ahsan, 827 F. App’x 222, 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); see James v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., 230 F. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“Although [Plaintiff] may have
preferred a different course of treatment, his preference alone cannot establish deliberate
indifference[,] as such second-guessing is not the province of the courts.””). Without more, Plaintiff
simply cannot overcome the presumptive propriety of Dr. Haggag’s manner of treatment.
Beyond “rel[ying] on and incorporat[ing]’” Defendant’s SUMF, (Opp. at 1), the only
evidence Plaintiff cites in his opposition brief is fourteen lines of deposition testimony from a non-
party phlebotomist who works at NJSP, (id. at 2 (citing ECF No. 151-16 at 16:8—21)). Plaintiff
relies on that testimony in support of his assertion that “[p]hlebotomists at New Jersey State Prison
will take patient preferences regarding where to draw blood from into account.” (Id.; see ECF No.
151-16 at 16:8—-14 (“Q. Is [the back of the hand] typically where you draw blood? A. So something
the patient might sa[y] . . . they have a preference they want it from. Sometime[s] we do let them
399
say, ‘Well, I want it from my hand, or I want it from my arm.’”’).) He also asserts, without any
citation, that for nine years at a prior facility his “blood was drawn from the posterior of his left
knee without any pain or complications.” (Opp. at 1-2.) In passing, and again without any citation,
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he adds that “[e]xtraction from the radial wrist veins cause[s] severe discomfort for Plaintiff.” (Id.
at 5.) Even if the Court were to consider these factual allegations despite their patent deficiencies,
see, e.g., L. Civ. R. 56.1(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), they fail to defeat Dr. Haggag’s properly
supported summary judgment motion.
The record is devoid of objective evidence that the treatment Plaintiff received from
Defendant fell below professional standards of care. That NJSP phlebotomists sometimes “let
[patients] say” where they prefer their blood drawn from, (ECF No. 151-16 at 16:12—13), does not
bear on these standards. Nor does the bare fact that a prior facility drew Plaintiff's blood from
behind his left knee. Without more, this fact at best shows mere differences in treatment, not “a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards” from which “a
reasonable jury could conclude that [the defendant] actually did not base [his] decision on such
judgment.” Gaines, 735 F. App’x at 804 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf Romero, 827 F.
App’x at 227 (“[N]o actionable claim arises “when a doctor disagrees with the professional
judgment of another doctor,’ because ‘[t]here may... be several acceptable ways to treat an
illness.” (second alteration and omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting White v.
Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990))).
To survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must adduce expert testimony or other extrinsic
evidence to show that Dr. Haggag’s treatment deviated from professional standards of care. “[A]s
laymen, the jury would not be in a position to determine that the particular treatment’—the blood-
draw site utilized by Dr. Haggag—‘fell below a professional standard of care.” Pearson, 850 F.3d
at 536; see id. (“[E]valuating whether medical treatment is adequate presents an objective question
typically beyond the competence of a non-medical professional.”’). Plaintiff puts forth no extrinsic
evidence on this issue. He counters only that “any reasonable juror could see” that drawing blood
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from behind his knee “was objectively safer and more effective” than drawing blood from
Plaintiff's wrists. (Opp. at 5; see id. at 1, 6.) Simply insisting that the inadequacy of treatment
would be obvious to a layperson does not make it so. Plaintiff does not attempt to explain why it
would be “obvious” to a layperson that Dr. Haggag’s blood-draw site violated professional
standards or why this case resembles those in which extrinsic evidence has been found
unnecessary. See, e.g., Pearson, 850 F.3d at 537 (“A layperson is capable of concluding that
forcing a screaming patient to crawl to a wheelchair violates professional standards of care.”);
Natale, 318 F.3d at 582-83 (“A reasonable jury could conclude that [defendants] knew that
[plaintiff] was an insulin-dependent diabetic and that if insulin was not administered as required,
he would suffer adverse health consequences.”’). Here, the undisputed record supports the opposite
conclusion. Plaintiff's failure to present any evidence sufficient to support his claim that Dr.
Haggag acted with deliberate indifference by drawing blood from Plaintiff's radial wrist veins
rather than from behind his knee is thus fatal to his claim.®
In sum, Dr. Haggag has shown the absence of evidence sufficient to support an essential
element of Plaintiff's claim, and Plaintiff has failed to defeat Defendant’s properly supported
Motion for Summary Judgment. Because deliberate indifference requires more than mere
negligence, and because Plaintiff has not presented extrinsic evidence that would permit a
reasonable jury to conclude that Dr. Haggag’s actions “so deviated from professional standards of
care that it amounted to deliberate indifference,’ Pearson, 850 F.3d at 541, Plaintiff's Eighth
Amendment claim against Dr. Haggag fails as a matter of law, and Dr. Haggag is entitled to
summary judgment.
8 The record also appears devoid of evidence that Dr. Haggag acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind. The Court does not consider this issue further because Defendant focuses only on the adequacy of
care prong of deliberate indifference.
9
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 151) and DISMISSES AS MOOT Defendant’s crossclaims against the
remaining defendants” (see ECF No. 120). An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
(LAE
Ropexy Kirscu
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Opinion.
Dated: December 29, 2025
* In his Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Defendant brought crossclaims against the other
defendants for contribution and indemnification in the event that Defendant was found liable to Plaintiff.
(See ECF No. 120.) Although no party raises the issue, because summary judgment is herein granted in
Defendant’s favor, his crossclaims are necessarily moot.
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