WILLIAMS v. BOSLEY et al

3:18-cv-13092Njd28 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
PAUL C. WILLIAMS,
Civil Action No. 18-13092 (ZNQ) (TJB)
OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD BOSLEY, et al.,
Defendants.
QURAISHI, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion for Recusal (the “Motion,” ECF
No. 116) filed by pro se Plaintiff Paul C. Williams (“Plaintiff”). 	Defendants Richard Bosley,
Theodore Kucowski, Trevor Crowley, Kevin Chesney, and Edward Travisano (collectively,
“Defendants”) did not respond to the Motion and the Court did not order them to do so.
The Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s submissions and decides the Motion without
oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court will DENY the Motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The above-captioned matter was tried before the undersigned from January 12 through the
14, 2026. Plaintiff appeared pro se throughout the duration of the trial. Pursuant to a Court Order
entered by the Honorable Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J., Mr. Craig Hilliard was assigned to
Plaintiff as standby counsel. Specifically, Mr. Hilliard was to conduct the direct examination of
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Plaintiff, given that the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s request to present his testimony in a
narrative format.
On January 14, 2026, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of no cause, finding that
Plaintiff had not proven: (1) that the force used by the Defendants was objectively unreasonable
under the totality of the circumstances; and (2) that Defendant Bosley had searched Plaintiff’s cell
phone without a warrant. (See ECF No. 109.)
II. 	SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff moves to disqualify the undersigned as the district court judge overseeing his case
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Section 455(a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” 	See also United States v. Jacobs, 311 F. App’x 535, 537 (3d Cir.
2008). “Because [Section] 455(a) is intended to promote not only fairness to the litigants but also
public confidence in the judiciary, a party seeking recusal need not demonstrate that the judge is
actually biased, but rather that he would appear to be biased to a reasonable person, with
knowledge of all of the facts.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
To succeed on a recusal motion, a movant must make a three-part showing: (1) the facts
must be material and stated with particularity; (2) the facts must be such that, if true they would
convince a reasonable person that a bias exists; and (3) the facts must show that the bias is personal,
as opposed to judicial, in nature. United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973);
see also Jacobs, 311 F. App’x at 537 (“A recusal motion must be based on ‘objective facts,’ not
mere ‘possibilities’ and ‘unsubstantiated allegations.’”).
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“[A] party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 	To the
contrary, “the source of bias [must] be extrajudicial, that is stemming from a source outside of the
proceeding, or of such an intensity as to make a fair trial impossible.” 	Jacobsen v. Citi Mortg.
Inc., Civ. No. 17-1555, 2017 WL 3877850, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017). Extrajudicial bias is “not
derived from the evidence or conduct of the parties that the judge observes in the course of the
proceedings.” 	Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1980). 	Without extrajudicial
bias, “a party seeking recusal must show that a judge has a ‘deep-seated and unequivocal
antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible . . . .’” 	Thompson v. Eva’s Vill. &
Sheltering Program, Civ. No. 04-2548, 2005 WL 2474930, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2005) (quoting
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994)). 	“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. 	In and of themselves (i.e., apart from
surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance upon an
extrajudicial source.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
“[I]ncorrect rulings do not prove that a judge is biased or prejudiced.” 	United States v.
Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1039 (3d Cir. 1978); see also Jacobsen v. Citi Mortg. Inc., 715 F. App’x
222, 223 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Adverse legal rulings are not proof of prejudice or bias, and are almost
never a basis for recusal.”); Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793 F.3d
313, 330 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A]dverse rulings—even if they are erroneous—are not in themselves
proof of prejudice or bias.”); Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83, 87 (3d Cir. 1978) (“The Smiths also
object that some rulings were wrong. 	Such errors, even compounded, do not satisfy the
requirements of [§] 144.”). 	The Supreme Court has opined that while “judicial rulings alone
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almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion,” they are “[a]lmost invariably
[ ] . . . proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
After careful review of Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to meet the
standard established by 28 U.S.C. § 455. 	Specifically, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the
undersigned lacks impartiality, has a personal bias or prejudice against him derived from
extrajudicial sources, or harbors a deep-seated antagonism that renders fair judgment impossible.
A. 	TRIAL FRAMEWORK
First, Plaintiff asserts that the Court’s procedural framework was tailored to disadvantage
him as a pro se litigant. (See Letter Br. at 13–14.)
Plaintiff takes issue with the undersigned’s conduct of a pretrial conference that occurred
on January 8, 2026. (ECF No. 103.) Plaintiff argues that the undersigned gave him an ultimatum
of sorts: either Plaintiff would represent himself with Mr. Hilliard as stand-by counsel, or Mr.
Hilliard would be required to take over as lead counsel for the duration of the trial. (See Williams
Decl. ¶ 12.) 	Williams argues that the undersigned “silenced” him and “r[a]n roughshod over
[him],” essentially forcing him to concede to proceed pro se with Mr. Hilliard as stand-by counsel
for purposes of his direct. (Id.)
Additionally and relatedly, Plaintiff critiques the structure of his direct examination
permitted during trial. (Letter Br. at 13–14; see also Williams Decl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff preferred to
present his testimony in narrative form, which he argues is “a fundamental accommodation for a
pro se litigant.” (Williams Decl. ¶ 13.) Notably, Plaintiff does not cite to any caselaw in which
such an accommodation was provided, much less deemed “fundamental.” Plaintiff reiterates his
belief that Mr. Hilliard was “complete[ly] unprepared[]” to conduct his direct examination. (Id.)
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In response to Plaintiff’s concerns about Mr. Hilliard’s unpreparedness, the undersigned
reminded Plaintiff that he had “four days” to gameplan his direct examination with Mr. Hilliard—
and that he probably should have been preparing his direct examination with Mr. Hilliard all along.
(Id.) Plaintiff again took issue with the fact that Mr. Hilliard was allegedly unprepared for trial,
highlighting Plaintiff’s urgent letters filed with the court. (Letter Br. at 13; ECF No. 102.)
Plaintiff is correct that the Third Circuit has “consistently” disproved of situations where
trial courts “have erected procedural barriers that ‘effectively deny[] access to the courts.” (See
id. at 14 (citing Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).) However, Plaintiff ignores
the Court’s broad discretion applicable here.
Courts have “broad discretion over the mode and order of examining witnesses and
presenting evidence and may allow testimony in narrative form at trial if the Court finds that it
would be helpful to the jury.” Chichakli v. Gerlach, Civ. No. 15-687, 2018 WL 3625840, at *3
(W.D. Okla. July 30, 2018); Fed. R. Evid. 611. 	“This includes the discretion to permit pro se
litigants to testify in narrative form, but none of these decisions establish that a court is required
to permit narrative testimony or vice versa.” United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 23-690, 2024
WL 3540519, at *8 (D.N.J. July 23, 2024) (citing Kaufman LLC v. Est. of Feinberg, Civ. No. 13-
1259, 2022 WL 13845083, at *8 (D. Conn. Oct. 24, 2022) (collecting cases); United States v.
Boukamp, 105 F.4th 717, 749 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that trial courts have the “discretion to
require [a pro se party’s] testimony to be in question-and-answer, rather than narrative, form”)).
Here, the Court was well within its discretion to direct the format of Plaintiff’s direct
testimony as it did. 	Furthermore, Plaintiff had ample time to prepare his direct testimony in
collaboration with his standby counsel. 	In sum, the undersigned’s refusal to permit Plaintiff to
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present his testimony in a narrative format was entirely within his purview and does not warrant
recusal.
B. 	WHETHER 	THE 	COURT 	ACTED 	AS 	AN 	ADVERSARIAL 	FACT-
WITNESS
Next, Plaintiff asserts that the undersigned demonstrated a “disqualifying alignment with
the defense,” by: (1) acting as an adversarial fact-witness against Plaintiff; and (2) “actively
coach[ing] the defense.” (See Letter Br. at 15–16.)
As to the first allegation, Plaintiff recounts a moment during his cross-examination during
which counsel for Defendants asked Plaintiff to explain the “basis” for Plaintiff’s unreasonable
search claim. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff claims such questioning “reopened the subject and waived any
prior objection.” 	(Id.) 	Plaintiff takes issue with the fact that the undersigned intervened and
prohibited this line of questioning. (Id.)
At bottom, Plaintiff takes issue with the undersigned’s evidentiary ruling at trial. 	Such
disagreements do not rise to the standard for recusal. 	Judicial rulings alone “almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion . . . . Almost invariably, they are proper
grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” 	United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 218 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555); Securacomm Consulting, Inc., 224 F.3d at 278 (“We have
repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for
recusal.”). Plaintiff’s disagreements with the Court’s evidentiary rulings are more appropriate on
appeal, rather than on a motion for recusal.
As to Plaintiff’s second allegation, Plaintiff claims that the undersigned “actively coached
the defense” by making “extremely obvious and overt gestures to defense counsel,” including
“glaring with wide eyes[ and] raising both hands overhead.” (Letter Br. at 16; Williams Decl. ¶
33.) Plaintiff asserts that after these movements, Defense counsel objected. (Id.)
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Plaintiff cites to United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007), in support of his
argument that “a judge’s numerous interruptions and admonishments that convey impatience,
disdain, and hostility can create an appearance of bias requiring a new trial.” (See Letter Br. at 16
(internal quotations omitted).) However, as the Third Circuit explains in Wecht:
[R]emarks that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to,
counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias
or partiality challenge. 	They may do so if they reveal an opinion
that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they
reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make
fair judgment impossible . . . . Not establishing bias or partiality . . .
are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even
anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women,
even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes
display.
Wecht, 484 F.3d at 194 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56) (emphases added). 	In Wecht, the
court determined that Wecht “failed to demonstrate the ‘high degree of favoritism or antagonism’
required under Liteky.” Id. Specifically, the Third Circuit noted that “[t]he District Court Judge
was frustrated with defense counsel for not objecting to . . . exhibits in accordance with the . . .
Pretrial Order.” Id.
Similarly, here, the undersigned expressed frustration with Defense Counsel for failing to
object when the undersigned thought he should have. 	This does not establish bias or partiality.
See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56.
C. 	CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Next, Plaintiff argues that the Court engaged in “explicit factual deception” during his
closing argument. (See Letter Br. at 17.) During his closing statements, Plaintiff asked the jury
about missing video evidence, asking “What happened to that video? Where is it?” (Id.) At that
time, the Court sustained Defense Counsel’s objection. (Id.)
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Again, Plaintiff takes issue with the undersigned’s evidentiary ruling at trial. 	Such
disagreements do not rise to the standard for recusal. 	Judicial rulings alone “almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion . . . . Almost invariably, they are proper
grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” 	Wecht, 484 F.3d at 218 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555);
Securacomm Consulting, Inc., 224 F.3d at 278 (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s
displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.”). 	Plaintiff has not
presented the Court with anything more than a disagreement with its evidentiary ruling at trial.
D. 	POST-TRIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Finally, Plaintiff takes issue with several post-trial events. (See Letter Br. at 19–21.) On
January 20, 2026, Plaintiff requested transcripts of two specific portions of the trial proceedings.
The nature of Plaintiff’s request gave the Court cause to believe that Plaintiff may have recorded
audio of the trial without authorization from the Court in violation of Local Civil Rule 401.1.1
Thereafter, the undersigned scheduled a telephone conference with Plaintiff and Defense Counsel
for January 22, 2026. (See ECF No. 114). The purpose of the conference was to inquire whether
Plaintiff had recorded the trial and, if he had, to instruct him to refrain from distributing those
recordings and immediately destroy them.
The conference did not go as planned. 	At the outset, the undersigned asked whether
Plaintiff had recorded any of the trial proceedings. 	Plaintiff refused to answer, asserted a Fifth
Amendment right, and instead demanded that trial transcripts be provided to him. 	Plaintiff
repeatedly spoke over and interrupted the undersigned throughout the call. 	Eventually, the
1 Local Civil Rule 401.1 prohibits the “recording, both video and voice, by way of camera, cell phone or other device
. . . throughout the interior of the United States Courthouse[] in . . . Trenton.” L. Civ. R. 401.1(a). Various signs are
posted throughout the courthouse advising that any recording of any proceeding is expressly prohibited without
permission from the judge overseeing the proceeding in accordance with Local Civil Rule 401.1.
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undersigned determined that the call was no longer productive and terminated the call after
informing the parties that the Court would be scheduling a hearing in the near future.
The same day, the Court entered the following Text Order:
TEXT ORDER that in light of the telephonic conference conducted
earlier today during which the Court advised Plaintiff that it had
cause to believe that he had recorded one or more Court proceedings
and Plaintiff was advised that unauthorized audio or video recording
of proceedings in the Trenton U.S. Courthouse is a violation of
Local Civil Rule 401.1, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 1)
by no later than January 29, 2026, Plaintiff shall certify in writing
under penalty of perjury whether he has recorded any district court
proceeding pertaining to this matter (either in-person or remote); 2)
if Plaintiff has recorded any district court proceeding pertaining to
this matter, he is hereby Ordered to refrain from distributing or
disseminating (including posting on the internet) those recordings
and 	immediately 	retrieve 	or 	remove 	them 	if 	distributed 	or
disseminated; 	3) 	if 	Plaintiff 	has 	recorded 	any 	district 	court
proceeding pertaining to this matter, he is further Ordered to destroy,
by January 29, 2026, those recordings (and any copies thereof in his
possession, custody or control) and certify to their destruction in
writing under penalty of perjury; 4) if Plaintiff refuses to timely
comply with Orders 1 - 3, Plaintiff shall appear in person before the
undersigned in Courtroom 4W on February 5, 2026 at 2:30 p.m. and
shall Show Cause why he should not be held in civil contempt for
violation of Orders 1 - 3 and subject to appropriate sanctions. Given
Plaintiff's indigent status, he should be prepared to present any
evidence during his appearance that he wishes the Court to consider
regarding his ability to pay any monetary sanctions the Court might
impose. Chambers of the undersigned is sending a copy of this Order
via email to the parties today. The Clerk's Office is also instructed
to send a copy of this Order to Plaintiff via regular mail. So Ordered
by Judge Zahid N. Quraishi on 01/22/2026.
(ECF No. 111.)
Since 	entry 	of 	the 	Text 	Order, 	Plaintiff 	has 	filed 	several 	letters 	and 	motions:
correspondence to the Clerk (ECF No. 112); correspondence to Chief Judge Bumb regarding
emergency notification and request for supervisory intervention (ECF No. 115); this Motion for
Recusal (ECF No. 116); an emergent motion for a stay and reconsideration (ECF No. 117); various
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exhibits in connection with the Motion for Recusal (ECF No. 118); and an exhibit in connection
with the emergent motion for a stay and reconsideration (ECF No. 119).
Because it appeared Plaintiff had misinterpreted the purpose of the Court’s first Text Order,
the Court entered a second Text Order on January 28, 2026 to clarify:
TEXT ORDER that before the Court are Plaintiffs' various letters
and motions 115 - 120 that, among other things, seek recusal of the
undersigned and emergent relief from the Court's Order 111
regarding Plaintiff's suspected unauthorized recordings in violation
of Local Civil Rule 401.1. Those motions will be addressed
expeditiously. In the meantime, because Plaintiff appears to be
confused by the Order 111, the Court takes this opportunity to
clarify that its Order 111 contemplates civil contempt rather than
criminal contempt, and only if Plaintiff refuses to comply with the
first three elements of that Order: certifying whether he recorded
Court proceedings, ceasing from any distribution of any recordings,
and 	certifying 	to 	the 	destruction 	of 	any 	recordings. 	For 	the
avoidance 	of 	doubt, 	if 	Plaintiff 	timely 	complies 	with 	those
requirements, the Court will not hold Plaintiff in contempt. So
Ordered by Judge Zahid N. Quraishi on 1/28/2026. (kas) (Entered:
01/28/2026)
(ECF No. 121.) Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted correspondence to the undersigned in response to
that Text Order. 	(ECF No. 122.) 	In that letter, Plaintiff again raises the same concerns about
admitting whether he recorded the trial and proposes an alternative: that the Court instead issue an
Order directing any person who may have recorded proceedings to destroy such recordings and
seek their removal from third parties, without compelling self-incrimination.
To alleviate Plaintiff’s self-incrimination concerns and achieve the Court’s ultimate goal
of enforcing Local Civil Rule 401.1, the Court will vacate its first Text Order and will issue a new
one requiring that, by no later than February 3, 2026, any recordings of the Court proceedings in
this matter must be destroyed and their retrieval must be sought from any third parties. 	To be
clear, this accommodation is without prejudice to the Court’s authority to proceed against any
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other violations of Local Civil Rule 401.1 (or any other Court orders), including the Court’s
exercise of its inherent authority to find individuals in civil contempt.
In sum, the Court finds that none of its post-trial acts, taken singly or in combination, form
a valid basis for the undersigned’s recusal.2
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s bias claims do not warrant recusal
of the undersigned.3 The Court will therefore DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal (ECF No.
116). This Court will also VACATE its January 22, 2026 Text Order. (ECF No. 111.) It will
also issue a new Order requiring destruction and/or retrieval of any recording of the trial
proceedings. Accordingly, the Court will DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Emergent Motion for Stay
and Reconsideration (ECF No. 117).
Further, the Court will instruct the parties to re-request any transcripts they seek. The Court
will also ENTER JUDGMENT in light of the jury verdict and order that Mr. Hilliard’s
representation of Plaintiff is TERMINATED insofar as the term of his representation “for trial”
has concluded. An appropriate Order will follow.
Date: January 28, 2026
s/ Zahid N. Quraishi
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 Plaintiff separately asserts that the undersigned’s Courtroom Deputy “surveill[ed] Plaintiff’s social media posts
detailing his planned legal challenges to the Court’s conduct.” (See Letter Br. at 19–20; Williams Decl. ¶¶ 56–60.)
To clarify the record, I instructed my Deputy to review any public social media posts to see whether recordings of the
trial proceedings had been posted in violation of Local Civil Rule 401.1.
3 It is worth noting that the undersigned took several actions in an attempt to ensure that Plaintiff was not prejudiced
by his pro se status—including providing Plaintiff with one of the undersigned’s own neckties when he appeared for
day three of his trial without one.
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