JONES v. NJ DOC CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION et al

3:18-cv-01454Njd24 févr. 2026

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Case 3:18-cv-01454-RK-JTQ Document 207 Filed 02/24/26 Page 1 of 13 PagelD:
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTONIO JONES,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 18-1454 (RK) (JTQ)
V.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NJ DOC CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION et
al.,

Defendants.

KIRSCH, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiff Antonio Jones’s (“Plaintiff’)
Appeal, (ECF No. 198), of the April 24, 2025 Memorandum Opinion and Order of the Honorable
Justin T. Quinn, U.S.M.J., (‘Judge Quinn’s Opinion,” or “Opinion,” ECF No. 197). Defendant
Abu Ahsan, M.D. (“Defendant”) opposed, (ECF No. 199), and Plaintiff replied, (ECF No. 200).!
The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and resolves the matter without oral
argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiff's Appeal is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND?

Plaintiff is a state prisoner represented by Court-appointed pro bono counsel in this civil
rights action relating to medical treatment he received while an inmate. (Opinion at 2; see also

ECF No. 14.) After over five years of litigation, Plaintiff's sole remaining claim is an Eighth

' This matter was transferred to the undersigned on January 5, 2026. (ECF No. 205.)

* The Court adopts in full Judge Quinn’s recitation of the relevant background and recites the following
facts solely to provide context for this Court’s adjudication of the instant appeal.

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

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Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant concerning medical care he provided
to Plaintiff for a pituitary tumor. (Opinion at 2.)

Plaintiff sought to retain a neurosurgeon to serve as an expert. (/d. at 3.) On July 6, 2022,
Plaintiff filed an application for pre-approval of pro bono services in the amount of $126,500.00
from this District’s Attorney’s Admission Fee Account (the “Fund,”) an account that provides
funding for, among other things, a high volume of pro bono cases filed in this District. (/d. at 1, 3;
ECF No. 194-3.°) According to Plaintiffs application, the proposed expert’s rates consisted of an
hourly rate of $1,500 and a daily testimony rate of $16,000. Plaintiff's application also included

an itemized cost estimate, reproduced below:

Task Hours Cost
Review Documents, Including Plaintiff's Deposition 20 $30,000
Assist with Preparation for Depositions of Defendants 5 $7,500
Draft Expert Report 10 $15,000
Review Defendants’ Expert Report 3 $4,500
Deposition Preparation 10 $15,000
Deposition Testimony 1 Day $16,000
Assist with Preparation for Deposition of Defendants’ Expert 5 $7,500
Trial Preparation 10 $15,000
Trial Testimony 1 Day $16,000
Total $126,500

(ECF No. 194-3 at 2.)

On September 12, 2022, the Honorable Douglas E. Arpert, U.S.M.J. (ret.) granted
Plaintiff's application in part. (ECF No. 194-6 at 2.) Judge Arpert approved an amount of
$37,500.00 so that Plaintiff could engage his expert “in preparation for the deposition(s) of

[D]efendants’ witnesses,” and “deferred” the rest of Plaintiffs requested amount “pending further

> The Court cites to Plaintiff's application by the PDF page number as it appears in ECF.

“ By handwritten notation on Plaintiff's application, Judge Arpert grouped together the first two rows of
Plaintiff's cost estimate, i.e., “Review Documents, Including Plaintiff's Deposition,” at an estimate of
$30,000 and “Assist with Preparation for Depositions of Defendants” at an estimate of $7,500, which,
together, make up the $37,500 that he approved as part of Plaintiffs application. (ECF No. 194-6 at 2-3.)

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consideration.” (/d.) As Plaintiff would later confirm, of the $37,500 approved, Plaintiff spent a
total of $25,950 of Fund monies in connection with his expert. (ECF No. 198-1 at 7.)

Following an extended period of litigation,° the denial of Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, and unsuccessful attempts to settle the matter, the Court directed the parties to proceed
with expert discovery and begin trial preparation. (Opinion at 4.) On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff
submitted via email another application for pre-approval of pro bono services (the “operative
application’”’) requesting approval of the balance sought in his first application, which was $89,000.
(ECF No. 198-1 at 8; ECF No. 194-8 at 4.) On October 18, 2024, Judge Quinn advised Plaintiffs
counsel that $89,000 exceeded the amount typically requested from the Fund and that Plaintiffs
expert’s hourly rate “exceeds what the Clerk’s Office typically sees in pro bono cases.” (ECF No.
194-8 at 3-4.) In writing, Judge Quinn requested Plaintiffs counsel “to discuss a cost reduction
with the expert, reminding him that ‘this matter involves a pro bono appointment for which

999

Appendix H encourages either free or reduced costs for... experts.’” (Opinion at 4 (alteration in
original) (citing ECF No. 194-8 at 3).)

Plaintiff's counsel responded on October 25, 2024 and advised the Court that the expert
agreed to “reduce the hourly rate by $100.00 (from $1,500.00 to $1,400.00), the trial testimony
daily rate from $16,000.00 to $15,600.00, and to charge an hourly rate of $1,900.00 for deposition
testimony rather than a daily rate,” which resulted in a revised total of $76,400.00. (/d.) There is
nothing in the record that indicates that Plaintiff attempted to retain or even consult with any other

potential neurosurgeons who might serve as Plaintiff's expert, or that any comparables were

obtained and produced demonstrating the reasonableness of Plaintiff's expert’s proposed rates.

> The Court notes that this matter was assigned to Judge Quinn on May 31, 2024. (See Dkt. Entry dated
May 31, 2024.)

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Moreover, notwithstanding the modest proposed reduction of the expert’s rates, Judge Quinn’s
concerns remained unabated, and he thereafter conferenced with the parties and directed them to
confer with their respective clients and each other to discuss potential alternatives to Plaintiffs
position regarding his sought expert. (/d. at 5.) The parties failed to reach an agreement, and at
Judge Quinn’s request, briefed the issue before him. (See ECF Nos. 193-96.)
On April 24, 2025, Judge Quinn denied the operative application on two discrete grounds:

1) that the pre-approval amount was not “reasonable and necessary” in contravention to Appendix
H and the Application for Pre-Approval of Pro Bono Services; and 2) that it implicated due process
concerns? as such an amount “would tilt the scales of justice in such a way that the appearance and
reality of fairness would be illusory.” (See Opinion at 7-14; see also id. at 7 (“Here, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff's request plainly crosses that line triggering serious due process issues.
And even if there were no due process concerns, Plaintiff's Application would still fail because
the request is neither fair nor reasonable.”).) In ruling that the Plaintiffs requested amount was not
“reasonable and necessary,” Judge Quinn’s Opinion provided in pertinent part as follows:

This Fund is not a bottomless coffer to draw from, however; it is an

account of limited resources that provides funding for the many pro

bono assignments in this District, among other things. And that is

why applications over a certain monetary threshold require judicial

pre-approval. The instant Application falls into this category, as it

seeks pre-approval of $76,400.00, a staggering amount that appears

unprecedented not only in this District but nationwide. To receive

the Court’s pre-approval, the requesting party must demonstrate that

the services and expenses requested are “reasonable and necessary.”

Plaintiff's Application fails to make this showing.

(Id. at 1.) Accordingly, Judge Quinn denied Plaintiff's Motion to Approve his operative

application, and this appeal followed.

° For reasons explained more fully below, the Court need not analyze Judge Quinn’s alternative due process
rationale.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A Magistrate Judge is accorded wide discretion in addressing non-dispositive motions.”
Marks v. Struble, 347 F. Supp. 2d 136, 149 (D.N.J. 2004). A magistrate judge’s ruling on a non-
dispositive matter may only be set aside if the “order is ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” Id.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d
1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1986)). “A finding is clearly erroneous only ‘when although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’” Cooper Hosp./Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 183 F.R.D. 119,
127 (D.N.J. 1998) (quoting Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng’g Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D.N.J. 1995));
see United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 365, 395 (1948). “However, ‘[w]here there are
two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.’” Jn re Allergan Biocell Textured Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 19-2921, 2022
WL 3211421, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2022) (quoting United States v. Waterman, 755 F.3d 171, 174
(3d Cir. 2014)).

For a decision to be contrary to law, “the Court must find the magistrate judge misapplied
or misinterpreted the applicable law.” Hooker v. Novo Nordisk Inc., No. 16-4562, 2019 WL
2521749, at *2 (D.N.J. June 19, 2019) (citing Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d
162, 164 (D.N.J. 1998)). The party appealing the decision bears the burden of showing it is clearly
erroneous or contrary to law. Travelers Indemn. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 752,
758-59 (D.N.J. 2008), aff'd, 594 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2010).

“Abuse of discretion encompasses clearly erroneous findings of fact and misapplications
of law.” United States v. Walls, 290 F. App’x 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.

Williams, 443 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir. 2006), partially abrogated on other grounds, Esteras v. United

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States, 606 U.S. 185, 190 n.1 (2025)). Abuse of discretion is found “when the judicial action is
arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable,” or in other words, “only where no reasonable [person] would
take the view adopted by the. . . court.” Fagan v. Fischer, No. 14-7013, 2018 WL 2859541, at *3
(D.N.J. June 11, 2018) (quoting Lindy Bros. Builders vy. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
540 F.2d 102, 115 (3d Cir. 1976)). When the underlying ruling relates to a non-dispositive matter,
such as a discovery motion, the magistrate judge’s “ruling is entitled to great deference and is
reviewable only for abuse of discretion.” Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 623
(D.N.J. 1996); see also Cordero-Rezabala v. United States, No. 24-4010, 2024 WL 1673366, at
*4 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2024) (“The decision of the magistrate judge is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, and must be upheld ‘if there is any competent evidence in the record to support it.’””

(quoting Sidali y. IN.S., 107 F.3d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 1997))).

Ii. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that Judge Quinn’s Opinion was both clearly erroneous and
contrary to law because his due process analysis “calls into question the legality of this Court’s
pro bono program” and “implie[s] that Appendix H of the Court’s Local Civil Rules .. . is
unconstitutional as applied to anything more than de minimis reimbursements.” (ECF No. 198-1
at 2, 20.) He further argues that Appendix H imposes a mandatory obligation upon the Court to
grant reimbursement of fee requests to the extent funds are available, and that Judge Quinn erred
in finding to the contrary. (/d. at 11-12.) Finally, Plaintiff surmises that Judge Quinn’s due process
analysis “likely influenced” his consideration of Appendix H’s reasonableness inquiry, and that
“there is reason to believe that [Judge Quinn] would have assessed the [operative] Application

differently had he not incorrectly thought due process precedent weighed against the request.” (/d.

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at 20.) According to Plaintiff, his requested fees were reasonable, necessary, and fair, and thus
required court approval. (See id. at 20-26.)

The Court finds no basis to reverse Judge Quinn’s Opinion denying Plaintiff's application
for pre-approval of pro bono services. It is evident from Judge Quinn’s thoughtful and cogent
opinion that he carefully evaluated Plaintiff's operative application and reasonably exercised his
discretion in denying same. Because the Court finds that Judge Quinn’s denial was based on two
independently sufficient grounds and plainly affirmable on reasonableness grounds alone, the
Court need not address Judge Quinn’s alternative holding on due process grounds.’ See, e.g.,
United States v. Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 334 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We do not reach constitutional
issues unnecessarily.”); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305 (1982) (“It is this Court’s settled policy
to avoid unnecessary decisions of constitutional issues.’’).

At the outset, the Court notes that Judge Quinn approached Plaintiffs operative application
deliberatively, and it is clear to the Court that every aspect of Plaintiff's pre-approval request
received Judge Quinn’s rigorous and thoughtful consideration. Rather than summarily deny the
operative application outright, Judge Quinn provided Plaintiff with notice and repeated
opportunities to address the court’s concerns as to the excessive amount of expert fees sought, and
for potential alternatives. (See Opinion at 4, ECF No. 194-8.) However, rather than attain a
significant reduction for his proposed expert, or obtain an alternative, Plaintiff simply doubled-

down and failed to substantively address Judge Quinn’s bona fide concerns in any meaningful

7 As Judge Quinn clarified, “even if there were no due process concerns, Plaintiff's [operative] Application
would still fail because the request is neither fair nor reasonable.” (Opinion at 7); cf Tompkins v. Hackett,
841 F. App’x 367, 369 n.2 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (noting that the Court “need not address the District
Court’s alternative grounds for dismissal” when affirming on a separate basis); M&T Bank y. Arsenis, No.
23-2324, 2024 WL 1171081, at *1 n.1 (3d Cir. Mar. 19, 2024) (per curiam) (similar); Maybin v. Slobodian,
739 F. App’x 161, 165 n.4 (d Cir. 2018) (noting that as an appellate court, it “may affirm ... on any
ground supported by the record” (alteration in original) (quoting Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,
240 (3d Cir. 1999)).

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way. In fact, as stated previously herein, there is nothing in the record by way of comparable expert
fees in pro bono cases to indicate that Plaintiff's request is in any way reasonable.

The sought amount of Plaintiff's expert was unreasonable. As Judge Quinn noted,
Plaintiff's reduced request seeking pre-approval of $76,400.00 in expert fees is “unprecedented in
this District,” a finding that is supported by Plaintiff's own brief. (See Opinion at 13.) Plaintiff
cites to a variety of cases within this District where the court pre-approved disbursements from the
Fund for expert fees. (See ECF No. 198-1 at 20-21). However, Plaintiff's own cited cases make
clear that the highest preapproval amount was for $5,700, an amount that constitutes approximately
1/14 of the $76,400.00 he seeks here. (See id. at 14 (citing Szemple v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry
of N.J., No. 10-5445, ECF No. 55 (D.N.J. May 23, 2014)); see also Opinion at 9 (“Plaintiff fails
to even acknowledge that the body of Third Circuit law that permits expert fee reimbursement has
limited such reimbursement to no more than $5,700.00.”).)

The other in-district cases cited by Plaintiff only make Plaintiff's request more glaringly
an outlier. (See ECF No. 198-1 at 14 (citing Rolkiewicz v. Corr. Med. Servs. Inc., No. 05-2943,
ECF No. 62 (D.N.J. Jul. 31, 2006) (approving payment of $3,000 for plaintiff's medical expert
from the Fund); Oliver v. Main, No. 12-3757, ECF No. 94 (D.N.J. May 26, 2015) (approving
$1,500 from the Fund for an independent medical examination by plaintiffs neurological expert);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Barnickel Enters., Inc., No. 09-5068, ECF No. 32 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2011)
(limiting Plaintiff's pre-approval of funds to $5,000 “absent further order of the Court.’”’); Colston
v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 04-3209, ECF No. 52 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2008) (approving $1,000 for
payment of plaintiff's medical expert fees from the Fund)).

Further, the out-of-district cases Plaintiff cites to in support of his operative application

only lend additional support for Judge Quinn’s ruling; namely, that the total reimbursement

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amounts approved in these cases did not exceed $17,933.43, and in that case, only a small fraction
of that amount was for expert fees. (See ECF No. 198-1 at 21-22; see also Opinion at 9 (“only a
small portion” of the $17,933.43 disbursement was applied to expert fees (citing Groover v. U.S.
Corr., LLC, No. 15-61902 (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2019))).) In fact, while Judge Arpert’s initial
decision is not before the Court and the Court is certainly not second guessing it, the Court notes
that Plaintiff's own cited cases indicate that Judge Arpert’s approval of $37,500 was itself an
outlier favorable to Plaintiff. In light of this, the Court also agrees with Judge Quinn that Plaintiffs
reduction of his expert’s hourly rate by a mere $100.00 and trial testimony rate by $400.00 does
nothing to move the needle from unreasonable to reasonable. (See Opinion at 13 (finding that
Plaintiffs “de minim/i]s reduction” in expert fees to be “not compelling.”).)

Additionally, the Court agrees with Judge Quinn that Appendix H, Section 8 does not
impose a mandatory obligation upon the Court to approve any and all fee requests. (See Opinion
at 8.) Such a limited reading of this provision ignores that Plaintiff must first show that the
requested reimbursement is “reasonable and necessary.” (See ECF No. 194-3 at 4.) The logical
corollary of this, of course, is that reimbursement requests that are unreasonable and unnecessary
should not be granted. Additionally, As Judge Quinn noted, this District’s Application for Pre-
Approval of Pro Bono Services states that appointed attorneys “are encouraged to seek free or
reduced costs for depositions, experts and other services,” L. Civ. R. App’x H. § 8(d) (emphasis
added), and that the Court does in fact retain a discretion to grant or deny such requests, see United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey Procedures for Reimbursing Pro Bono
Attorneys, U.S. Dist. Ct. Dist. of N.J., 9 2, https://www.njd.uscourts.gov/sites/njd/files/APPH.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2026) [hereinafter Reimbursement Procedures] (noting that “if approved,” a

pro bono attorney may proceed in submitting a reimbursement voucher to the Court (emphasis

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added)). To suggest otherwise would render the entire pre-approval process superfluous; if pro
bono attorneys were permitted to withdraw funds at unbounded, exorbitant amounts limited only
by the amount remaining in the Fund itself,’ disbursements would be issued to those who raced to
the courthouse first, depleting the available funds for other pro bono litigants, resulting in a
miscarriage of justice.’ Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary are unconvincing.

Further, Plaintiff's mere dissatisfaction with Judge Quinn’s denial of his operative
application does not render the denial an abuse of discretion. The Court finds that Judge Quinn’s
denial of Plaintiff's operative application seeking pre-approval of $76,400.00 for its expert, after
having already been reimbursed in the amount of $25,950 in connection with Plaintiff's expert, for
what would amount to a total of in excess of $100,000 in disbursements from the Fund, was a
reasonable, and frankly necessary, exercise of discretion. Such a decision is entitled to great
deference by this Court. See Frank, 924 F. Supp. at 623. Relatedly, any assumption that Judge

Arpert’s deferral on the balance of Plaintiff's prior application served as a future “guarantee” to

8 It is obvious and uncontested that the Fund’s coffers are not unlimited, and procedures have been
implemented for the purpose of maintaining the Fund’s solvency. See Reimbursement Procedures 4(b)
(“So that the Fund may remain solvent and available to assist pro bono attorneys, any application for
attorney’s fees and/or costs on behalf of a party who has received reimbursement of expenses from the
Fund shall include a request for assessment of any expense for which disbursement from the Fund has been
made.”). This adds further support for Judge Quinn’s holding that approvals are not “mandatory” and
demonstrates the need for the additional requirement that attorneys certify that their requested fees are
reasonable and necessary.

* The Court agrees that the Fund is not a bottomless pit from which Plaintiff may usurp for his own benefit
alone. Approving Plaintiffs exorbitant request would drain the Fund for other current and would-be
litigants litigating their cases with the assistance of appointed pro bono counsel. Although not required for
the Court’s analysis, the Court notes that a search of CM/ECF reveals that, as of the close of business on
February 23, 2026, there are currently approximately sixty-five prisoner litigation cases with appointed pro
bono counsel pending in this District. Moreover, the Court notes that there is currently a total pool of 428
pro se prisoner cases in this District, each of which could be eligible for pro bono representation and money
from the fund. See Orabi v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We may take
judicial notice of the contents of another Court’s docket.”); SigmaPharm, Inc. v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 772
F. Supp. 2d 660, 667 n.41 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (‘The Court may take judicial notice of other court
proceedings.”), aff'd, 454 F. App’x 64 (3d Cir. 2011). Requests for disbursements must take into
consideration the many other litigants that are entitled to withdraw from the Fund.

10

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the full balance of the requested amount was an assumption made at Plaintiff's “own peril,”
untethered to the record and without support. (See Opinion at 12-13.) Judge Quinn’s decision was
supported by competent evidence in the record, and accordingly, it must be upheld.!° See Cordero-
Rezabala, 2024 WL 1673366, at *4.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Judge Quinn’s Opinion “should be set aside and [Plaintiffs]
[operative] application approved in the requested amount or in a lesser amount that would still
afford [Plaintiff] a meaningful opportunity to obtain expert assistance.” (ECF No. 198-1 at 3.) The
Court declines Plaintiff's invitation, as it is not required under the Local Rules to identify a lesser
amount, and further notes that the burden rests upon Plaintiff to certify that the expenses sought
are “reasonable and necessary.” (See ECF No. 194-3 at 4 (directing pro bono Counsel to “certify”
and “explain[] why the expenses . . . are reasonable and necessary”’)); Reimbursement Procedures
4 1 (noting that pro bono counsel may apply for reimbursement of expenses and that “[n]o
disbursement shall be made unless it is intended to pay for reasonable and necessary litigation
expenses”). Judge Quinn’s Opinion was limited to Plaintiff's operative application for pre-
approval for expert fees in the amount of $76,400.00, which Judge Quinn held (and this Court

agrees) was neither fair, reasonable, nor necessary. (See Opinion at 15.) Nothing in Judge Quinn’s

'© This Court is well-aware that “under the clearly erroneous standard, ‘a district court may not consider
any evidence which was not presented to the magistrate judge.’” Celgene Corp. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., No.
10-5197, 2015 WL 4138982, at *2 (D.N.J. July 9, 2015) (quoting Lithuanian Com. Corp. v. Sara Lee
Hosiery, 177 F.R.D. 205, 213 (D.N.J. 1997)). While the Court affirms for the reasons set forth in Judge
Quinn’s Opinion, the Court also notes that Judge Quinn’s denial of Plaintiff's operative application is
further supported by the limits placed on other Funds within the Third Circuit created to reimburse pro
bono counsel for costs incurred during the course of their representation. See Public Interest Litigation
Fund Guidelines, US. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Pa.,
https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/sites/paed/files/documents/frmreimb.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2026);
(limiting reimbursement to $4,000); Pro Bono Attorney Program, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa.,
https://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/pro-bono-attorney-program-0 (limiting reimbursements to $1,500);
Federal Civil Panel, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Del., https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/federal-civil-panel
(last visited Feb. 18, 2026) (limiting reimbursement to “generally up to $10,000”).

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Opinion or this Court’s decision precludes Plaintiffs counsel from obtaining an expert or prevents
him from submitting another application for pre-approval of expert expenses, if he so chooses.
(See id. at n.6 (noting that “contrary to Plaintiffs position,” the Court was not “direct[ing] Plaintiff
to find a new expert . . . instruct[ing] Plaintiff to retain his expert in the first instance,” or
“disturb[ing] the Court’s previous approval of $37,500.00.”).) Thus, the Court declines to order
the requested relief.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court would affirm Judge Quinn’s holding even on de
novo review. Moreover, there is certainly nothing to suggest that Judge Quinn abused his
discretion, made a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or otherwise committed reversable error. See
Walls, 290 F. App’x at 455. Consistent with Judge Quinn, on this record, it is clear that the sought

amount is neither fair nor reasonable. Accordingly, Plaintiff's appeal is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Appeal, (ECF No. 198), is DENIED and Judge

Quinn’s Opinion, (ECF. No. 197), is AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order follows.

L

ROBERT KIRSCH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: February 24, 2026

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