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2:26-cv-00532Njd4 févr. 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOAQUIN ERNESTO CORDOVEZ
ALVIAREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
Civil Action No. 26-532 (JXN)
PAMELA BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court is Petitioner Joaquin Ernesto Cordovez Alviarez’s (“Petitioner”) Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued
detention by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing. (Habeas Pet., ECF
No. 1.) Respondents filed a letter response. (Resp., ECF No. 5.)
Petitioner, a native of Venezuela, entered the United States in 2021 without inspection.
(Habeas Pet. ¶ 1.) Five years later, Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested
Petitioner; he has been detained in ICE custody since. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.) Following Petitioner’s arrest
and detention, he has not been afforded an individualized bond hearing because he is being held
in mandatory detention under 8 U.S. C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id. ¶ 5.)
The Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. (See Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents
filed a letter response. (Resp.)
The Petition contends Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights. (See generally
Habeas Pet.) Respondents do not dispute the salient facts and acknowledge that here they assert
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the same position they have in many other similar cases in this District, including before this Court
in Velasquez v. Noem, No. 25-16797, 2025 WL 3653657 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2025). (See Resp..) In
Velasquez, Respondents argued the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) implemented a
new policy interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 235, 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2)(A), to require mandatory detention of noncitizens who entered the United States
without admission or inspection and to render them ineligible for release on bond, a position that
the Board of Immigration Appeals recently adopted in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec.
216 (BIA 2025). See Velasquez, 2025 WL 3653657, at *2.
In Velasquez, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Id. at
*3–5. Accordingly, the Court held that Fuentes Velasquez was unlawfully held in mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) and must be treated as being held under the discretionary authority
of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See id.
This Court explained the following:
The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or §
1226(a) is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the
country. “The line historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that
section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the
country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already
in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238,
at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see
also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not
Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this
country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States
when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival
at the border.”). “[T]he provisions at issue here are mutually exclusive—a
noncitizen cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and
discretionary detention under § 1226 . . . .” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No.
25-cv-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025).
. . .
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For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either
seeking entry to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and
§ 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the interior of the United
States. The Supreme Court in Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction,
describing § 1225 as the detention statute for noncitizens affirmatively
“seeking admission” into the United States, and § 1226 as the detention
statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.” 583 U.S. at 289.
And although the Jennings Court characterizes § 1225(b)(2) as the
“catchall” detention provision for noncitizens who are “seeking admission,”
it identifies § 1226(a) as the “default rule” for the arrest, detention, and
release of non-criminal aliens who are already present in the United States.
Id. at 303.
The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have rejected
Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado,
as contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.1 See, e.g., Soto, 2025 WL
2976572, at *7 (finding that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens
who are actively, i.e., affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United
States and not petitioners who have been residing in the United States);
Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947 at * 6 (D. Minn.
Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the government’s proposed interpretation of §
1225(b) [is] at odds with the context and structure of the provisions
governing detention of noncitizens who are arriving at the border and those
who are already present in the country”); Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496 at * 3
(noting that “up until July 8 the predominant form of detention authority for
petitioner and other noncitizens arrested in the interior of the United States
was § 1226(a)”); Salazar v. Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729
(D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL
2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684,
2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept. 23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-
cv-4048, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis,
No. 25-cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera v.
Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025);
Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408, 2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19,
2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–cv–01542, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev.
Sept. 17, 2025); [collecting additional cases].
Id. at *3–5.
1 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the meaning of a statute [is]
at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper
Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)).
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Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Velasquez, the Court finds the facts
asserted in the Petition establish Petitioner’s detention is authorized only by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
and not § 1225(b)(2).
Accordingly
IT IS, on this 4th day of February 2026,
ORDERED that the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
and it is further
ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this
Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and it is further
ORDERED that within three (3) days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a written
notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally
ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying
Opinion upon the parties electronically and CLOSE the case.
________________________
JULIEN XAVIER NEALS
United States District Judge
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