Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

2:25-cv-18648Njd5 janv. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
JULIO N. MORA-ACOSTA, 	:
: 	Civil Action No. 25-18648 (BRM)
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
:
PAM BONDI, et al., 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
:
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Petitioner Julio N. Mora-Acosta (“Petitioner”)
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his
detention by immigration authorities without an individualized bond hearing (ECF No. 1) and
Respondents’ letter response (ECF No. 4).
Petitioner, a native of Nicaragua, who has been living in the United States since he entered
without inspection in September 2022. (Id. at 1.) On November 23, 2025, Petitioner was arrested
by Immigration Customs and Enforcement (“ICE”) agents. (Id.) Petitioner has been in ICE
detention since his arrest. (Id.) Following Petitioner’s arrest and detention by ICE, he has not been
afforded an individualized bond hearing because he is being held in mandatory detention under 8
U.S. C. § 1225(b)(2). (Id.)
On December 17, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents to file an answer. (ECF No. 2.)
Respondents filed a letter response on December 31, 2025. (ECF No. 4.)
The Petition contends Petitioner is unlawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
without a bond hearing. (See ECF No. 1.) Respondents assert the same position they have in many
other similar cases in this District, including the position they took before this Court in the recent
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matter Sandhu v. Tsoukaris, No. 25-14607 (BRM). In Sandhu, Respondents argued DHS has
implemented a new policy interpreting INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), to require mandatory
detention of noncitizens who entered the United States without admission or inspection and to
render them ineligible for release on bond, a position that the Board of Immigration Appeals
recently adopted in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In Sandhu, this Court rejected Hurtado’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Sandhu,
No. 25-14607, ECF Nos. 7, 8. In a factually similar situation, the Court held that Sandhu was
unlawfully held in mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) and need to be treated as being held
the discretionary authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
In Sandhu, this Court explained the following:
The issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b) or §
1226(a) is similar to that of many cases in this District and around the
country. “The line historically drawn between these two sections . . . is that
section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens ‘seeking admission into the
country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens ‘already
in the country.’” Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11613, 2025 WL 2084238,
at *8 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288–89); see
also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
29, 2025) (“There can be no genuine dispute that Section 1226(a), and not
Section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to a noncitizen who has resided in this
country for over twenty-six years and was already within the United States
when apprehended and arrested during a traffic stop, and not upon arrival
at the border.”).
. . .
For nearly 30 years, § 1225 has applied to noncitizens who are either
seeking entry to the United States or have a close nexus to the border, and
§ 1226 has applied to those aliens arrested within the interior of the United
States. The Supreme Court in Jennings explicitly adopted this distinction,
describing § 1225 as the detention statute for noncitizens affirmatively
“seeking admission” into the United States, and § 1226 as the detention
statute for noncitizens who are “already in the country.” [Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)]. And although the Jennings Court
characterizes 	§ 	1225(b)(2) 	as 	the 	“catchall” 	detention 	provision 	for
noncitizens who are “seeking admission,” it identifies § 1226(a) as the
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“default rule” for the arrest, detention, and release of non-criminal aliens
who are already present in the United States. Id. at 303.
The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have rejected
Respondents’ interpretation, as well as the BIA’s interpretation in Hurtado,
as contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.[1] See, e.g., Soto [v. Soto, et al.,
No. 25-cv-16200, 2025 WL 2976572, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)] (finding
that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to noncitizens who are actively, i.e.,
affirmatively, “seeking admission” to the United States and not petitioners
who have been residing in the United States); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No. 25-
cv-3682, 2025 WL 2802947 at * 6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (noting that “the
government’s proposed interpretation of § 1225(b) [is] at odds with the
context and structure of the provisions governing detention of noncitizens
who are arriving at the border and those who are already present in the
country”); Zumba, 2025 WL 2753496 at * 3 (noting that “up until July 8 the
predominant form of detention authority for petitioner and other noncitizens
arrested in the interior of the United States was § 1226(a)”); Salazar v.
Dedos, No. 25-cv-835, 2025 WL 2676729 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe
v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01163, 2025 WL 2716910 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025); Roman v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01684, 2025 WL 2710211 (D. Nev. Sept.
23, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-4048, 2025 WL 2712427 (N.D.
Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-cv-0096, 2025 WL 2699219
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL
2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-cv-1408,
2025 WL 2682255 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25–
cv–01542, 2025 WL 2676082 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025); [collecting
additional cases].
Sandhu, No. 25-14607 (ECF No. 7 at 7–11).
Based on this Court’s statutory interpretation in Sandhu, No. 25-14607, the Court finds the
facts asserted in the Petition establish Petitioner’s detention is authorized only by 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2).
Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS on this 5th day of January 2026,
1 This Court is not required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 1225 because “[w]hen the
meaning of a statute [is] at issue, the judicial role [is] to ‘interpret the act of Congress, in order to
ascertain the rights of the parties.’” Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412
(2024) (quoting Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 503 (1840)).
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ORDERED the Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED Respondents shall treat Petitioner as detained under 28 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and
it is further
ORDERED that, as soon as practicable but no later than 7 days from the date of this
Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an immigration judge who shall assess whether he presents a flight
risk or a danger to the community; and it is further
ORDERED within 3 business days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a written
notice of the outcome of that proceeding with the Court; and it is finally
ORDERED the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Order and the accompanying
Opinion upon the parties electronically.
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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