Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

2:25-cv-18540Njd5 févr. 2026

Texte intégral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SEHER AYGUN,
Petitioner,
v.
LUIS SOTO, in his official
capacity as Warden of Delaney
Hall Detention Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 25-cv-18540 (MEF)
OPINION and ORDER
* 	* 	*
Under federal law, noncitizens who are detained pending removal
are generally (i) granted a bail hearing before an immigration
judge if they have been in the United States for a while,1 or
(ii) not granted a bail hearing if they have just arrived here,
say on an international flight.2 	See Y.Z. v. Soto, 2025 WL
3564652, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2025).3
A July 2025 executive branch memo purported to change things ---
so that even detained noncitizens who have been in the United
States (people in category (i)) will no longer get a bail
hearing. 	See Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *2-
3, *2 n.1 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025).
1 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
2 	See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b).
3 	The description of the law in the text boils things down and
therefore does not include some important caveats. 	For a fuller
statement of the law in this area, see, for example, Y.Z., 2025
WL 3564652, at *1 n.2, *2 n.4.
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In response, some noncitizens have filed habeas corpus
petitions, claiming that they are being held in custody without
bail hearings, and that this breaks the law.
Federal officials, the argument goes, are picking and choosing.
They are using the powers Congress gave them, to arrest and
detain. 	But they are ignoring the check that Congress put on
that power, the requirement of a bail hearing before an
immigration judge.
In this district, the habeas cases have spun off uniform
results:
In New Jersey . . . . [t]he cases have gone before many
different judges. 	But in no case has a federal judge in
this state concluded that the July 2025 policy has it right
--- that mandatory detention, with no possible bond
hearing, is required as to all noncitizens, regardless of
whether they were living in the United States before being
detained. . . . Rather, in every one of the . . . cases,
the judge has held that a noncitizen who has been here for
a while must be (i) given a bond hearing . . ., or (ii)
released . . . .
Y.Z., 2025 WL 3564652, at *2 (citations omitted).
The question here is whether district courts in this circuit can
continue to consider these sorts of cases.
* 	* 	*
On January 15, the Third Circuit decided Khalil v. President,
United States of America, 164 F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026).
There, federal officials were seeking to remove a noncitizen
from the United States under the Nation’s immigration laws. 	See
id. at 266-67. 	The noncitizen was detained and filed a habeas
petition. 	See id. at 266. 	The district court took
jurisdiction. 	See id. at 267.
On appeal, the Third Circuit ruled that this was error. 	See id.
at 273.
Among other things, it held that under a jurisdiction-stripping
statute, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (“Section 1252(b)(9)”), the
district court had no role to play. 	See Khalil, 164 F.4th 259
at 273. 	Section 1252 pulled away the district court’s
jurisdiction over the petitioner’s case. 	See id.
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Therefore, Khalil held, the petitioner was required to press any
challenge via a different route --- (1) before an immigration
judge, (2) on to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and then (3)
up to the federal court of appeals, via a petition for review of
any final order of removal that might ultimately be entered
against the petitioner by the immigration courts. 	See id. at
274 (citing E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950
F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2020)).
Khalil, in short, held that under Section 1252(b)(9) there was
no district court jurisdiction over the detained noncitizen’s
claims.
So is there district court jurisdiction for other detained
noncitizens?
* 	* 	*
The day after the Khalil decision, the Court ordered the
Respondents to “explain the implications of Khalil for the
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.” 	Aygun v.
Soto, 2026 WL 136151, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2026).4
Legal papers were prepared, and the case is now fully submitted.
The parties agree that, as construed in Khalil, Section
1252(b)(9) does not take away this Court’s jurisdiction. 	See
Respondents’ January 26, 2026 Letter (“January 26 Letter”) (ECF
18); Petitioner’s January 27, 2026 Letter (ECF 19); Respondents’
February 2, 2026 Letter (“February 2 Letter”) (ECF 21).
But the Court is required to ask for itself, see Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citations omitted), and does so
here.
* 	* 	*
4 	The Court entered orders along the same lines in around a
dozen other cases that raise similar issues. 	See, e.g., Sulugui
Chiyal v. Genalo, No. 2:26-cv-00729-MEF (ECF 13); Batista Vaz v.
Dorr, No. 2:26-cv-00545-MEF (ECF 8). 	And note that, per the
Respondents, a substantial fraction of the district judges in
New Jersey made similar requests for post-Khalil jurisdictional
briefing. 	See Respondents’ January 21, 2026 Letter (ECF 14) at
1 (“at least seven other courts in this District [have]
order[ed] supplemental briefing from [the] Respondents regarding
the effect of Khalil”).
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As construed in Khalil, does Section 1252(b)(9) remove
jurisdiction from a district court, so that it cannot decide
whether a detained noncitizen, purportedly held under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b), is actually held under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is
therefore entitled to a bail hearing?
The Respondents state that this is a “complex” question. 	See
Respondents’ January 21, 2026 Letter (“January 21 Letter”) (ECF
14) at 1.5
They emphasize that, under Khalil, “claims that raise legal or
factual questions that can later be addressed [by a federal
court of appeals] via [a petition for review] . . . fall within
[Section] 1252(b)(9)’s jurisdictional bar.” 	January 26 Letter
at 2.
That is, if a court of appeals will be called upon down the road
to take up a particular question on a petition for review of an
immigration-court final order of removal --- then the district
court has no jurisdiction to take up that same question for
itself, in the habeas context. 	See id.
Sometimes, applying this rule may raise “complex” questions. 	It
may not always be easy to foretell whether the question that a
noncitizen wants reviewed now, by the district court on habeas,
will be a question that the federal court of appeals will later
take up on a petition for review.6
But here, there are no meaningful complexities.
The reason, among others, is this: in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281 (2018), three Justices (Justice Alito, Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justice Kavanaugh) explicitly held that Section
1252(b)(9) does not remove jurisdiction over a challenge very
5 	The Department of Justice represents the Respondents. 	Its
position has not always been consistent. 	Compare January 26
Letter (the DoJ arguing that, under Khalil, Section 1252(b)(9)
does not strip jurisdiction), with Coronel-Hernandez v. Woosley,
2026 WL 227011, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 28, 2026) (rejecting a DoJ
argument that, under Khalil, Section 1252(b)(9) does strip
jurisdiction).
6 	Cf. Khalil, 164 F.4th at 276 (quoting Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d
416, 422 (3d Cir. 1996) for the proposition that district courts
lack jurisdiction over “a ‘matter[ ] on which the validity of
the final order [of removal entered by the Board of Immigration
Appeals] is [or will be] contingent’”).
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much like this one --- a challenge to whether a detained
noncitizen is legally entitled to a bail hearing. 	See id. at
291-95.
The just-referenced part of Justice Alito’s Jennings opinion is
directly on point.
* 	* 	*
Is Justice Alito’s on-point opinion controlling?
Where, as in Jennings, the Supreme Court issues a “fragmented”
decision, “and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys
the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in
the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” 	Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (cleaned up).
Khalil held that Justice Alito’s Jennings opinion was narrower
than another three-Justice opinion, authored by Justice Breyer -
-- and therefore, Khalil held, it is Justice Alito’s narrower
opinion that must be counted as the Supreme Court’s opinion
under Marks. 	See Khalil, 164 F.4th at 277-78.
Accordingly, Justice Alito’s opinion governs here.
Justice Alito’s opinion governs as to the implicit aspects of
its reasoning. 	Khalil so held. 	See id.
It follows that Justice Alito’s opinion must surely also govern
as to the explicit parts of its holding --- that is, those parts
of the Justice Alito opinion, alluded to above, that are
directly on-point because they reach and resolve the precise
question here, the question of whether Section 1252(b)(9)
removes jurisdiction over claims that a noncitizen is legally
entitled to a bail hearing.7
7 	The a fortiori (“must surely”) point in the text may need some
unpacking. 	Khalil ruled that Justice Alito’s three-Justice
Jennings opinion was narrower because it held that Section
1252(b)(9) did not strip jurisdiction over the particular class
of cases before the Court. 	See Khalil, 164 F.4th at 278. 	By
contrast, Khalil noted, Justice Breyer’s three-Justice Jennings
opinion was broader because it held that Section 1252(b)(9) did
not strip jurisdiction over a wider class of cases --- that is,
over all pre-order-of-removal cases. 	See id. 	From the implicit
approach to the statute “strongly suggested” by Justice Alito’s
Jennings opinion, id. at 277, Khalil took away a principle (that
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* 	* 	*
Bottom 	line: 	Section 	1252(b) (9), 	as 	construed 	in 	Khalil, 	does
not 	strip 	jurisdiction 	from 	a 	district 	court, 	so 	that 	the
district 	court 	can 	decide 	in 	the 	habeas 	context 	whether 	a
detained 	noncitizen, 	purportedly 	held 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b),
is 	actually 	held 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a) 	and 	is 	therefore
entitled 	to 	habeas 	relief.
* 	* 	*
IT 	IS 	on 	this 	5th 	day 	of 	February, 	2026, 	SO ORDERED.
Michael 	E. 	Farbiarz, 	U.S.D.J.
Section 	1252(b) (9) 	can 	apply 	to 	pre-order-of-removal 	cases) 	---
and 	then, 	based 	in 	part 	on 	that 	principle, 	ruled 	that 	Justice
Alito's 	opinion 	had 	abrogated 	Chehazeh 	v. 	Attorney 	General, 	666
F.3d 	118 	(3d 	Cir. 	2012), 	which 	had 	held, 	like 	Justice 	Breyer's
three-Justice 	Jennings 	opinion, 	that 	Section 	1252(b) (9) 	does 	not
apply 	to 	pre-order-of-removal 	cases. 	See 	Khalil, 	164 	F.4th 	at
278. 	That 	is, 	Khalil 	suggests 	(a) 	that 	Justice 	Alito's 	three-
Justice 	opinion 	controls 	because 	it 	is 	narrower 	than 	Justice
Breyer's 	opinion, 	and, 	because 	Justice 	Alito's 	narrower 	opinion
controls, 	(b) 	the 	broader 	principles 	implicit 	in 	Justice 	Ali to' s
opinion 	also 	controls 	(including 	a 	principle 	--- 	that 	Section
1252(b) (9) 	applies 	before 	the 	entry 	of 	an 	order 	of 	removal 	---
that 	may 	have 	been 	precisely 	as 	broad 	as 	the 	mirror-image
principle 	in 	Justice 	Breyer's 	opinion, 	that 	Section 	1252(b) (9)
does 	not 	apply 	before 	the 	entry 	of 	an 	order 	of 	removal). 	Given
that, 	under 	Khalil, 	the 	broad 	principle 	in 	Justice 	Alito's
opinion 	controls, 	it 	follows 	that 	Justice 	Alito's 	opinion must
surely 	control 	as 	to 	its 	narrow 	holding 	--- 	that 	is, 	its 	holding
that 	Section 	1252(b) (9) 	does 	not 	strip 	jurisdiction 	over
challenges 	to 	whether 	bail 	hearings 	are 	legally 	required. 	After
all, 	Justice 	Alito's 	narrow 	holding 	rests 	on 	distinct 	and
especially 	sturdy 	footing 	--- 	because 	it 	was 	that 	holding's
narrowness 	that, 	under 	the 	Marks 	ruie, 	made 	Justice 	Alito's
opinion 	authoritative 	in 	the 	first 	place. 	Cf. 	id. 	("[Justice
Alito's] 	narrower 	reading 	defines 	the 	proper 	scope 	of§
1252(b) (9)"); 	Richard M. 	Re, 	Beyond 	the 	Marks 	Rule, 	132 	Harv. 	L.
Rev. 	1942, 	1982 	(2019).
6
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